Governance by discretion: Civil service reform in post-communist Hungary. by Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik
Governance by Discretion
Civil Service Reform in Post-communist Hungary
Thesis submitted for the Degree o f Doctor o f Philosophy
Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling 






INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U613348
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Fl o t  5 7
Abstract
This thesis analyses civil service reform and policy developments in Hungary since 1990 as 
an extreme case of the discrepancy between attempts to establish professional, de-politicised 
civil services and the persisting politicisation of personnel policy in post-communist central 
executives. At the theoretical level, it applies the insights of new institutionalist approaches 
to executive politics, in particular the body of so-called ’delegation studies’ rooted in the new 
economics of organisations. The thesis develops four ideal types of personnel policy 
regimes that are distinguished on the basis of the concept of formal political discretion, 
which is defined as the extent to which the government of the day, or its ministers, has the 
possibility to exercise personnel policy authority and the extent to which the exercise of this 
authority is subject to specific procedural constraints. The thesis argues that a low degree of 
formal political discretion built into civil service legislation can enhance the informational 
role of ministerial bureaucracies in policy-making. However, governments do only have an 
incentive to establish or maintain a low degree of formal political discretion built into civil 
service legislation, if they have no problems of political trust towards the bureaucracy. The 
empirical analysis of civil service reform outcomes in Hungary reveals that three reforms 
since 1990 have led to the emergence of a personnel policy regime that allows governments 
to exercise a considerable degree of political discretion over personnel policy, in particular, 
the allocation of civil servants in managerial ranks. The analysis of civil service reform 
processes shows that the communist legacy of over-politicised personnel policy, the radical 
anti-communism of centre-right parties and four wholesale changes of government since 
1990 have tended to reproduce severe problems of political trust in the relation between 
governments and the ministerial bureaucracy. The thesis shows that incoming governments 
have therefore continuously exercised political discretion over personnel policy, in 
particular, by recruiting (often politically affiliated) senior personnel from outside public 
administration. At the same time, successive governments have been unwilling to make a 
commitment to a de-politicised civil service system because of their distrust in the loyalty of 
bureaucrats associated with previous governments. Moreover, as the group of senior 
bureaucrats who seek a career in public administration has shrunk, the de-politicisation of 
the civil service has increasingly come to contradict the career interest of senior bureaucrats 
whose tenure is bound to that of the government and who commute between public 
administration, politics and the private sector. Setting Hungarian civil service reform and 
policy developments into a comparative post-communist perspective, the thesis concludes 
that the context of post-communist transformation tends to lock in a pattern of civil service 
governance characterised by high levels of political discretion.
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On 23 May 1990, Jozsef Antall was appointed the first democratic Prime Minister of 
Hungary after democratic elections since 1946. Already one week before, the 
Hungarian Parliament had adopted the Temporary Act on State Secretaries, which 
regulates the top two administrative ranks of the ministerial hierarchy, 
Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries, except their remuneration. In the spring 
of 1992, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the Act on the Legal Status of Civil 
Servants (henceforth Civil Service Act), which also refers to state secretaries as 
permanent career civil servants. Thus, within less than two years after the formation 
of the first democratic government, a new formal-legal framework had been put in 
place that separates the administrative from the political component of the central 
executive and establishes the 'legal minima' (Hesse 1998) for the development of a 
professional, de-politicised civil service in Hungary. Accordingly, the preamble of 
the Civil Service Act states that "[t]he precondition of democratic public 
administration generally esteemed by society is that public affairs be conducted by 
impartial public officials neutral to party politics, operating legitimately and 
possessing up-to-date special knowledge". Eventually, Hungary embarked on a path 
of continuous civil service reform. In 1997, this led to the amendment of the 1992 
Civil Service Act and the adoption of the Act on the Legal Status of Members of the 
Government and State Secretaries, which substituted the regulations of the 1990 
Temporary Act on State Secretaries. Moreover, the most recent civil service reform 
led to a revision of the Civil Service Act in summer 2001 and another amendment in 
the summer of 2002.
Although a new formal-legal framework governing the civil service had been in place 
by 1992, observers of Hungarian civil service developments argue that personnel 
policy at the central government level has continuously been subject to politicisation, 
i.e. executive politicians tend to determine the outcomes of personnel policy (Gyorgy
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1999; Korosenyi 1996, 1997; Szente 1999; Vass 2001a). Politicisation tendencies 
have been most apparent in the senior ranks of the administrative hierarchy. For 
instance, Vass (2001b: 85-86) argues that [t]here is little doubt that administrative 
state secretaries are political appointees, with party-political considerations playing 
an important role in selection. (...) The political nature of their employment and the 
fact that they rely on the minister's goodwill obviously greatly limits the capacity of 
administrative state secretaries to represent neutral professionalism against political 
interventions [and to act] as a barrier to political interference with the departmental 
civil service". Hence, it appears that three civil service reforms since the change of 
regime and the adoption and revision of civil service laws have not led to the 
professionalisation and the de-politicisation of personnel policy in Hungary.
The Hungarian story of civil service development is not entirely unusual in Central 
and Eastern Europe.1 Rather, Hungary is an 'extreme case' (Eckstein 1992) in that the 
discrepancy between attempts to establish a professional, de-politicised civil service 
and the continuing politicisation of personnel policy appears to be most evident. 
Political Science literature that concentrates on processes of democratisation and 
marketisation in Central and Eastern Europe, tends to regard the establishment of a 
professional, de-politicised civil service as a prerequisite for the success of the 'dual 
transformation' (Bartlett 1997) from one-party to democratic rule and from a state- 
planned to a market economy. Linz/Stepan (1997: 14), for instance, argue that a 
'usuable state apparatus' organised on the basis of 'rational-legal bureaucratic norms' 
is one of five major arenas that constitute a 'modem consolidated democracy'. 
Similarly, to the extent that political economists emphasise the role of a 
'developmental state' (Evans 1995) as a prerequisite for establishing the conditions 
for a market economy, they suggest that the internal design of the post-communist 
state has to aim at regulating coherent careers that are based on rigorous selection 
criteria to bring talent into the state administration (Amsden/Kochanowicz/Taylor 
1994; Nelson 1994). In either case, the point of reference for the reform of the state is
1 When speaking about Central and Eastern Europe I limit myself to Hungary, Poland, The Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Albania. Hence, I 
exclude the successor states of former Yugoslavia to the extent that they were involved in the Balkan 
War, and the CIS. I use the terms 'Central and Eastern Europe' and 'post-communist Europe' 
interchangeably.
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a specific type of public administration that shares the features of a Weberian public 
bureaucracy including a permanent civil service that is staffed with trained experts, 
appointed on the basis of competitive examinations, whose members are protected 
from political dismissals, receive a regular salary and have some prospect of a career 
within the administration (Weber 1980).
However, one decade after the change of regime, the record of civil service reform in 
Central and Eastern Europe suggests that governments have had difficulties to even 
establish the 'legal minima' for the development of a professional civil service that is 
insulated from political interference. As Hesse (1998: 176) argues, "[w]ithout a legal 
framework, provided by a comprehensive civil service law. It will be impossible to 
attract an elite into public services. Confidence (...) will only be ensured if 
employment duties as well as rights are guaranteed and made enforceable". Yet, the 
Hungarian civil service reform record is exceptional in post-communist Europe in 
that it has adopted civil service legislation early after the change of regime and has 
subsequently embarked on a path of continuous reform. Otherwise, civil service 
developments in post-communist Europe have been subject to delays, incomplete 
reforms and failures to implement legislation (Nunberg 1999; Verheijen 1999b). In 
contrast to Hungary, most Central and Eastern European governments have adopted 
formal-legal frameworks governing the civil service only at the end of the 1990s and 
thereafter.3 Poland, Latvia and Lithuania had adopted civil service laws in the mid 
1990s but failed to implement them and, therefore, adopted revised laws in 1998, 
1999 and 2000 respectively (Torres-Bartyzel/Kacprowicz 1999; Vanagunas 1999; 
Wiatr 1996). Among the other countries that have adopted civil service laws, Estonia 
adopted an Act of Parliament in 1995, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania in 1999, 
Slovakia in 2001, The Czech Republic and Slovenia in 2002 (Bercik/Nemec 1999; 
Sootla 2002; Sootla/Roots 1999; Stremcki 2002; Velinova/Bozhidarova/Kolcheva 
2001; Verheijen 1999c; Vidlakova 2001). However, Slovenia has only begun the
2 The other arenas are civil society, a political society, the rule of law and an economic society.
31 use the terms 'formal-legal frameworks governing the civil service or governing personnel policy', 
'civil service legislation', 'civil service laws or Acts' interchangeably. In all cases, the terms refer to 
Acts of Parliament. When talking about secondary legislation, which complements civil service Acts, 
such as Government Decrees, Decisions, Resolutions or ministerial decrees, I make this explicit.
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implementation of the civil service Act in June 2003 and The Czech Republic is 
planning to begin the implementation of its civil service Act in 2004.
However, like in Hungary, empirical research on civil service developments in 
Central and Eastern Europe has found little evidence that the adoption of civil service 
legislation spurs the creation of professional, de-politicised civil services. For 
instance, Verheijen (2000: 29) argues that "civil service laws have seldom been the 
expected catalysts for the Stabilisation, depoliticisation and professionalisation of the 
central administration. Rather than being a starting point for the development of civil 
service policies, the adoption of laws has become an objective in itself. Apart from 
Hungary, none of the [European Union] candidate countries has come close to the 
development of civil service policy, in addition to the necessary legal framework". 
Similarly, the World Bank has sought to evaluate the performance of Central and 
Eastern European civil services in the context of European Union accession with 
reference to international best practice. It concludes that real progress is evident when 
it comes to "credible efforts to delineate the basic legal and institutional foundation 
for a professional, de-politicised civil service. [However, the] study's findings 
reinforce the impression from previous analyses (...) that administrative development 
in Central and Eastern Europe, has been incipient or intermittent [and that] 
considerable distance still needs to be travelled to achieve sound international 
practice" (Nunberg 2000: 7).
The discrepancy between the ostensible intention of civil service legislation and the 
practice of personnel policy has been especially evident with respect to the senior 
civil service. On this aspect, first research has found that, at the central government 
level, politico-administrative relations are characterised by 'instability', as incoming 
governments show little willingness to continue to work with the administrative staff 
that has served the predecessors in government. Verheijen/Rabrenovic (2001: 411) 
argue that "[t]he prevailing pattern in [post-communist] states is still one of the top 
echelons of the Civil Service changing with each elections, or, in worse cases, 
government re-shuffles". Similarly, Goetz/Wollmann (2001: 880) observe a 
'persistent influence of party politics in the management of personnel policy1 and the 
tendency of ministers to 'surround themselves with entourages of political advisors'.
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Hence, political interference at the top of the civil service continues to contradict 
attempts to establish professional civil services insulated from politics. At the same 
time, Goetz/Wollmann (2001: 881) argue that there are signs of professionalisation in 
some key policy areas including fiscal and budgetary policy and the management of 
European Union accession. They contest that there is evidence of the emergence of 
so-called 'islands of excellence' in some key policy areas, but they hesitate to 
conclude that these islands will provoke a spill-over to the wider central 
administration (also Agh 2002).
Goetz/Wollmann (2001) and Goetz (2001) put forward several contending images in 
order to come to grips with the puzzling empirical record of administrative 
developments including civil service reform and policy in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Accounts of administrative developments in Central and Eastern Europe had 
initially expected a gradual Westernisation of post-communist public bureaucracies 
including the emergence of a professional, de-politicised civil service (Hesse 1993; 
Hesse/Goetz 1993/4). However, more recent research on the 'state after communism' 
has suggested that public bureaucracies in post-communist Europe "have proved 
strikingly resistant to wholesale transformation, dashing notions that modem, 
'westem-style' administrations could be installed with minimal effort and maximal 
speed" (Nunberg 1999:265). Accordingly, Goetz/Wollmann (2001: 882-884) argue 
that, firstly, the administrative reform process in Central and Eastern Europe may still 
be an unfinished project and, thus, the process of Westernisation will continue, 
though we have to calculate with longer time horizons. Alternatively, they suggest 
that we might be witnessing the emergence of an entirely new type of central 
administration including a new type of civil service (see also Goetz 1995; 
Goetz/Margetts 1999). Still another scenario put forward by Goetz/Wollmann (2001) 
suggests that the institutionalisation of central administrations in Central and Eastern 
Europe will remain incomplete. Hence, we might expect the emergence of 'defective 
civil services', similar to O'Donnell's (1994) suggestion of'delegative democracies' as 
a potential type of 'defective democracy'. Finally, Goetz (2001) argues that the 
outcomes of post-communist administrative developments of the last decade reflect 
pathologies similar to Southern European and Latin American experience leading
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him to the suggestion that we might observe the 'Latinisation' of post-communist 
administrations.
At first sight, however, the brief survey of post-communist civil service 
developments suggests that there are considerable differences of timing civil service 
reform processes in Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, what accounts for the 
fast-track reforms in Hungary as opposed to the majority of Central and Eastern 
European countries, especially the lagging behind of The Czech Republic as a 
country with good records in economic and political reforms and the prospect of 
being first wave candidate for European Union accession? However, it also raises 
questions with respect to the content of the new formal-legal frameworks governing 
the civil service. In particular, the Hungarian development of civil service reform 
activism combined with persisting politicisation of personnel policy raises concerns 
as to what extent new civil service laws provide the institutional conditions for de- 
politicising personnel policy processes.
At first glance, the Hungarian civil service system that was established between 1990 
and 1992 shares many features of a decentralised seniority-based closed career 
system well known from Western Europe. However, closer scrutiny reveals that the 
formal-legal frameworks governing the civil service include several discretionary 
instruments, which executive politicians may use in order to determine the outcomes 
of personnel policy processes. In the formal-legal frameworks that had been put in 
place by 1992, admission of new civil servants in non-managing positions is under 
the formal responsibility of the Administrative State Secretary as administrative head 
of the ministry. At the same time, the Administrative State Secretary's authority to 
admit non-managing civil servants is rather unrestricted, as candidates have to meet 
only general entry criteria, while a general recruitment procedure is neither properly 
formalised nor compulsory. Promotions are primarily seniority-based with a very 
limited possibility to accelerate promotions by means of a performance appraisal 
system, and lateral transfer requires the consent of civil servants to be transferred. 
The dismissal of individual civil servants is restricted, as it can only occur as a result 
of a disciplinary procedure or when a civil servant has been judged incapable of 
performing his or her work responsibilities, but in both cases the Administrative
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State Secretary has to prove the case by means of confining procedures. Civil 
servants' professional and political activities are both restricted. Finally, civil 
servants’ remuneration is mainly linked to a detailed classification system with 
clearly defined rights for supplementary pay. Hence, in so far as civil servants in non­
managing positions are concerned in the civil service system that was established in 
1992, it appears that executive politicians have no say when it comes to the 
recruitment, appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal, or remuneration of civil 
servants.
However, one example may suffice to illustrate the discretionary powers of executive 
politicians in determining personnel policy outcomes after the first civil service 
reform had been enacted. The 1990 Temporary Act on State Secretaries grants 
decision-making authority for the admission and appointment of state secretaries 
exclusively to the government and its ministers. Formally, Administrative and 
Deputy State Secretaries are selected by the Prime Minister and the minister 
respectively, and candidates have to meet only general entry criteria such as a 
Hungarian citizenship or a university degree. State secretaries are appointed for an 
indefinite period, which suggests that they enjoy permanent tenure, but their 
appointment may be withdrawn at any time without giving reasons. As a 
consequence, governments and their ministers are almost entirely free in selecting 
and de-selecting their state secretaries. New governments may choose between 
replacing and continuing to work with 'inherited' state secretaries. They may recruit 
new appointees from the ministerial bureaucracy or from any other setting outside the 
ministerial bureaucracy including organs of public administration under government 
control, the private sector, academia or other backgrounds such as non-governmental 
organisations or interest groups. Moreover, governments may recruit new state 
secretaries from political parties and political institutions such as Parliament because 
the 1990 Temporary Act on State Secretaries merely requires appointees with a 
political background to resign from their political posts before taking on a position as 
state secretary.
Obviously, governments do not have to exercise the discretion over the allocation of 
state secretaries at their disposal, that is, the decisions referring to the recruitment,
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appointment, promotion, transfer and dismissal of state secretaries, but they may 
choose to do so. Therefore, the rules governing the allocation of state secretaries to 
the ministerial organisation do not have the capacity to de-politicise personnel policy 
processes. Although a formal-legal framework is in place that defines state 
secretaries as permanent, professional civil servants, the institutional arrangements 
allow Hungarian governments and their ministers to fill the top positions in the 
ministerial hierarchy from inside and outside public administration at all times. In 
other words, the top of the civil service is essentially open and the institutional 
boundaries between politics and administration are highly permeable. As a result, if 
the de-politicisation of personnel policy in Hungary occurs, it cannot be attributed to 
the adoption of civil service legislation, but is the result of other factors that surround 
governments' personnel policy decisions.
The power of governments to appoint and dismiss senior officials is well known 
from studies of Western European senior civil services. For instance, the appointment 
and dismissal of both the German politische Beamte and the French directeurs 
d'administration and directeurs de cabinet is subject to the discretion of the 
government of the day (Goetz 1999; Rouban 1999). By contrast, the virtual absence 
of political interference into senior personnel policy decisions like in the UK is an 
exception rather than the rule in Western Europe (Page/Wright 1999). However, the 
general evidence reported in studies of political appointments and dismissals in 
Western European senior civil services also suggests that governments do not 
necessarily take full advantage of their discretionary powers. The country-based 
evidence reported from, for instance, the French and the German case indicates that 
many top officials are replaced after changes in government but most of the new 
appointees are recruited from senior civil service ranks rather than a non-public 
administration background such as academia, the private sector or even political 
parties (Bodiguel 1983; Derlien 1988; Elgie 2001).
After the change of regime, personnel policy in Hungary appeared to take the same 
course, when the first democratically elected government led by Prime Minister 
Antall replaced the overwhelming majority of senior officials inherited from the last 
socialist government with senior officials who had already worked in the ministerial
15
bureaucracy during the last government of the communist regime led by Prime 
Minister Nemeth. However, the initial personnel policy strategy of the Antall 
government was to remain an exception in post-communist Hungary because the 
Antall government itself began to change its personnel policy strategy already shortly 
after taking office. Many of the first generation state secretaries appointed in 1990 
left the administration and were replaced with senior officials who had only been 
recruited by the Antall government into other senior positions or who had been 
directly recruited from other settings than the ministerial bureaucracy. Moreover, the 
more the parliamentary elections in 1994 approached, the more state secretaries were 
recruited who had unambiguously a political background, for instance, officials of 
one of the governing parties or members of parliament.
After the formation of the first democratic government in 1990, Hungary witnessed 
three wholesale changes in government that occurred after the parliamentary 
elections in 1994, 1998 and 2002. In 1994, a Socialist-Liberal coalition under Prime 
Minister Horn from the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP, took office. In 1998, the 
Horn government was replaced by a three party National-Christian-Conservative 
government led by Prime Minister Orban from the Alliance of Young Democrats, 
Fidesz, and, after the parliamentary elections in 2002, another Socialist-Liberal 
coalition under the leadership of Prime Minister Medgyessy formed the government. 
All three changes in government reinforced the personnel policy patterns of the later 
Antall years. Already by 1998 when the Orban government took office, it had 
become a pattern that a change in government would lead to a near complete 
substitution of all state secretaries in office, most of the new appointees would be 
recruited from other settings than public administration, and many of the new state 
secretaries would have a party political background. However, many of the new state 
secretaries would be returnees in the sense that they had worked in senior 
administrative ranks under governments of the same political colour after having 
bridged the out-of-office period in the private sector, academia or at a political party. 
Hence, notwithstanding the virtual lack of detailed studies of politicisation in 
Western European central administration, the evidence presented in this thesis 
suggests that the politicisation of personnel policy in Hungary differs both in quantity 
and quality.
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This logic of personnel policy presented for state secretaries can be easily extended to 
other ranks of the civil service and other personnel policy domains than the allocation 
of civil servants to the ministerial organisation. For instance, the rules governing the 
allocation of senior civil servants, that is, Heads of Departments, their Deputies and 
Heads of Division, which make up the level three to five in the ministerial hierarchy, 
differ only marginally from the rules that govern state secretaries. As a result, the 
composition o f the entire group of civil service managers is subject to the 
discretionary powers of governments and their ministers. Second, as mentioned 
above, allocation decisions that concern civil servants in non-managing ranks are 
subject to the discretion of the Administrative State Secretary as administrative head 
of the ministry rather than an independent civil service commission as can usually be 
found in Western Europe. Recall the quote from Vass (2001b: 85-86) above. Because 
the appointment of Administrative State Secretary may be politicised, Administrative 
State Secretaries are virtually unable to act "as a barrier to political interference with 
the departmental civil service". Hence, governments may politicise the allocation of 
higher and middle ranking civil servants indirectly, that is, through the 
Administrative State Secretary, but, again, they do not need to do so.
Thirdly, when looking at the remuneration system of the 1992 civil service system, it 
turns out that the standard remuneration system is paralleled by important 
discretionary schemes. For instance, the 1992 Civil Service Act grants ministers the 
right to define a 'personal remuneration' for civil servants displaying outstanding 
performance different from the standard remuneration system. In this case, the 
evaluation of'outstanding performance' is subject to the judgement of the minister so 
that there is no specific restriction to apply this provision apart from the indirect 
constraint of limited ministerial budgets. Hence, like in the case of allocation 
decisions, Hungarian governments and their ministers may offset the entire standard 
remuneration system by invoking the personal remuneration clause, and they indeed 
did so. Until 2001 when the provision was deleted from the Act, ministers had 
increasingly made use of the personal remuneration clause provided in the Civil 
Service Act. Consequently, the civil service system that was established in Hungary 
in 1992 has the potential to function according to the principles of a seniority-based
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closed career system but only as long as executive politicians do not take advantage 
of their discretionary instruments that complement the general system. This situation 
did not change after the enactment of the 1997 civil service reform, although it was 
based on a comprehensive Public Administration Reform Programme. Finally, the 
most recent reform that was enacted in 2001 and revised in 2002 introduced major 
changes to the formal-legal governance of the civil service, but ultimately it only 
established institutional arrangements for the de-politicisation of the remuneration 
system but not of the allocation system. Hence, at the time of writing, Hungarian 
governments and their ministers retain a considerable amount of discretionary power 
at their disposal, which they can but do not need to use to determine the outcomes of 
personnel policy.
Empirical research on administrative developments in post-communist Europe has so 
far provided several country-based surveys that open the black box of national civil 
service systems (Baker 2002; Verheijen 1999a) and country-based studies of 
emerging politico-administrative relations at the central executive level (Verheijen 
2001). However, this research has paid curiously little attention to the precise nature 
of the authority relationship between executive politicians and civil servants as it 
arises from the new formal-legal frameworks governing the civil service and the kind 
of personnel policy processes that occur within these new formal-legal frameworks. 
This concerns especially the question as to what extent civil service legislation 
provides discretionary instruments that may be used by executive politicians to 
determine the outcomes of personnel policy, and why executive politicians choose to 
incorporate discretionary instruments into civil service legislation in the first place. 
Moreover, the claim that politico-administrative relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe are characterised by 'instability' (Verheijen/Rabrenovic 2001) or 'persistent 
party politicisation' (Goetz/Wollmann 2001) is usually not subjected to a thorough 
assessment of the quality and depth of politicisation.4 Hence, it has also remained 
puzzling how and why executive politicians make use of their discretionary 
instruments to determine personnel policy outcomes. This thesis takes issue with
4 Roots/Karotom (2002: 74) assess the aggregate turnover in the administration between 1991 and 
1994. They reveal that during this period, "more than 73 percent of top officials, 45 percent of middle 
management, 35 percent of specialists and 33 percent of technical staff were changed". Szente (1999) 
assesses the turnover among Hungarian state secretaries in 1994 and 1998.
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these questions. At the theoretical level, it applies the insights of new institutionalist 
approaches to executive politics, in particular the body of so-called 'delegation 
studies' (Pollack 2002) that analyses institutional arrangements for the political 
control of public bureaucracies on the basis of the new economics of organisations 
(Milgrom/Roberts 1992; Moe 1984). At the empirical level, the thesis assesses the 
civil service reform and policy developments in Hungary since 1990 as a case, in 
which the discrepancy between attempts to establish a professional, de-politicised 
civil service and persisting politicisation of personnel policy in post-communist 
Europe is most evident. The remainder of this Introduction outlines the main 
arguments raised in this thesis and presents the plan of campaign for the following 
Chapters.
What this Thesis Argues
At the theoretical level, this thesis argues in Chapter 2 that the extent to which civil 
service reform has the capacity to de-politicise personnel policy processes depends 
on the type of personnel policy regime that is established by formal-legal frameworks 
governing the civil service. A personnel policy regime can be understood as a set of 
institutional arrangements that structures the access to personnel policy instruments 
and the way they can be applied.5 Personnel policy regimes differ with respect to 
both the degree of formal political discretion and the impact they may have on 
particular patterns of politicisation. The concept of formal political discretion 
assumes that civil service legislation provides executive politicians with personnel 
policy instruments as one possible set of control measures they can apply to induce 
bureaucratic compliance with political objectives. One of the two strands of 
delegation studies, which will be discussed in Chapter 2, concentrates on the degree 
of policy-making discretion that is delegated by politician principals to their 
bureaucratic agents (Epstein/O'Halloran 1999; Huber/Shipan 2002). By contrast, the 
concept of formal political discretion serves to capture the extent to which civil 
service legislation grants executive politicians authority over personnel policy 
decisions, in particular decisions that concern the allocation and the remuneration of
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civil servants, and the extent to which the exercise of this authority is subject to 
procedural constraints such as formalised standards and procedures. As a result, the 
degree of formal political discretion built into civil service legislation may range on a 
continuum from high to low.
Personnel policy regimes differ with respect to the degree of formal political 
discretion and, hence, the extent to which formal-legal institutional arrangements 
allow the politicisation of personnel policy processes. However, they also seek to 
take into account the impact they may have on the emergence of particular patterns 
of politicisation. In a 'de-politicised personnel policy regime', the institutional make 
up of the civil service makes it virtually impossible for executive politicians to 
interfere with civil service affairs and, hence, to politically determine the outcomes of 
personnel policy. Rather, although executive politicians are formally heading the 
civil service, personnel policy processes are under the authority of administrative 
actors, for instance, an independent civil service commission, and operate within a 
dense web of formalised standards and procedures to ensure the professionalism of 
the civil service. Hence, civil service reform does only have the capacity to directly 
prevent the politicisation of personnel policy, if a civil service reform Act formally 
institutionalises a de-politicised personnel policy regime.
By contrast, if a personnel policy regime allows the structured politicisation, the open 
politicisation, or the unbounded politicisation of personnel policy, the capacity of 
civil service legislation to de-politicise personnel policy processes gradually 
weakens, as each of these three regime types provides governments and their 
ministers with distinct sets of discretionary instruments that vary with respect to the 
extent and the way they can use them to determine the outcomes of personnel policy 
processes. First, a personnel policy regime that allows structured politicisation 
recognises that the institutional set up of the civil service allows executive politicians 
to influence the appointment and transfer of civil servants but not their admission to 
and their dismissal from the civil service nor their remuneration. Hence, political 
influence over personnel policy is constrained in the sense that its exercise is pre-
51 define institutions in accordance with North (1990: 3) as "the rules of the game in a society or, 
more fundamentally, (...) the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction44.
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structured by limiting political appointments to a pool of pre-selected candidates. By 
contrast, in a personnel policy regime that allows open politicisation, executive 
politicians have the discretion to determine the admission and the dismissal, the 
appointment and transfer, and - at least partially - the remuneration of civil servants, 
while they are only constrained by (minor) procedural constraints such as general 
entry criteria. Hence, although a civil service is functionally defined in public law, 
executive politicians retain the discretion to determine the composition of the civil 
service by recruiting appointees from inside and outside public administration, 
Finally, a personnel policy regime that allows unbounded politicisation poses no 
formal-legal barriers to the politicisation of personnel policy. If no formal-legal 
framework is in place like during the communist regime or in countries that have not 
yet adopted any civil service legislation, executive politicians are entirely 
unconstrained, if they seek to intervene into personnel policy processes. In the 
extreme case, bureaucrats may simultaneously hold political office, for instance, as a 
party functionary and, hence, the politicisation of personnel policy processes may be 
without any bounds.
Viewed from this perspective, Chapter 5 shows that the Hungarian civil service 
system had moved from a personnel policy regime that allows unbounded 
politicisation to an openly politicised regime by 1992. Until 2001, both the allocation 
and the remuneration regime remained in the category of open politicisation. Since 
2001, when the third civil service reform was enacted, the Hungarian remuneration 
regime has become de-politicised, while the allocation regime has remained primarily 
in the category allowing open politicisation. The concepts of formal political 
discretion and personnel policy regime can also be used for the empirical analysis of 
personnel policy processes, that is, the extent to which and the way political 
discretion is exercised by governments and their ministers. In contrast to the 
development of formal-legal frameworks, Chapter 6 reveals that the patterns of 
personnel policy processes took an opposite path. Concentrating on state secretaries 
as the top two ranks in the ministerial hierarchy, the Antall government did by far not 
exploit the discretionary powers at its disposal when taking office in 1990 (see 
above). Rather, the strategy of the Antall government reflected a structured 
politicisation of personnel policy by recruiting the majority of state secretaries from
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the ministerial bureaucracy. However, the tendency towards the open politicisation of 
personnel policy became increasingly evident during the later Antall years and 
reproduced itself between 1994 and 2002. The analysis of remuneration policy in the 
Ministry of Transport between 1994 and 2001 as an illustrative case study at the end 
of Chapter 5 reveals the same developmental path for the exercise of political 
discretion over the remuneration of civil servants. Since 2001, however, the 
institutional configuration of the remuneration policy has made political interference 
virtually impossible.
The presence of a variety of discretionary personnel policy instruments that may 
differ in the extent to which executive politicians can apply them in practice and the 
evidence that the use of these discretionary instruments varies across time and 
national settings raises finally the questions of why executive politicians exercise (or 
not) political discretion over personnel policy and why they choose (or not) to 
incorporate discretionary instruments into civil service legislation? Paraphrasing 
Gilligan/Krehbiel's (1987: 288) argument about the use of restrictive amendment 
procedures in the legislative decision-making process of the US Congress, this thesis 
argues that a low degree of formal political discretion built into civil service 
legislation can enhance the informational role of ministerial bureaucracies in policy­
making. More precisely, a low degree of formal political discretion can encourage 
bureaucrats that seek to pursue a career in public administration to invest in the 
development of expertise or to share their expertise with governments because it 
safeguards bureaucrats' career expectations by credibly committing governments not 
to intervene into personnel policy and, hence, not to meddle with bureaucratic 
careers. As a result, governments can develop better-informed public policies, which 
reduce the uncertainty about the impact of public polices upon policy outcomes they 
are assumed to desire. However, governments will only have an incentive to establish 
or maintain a low degree of formal political discretion built into civil service 
legislation, and/or if they have no problems of political trust towards the bureaucracy, 
if they can (at least partially) overcome problems of political trust.
The motivation for studying discretionary instruments, which governments can use to 
determine the outcomes of personnel policy in light of the informational role of
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ministerial bureaucracies in policy-making results from the implausibility of 
approaches that explain the institutions of de-politicised civil services with reference 
to politicians' problems of commitment towards constituent voters (Horn 1995). 
Regardless of the failure to address variation in (especially senior) civil service 
configurations when viewed through the lens of formal political discretion, the 
'political commitment towards constituent voters explanation' ignores that ministerial 
bureaucrats, especially in the senior ranks, are much less concerned with the 
continuous implementation of once adopted public policies. Rather, the comparative 
public administration literature has long emphasised that senior bureaucrats in 
Western ministerial bureaucracies do typically have an important role in policy­
making (Aberbach/Putnam/Rockman 1981), that is, they are primarily concerned 
with the 'production' of public policies rather than their implementation 
(Mayntz/Scharpf 1975). Moreover, since the writings of Weber (1980), comparative 
public administration literature has traditionally stressed the centrality of expertise in 
shaping the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, whereas bureaucratic 
expertise is both an indispensable condition for politicians to govern and a major 
cause of problems of political control of public bureaucracies. Thus, this thesis 
suggests that it is much more plausible to formulate a theoretical explanation that 
recognises the centrality of information in determining institutional choices that - 
bearing in mind North's (1990: 3) definition of institutions - structure (an essential set 
of) the rules of the game between politicians and bureaucrats.
Taking into account the logic of informational theories of legislative choice (Krehbiel 
1991), the theoretical explanation of the choice of higher or lower degrees of formal 
political discretion is constructed around a constellation, in which an incoming 
government has to decide whether or not to take advantage of expertise held by 
senior bureaucrats inherited from an outgoing government. Generally, governments 
and their ministers are assumed to be motivated by policy outcomes rather than 
policies themselves, which are chosen in the legislative process. Second, any 
incoming government is initially uncertain about the consequences of alternative 
public policies upon policy outcomes. By contrast, I assume that bureaucrats are 
motivated by career advancement and/or the prospect of retaining positions close to 
political power centres (cf. Dunleavy 1991). Moreover, I assume that bureaucrats that
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are inherited from an outgoing government are policy specialists relative to an 
incoming government. As a consequence, an incoming government can benefit from 
taking advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise, if it chooses to work with 
inherited bureaucrats because this can enhance the prospect of developing well- 
informed policies.
However, an incoming government will only be willing to tap the expertise of 
inherited bureaucrats, if it can trust the bureaucrats in office and if it can credibly 
commit towards bureaucrats that it will not intervene into personnel policy. First, the 
extent to which an incoming government is facing a problem of political trust 
depends on (i) the past policy-making record of senior bureaucrats, i.e. the extent to 
which the policies pursued by the previous government differ from the goals of the 
incoming government, and on (ii) the career record of senior bureaucrats, i.e. the 
extent to which inherited bureaucrats owe their career (advancement) to the outgoing 
government. Second, bureaucrats that stay in office will only have an incentive to be 
informative, i.e. to share their expertise with the incoming government, if the 
government establishes or maintains a personnel system with a low degree of formal 
political discretion as a means to commit towards not meddling with bureaucratic 
careers and as a signal towards future governments that bureaucrats do not owe their 
career to the government of the day. However, if an incoming government can trust 
inherited bureaucrats or if it can mitigate problems of political trust, it has an 
incentive to set up or maintain a personnel system with a low degree of political 
discretion. As a consequence, bureaucrats in office can be informative because it can 
enhance their career prospects, and governments can enhance the prospect of 
developing well-informed public policies.
By contrast, if an incoming government is troubled by a problem of political trust 
towards senior bureaucrats, it will not want to rely on the expertise of inherited 
bureaucrats. As a consequence, it will prefer to replace inherited bureaucrats with 
trusted appointees. However, because trusted appointees owe their 
career/appointment to senior ranks to the government of the day, they can anticipate 
that they will only stay in office for as long as the government does. Therefore, 
trusted appointees will be informative regardless of the degree of formal political
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discretion and, thus, governments have no need to restrict their possibilities to 
intervene into personnel policy in the first place. However, because governments will 
typically be unable to replace all inherited bureaucrats, they will also create a 
problem of bureaucratic informativeness with respect to bureaucrats that stay on* from 
the previous government. The reason is that the lack of a personnel system with a low 
degree of formal political discretion undermines the incentive of remaining 
bureaucrats to seek career advancement and to be informative towards a new 
government. Governments could resolve this problem by enacting civil service 
legislation with a low degree of formal political discretion, but they will be reluctant 
to commit towards mistrusted bureaucrats. As a consequence, governments will 
prefer to retain the possibility to enhance trust towards the senior bureaucracy, but 
the informational role of the bureaucracy will be inferior relative to a personnel 
policy regime with a low degree of formal political discretion because, first, the 
incoming government does not take advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise and, 
second, it will have difficulties to elicit co-operation from remaining bureaucrats. 
However, this implies that personnel policy regimes with high degrees of formal 
political discretion are confronted with an inherent tension towards de-politicisation, 
but for as long as problems of political trust persist, governments will prefer to 
enhance trust towards the bureaucracy rather than enhancing its informational role in 
policy-making; given that government do not appreciate the advice of mistrusted 
bureaucrats.
However, the extent to which either of the two constellations arises, is heavily 
influenced by the personnel policy regime that is in place when a government takes 
office. If a de-politicised personnel policy regime is in place, problems of political 
trust will continuously tend to be low and they will only vary in accordance with the 
ideological positions of alternating government parties. As a result, governments will 
have an incentive to take advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise rather than 
demanding a replacement of inherited senior bureaucrats. At the same time, senior 
bureaucrats and those who strive for senior office will remain informative because it 
enhances their prospects of career advancement in the ministerial hierarchy. Hence, a 
de-politicised personnel policy regime tends to be stable once it has been 
institutionalised. By contrast, if a regime that allows unbounded politicisation is in
25
place and if governments do also exercise the discretion at hand, severe problems of 
political trust will arise whenever the government changes while the ideological 
positions of alternating government parties could reinforce the problem of trust. As a 
consequence, incoming governments will be reluctant to tap the expertise of inherited 
senior bureaucrats. Rather, the new government will seek to replace inherited senior 
bureaucrats due to a severe problem of political trust, and the new appointees will be 
informative because their time in office will effectively be bound to that of the 
government.
Consequently, in either case, the personnel policy regime that is in place when a new 
government takes office tends to reproduce the extent to which governments are 
confronted with problems of political trust, their personnel policy strategies and 
bureaucrats’ incentive to be informative. By contrast, pressures towards the reform of 
a given degree of formal political discretion will only arise under particular 
conditions. Firstly, pressures towards a reform of a de-politicised personnel policy 
regime will primarily result in the wake of a polarisation of inter-party competition. 
Hence, an incoming government may have an incentive to initiate institutional 
reforms that increase the degree of formal political discretion because it feels unable 
to address problems of political trust. However, this move would be strongly opposed 
by the senior bureaucrats in office and in particular bureaucrats who are striving for 
senior office because it would undermine their career prospects.
By contrast, the impetus to change a personnel policy regime that allows 
governments to exercise a high degree of political discretion will primarily arise 
under three conditions. Firstly, the salience of the problem of political trust may 
decrease, for instance, as a result of patterns of inter-party competition that reduce the 
ideological and policy differences between incoming and outgoing governments. 
Secondly, incoming governments may have a chance to mitigate problems of 
political trust thanks to an opportunity to learn about the policy orientations of 
inherited bureaucrats before taking office. In both cases, governments will have an 
incentive to take advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise, but a non-replacement 
strategy will increase bureaucratic demand for government commitment to non­
intervention into personnel policy, for bureaucrats would otherwise have little
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incentive to be informative towards the new government and its ministers. However, 
given a rather minor problem of political trust, governments will have an incentive to 
initiate and support institutional reforms with de-politicising effects upon personnel 
policy. Finally, a personnel policy regime with a high degree of formal political 
discretion may change, if governments incur increasing costs resulting from a lack of 
performance incentives for bureaucrats that seek to pursue a career in public 
administration. As a result, governments may become more receptive towards the de­
politicisation of personnel policy and initiate a civil service reform, but as long as 
severe problems of political trust persist, it is unlikely that these pressures lead to the 
establishment of major islands of de-politicised bureaucratic career paths.
These general propositions have implications for the course of civil service reforms 
in post-communist Europe. Before the change of regime, Central and Eastern 
European personnel systems had features of personnel policy regimes that allowed 
unbounded politicisation, in which especially the nomenclature system of the 'real- 
existing socialist administration1 (Konig 1992) implied a penetration of the 
ministerial bureaucracy by the ruling communist party. Moreover, the first 
democratic elections after the change of regime brought to power governments that 
were either formed by communist successor parties or exclusively by parties of the 
former democratic opposition. As a consequence, this thesis argues in Chapter 4 that 
the only reasonable prospect for the initiation of a civil service reform with de- 
politicising effects upon personnel policy arose in countries, in which the first post­
communist governments were formed by parties of the former democratic opposition 
that took office after a pacted transition. The reason is that in these cases, the Round 
Table Talks provided an opportunity for the members of the first post-communist 
government to learn about bureaucratic preferences and therefore to mitigate 
problems of political trust. As a result, these governments had an incentive to take 
advantage of the expertise of bureaucrats inherited from the communist regime and 
they were also willing to endorse ensuing bureaucratic demand for the de­
politicisation of personnel policy. However, a civil service reform initiative could 
only succeed to the extent that the members of the government shared the same 
incentive towards de-politicisation, i.e. the preferences of 'veto players' at the level of 
the government converged (Tsebelis 2002).
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By contrast, neither post-communist governments that were formed by communist 
successor parties after an imposed regime change nor governments comprising 
parties of the former democratic opposition that were formed after a regime collapse 
had the potential to set off enough pressures for the initiation of civil service reforms 
with de-politicising effects upon personnel policy. In the former scenario, the 
personnel policy dynamics of the communist regime effectively persisted, and hence 
a personnel policy regime that allows unbounded politicisation remained stable. By 
contrast, in the second scenario, severe problems of trust triggered an attempt of 
incoming governments to implement a major change of personnel in the bureaucracy, 
which however was limited in scope due to a lack of personnel alternatives. As a 
result, even when remaining bureaucrats voiced demand for the de-politicisation of 
personnel policy, these new governments were reluctant to make a commitment 
towards mistrusted bureaucrats inherited from the communist regime. As a 
consequence, I will conclude that Hungary and to a much lesser extent Poland were 
the only countries that had a reasonable prospect for the institutionalisation of a de- 
politicised personnel policy regime in the immediate period after the change of 
regime in Central and Eastern Europe. However, as I will show in Chapter 7, not 
even the Hungarian government could overcome the resistance of opposing groups 
within the governing parties in parliament.
In fact, Chapter 7 reveals that the history of Hungarian civil service reform dates 
back to the mid 1980s or in a broad interpretation even to institutional reforms that 
followed the economic reforms of the late 1960s to strengthen the professional skill 
of the Hungarian state administration. However, the initiation of a civil service 
reform gained momentum during the National Round Table Talks and especially 
after the second round of the parliamentary elections in 1990. In this context, senior 
bureaucrats pushed a civil service reform with de-politicising effects upon personnel 
policy, which was reinforced after the Antall government had chosen to recruit state 
secretaries and senior civil servants from the ministerial bureaucracy. However, 
although the government, especially Prime Minister Antall, supported a civil service 
reform that would have led to the establishment of a de-politicised personnel policy 
regime, the proponents of reform had lost the capacity to impose their will upon
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opponents of reform in parliament by the end of 1990, i.e. approximately six months 
after the investiture of the first post-communist government. In particular, the anti­
communist position of radical factions within the senior governing party, Hungarian 
Democratic Forum, generated demand for tough transitory mles and/or an open 
system for the allocation of civil servants to the ministerial organisation. Hence, the 
opponents of reform were unwilling to commit to a de-politicised civil service 
system because of a perceived distrust in the loyalty of bureaucrats inherited from the 
communist regime. As a consequence, opponents to a civil service reform with de- 
politicising effects were able to delay the enactment of reform and succeeded in 
amending the government proposal in favour of their own most preferred civil 
service system, which in turn led to the institutionalisation of a personnel policy 
regime that allows open politicisation.
Although the Antall government had changed its personnel policy strategy towards 
replacing many senior officials that were inherited from the communist regime since 
the turn of 1990/91 and although the investiture of the Horn government led to a 
large turnover in the senior bureaucracy, the establishment of a de-politicised civil 
service came back onto the government agenda as a key component of a 
comprehensive Public Administration Reform Programme in 1996. Chapter 8 shows 
that the reform was initiated and prepared by the same administrative reform 
entrepreneurs among the senior bureaucracy that had already prepared the first reform 
in 1990/92. They sought to complete 'their civil service reform project' and to correct 
dysfunctional developments such as the politicisation of personnel policy. Therefore, 
apart from an entrepreneurial spirit, the reformers can be conceptualised as agents of 
'second tier bureaucrats' who had stayed on in the administration and had no 
incentive to seek career advancement as a long as a high degree of formal political 
discretion persisted. However, the ensuing 1997 reform of the civil service is 
commonly regarded as a failure. The reasons were, first, that senior bureaucrats did 
not represent a unified interest in civil service reform because especially the state 
secretaries and senior civil servants that had been brought (back) in by the Socialist- 
Liberal government were effectively disinterested in the de-politicisation of 
personnel policy. Second and partly as a result, the two governing parties, the 
Hungarian Socialist Party and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats, were ultimately
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not interested in tying their hands in the exercise of political discretion over 
personnel policy. This disinterest was reinforced as a result of the changing balance 
of power within the governing coalition, especially the anticipated victory of the 
Socialists in the approaching 1998 parliamentary elections and the gradual 
weakening of the Liberals after 1996. As a consequence, the reform agents among the 
senior bureaucracy were only able to gain political support for a small scale 
institutional adjustment with virtually no impact on the degree of formal political 
discretion.
Finally, probably the most puzzling reform initiative from a theoretical point of view 
was pursued between 1998 and 2001, which is discussed in Chapter 9. First, the 
Orban government had exercised more political discretion over personnel policy than 
its predecessors, and second, the reform was initiated and supported from the 
beginning to the end by a high-ranking member of the government, namely, the 
Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office, Stumpf. Although Minister Stumpf 
sought to realise a fundamental reform of the civil service system, he proposed only a 
partial de-politicisation of the civil service system when viewed through the lens of 
formal political discretion by trying to establish a personnel policy regime that allows 
structured politicisation for a small elite of senior officials, i.e. the members of a 
senior executive service. However, similar to 1997, the 2001 reform proposal 
represented an attempt to correct dysfunctional developments; mainly a loss of 
expertise, that is, a steady weakening of the informational role of the ministerial 
bureaucracy resulting from a lack of performance incentive for officials below the top 
three or so levels of the ministerial hierarchy. However, both the political interest of 
the senior governing party, Alliance of Young Democrats, and the career interests of 
senior bureaucrats that had only been recruited into the administration after the 
summer of 1998 contradicted the attempt to partially reduce the degree of formal 
political discretion. These opposing positions crystallised in the intervention of Prime 
Minister Orban in the negotiations over the final draft of the civil service reform Act. 
As a consequence, a fundamental reform was enacted in 2001, but, from the point of 
view of political discretion, only the remuneration system was de-politicised. 
Moreover, the amendment of the Civil Service Act that was passed in the summer of 
2002 shortly after the Medgyessy government had taken office in response to the
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2001 amendment has hardly affected the possibilities to exercise political discretion 
over personnel policy.
Overall, the Hungarian story of civil service reform and policy since 1990, therefore, 
suggests that civil service reform activism does not necessarily lead to the emergence 
of a professional, de-politicised civil service and the de-politicisation of personnel 
policy. Moreover, although the Hungarian story indicates that post-communist 
politicians increasingly recognise the consequences of politicisation, they remain 
prisoners of the context of post-communist politics, which presents a number of 
obstacles towards the achievement of goals like the establishment of a professional, 
de-politicised civil service, that cannot easily be overcome. As a consequence, at 
least in the medium term, we can hardly expect the establishment of civil service 
systems that provide the institutional conditions for the de-politicisation of personnel 
policy in post-communist central executives unless the patterns of inter-party 
competition become less polarised and provide conditions that lower the salience of 
problems of political trust for incoming governments.
Outline of the Thesis
The development of the arguments in this thesis is divided in three parts. The first 
part establishes the theoretical foundations for the empirical analysis of the 
Hungarian case since 1990, which is undertaken in the second and the third part. 
Chapter 2 starts with a brief review of the main insights of the body of delegation 
studies and then develops the concept of formal political discretion and the typology 
of four personnel policy regimes as analytical tools for the comparative study of civil 
service systems and policy. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical discussion of the 
determinants of varying degrees of formal political discretion in parliamentary 
democracies. It begins with a critique of existing theories of choosing civil service 
institutions. Subsequently, it develops an informational rationale of choosing varying 
degrees of formal political discretion built into civil service legislation. Chapter 4 
applies the insights of the theoretical model to the civil service reform dynamics in 
Central and Eastern Europe. It first discusses personnel policy dynamics and possible
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causes of civil service reform pressure during the communist regime. Then, it turns to 
different scenarios that could occur in the immediate period after the change of 
regime and assesses their impact on the course of civil service reform in post­
communist Europe. Finally, the Chapter assesses the developments in later periods 
and concludes with a discussion of determinants that may cause the choice of one of 
the four personnel policy regimes rather than merely a high or low degree of formal 
political discretion. The concluding discussion also includes the role of ideas in 
shaping institutional choices and the potential impact of European Union accession 
usually discussed under the heading of'Europeanisation'.
The second part is divided into two Chapters. Chapter 5 assesses Hungarian civil 
service legislation that has been adopted since 1990. The Chapter begins with an 
assessment of the structure of the civil service and the size of different ranks of civil 
servants using empirical data from several ministries. Subsequently, the discussion 
turns to an assessment of civil service legislation on the basis of the concepts of 
formal political discretion and personnel policy regime. Finally, the Chapter provides 
a brief analysis of the practice of exercising political discretion in the domain of 
remuneration policy between 1994 and 2001, before a reform de-politicised the 
remuneration regime. Chapter 6 provides a longitudinal empirical analysis of the 
exercise of political discretion over the allocation of state secretaries to the 
ministerial organisation in post-communist Hungary. The Chapter combines 
quantitative and qualitative methods to determine how and why Hungarian 
governments have exercised political discretion in the decade after the change of 
regime. Moreover, the assessment of the use of discretionary instruments serves to 
identify the personnel policy strategies that have been pursued by different 
governments at the time of taking office and while being in office. Hence, Chapter 6 
also establishes the bridge between personnel policy processes and civil service 
reform dynamics, as it can help to formulate expectations about the kind of civil 
service reform dynamics that have occurred since 1990.
Finally, the third part analyses the three major civil service reforms that have been 
enacted in 1990/92, 1997 and 2001/2 in Chapter 7 though 9 respectively. The 
analysis traces the origins of the reforms, the goals pursued by the reformers and the
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negotiations that led eventually to the adoption or revision of civil service legislation. 
The analysis takes into account the political context of reforms and assesses the civil 
service reform processes in light of the informational theory of civil service reform 
and policy developed in Chapter 2 through 4. Finally, the Conclusion summarises the 
main results of the thesis and discusses the implications of the study for civil service 
developments in post-communist Europe.
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Chapter 2
Political Discretion and Varieties o f Personnel Policy Regimes: A 
Framework for the Comparative Analysis o f Civil Service Systems
1. Introduction
This Chapter develops an analytical framework that can serve to assess how and to 
what extent formal-legal frameworks governing the civil service provide the 
institutional conditions for the de-politicisation of personnel policy. To this end, it 
applies the insights of new institutionalist approaches to executive politics, in 
particular, the body of so-called 'delegation studies' (Pollack 2002) that analyses 
institutional arrangements for the political control of public bureaucracies on the 
basis of the new economics of organisations (Milgrom/Roberts 1992; Moe 1984). 
Following a brief review of two generations of delegation studies in the first part of 
this Chapter, the second and the third part develop the concepts of formal political 
discretion and personnel policy regime as analytical tools to assess civil service 
legislation across countries and at different points in time. The second part adopts the 
perspective that civil service legislation defines the specific set of personnel policy 
instruments, which ministers can choose to apply as control measures and that the 
extent to which ministers can apply personnel policy instruments denotes the degree 
of formal political discretion.
The third part develops four types of personnel policy regimes that are distinguished 
with respect to the degree of formal political discretion and the impact they may have 
on particular patterns of politicisation. It takes the position that the typology of 
personnel policy regimes is a flexible enough instrument to assess the differences and 
similarities of formal-legal governance structures of civil services. Finally, the 
conclusion discusses the implications of the two concepts for the empirical
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assessment of how discretion is exercised by executive politicians in personnel policy 
processes and, hence, identifies the capacity of different types of personnel policy 
regimes to de-politicse personnel policy processes. It argues that civil service reform 
does only have the capacity to prevent the politicisation of personnel policy, if the 
adopted civil service legislation formally institutionalises a so-called 'de-politicised 
personnel policy regime'. By contrast, if a personnel policy regime allows what will 
be defined as 'structured politicisation', 'open politicisation' or 'unbounded 
politicisation', the capacity of capacity of civil service legislation to de-politicise 
personnel policy processes gradually weakens.
2. Principals, Agents, and the Logic of Delegation between Politicians 
and Bureaucrats
Over the last two decades, a growing body of literature has emerged that studies 
institutional arrangements for political control of public bureaucracies on the basis of 
the new economics of organisation. The new economics of organisation, in particular 
transaction costs economics and agency theory, seeks to explain why and how 
individuals in the marketplace co-ordinate collective action by means of 
organisations (Milgrom/Roberts 1992; Moe 1984). Organisations are assumed to 
share the characteristic that one or more individuals - the principals - delegate 
authority to one or more agents, thereby entering into a contractual relationship with 
the agents, in the expectation that the agents will subsequently choose actions that 
produce outcomes desired by the principals. Hence, in organisations, the social 
benefits of collective action are assumed to be produced through hierarchical control 
and central authority as opposed to voluntary exchange and decentralised co­
ordination in the marketplace. In transaction costs economics, the focus is on the 
business firm understood as a governance structure. It argues that business firms arise 
out of markets to economise on transaction costs such as measurement, bargaining or 
enforcement costs in order to arrive at enforceable contracts (Williamson 1975, 
1985).6 In agency theory, the substantive focus is much the same. However, it is 
narrower in that its analytical perspective is explicitly directed at the principals'
6 Transaction costs can be defined as all those costs that are incurred in operating an economic system 
(North 1992; Williamson 1985).
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decision problem of designing a contractual structure that can induce a consenting 
agent to take action in the principals' interests (Pratt/Zeckhauser 1985).
Strom (2000) applies the new economics of organisations, in particular agency 
theory, to the logic of delegation in liberal democracies. In general, Strom (2000) 
suggests that the institutions and the operations of liberal democracies can be 
understood as a chain of delegation and accountability with multiple links that ranges 
from voters to the ultimate policy-makers and back to voters.7 Comparing the logic of 
delegation in presidential and parliamentary democracies, Strom (2000: 269) argues 
that, in contrast to presidential democracy, parliamentary democracy is characterised 
by a 'singularity principle'. An "ideal typical parliamentary democracy (...) features a 
single chain of command, in which at each link a single principal delegates to one 
and only one agent (or several non-competing agents), and where each agent is 
accountable to one and only one principal". Hence, in an ideal typical parliamentary 
democracy, voters elect their representative in single member districts to a 
unicameral legislature.8 Members of parliament eventually delegate to the executive, 
ideally a prime minister who oversees an executive branch of ministries with non­
overlapping jurisdictions. The chain of delegation continues from the prime minister 
to the heads of different executive departments, that is, individual cabinet ministers, 
and from cabinet ministers to civil servants. Conversely, agents in parliamentary 
democracies are accountable to a single principal. This differs from a presidential 
system in which agents may have multiple principals. For instance, voters typically 
elect multiple competing agents and civil servants on the other end of the delegation 
chain may have to report to the president and to one or several legislative chambers.9
7 Pollack (2002: 215) adds three more delegation stages, which have gained increasing relevance in the 
wake of administrative reforms over the last two decades. He mentions delegation from governments 
to private actors who deliver public services on their behalf, to 'non-majoritarian institutions' such as 
central banks, and to international institutions like the European Union (see also the contributions in 
the special issue by Thatcher/Stone Sweet 2002).
8 Strom (2000) argues that systems of government usually classified as semi-presidential such as the 
French Fifth Republic share features of parliamentary systems when analysed though the lens of 
agency theory, though they happen to have a powerful president. This argument de-emphasises the 
popular election of the president, but it takes into account the limited power of the president, when he 
does not command a legislative majority in parliament, that is, under conditions of cohabitation (see 
Duverger 1980; Elgie 1999).
9 The analysis o f representative democracies on the basis of the principal agent framework implies that 
parliamentary and presidential systems are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. Rather, as 
parliamentary systems feature a single chain of command, they represent one end on a continuum that
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Western European democracies and the new democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe are either of a parliamentary or a semi-presidential type. So far, however, few 
studies analyse the origin and impact of institutional arrangements that govern the 
relation between political principals and their bureaucratic agents in parliamentary 
democracies by applying the new economics of organisations.10 Moreover, with the 
exception of Horn (1995), there are no studies that pay systematic attention to the 
choice of civil service institutions in liberal democracies. Rather, the so-called 
delegation studies have mainly directed their attention to the US presidential system. 
We can distinguish two strands or generations of delegation studies. The first 
generation of research pays attention to the behaviour of bureaucratic agents, mainly 
in the form of US regulatory agencies, by assessing the impact of different control 
measures on bureaucratic decision-making. Ultimately, this research seeks to 
determine whether democratically elected politicians do effectively control their 
bureaucratic agents or whether delegation can be equated with an abdication of 
authority to the bureaucracy. The second generation of research directs its focus from 
the behaviour of bureaucratic agents to the delegation stage itself by assessing the 
impact of political context variables on politicians’ choice of governance strategies. 
To this end, the research analyses the extent of policy-making discretion politicians 
delegate to executive agencies. The remainder of this part briefly summarises the 
main insights of the two generations of delegation studies as a toolkit for the 
development of an analytical framework that can serve to assess how and to what 
extent formal-legal frameworks governing the civil service provide the institutional 
conditions for the de-politicisation of personnel policy.
ranges to systems with multiple parallel chains of delegation and accountability on the other. Note also 
that from this perspective the Swiss political system with a collective executive that is not accountable 
to the legislature does not classify as a parliamentary system (Lane 2001; Lijphpart 1992).
10 For exceptions, see Ramseyer/Rosenbluth (1993) who study political control of the Japanese 
bureaucracy, Moe/Caldwell (1994) who also broadly address civil service issues, Huber (2000), 
Huber/Lupia (2001) and Huber/Shipan (2002). In principle, Horn's (1995) transaction costs approach 
to institutional choice in the public sector is also compatible with parliamentary systems though at a 
very general level. I will discuss Horn (1995) in the next Chapter in more detail.
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2.1. First Generation Deiegation Studies: The Logic of Controiling 
Bureaucratic Decision-Making
First generation delegation studies analyse the impact of institutional arrangements as 
political control measures on bureaucratic decision-making. These studies are based 
on the assumptions of agency theory. Agency theory assumes that through delegation 
of authority, principals can draw efficiency gains from a division of labour with their 
agents. At the same time, principals always experience some reduction in welfare 
because they may suffer agency losses that result from the potential for opportunistic 
behaviour of agents (Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991).11 Agency losses arise out of a 
natural conflict of interests and information asymmetries between principals and 
agents. Agents, once hired, are assumed to maximise their return subject to the 
constraints and incentives offered by the principals. Because the agents are viewed as 
self-interested, they are induced to pursue the principals' objectives only to the extent 
that the incentive structure of the contract renders such behaviour advantageous. 
Therefore, there is a natural conflict of interests between principals and agents. 
Information asymmetries accrue because the agents are assumed to possess and 
acquire information that is either unavailable to the principals or prohibitively costly 
to obtain. Given a natural conflict of interest, agents may regard it as beneficial to use 
this information strategically or simply to keep it hidden. Furthermore, principals can 
usually not observe without incurring costs whether the action taken by the agent is 
in his best interest.12 (Arrow 1985) Therefore, the essence of principals' problem is to 
design an incentive structure such that the outcomes produced through the agents' 
efforts are the best the principals can achieve, given the choice to delegate in the first 
place. Yet, the measures principals can undertake to minimise the occurrence of 
agency losses are themselves costly and reduce the benefits the principals can draw 
from a division of labour with their agents (Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991).
11 Agency losses can take two forms. When agents fail to act in the best interest of the principals, it 
takes the form of omission. By contrast, commission or sabotage result, when agents take positive 
action that contradicts the will or interest of the principals (Strom 2000: 270).
12 These problems can also be called adverse selection problems and moral hazard problems or the 
problems of 'hidden information' and Tiidden action' (Arrow 1985). It is commonly argued that the 
problems of hidden information and hidden action are reinforced when principals delegate authority to 
multiple agents, as the principal will face more difficulties in evaluating the work performed by 
individual agents. Hence, multiple rational agents may have an incentive to engage in 'team shirking'.
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In accordance with the assumptions of agency theory, first generation delegation 
studies have analysed different aspects of the agency relationship between legislators 
in the US Congress as political principals and the staff of executive agencies as 
bureaucratic agents.
• Political principals possess powers o f legislation, budget appropriation, 
personnel appointment, and rights to conduct public hearings and investigations, 
which they can use as ex post rewards and sanctions to correct agency 
behaviour. Weingast/Moran (1983) and Calvert/Moran/Weingast (1987) argue 
that the availability of these constitutionally enshrined powers affects the 
incentives of bureaucratic decision-makers. The probability that improper 
behaviour will be detected and punished enters as a costs in bureaucrats' 
calculations of net benefits when contemplating to implement policies 
incompatible with legislators' interests.
• Alternatively, political principals can write a variety o f different administrative 
procedures ex ante into an Act in order to channel bureaucratic decision-making 
into the desired direction. McCubbins/Noll/Weingast (1987, 1989) {henceforth, 
McNollgast) assess the role of administrative procedures formalised in the US 
Administrative Procedures Act. McNollgast (1987: 244) argue that "procedural 
requirements affect the institutional environment in which agencies make 
decisions and thereby limit an agency's range of feasible policy actions". Hence, 
the mechanisms are functional in the sense that they induce agency compliance 
by operating in accordance with the logic of 'structure-induced equilibrium' 
(Shepsle 1986, 1989). On the one hand, administrative procedures help legislators 
to overcome informational disadvantages when dealing with agencies by 
stipulating requirements to gather specific information and to report regularly to 
congressional committees. On the other, legislators can use administrative 
procedures to 'stack the deck', that is, they can enfranchise relevant constituents in 
agency decision-making, thereby assuring durability of agency responsiveness to 
the relevant groups' interests.
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• Political principals prefer to choose control strategies that minimise the costs o f 
establishing and implementing them and maximise the effectiveness in inducing 
bureaucratic compliance. McCubbins/Schwartz (1984) and McNollgast (1987, 
1989) argue that legislators will prefer to rely on administrative procedures rather 
than reactive control measures. In particular ex post oversight directly performed 
by congressmen lacks teeth in order to induce bureaucratic compliance with 
legislative intent. Legislators depend on agencies for the provision of 
information, which strategic bureaucrats will not necessarily report upwards. At 
the same time, bureaucrats will hardly fear to be severely punished for their 
wrongdoing because disciplinary procedures are usually too cumbersome to pose 
an effective sanction at the disposal of legislators. Moreover, legislators incur 
opportunity costs resulting from time and energy which they could use for other 
purposes than overseeing executive agencies. Hence, on balance, ex post 
oversight creates costs for legislators rather than for agency personnel. By 
contrast, the use of administrative procedures shifts the costs of monitoring and 
reporting from congressmen to agency staff, the relevant interests groups and the 
courts. In particular the enfranchisement of relevant constituents sets up a 'fire 
alarm system' that, when set off by complaining groups, provides legislators with 
an opportunity to claim credit for correcting agency actions 
(McCubbins/Schwartz 1984).13 Lupia/McCubbins (1994) develop the latter 
argument further identifying several conditions under which legislators can 
sufficiently learn about bureaucratic actions rather than effectively abdicating 
their policy-making powers to the bureaucracy. Among the most important 
conditions, they argue that the fire alarm must have an incentive to provide 'true' 
information to legislators which requires overlapping preferences between 
legislators and the relevant groups, repeated interactions, or independent 
verification mechanisms.
13 Bawn (1997) further differentiates this argument. She argues that in particular US legislators who 
lack opportunities to exercise ex post oversight will favour ex ante procedural means of control. 
Hence, committee members are willing to delegate more discretion to the bureaucracy because they 
are better informed about area specific policy-making and because it is less costly for them to rely on 
ex post oversight than for members of the congressional floor.
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First generation delegation studies conclude that political principals can indeed 
control administrative agencies and that agencies are generally more responsive when 
control mechanisms are extensive and more autonomous when administrative 
procedures are 'thin' and oversight is weak. In the end, however, political principals 
can still choose to delegate less policy-making authority, if they perceive a lack of 
ability to control bureaucratic agents.14
2.2. Second Generation Delegation Studies: The Logic of Delegating 
Policy-making Discretion to the Bureaucracy
Second generation delegation studies have explicitly paid attention to the delegation 
stage rather than the behaviour of bureaucratic agencies and analyse the impact of 
political context variables on political principals' delegation strategy. At the centre of 
these studies is the concept of discretion. Discretion is broadly defined as the amount 
of policy-making authority delegated by political principals to the bureaucratic agents 
minus the amount of procedural constraints relative to the amount of delegated 
authority to limit the bureaucracy's leeway (Epstein/O'Halloran 1999: 109). Assessing 
the content of legislative statutes, these studies have found that the amount of 
delegated discretion varies widely across time, policy areas, and political systems 
(Epstein/O'Halloran 1999; Huber/Shipan 2002). The central aim of second generation 
delegation studies is to identify the conditions under which political principals are 
willing to allocate more or less discretion to their bureaucratic agents. Typically, four 
aspects of the political context are advanced to explain the delegation decision of 
political principals in the political process (similarly, Pollack 2002).
• Political principals delegate policy-making authority to the bureaucracy because 
they can benefit from bureaucratic expertise under conditions o f informational 
uncertainty. Problems of informational uncertainty result from politicians'
14 The hypotheses have been subjected to empirical tests with the most important general finding that 
control o f administrative agencies by US congressmen does indeed occur (Wood/Waterman 1991). 
However, although the first generation studies have provided insights into why American legislation 
takes the shape it does, it has often proven difficult to conduct thorough empirical evaluations because 
of the lacking prediction of variation in the application of different control measures (Huber/Shipan 
2000, 2002). Hence, some of the interpretative studies have found supporting evidence (Balia 1998;
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difficulties to assess the nature of policy problems and the consequences of policy 
choices to resolve the respective problems. In particular, Gilligan/Krehbiel (1987, 
1989) and Krehbiel (1991) show how legislators in the US Congress transfer 
authority to congressional committees by restricting the ability of the 
congressional floor to amend committee proposals. They argue that "restrictive 
procedures can encourage committees to gather information and can facilitate the 
adoption of informed policies that are jointly beneficial to the committee and [its] 
parent body" (Gilligan/Krehbiel 1987: 288). Accordingly, second generation 
delegation studies show that political principals can increase the benefits from 
delegation to the bureaucracy, the more they are confronted with uncertainties in 
a given policy area or the more they are lacking the 'legislative capacity* to write 
legislative statutes that contain detailed policy instructions (Bawn 1995; 
Epstein/O'Halloran 1994,1999; Huber/Shipan 2002).
• Political principals have an incentive to delegate policy-making authority rather 
than making policy themselves, i f  they are confronted with problems o f credible 
commitment. Political commitment problems result from a lack of exogenous 
enforcement mechanisms in politics. Politicians often find it difficult to guarantee 
their voters that the policies they adopt today will remain in place tomorrow, in 
particular after a legislative majority will have changed.15 The problem of 
commitment has received particular attention with respect to economic policy and 
market regulation. These studies argue that delegation of authority to an 
independent regulatory agency enables political principals to credibly commit to 
the durability of an enacted policy because the formal institutionalisation of 
discretion constrains the present and future enacting coalitions to change a once 
chosen policy (Hom/Shepsle 1989; Shepsle 1991).
• Political principals can benefit from delegating policy-making authority to their 
bureaucratic agents under conditions o f conflict o f interests among multiple
Spence 1999), while others have only received mixed support (e.g. Balla/Wright 2001). For an early 
critique of first generation delegation studies, see also Moe (1987).
15 Shepsle (1992) defines the non-correspondence between a present and a future enacting coalition as 
'coalitional drift1. Moe (1989, 1990a, 1990b) similarly argues that political officials are constrained by
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principals. In particular, McCubbins/Page (1987) argue that increasing conflict 
among US legislators creates difficulties to narrow down the scope of policy 
alternatives. As a result, conflicting legislators can overcome their internal 
decision-making problems by delegating policy-making discretion to bureaucratic 
agencies. Similarly, Huber/Shipan (2002: 11, emphasis in original) argue that the 
"bargaining environment (e.g. the existence of vetoes or bicameral conflict) in 
which [legislative] statutes are adopted", shapes the incentives of political 
principals to more or less micro-mange policy-making. They show that more 
'veto players' (Tsebelis 1995, 2000) raise the obstacles to pass legislation. As a 
result, discretion delegated to bureaucratic agents cannot decline but increases, if 
the bargaining environment becomes more complex.
• Finally, political principals have less incentive to delegate policy-making 
authority to their bureaucratic agents under conditions o f policy conflict between 
politicians and bureaucrats. For instance, Epstein/O'Halloran (1999) show that 
legislators in the US Congress reduce the amount of discretion delegated to 
executive agencies under conditions of divided government. Their argument is 
based on the assumption that the president appoints heads of agencies and thus 
divided government serves as an approximation for conflict of interests between 
principals and agents in the US presidential system of government. Similarly, 
Huber (2000) argues that in parliamentary systems ministers' benefits from 
delegation decrease as conflict between ministers and civil servants increases.
3. Comparing Civil Service Systems: The Degree of Formal Political 
Discretion Built into Civil Service Legislation
First and second generation delegation studies provide the toolkit to develop an 
analytical framework for the comparative assessment of civil service systems in 
parliamentary democracies prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe. Taking into 
account the ideal typical perspective upon parliamentary systems as suggested by 
Strom (2000), first generation delegation studies suggest that civil service legislation
'political uncertainty' which is isomorphic to the commitment problem. Political uncertainty means a 
situation when political officials are uncertain whether they have political power in the future.
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defines the specific set of personnel policy instruments, which ministers can choose 
to apply as control measures in the day-to-day policy process in order to achieve the 
policy outcomes they desire. At the same time, personnel policy is but one possible 
control measure ministers can adopt in order to mitigate potential losses from agency 
and to (re-)align the incentives and preferences of civil servants.16 The majority of 
control instruments is defined by other sources of administrative and constitutional 
law or is subject to internal ministerial procedures regulated by ministerial decree. 
Hence, we have to bear in mind that politicians can choose between different control 
instruments, one of which is personnel policy.
Secondly, with reference to second generation delegation studies, we can argue that 
the perspective on civil service legislation as a means to provide and structure a set of 
personnel policy instruments ministers can apply in the policy process means that 
civil service legislation defines different degrees of formal political discretion. 
Hence, in contrast to the standard conceptualisation given by Epstein/O'Halloran 
(1999) (see above), I will assess the degree of political discretion as opposed to 
agency discretion. We can generally define formal political discretion over personnel 
policy as the possibility of a minister to determine the outcomes of personnel policy. 
This definition begs two questions. Firstly, where does formal political discretion 
apply, i.e. what are the domains in which political discretion can be exercised. 
Secondly, because civil service legislation is unlikely to assign political discretion in 
a uniform way across domains, different national institutional settings or across time, 
the second question refers to the extent to which political discretion can be exercised.
I will begin with the domains of personnel policy in which formal political discretion 
can be exercised and discuss its extent in order to provide a working definition of 
'degrees of formal political discretion' further below. The relevant personnel policy 
domains are the allocation of civil servants in the administrative organisation and the 
determination of levels of remuneration for civil servants. Civil service management
16 As argued above, Calvert/Moran/Weingast (1987) refer to personnel appointments as ex post 
instruments of control, thereby trying to capture the possibility that politicians may use the threat of 
dismissal as a sanction against non-compliant officials. However, later studies tend to refer to 
appointment powers as ex ante means of control (Calvert/McCubbins/Weingast 1989;
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systems are commonly characterised as 'internal labour markets' (Silberman 1993; 
Wise 1996). An internal labour market is defined as "an administrative unit (...) 
within which the pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of 
administrative rules and procedures" (Doeringer/Priore 1971: 1-2). Hence, both 
domains are central to the study of internal labour markets, and both are 
distinguished in that they tend to require a residual decision-maker (Milgom/Roberts 
1992: 330). However, as will become clear in the discussion below, other aspects of 
civil service systems can be integrated into these two domains.
The measures to determine the allocation of civil servants in the administrative 
organisation are commonly referred to as the minister's powers of appointing civil 
servants. However, they equally apply to the promotion and lateral transfer of civil 
servants as well as the decision to admit new members of the civil service; provided 
the latter decision is separated from a positional appointment. From the perspective 
of first generation delegation studies, personnel appointments serve to overcome the 
conflict of interest between minister principals and civil servant agents 
(Lupia/McCubbins 2000). Yet once a match of preferences between ministers and 
civil servants has been achieved, the second problem of asymmetric information 
should be resolved, too. It should be resolved because, in principle, the match of 
preferences ensures that a self-interested civil servant will pursue actions that 
correspond to the desires of the minister prior to his decision to delegate a set of tasks 
to the civil servant. At the same time, the elimination of information asymmetries by 
means of personnel appointments rest on two assumptions. Firstly, the minister can 
exactly observe the preferences of the civil servant at the moment of selection and 
appointment (Calvert/McCubbins/Weingast 1989). Secondly, it assumes that neither 
the civil servant nor the minister change their preference during the course of their 
interaction. If this occurs, the minister incurs additional costs of both checking the 
action of the civil servant and taking corrective measures to re-align the civil 
servant's preferences with his own preferences. Hence, personnel appointments serve 
to mitigate the problems of conflict of interests and information asymmetries, but 
they cannot eliminate them. On the one hand, the application of agency theory
Hammond/Knott 1996; Lupia/McCubbins 2000). This perspective is much is more in correspondence 
with conventional comparative public administration literature (Page 1992; Peters 2001).
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implies the general existence of asymmetric information by way of assumption. On 
the other, one should take into account that the civil service is neither a unitary actor 
nor a collective actor of small size; hence, even if both problems were theoretically 
solved, there would remain the practical problem of its limited applicability.
Bearing in mind that, everything else being equal, the allocation of a civil servant to 
an administrative position is of limited effectiveness, the key to an understanding of 
the problem of formal political discretion are the distribution of decision-making 
authority and the procedural constraints upon its exercise. Sticking for the time being 
to the ideal perspective of a minister (rather than the government) as the principal of 
a civil servant, civil service legislation does usually not guarantee unilateral authority 
over appointment decisions to a minister. Rather, civil service legislation may set out 
a decision-making procedure to appoint civil servants in which the minister shares 
decision-making authority with other political actors, e.g. the Prime Minister, and/or 
administrative actors, e.g. a civil service commission. As a consequence, a minister 
will only be able to appoint a civil servant with matching preferences to the extent 
that other parties involved in the appointment procedure will share the same 
preferences. In other words, the more the preferences of the decision-makers diverge, 
the more difficult it is to align preferences between minister and appointed civil 
servant and, hence, to overcome problems of agency (Hammond/Hill 1993). This 
constellation is comparable to a problem of multiple principals, in which an agent 
may exploit disagreement between multiple preferences in her own favour 
(McCubbins/Noll/Weingast 1989).
Secondly, minister's powers to allocate civil servants may not only be restricted 
through the need to get involved in collective action, but also as a result of 
procedural constraints he has to follow prior to taking a decision. Civil service 
legislation may reduce the pool of eligible candidates a minister can appoint to 
internal candidates only rather than granting a free choice of candidates for 
appointment to a civil service position. Similarly, civil service legislation may oblige 
a minister to choose only those candidates who meet certain standards of 
qualification or experience. Moreover, obligations upon civil servants' political and 
professional activities may indirectly narrow a minister's freedom of choice. For
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instance, if the simultaneous holding of party office or an occupation in the private 
sector are prohibited by law, a potential candidate may incur opportunity costs of 
foregoing the benefits of an activity outside the civil service (similarly, Huber 2000: 
400). A decision to appoint a civil servant may also be constrained by the minister's 
lack of possibility to dismiss or even transfer a civil servant once she has been hired. 
Hence, a minister will be unable to re-align the civil servant's preference with his 
own one in case the preference of either parties changes over time (Hammond/Knott 
1996). Finally, if a special formalised disciplinary procedure for civil servants has 
been put in place, a minister may either not be involved in the proceedings at all or he 
may have to follow a procedure that grants him little discretion and also gives the 
civil servant the right to appeal against the outcome of the decision. Consequently, 
even if a minister wields decision-making authority, the constraints upon its exercise 
may restrict the pool of eligible candidates he can choose from, and therefore, the 
possibilities to exercise political discretion are reduced.
The second domain of personnel policy over which a minister may be allowed to 
exercise political discretion refers to the determination of civil servant's levels of 
remuneration. In general, pay serves to impact on the motivation of employees to 
perform the best level of effort as desired by the principal. In this context, 
remuneration measures have the same purpose but they rather take on the form of 
positive (or negative) rewards ministers may use in the policy process. The 
characterisation of civil service employment systems as internal labour markets and 
the importance of varieties of social dialogues (Bosseart et al. 2001) for the 
determination of remuneration levels of members of the civil service is not conducive 
to the provision of formal political discretion. Firstly, in internal labour markets, 
wages attach to jobs rather than to individuals. Hence, civil service legislation does 
not define any residual decision-maker, as personnel policy outcomes are entirely 
determined by administrative rules. Secondly, the determination of pay levels either 
in form of collective bargaining or as a unilateral act of parliament does not leave any 
room for the adjustment of remuneration levels of individual civil servants. 
Therefore, we should expect that the rules stipulated in civil service legislation 
provide only few opportunities to exercise political discretion over the determination 
of an individual civil servant's wage level.
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However, if a civil servant's wage level is not exclusively determined by the job 
classification, but also dependent on the civil servant's performance on the job, a 
minister may be authorised to 'adjust' a civil servant's wage. For instance, he may 
have the right to reward (good) performance of civil servants and grant a 
remuneration bonus to a civil servant. Moreover, because wages are attached to the 
job classification, a minister who can exercise a certain degree of political discretion 
over promotion decisions may reward a civil servant by means of promotion to a 
higher grade in the job classification. At the same time, like in the domain of 
personnel allocation, the minister's discretion to intervene into the determination of 
civil servants' remuneration level may be constrained by formal procedures or 
standards he has to meet prior to taking action. For instance, a standardised 
performance evaluation system with the right for civil servants to appeal against its 
outcomes and consequences highly restricts a minister's opportunity to adjust 
individual civil servants' remuneration levels.
In sum, civil service legislation can be analysed by assessing the specific set of 
personnel policy instruments as one among other instruments ministers can choose to 
apply in the day-to-day policy process in order to control civil servants. From this 
perspective, civil service legislation establishes institutional arrangements that 
determine varying levels of formal political discretion in the personnel policy 
domains of allocating civil servants to the administrative organisation and 
determining their levels of remuneration. Civil service legislation then serves both to 
enable and to constrain the exercise of political discretion on two key dimensions of 
both personnel policy domains. On the first dimension, it is simply a matter of who is 
authorised to take a personnel policy decision. For instance, is this the minister who 
can decide unilaterally, does he have to share the authority with other members of the 
government or with a body consisting of civil servants, or is a third party like an 
independent civil service commission responsible for the respective personnel policy 
decision. Hence, on the first dimension civil service legislation assigns varying 
degrees of decision-making authority over personnel policy to political and/or 
administrative institutions.
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The second dimension refers to the restriction upon the exercise of this decision­
making authority. These restrictions can be understood as procedural constraints. 
They include the existence of standards and formal procedures a minister or any other 
authorised (set of) actors has to follow before taking a personnel policy decision. 
Procedural constraints primarily serve to determine the size and nature of the pool of 
candidates a minister can choose from as well as they determine the rights of 
candidates potentially subject to the respective personnel policy decision. Moreover, 
a minister's decision-making authority may be further restricted by indirect 
constraints arising from civil servants' rights and duties upon their political and 
professional activities and upon the minister's ability to create vacancies for the 
allocation of civil servants by means of transfer and dismissal decisions in the first 
place.
Therefore, at the conceptual level, we can distinguish degrees of formal political 
discretion from high to low. Correspondingly, I define the degree of formal political 
discretion over personnel policy as the extent to which the government of the day, or 
its ministers, has the possibility to exercise personnel policy authority and the extent 
to which the exercise of this authority is subject to specific procedural constraints. 
Although US delegation studies do not make this distinction, I have emphasised the 
word 'possibility' because a high degree of formal political discretion does not mean 
that it is exercised in practice; rather it provides the means to do so.17 Therefore, after 
an assessment of the degree of formal political discretion inherent to civil service 
legislation, it is possible to move on to an assessment of the extent to which 
governments and their ministers have exercised the available political discretion in 
personnel policy processes.
In principle, delegation studies suggest that both the assignment of decision-making 
authority over personnel policy and the procedural constraints upon the exercise of 
this authority as defined in civil service legislation are two sides of the same coin. 
The delegation of decision-making authority then is the key variable, but it is the
17 Schnapp (2000: 29) recognises the distinction between the possibility to exercise political discretion 
and political discretion that is exercised in practice by defining what he calls 'formal politicisation' 
similar to the degree of formal political discretion as 'the possibility for the government of the day, or 
its ministers, to pick their top bureaucrats at will without major procedural obstacles'.
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procedural constraints that complement and differentiate degrees o f formal political 
discretion. It follows that as procedural constraints become less restrictive, the degree 
o f formal political discretion increases. Therefore, I assume that civil service 
legislation that grants decision-making authority to members of the government and 
stipulates a minimum of or no procedural constraints is equivalent to the highest 
degree of formal political discretion. If a civil service commission is authorised to 
take personnel policy decisions, the same logic applies. The reason is that a minister 
may be able to exercise some kind of indirect political discretion, the less confining 
the procedural constraints on a personnel policy decision are. By contrast, the degree 
o f formal political discretion is lowest, if personnel policy decisions are determined 
by non-political actors acting within a dense web of formalised standards and 
procedures or if  decision are determined by administrative rules only, thereby 
eliminating any formal decision-maker in the implementation of personnel policy. 
Figure 2.1. summarises the discussion with an illustration of degrees of formal 
political discretion.
Figure 2.1. Degrees o f  Formal Political Discretion over Personnel Policy
Decision-making authority to 
determine the
allocation o f civil servants within the
Procedural Constraints 
upon the exercise of decision-
Degree o f  
Formal Political
4. Four Types of Personnel Policy Regimes
Based on the concept of formal political discretion, it is possible to distinguish 
different types of personnel policy regimes. The term 'personnel policy regime' is 
appropriate because the common application in political science literature of different 
types of political regimes captures the aspects of institutional arrangements that 
structure the access to and the exercise of political power (Merkel 1999; 
O'Donnell/Schmitter 1986). Therefore, types of personnel policy regimes are 
conceived as institutional arrangements that structure the access to the specific set of 
personnel policy instruments and structure the way they are exercised. This 
perspective corresponds to the understanding that civil service legislation - or 
corresponding legislation, in case no civil service legislation has been adopted - 
consists of institutional arrangements that determine a degree of formal political 
discretion over personnel policy. These personnel policy regimes then differ with 
respect to the degree of formal political discretion and, hence, the extent to which 
formal-legal institutional arrangements allow the politicisation of personnel policy 
processes. However, the distinction between different types of personnel policy 
regimes also seeks to take into account the impact different sets of institutional 
arrangements may have on the emergence of particular patterns, which a potential 
politicisation of personnel policy processes may exhibit. The remainder of this part 
develops four ideal types of personnel policy regimes that can be distinguished on the 
basis of the two personnel policy domains and their institutional features as outlined 
above. The typology will be summarised in Table 2.1. below.
Before, however, one point of clarification has to be made. So far, the discussion has 
treated the civil service as if it consisted of one group of civil servants and, thus, it 
has ignored that civil service legislation usually distinguishes different categories or 
ranks of civil servants. Therefore, the degree of formal political discretion may differ 
from one group of civil servants to another and it is a matter of assessment whether 
and to what extent group- or rank-specific personnel policy regimes differ. Hence, it 
is important to note that the identification of a particular personnel policy regime 
does not necessarily refer to the entire group of senior civil servants let alone all civil
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servants. Because an assessment of discretionary instruments built into civil service 
legislation directs attention primarily to the senior civil service, it is of interest to 
reveal the country-specific set of personnel policy regimes that govern the senior civil 
service and to assess its governance structure in relation to the wider civil service, 
especially the higher civil service. For the time being, I will present the typology as if 
the civil service consisted of one single undistinguished group of civil servants. 
However, from an analytical point of view, the concept of personnel policy regime 
can be applied for an assessment of the formal governance structure of the senior 
civil service as well as for others ranks of the civil service.
4.1. De-Politicised Personnel Policy Regimes
The degree of formal political discretion is lowest in personnel policy regimes that 
create the institution of a civil service in public law, define clear boundaries of the 
civil service and establish a distinct personnel management system with the 
following characteristics. Members of the government are formally the head of the 
civil service. However, in the domain of allocating civil servants to the 
administrative organisation, members of the government do not wield decision­
making authority in neither the admission of new members to the civil service nor in 
the appointment of a civil servant to all positions functionally defined as civil service 
positions. Furthermore, members of the government are not authorised to determine 
or adjust individual civil servant's level of remuneration. Rather, personnel policy 
decisions in both domains are the result of civil service self-government and 
administrative rules that do not require a residual decision-maker in the day-to-day 
process of personnel policy-making.
At the same time, the implementation of personnel policy takes place within a dense 
web of formal procedures and standards that minimise opportunities for the exercise 
of indirect political discretion. Firstly, the admission of civil servants requires 
decision-makers to select candidates who meet a minimum set of criteria specified in 
legislation, in particular educational qualifications. Moreover, decision-makers have 
to follow a formalised recruitment procedure that allows for competition and grants
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rejected applicants the right to appeal against the outcome of the recruitment process. 
Secondly, the decision to appoint civil servants to their respective position in the 
administrative hierarchy is either regulated by administrative rules through a system 
of promotion by seniority or requires the decision-making body to follow a 
formalised recruitment procedure inside the civil service, thereby limiting the pool of 
eligible candidates to internal applicants only. Thirdly, the level of remuneration of 
individual civil servants is either determined by administrative rules (job 
classification) only or requires the body authorised to adjust a civil servant's 
remuneration to follow a standardised performance evaluation procedure, which 
grants civil servants the right to appeal against the outcomes of the evaluation.
Furthermore, a personnel policy regime with lowest degrees of formal political 
discretion is distinct with respect to rights and duties of civil servants representing a 
context of additional though indirect procedural constraints for the exercise of 
indirect political discretion. Civil servants have the duty to explicitly demonstrate 
political neutrality and, hence, have neither minimum rights to pursue political 
activities nor are they in a position to demonstrate partisanship while performing 
their civil service job. Similarly, professional activities outside the civil service are 
prohibited except for certain artistic and intellectual activities. Finally, civil servants 
enjoy extensive protection against dismissal from the civil service as well as transfer 
from the position requires their consent.
In the domain of allocating civil servants this does not mean that members of the
government have no influence over allocation decisions whatsoever. However, the
decision to appoint civil servants, in particular, to the highest positions of the
administrative organisation is effectively pre-determined by administrative rules or a
body like a civil service commission. In the latter case, this body proposes -
following an internal recruitment procedure - either a single or a small number of 
*
candidates to the political leadership who can eventually select among them and 
formally appoint them to the respective post. Hence, the admission of new members 
to the civil service is entirely removed from political decision-making authority, 
whereas selection and appointment procedures minimise the opportunity to exercise 
political discretion. At the same time, the political element in this type of personnel
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policy regime is limited to formal leadership of members of the government over the 
civil service, which in turn may lead to some kind of informal anticipated reaction of 
the pre-selecting body in the day-to-say process of personnel policy to accommodate 
the preference of the political leadership.
We can label this set of institutional arrangements a 'de-politicised personnel policy 
regime'. The reference to the concept of politicisation sheds light on the potential 
impact of varying degrees of formal political discretion. In other words, because the 
degree of formal political discretion is lowest in this first type of personnel policy 
regimes, members of the government have little room to intervene into personnel 
policy and hence the potential for a politicisation of the civil service is very low. As a 
result, civil service legislation that establishes a de-politicised personnel policy 
regime does have the capacity to also de-politicise personnel policy processes. In the 
real world, we might argue that although the Parliament in the UK has not adopted a 
civil service Act, the senior civil service system approximates a de-politicised 
personnel policy regime most closely, especially when it comes to the exercise of 
political discretion (Kellner/Crowther-Hunt 1980; Rhodes 2001; Ri<jhards 1996).
4.2. Personnel Policy Regimes Allowing Structured Politicisation
The second type of personnel policy regimes displays a low to medium degree of 
formal political discretion. It differs from de-politicised regimes in three respects. 
Firstly, members of the government are authorised to appoint civil servants to their 
positions in the administrative hierarchy. At the same time, the exercise of this 
decision-making authority is constrained by explicitly limiting the pool of eligible 
appointees to internal candidates only, for instance, by stipulating a certain number of 
years an appointee has to be member of the civil service before becoming an eligible 
candidate. Hence, in principle, procedural constraints do not differ from the previous 
type in their implication that only internal candidates can be appointed to (especially 
senior) administrative office. Moreover, because the admission of new members to 
the civil service is subject to low levels of political discretion - as in the case of de­
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politicised personnel policy regimes - members of government are confronted with an 
additional constraints upon the exercise of their appointment authority.
Secondly, whereas the membership of civil servants in the civil service is well 
protected, civil servants' positional appointment is not. In other words, members of 
the government can choose to transfer a civil servant without her consent but they 
cannot dismiss civil servants in order to create vacancies for new appointments. 
Thirdly, civil servants possess limited rights to political activities such as becoming 
party member which effectively allow them to openly take on political roles. On the 
other hand, civil servants are not allowed to simultaneously hold elected office or an 
official post in a political party. This feature complements the first three, as the 
possibility to exercise political discretion over the appointment and transfer of civil 
servants would practically be incompatible with high-level restrictions upon civil 
servants' rights to pursue political activities. As a consequence, this personnel policy 
regime selectively grants formal political discretion to members of government but 
generally maintains high levels of procedural constraints. Furthermore, remuneration 
levels remain beyond the reach of members of government and civil servants are 
obliged to forego alternative professional activities.
Consequently, we can distinguish this personnel policy regime from the former as 
one that allows 'structured or channelled politicisation'. This label takes into account 
that its institutional configuration grants political actors the opportunity to satisfy 
their short-term needs to mitigate agency problems by granting them rights to apply 
selected personnel policy instruments in the policy process. At the same time, the 
exercise of this discretion is highly restricted, in particular, because procedural 
constraints pre-structure the pool of eligible candidates. I suggest that the senior civil 
services of Germany and France represent two real-world cases that correspond 
largely to a personnel policy regime that allows structured politicisation (but see also 
my Conclusion below). Like in the British case, especially senior personnel policy 
processes tend to reflect a structured politicisation (Derlien 1988; Elgie 2001; 
Mayntz/Derlien 1989; Rouban 1999).
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4.3. Personnel Policy Regimes Allowing Open Politicisation
The third ideal type of personnel policy regimes is characterised by medium to high 
levels of formal political discretion. It differs from the previous two in several 
respects. Firstly, civil service legislation does not only authorise members of 
government to appoint civil servants to their position, but also grants them decision­
making authority in the admission of new members to the civil service. At the same 
time, procedural constraints for both the admission and the appointment of civil 
servants are soft. As regards the admission of new members to the civil service, entry 
criteria, in particular, minimum educational qualifications, are defined, but the 
absence of a formalised recruitment procedure allows decision-makers to 'tailor' job 
tenders or to entirely avoid the disclosure of vacancies in the civil service. Moreover, 
when it comes to the appointment of civil servants to their position, decision-makers 
are free in their choice between internal or external candidates. Hence, either 
appointment criteria are not defined at all or they are sufficiently open to include 
external candidates with the respective entry criteria in the pool of eligible 
candidates. As a consequence, the distinction between admission and appointment 
becomes blurred and nominal only.
Secondly, although a job classification has been established and wages are 
determined accordingly, i.e. by administrative rules, civil service legislation provides 
members of government with one or several mechanisms to 'adjust' an individual 
civil servant's level of remuneration. Moreover, procedural constraints upon the 
exercise of this discretion are weak, as the adjustment is not linked to a standardised 
performance evaluation system but depends on the subjective judgement of the 
authorised member of government and an appeal possibility for the civil servant is 
lacking. As a consequence, the mechanisms to 'adjust' individual civil servants' level 
of remuneration have the potential to (entirely) offset the administrative rules defined 
in civil service legislation as a standard procedure for the determination civil 
servants' wages.
Thirdly, members of government are less restricted in the exercise of decision­
making authority by indirect constraints when compared to decision-makers in a
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personnel policy regime that allows structured politicisation. On the one hand, this 
type of personnel policy regime also shares certain restrictions upon civil servants' 
political activities and a lacking protection of positional appointments, as transfers 
within public administration do not require a civil servant's consent. In contrast, 
however, civil servants are also allowed to pursue professional activities outside the 
civil service or the civil service legislation provides one or several exceptions to 
undermine the otherwise stipulated prohibition. In particular, civil servants are 
permitted to pursue alternative professional activities subject to the consent of 
members of government as the institution formally authorised as decision-maker in 
the personnel policy domain of determining civil servants' levels of remuneration. 
Finally, although the civil service legislation provides for permanent tenure, it 
includes one or several mechanisms for ministers to dismiss members of the civil 
service; possibly with few restrictions upon unilateral exercise of political discretion.
As a consequence, we can distinguish this personnel policy regime from the previous 
two by its lack to structure the potential politicisation of personnel policy and, hence, 
by the potential to allow 'open politicisation' of personnel policy processes. On the 
one hand, this personnel policy regime is established through civil service legislation 
in public law, it draws boundaries of the civil service and sets up a personnel 
management system that at first glance shares many features of the first two regime 
types outlined above. On the other, it tends to either assign considerable decision­
making authority directly to members of the government or complements non­
political personnel policy processes by means of one or several exceptions granting 
high levels of formal political discretion. Moreover, the lack or vagueness of 
procedural constraints increases the level of formal political discretion inherent to 
this type of personnel policy regime. As a result, for the outside observer, the 
potential politicisation of the civil service may be more of a hidden than an obvious 
nature. However, if we want to account for the potential impact of these institutional 
arrangements, we have to recognise that this type of personnel policy regime 
establishes a highly permeable boundary between politics and administration and 
allows governments, or their ministers, to openly politicise personnel policy 
processes by filling the (especially senior) administrative positions from above and 
from outside. In the real word, the civil service developments in Central and Eastern
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Europe discussed briefly in Chapter 1 suggest that post-communist civil services may 
approximate this type of personnel policy regime both at the level of formal-legal 
governance structure and at the level of personnel policy processes.
4.4. Personnel Policy Regimes Allowing Unbounded Politicisation
Finally, a fourth personnel policy regime that displays highest levels of formal 
political discretion can be distinguished from the previous three types. At first glance, 
the key difference vis-a-vis the other three types of personnel policy regimes is its 
lack of a separate legal framework that establishes the institution of a civil service. 
Instead, administrative personnel is primarily regulated by labour legislation, which 
also applies to employees in the private sector. As a consequence, there is neither a 
limited scope of the civil service nor is there a personnel management system that 
applies uniformly across public administration employees. We are likely to see 
personnel management systems that apply to distinct administrative units and may 
differ from one unit to another. Hence, we might observe fragmented and incoherent 
personnel management systems.
Most important, these features have implications for the degree of formal political 
discretion because the employment relationship between the administrative unit and 
an employee is similar to private sector arrangements. Consequently, members of 
government as constitutionally defined heads of distinct administrative organisations 
are exclusive holders of decision-making authority over both personnel policy 
domains and the restrictions upon its exercise are effectively none due to the general 
lack of formalisation. Although, for instance, specific educational standards are 
defined in secondary legislation, these standards are neither compulsory nor 
enforceable. Put simple, employment is at will, subject to restrictions posed by labour 
legislation only. Moreover, decision-makers are not restricted by indirect constraints 
because civil servants are neither restricted by any obligations upon their political 
and/or professional activities nor do they enjoy any particular protection of their job. 
Instead, civil servants can simultaneously hold official posts in political parties, they
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can be appointed or elected to office in other branches of the state, and, in principle, 
they can take on jobs in addition to their employment in public administration.
Therefore, we can distinguish this type of personnel policy regime from the other 
three as one that allows an 'unbounded politicisation', given the lack of any 
differentiation between politics and administration. Obviously, Central and Eastern 
European countries before adopting civil service legislation and those countries that 
have not yet adopted any legislation approximate this type of personnel policy 
regime. Moreover, in principle, there is no reason to omit the 'real-existing socialist 
administration' (Konig 1992) from this typology of personnel policy regimes because 
it approximates this ideal personnel policy regime quite closely both in institutional 
terms and in terms of personnel policy processes. Hence, we can argue that the 
personnel policy regime featuring the real-existing socialist administration represents 
the polar opposite type to the ideal de-politicised personnel policy regime outlined 
above. Table 2.1. summarises the key features of the four types of personnel policy 
regimes.
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Table 2.1. Four Types o f  Personnel Policy Regimes and Potential Patterns o f  Politicisation
Regime Type De-politicisation Structured Politicisation Open Politicisation Unbounded Politicisation
Legal status Special civil service legislation Special civil service legislation Special civil service legislation No special civil service legislation
Authority over 
admissions




Compulsory educational standards; 
Formal recruitment procedure including 
competitive examinations;
Rejected candidates have right to 
appeal
Compulsory educational standards; 
Formal recruitment procedure including 
competitive examinations;
Rejected candidates have right to 
appeal
Compulsory educational standards; 
No Formal recruitment procedure; 
No right to appeal
No compulsory educational standards; 
No Formal recruitment procedure;
No right to appeal
Authority over 
appointments




Promotion by seniority or recruitment 
procedure internal to the civil service
Appointees must be recruited from 
inside the civil service;
Certain number of years are required





Administrative actors or no residual 
decision-maker
Administrative actors or no residual 
decision-maker
Administrative actors or no residual 
decision-maker, but members of 






If adjustment is possible, only on the 
basis of standardised performance 
evaluation;
Civil servants have right to appeal
If adjustment is possible, only on the 
basis of standardised performance 
evaluation;
Civil servants have right to appeal
No constraints upon adjustment; 
No right to appeal
No constraints upon remuneration 
authority;
No right to appeal
Protection of civil 
service membership
Permanent tenure;
Dismissal only in exceptional cases
Permanent tenure;
Dismissal only in exceptional cases
Permanent tenure, but one or several 
exceptions to justify dismissal
Employment at will;





Transfer requires consent of civil 
servant
Transfer does not require consent of 
civil servant
Transfer does not require consent of 
civil servant




Political activities are explicitly 
prohibited
Political activities are permitted, except 
simultaneous holding of political and 
elected office at central level
Political activities are permitted, except 
simultaneous holding of political and 
elected office at central level
Political activities are permitted, 
including simultaneous holding of 




Other professional activities are 
explicitly prohibited
Other professional activities are 
explicitly prohibited
Other professional activities require 
consent of members of government or 
head of agency
Other professional activities are 
permitted
Degree of formal 
political discretion
Lowest Low to medium Medium to high Highest
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5. Discussion and Conclusion
This Chapter has developed the concepts of formal political discretion and personnel 
policy regimes based on the body of delegation studies as tools for the comparative 
analysis of civil service systems. Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that the 
degree of formal political discretion and, hence, the type of personnel policy regime 
may differ from one group of civil servants to another. Therefore, it is important to 
disentangle the structure of the civil service and to identify the group or rank specific 
personnel policy regime. For instance, above I suggested that the German senior civil 
service approximates a personnel policy regime that allows structured politicisation. 
However, at closer scrutiny, this statement does not apply to the entire senior civil 
service. Rather, we have to take into account that the governance structure of the 
highest state secretary position in the German ministerial hierarchy allows open 
politicisation because ministers are free to choose candidates from inside and outside 
the administration and the appointment does not require the approval of the Federal 
Civil Service Commission (Derlien 1988). Moreover, if we compare the prevailing 
governance structures of Western European civil service systems, we find that it is in 
fact only the senior civil service systems that differ when viewed through the lens of 
formal political discretion (see Page/Wright 1999). By contrast, the degree of formal 
political discretion for the wider, non-managing civil servants is generally low and 
the differences across Western Europe are negligible when viewed through the lens 
of formal political discretion (Auer et al 1996; Bossaert et al 2001). Hence, an 
assessment of civil service systems in Western Europe would probably reveal that 
senior civil service systems fall primarily into either the category of a personnel 
policy regime that allows structured or de-politicisation and a few important 
exceptions would fall into the category that allows open politicisation. In contrast to 
senior civil service systems, the wider civil service in Western Europe would fall into 
the category of de-politicised personnel policy regimes. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, by contrast, we are not in a position to draw such a general conclusion. 
Instead, the only general statement we can make at this point is that at the time of 
regime change a personnel policy regime that allows unbounded politicisation is the
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starting point of institutional reforms and that the entire personnel system of public 
administration falls into the same category.
Secondly, there is an important implication for the study of personnel policy 
processes that results from the understanding of degrees of formal political 
discretion. As indicated above, a high degree of formal political discretion does not 
mean that governments exercise this discretion in practice. When looking at 
personnel policy regimes in Western Europe, it becomes obvious that the institutional 
basis does not necessarily equal personnel policy practice. For instance, like in 
Germany, the legal basis for the appointments of directeur d'administration and 
directeur de cabinet in France allows governments to openly politicise personnel 
policy for these top positions in the ministries. In practice, however, French 
governments tend to follow a personnel policy strategy of structured politicisation 
because the overwhelming majority of top level appointments is recruited from the 
senior civil service rather than outside public administration (Knapp/Wright 2001; 
Rouban 1999). Hence, from the perspective of the present discussion, the very top 
ranks of the French senior civil service combine features of a personnel policy regime 
that allows open politicisation and personnel policy processes that reflect a structured 
politicisation.
In general, governments that operate under personnel policy regimes with high 
degrees of formal political discretion have therefore more opportunities to apply 
personnel policy instruments in the day-to-day policy process than governments who 
operate under personnel policy regimes with low degrees of formal political 
discretion, but it does not necessarily mean that the former will eventually use their 
discretionary powers. Rather, a high degree of formal political discretion gives them 
the opportunity to exercise political discretion. As a result, we can understand the 
degree of formal political discretion as a possibility frontier for governments to use 
personnel policy instruments in the policy process and it is a matter of empirical 
investigation whether and to what extent governments do exercise formally granted 
political discretion over personnel policy (see Figure 2.2. the shaded area indicates 
that governments cannot exercise political discretion).
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Figure 2.2. Possibility Frontier built into Personnel Policy Regimes
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Consequently, the typology of personnel policy regimes can also serve as an 
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how and why governments and their ministers may choose to build higher or lower 




Expertise, Trust and Incentives: An Informational Rationale of 
Discretion in Civil Service Systems
1. Introduction
The discussion of second generation delegation studies at the beginning of the last 
Chapter suggests four variables that may cause governments to either reduce or 
increase the degree of formal political discretion built into civil service legislation. 
Firstly, governments may want to minimise the degree of formal political discretion 
in order to overcome
• problems of informational uncertainty;
• problems of credible commitment; and/or
• problems of conflict among multiple principals.
Alternatively, governments may prefer to maximise the degree of formal political 
discretion in order to overcome
• problems of policy conflict between political principals, i.e. governments and 
bureaucratic agents.
So far, the choice of civil service institutions, especially the choice of discretionary 
instruments built into civil service legislation has received relatively little attention in 
the literature on delegation and governance in liberal democracies. An exception is 
Horn's (1995) transaction costs approach to institutional choice in the public sector. 
Horn (1995) identifies legislators' problems of agency and problems of credible 
commitment towards constituent voters as the driving forces towards the 
establishment of what Horn (1995) calls modem merit civil services, which happen 
to share many features of a de-politicised personnel policy regime. This Chapter
therefore begins with a discussion of Horn's (1995) approach to the choice of civil
service institutions. It argues that the problem of commitment is a convincing reason
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for legislators to minimise the degree of political discretion over personnel policy as 
long as we are addressing the governance structure of bureaucrats who are primarily 
concerned with the implementation of more or less clearly stated policy goals. By 
contrast, legislators' commitment problem appears to be at odds with the task profile 
of ministerial bureaucrats in higher and senior ranks who are mainly responsible for 
the 'production' of legislation rather than its implementation (Mayntz/Scharpf 1975). 
Therefore, the first part concludes that an emphasis on the commitment problem is 
implausible for explaining why political principals may have an incentive to forgo 
the possibility to intervene into personnel policy, in particular at the higher and senior 
level.
Contrary to Horn (1995), the second part of this Chapter develops an explanation that 
is based on the logic of informational theories of legislative choice. Hence, it places 
political principals' problems of uncertainty at the centre of analysis. The first section 
discusses a basic constellation of actors that arises in the executive of parliamentary 
democracies after a change in government. On the one hand, it emphasises incoming 
governments' problems of uncertainty about the consequences of policies they choose 
on outcomes they desire. On the other hand, it points to senior bureaucrats as policy 
specialists relative to the members of the new government. The second and the third 
section discuss the conditions under which incoming governments are able to tap the 
expertise of senior bureaucrats in office in order to reduce problems of uncertainty 
and their implications for the choice of higher or lower degrees of formal political 
discretion built into civil service legislation.
In a nutshell, I argue that incoming governments will only be able to take advantage 
of existing bureaucratic expertise, if they can trust the senior bureaucrats in office 
and if they can credibly commit towards bureaucrats that they will not intervene into 
personnel policy. However, this implies that governments have to establish or 
maintain personnel systems with low degrees of formal political discretion. By 
contrast, if incoming governments are troubled by a problem of political trust 
towards senior bureaucrats, they will not have an incentive to rely on the expertise of 
inherited senior bureaucrats. Moreover, if governments are unable to credibly commit 
towards non-intervention into personnel policy, bureaucrats that stay in office will
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have no incentive to share their expertise with incoming governments. Both 
conditions are based on the logic of informational theories of legislative choice. The 
first condition is compatible with second generation delegation studies, which 
suggest that problems of policy conflict reduce political principals' incentive to 
delegate authority to bureaucratic agents. By contrast, the second condition builds on 
first generation delegation studies that tend to work with the assumptions of standard 
agency theory.
The last section of the second part discusses the impact of personnel policy regimes 
that are in place when governments take office on the nature of their problems of 
political trust, their personnel policy strategies and bureaucrats' incentive to be 
informative. The discussion concludes that status quo regimes develop strong 
reproductive effects upon the problems and actions that are taken by governments 
and bureaucrats. As a consequence, institutional reform pressures towards either a 
reduction or an increase of the degree of formal political discretion built into a 
personnel system will only occur in particular circumstances such as a polarisation of 
party competition or the inability of incoming governments to replace mistrusted 
bureaucrats. In addition, the change of an existing personnel policy regimes is 
conditional upon the absence of reform opponents with veto power, which implies 
that conflict among multiple principals has - contrary to the argument raised by 
second generation delegation studies - only an indirect effect upon the choice of 
personnel policy regimes.
2. De-politicising Modern Civil Services: Politicians' Response to 
Problems of Commitment towards Constituent Voters?
So far, the institutions of the civil service have received relatively little systematic 
attention in the study of delegation and governance in liberal democracies. The one 
exception is Horn's (1995) explanation of the 'modem merit civil service' in the 
context of his more general transaction costs theory of institutional choice in the
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public sector.18 Horn (1995: 95-96) seeks 'to explain the characteristic features of the 
merit civil service', all of which are formal rules defined in legislation. Among the 
institutional arrangements, he includes, are:
• 'appointment by competitive examination and restrictions on dismissal',
• security of tenure,
• some protection of the internal labour market of the civil service against 
competition from the external labour market,
• a compensation in which pay is linked to a job classification,
• promotion on the basis of seniority,
• deferred compensation, that is, payment of officials is below marginal 
productivity in the early stages of their career and above productivity in later 
stages,
• a prominent role of pensions, and
• the administration of civil service rules by an independent regulatory agency, 
commonly known as some kind of civil service commission.
If translated into the typology of personnel policy regimes developed in the last 
Chapter, then Horn's (1995) modem merit civil service shares many features of a de- 
politicised personnel policy regime, in particular, if we take into account the strong 
emphasis he places on the restrictions upon political interference into personnel 
policy. Horn (1995) argues that these "civil service arrangements survive because 
they help enacting legislators solve the transaction problems they face, especially 
commitment and agency problems. In addressing the agency problem, the enacting 
legislature will look for arrangements that promote the selection of administrators 
who have the incentives to administer legislation in the way the enacting legislature 
intended. In addressing the commitment problem, the enacting legislature will also 
want administrative arrangements that explicitly limit the extent to which future 
legislatures can control administrative outcomes. If the merit civil service helps 
address the commitment problem, then it will always look less responsive to the 
current legislature, and the interests it represents, than some alternative institutional
18 In fact, Moe/Caldwell (1994) also analyse the civil service in presidential and parliamentary 
systems. However, they are much more concerned with building a general theory of bureaucratic 
structure, giving only brief and rather general attention to the civil service.
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arrangement, like patronage. The merit civil service will be more responsive, 
however, to the interests represented at enactment (Horn 1995: 95)."
Horn (1995) contrasts the merit civil service with the patronage system and traces its 
origins with empirical reference to American civil service reforms between the late
t V i19 century and the New Deal era. In fact, when viewed through the lens of the 
concepts of formal political discretion and personnel policy regime, the institutional 
features of the patronage system are very similar to a personnel policy regime that 
allows unbounded politicisation as it existed at the outset of the change of regime in 
Hungary and other Central and Eastern European countries. He argues that legislators 
have electoral incentives to overcome unstable, discriminatory and corrupt practices 
of public administration operations and management that are produced by the 
patronage system. Hence, in order to improve their electoral support, legislators look 
for institutional arrangements that credibly restrict future opportunities to 'abuse' their 
own positions for office trading and assure that legislation continues to be 
administered by appointed officials broadly sympathetic to the interests of the 
enacting coalitions. As a consequence, legislators find it beneficial to tie their hands 
by taking away their ability to hire and fire appointed administrative personnel and to 
delegate authority for the administration of personnel policy to an independent 
regulatory agency (Horn 1995: 101-103).19
Addressing the problem of commitment in particular by eliminating legislators' 
opportunities to appoint and dismiss administrators at will goes directly at the 
expense of their opportunity to contain the agency problem. From the perspective of 
trying to solve the commitment problem, non-compliance by administrators means 
that they fail to be responsive to the interests representing the enacting coalition of 
legislators. In other words, Horn (1995) suggests that the governance structure of the 
agent is supposed to 'produce' a type of civil servant that demonstrates a strong status
19 Horn illustrates legislators' incentive to assure the administration of legislation as desired by the 
enacting coalition by example of the Roosevelt administration. "More than 80 percent of the 250,000 
government employees hired during Roosevelt's first term were exempted from the civil service. 
Roosevelt then introduced legislation to extend merit protection to his liberal appointees." Quoting 
Milkis (1987) he continues "that Roosevelt feared that the New Deal 'liberal era' might not outlast his 
administration, and that his extension of the merit system was directed at protecting New Deal policies
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quo orientation in the implementation of legislation (unless the interests of the groups 
favoured by the enacting coalition change their preferences). Horn (1995: 106) argues 
that "the characteristic features of the merit system act together to reduce 'shirking' by 
administrators. This is achieved by strengthening hierarchical control and hence the 
influence of senior management in general and bureau heads in particular."
Horn advances two factors that ensure a status quo orientation of senior officials. 
Firstly, "administrators are assumed to want to maximise some combination of 
lifetime income and leisure, which implies that they have no policy preferences per 
se" (p. 10). As a consequence, senior officials may have a natural "preference for a 
quiet life and an aversion to controversy" (p. 107) and hence will avoid conflict with 
their political superior whenever they can. Moreover, continuous interaction between 
the bureau and client groups induces senior officials to be and remain responsive to 
their demand (rather than to a changing political leadership). Hence, the close and 
continuous relationship between interest groups and senior officials ensures that the 
implementation of policy remains status quo biased.
Secondly, Horn refers to Miller (1992) who argues that it is impossible to solve the 
agency problem within any hierarchical organisation by means of formal contractual 
and incentives systems unless the leaders of the organisation can elicit the co­
operation of their subordinates. Accordingly, Horn (1995: 108-110) argues that 
senior officials will be unable to effectively perform their job, if they do not gain the 
co-operation of their subordinates. However, a preference of middle and lower ranks 
in the civil service for political neutrality resulting from the expectation to work for
political leaderships of different parties during their career will cause them to favour
00the implementation of policy as intended in the original legislation. Therefore, 
pressure from below and the necessity to achieve co-operation from subordinate staff
from the uncertainties of popular opinion and election results. ... [It] was one way to perpetuate the 
policies of his administration (1987: 447)."
20 Horn (1995) does not explicitly define different ranks of civil servants. However, in accordance with 
conventional distinctions, I refer to senior ranks as civil servants in managing positions and higher 
ranks as civil servants whose career may lead to the senior ranks. Below, I will call these higher civil 
servants or higher ranking bureaucrats also as 'second tier bureaucrats'. By contrast, middle and lower 
ranks have only in exceptional cases the opportunity to reach the higher or senior ranks.
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provide additional incentive for senior officials to implement legislation in a 
politically neutral way and responsive to the enacting coalition of legislators.
As a consequence, Horn's (1995) line of argumentation suggests that the burden of 
proof is partly shifted to the desired impact of a merit system governance structure on 
the middle and lower ranks of the civil service to exhibit political neutrality and 
status quo orientation in policy implementation. Horn (1995: 111) argues that a 
potential problem of agency is effectively addressed by "competition among officials 
for promotion that provides the best opportunity to influence their behaviour. Civil 
service rules regulate competition, just as the legal system regulates competition in 
the private sector." Four features of civil service rules stand out to provide incentives 
for civil servants to behave in the way desired by enacting legislators. Firstly, entry 
criteria based on educational qualifications, training and examination requirements 
serve to create a self-selecting mechanism and to sort out suitable from unsuitable 
candidates. Secondly, the classification system that assigns wages to jobs rather than 
individuals serves two purposes. As regards the features of deferred compensation 
during one's career plus a generous pension after the conclusion of one's career serve 
to discourage shirking because a civil servant foregoes higher income in later stages 
of the career if she gets caught. Similarly, Horn (1995) argues that a promotion 
system that allows competition for promotion to higher categories serves to select the 
most suitable civil servants to the top positions. Finally, security of tenure serves 
several purposes. It provides an incentive for civil servants to behave politically 
neutral given the expectation that they will serve many political leaders during their 
career. Conversely, Horn (1995: 109) suggests that failure to exhibit political 
neutrality damages their reputation as an able adviser and administrator of policy. 
This in turn undermines their prospect of gaining promotion to higher categories and 
senior posts. Moreover, security of tenure is intended to attract risk-averse 
individuals, who are assumed to be less inclined to shirk and who tend to favour a 
status quo oriented administration of policies. Finally, security of tenure to civil 
servants simultaneously serves to limit legislative influence and hence grants civil 
servants some degree of independence from legislators' intervention in the 
administration of policy.
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Horn's (1995) argument is plausible as far as legislators' strategy to contain the 
agency problem is concerned. However, it is not when considering that legislators' 
problem of commitment towards constituent voters shall be the key variable that 
causes their incentive to forgo the possibility to intervene into personnel policy, i.e. 
to institutionalise a low degree of formal political discretion. Firstly, in his 
explanation, Horn (1995) effectively ignores that 'modem merit civil services' differ 
across countries with respect to the extent to which legislators may intervene into 
personnel policy processes. On the one hand, he makes restrictions upon the 
appointment and dismissal of senior officials a hallmark of his conceptualisation of 
the civil service arguing that "[t]ying legislators' hands will only leave constituents 
better off (...), if these [senior] officials are more likely than subsequent legislative 
coalitions to protect the interests represented at enactment" (Horn 1995: 106). On the 
other hand, Horn (1995: 109-111) recognises that this is not the case in some 
countries and he mentions the US and Germany as examples and argues that political 
appointments are generally of little relevance because politically appointed senior 
civil servants will not be able to pursue their (politically induced) policy preferences
91as a result of the need to establish a co-operative relation with their subordinates. 
This argument suggests that either the emphasis on hierarchical control by senior 
officials is contradictory or that legislators in countries like the US and Germany 
have (so far) made irrational decisions, as they cannot take advantage of improved 
commitment in relation to the electorate nor can they assert political control. 
Consequently, it appears questionable to what extent legislators' problem of 
commitment towards voters helps to explain the institutionalisation of low degrees of 
formal political discretion over personnel policy.
There is in fact no agreement in Political Science when and to what extent the ability 
to credibly commit towards voters is really a problem for politicians. Shepsle (1991: 
250), one of the most active researchers on the aspect of credible commitment, for 
instance, argues that "both the inability of government to commit and its disabled 
capacity to uncommit (that is, the lack of flexibility) are serious problems". He goes
21 Horn argues that "[e]ven in the United States, politically appointed officials often appear to either 
end up supporting, or failing to change, the administrative behaviour of their subordinates. This 
appears to have much to do with the need of political appointees to elicit the co-operation of their 
subordinates" (Horn 1995: 110).
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on that "governance (the capacity to commit to policies) and representation (the 
capacity to respond to majorities) are sometimes at odds and that institutional 
shortcomings in the latter respect have gotten much press and attracted the passions 
of reformers, but that the former constitutes (...) a worthy objective, too" (Shepsle 
1991: 256). Correspondingly, I agree that politicians' ability to credibly commit to 
their decisions is an important problem in many policy areas, in particular, economic 
policy and market regulation. Conversely, I would argue that the civil service as a 
particular area of administrative policy is not necessarily subject to the commitment 
problem.
When discussing the problem of commitment in his theoretical framework, Horn 
(1995: 18) explicitly raises his concern with the problem of'administrative tinkering'. 
"[T]he real threat to the durability of the enacting coalition's deal is that future 
legislators will undermine the value of the legislation by altering the way it is 
administered or enforced". From this point of view, it is clear that Horn (1995) is 
generally concerned with the implementation of policy and crucially with its 
continuous, faithful and predictable implementation. Continuity and predictability 
have been held in high esteem in the study of public administration at least since 
Weber's writings at the beginning of the 20th century. It is also a very reasonable 
assumption to expect politicians to benefit from addressing public outcry over 
corrupt street-level bureaucrats or clientelist practices in public service delivery and 
to tackle this problem by means of civil service policy.
By contrast, senior and higher civil servants in the ministerial bureaucracy are less 
concerned with the implementation of legislation. Rather, especially, studies of 
bureaucrats' role perceptions suggest that senior bureaucrats tend to take on important 
roles in policy formulation and, hence, they are 'producing' legislation (Aberbach et 
al. 1981). They tend to fulfil a staff function and their activities cannot be highly 
routinised, that is, they cannot be directed by generalised rules except to some extent 
in procedural terms. As a consequence, the distinction between goal setting and 
implementation becomes at best blurred. Horn's argument that institutional 
arrangements governing the senior and the higher civil service are crucial in ensuring 
politicians' credible commitment towards citizen voters then turns out to be highly
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problematic. If the 'production' of legislation (Mayntz/Scharpf 1975) is the central 
concern of the upper ranks, then a goal such as 'durability of legislation' makes little 
sense. Moreover, Horn's (1995) attempt to induce them with a status quo preserving 
orientation may become dysfunctional, in particular, in the eyes of political officials 
who take office with an electoral mandate to change existing policies, that is, with a 
mandate to 'un-commit'.
Therefore, Horn's (1995) argument that the relation between his characteristic 
features of the modem merit civil service and politicians' problem of commitment 
may be plausible with respect to the lower and possibly middle ranks of the civil 
service or even heads of agencies that are primarily dealing with the implementation 
of clearly stated policy goals, for instance, directors of central banks. Moreover, note 
that the institutional configurations of Western civil services present a much more 
homogenous picture, if we look further down the hierarchy (see for instance, 
Bosseart et al. 2001). By contrast, it is less plausible why legislators should have an 
incentive to restrict their possibilities to exercise political discretion towards senior 
and higher ranking bureaucrats due to a problem of commitment towards constituent 
voters.
3. An Informational Rationale of Civil Service Reform: The Basic 
Explanatory Framework
3.1. Governments, Bureaucrats and Problems of Uncertainty
In contrast to Horn (1995), I suggest that the choice of civil service institutions that 
formalise restrictions upon the exercise of political discretion over personnel policy 
can be well explained with respect to politicians' problems of informational 
uncertainty. Horn (1995) also acknowledges that the institutional features of the merit 
civil service may have resulted out of a desire to 'improve the competence of 
administrative personnel', hence, to overcome problems of informational uncertainty. 
However, he dismisses this possibility arguing that "[t]hese considerations are likely 
to have played a role. It is, however, very difficult to distinguish clearly between a 
desire for "competence" and a desire to constrain legislators (and the "neutrality" 
implied by that)". Moreover, he goes on to say that "[i]f administrative competence is
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the sole objective, then it is difficult to explain the precise nature of the restrictions 
imposed by civil service rules. Civil service employment arrangements are not 
common in the private sector. Private firms have an incentive to hire competent 
employees but few would (...) hire simply on the basis of ranking on examination 
boards. Nor would they prohibit hiring more than two people from the same family" 
(Horn 1995: 104). Contrary to this view, the remainder of this Chapter shows that 
governments' desire to overcome problems related to policy-making uncertainty are 
critical to understand why politicians should be willing to tie their hands towards 
civil service management. To this end, it develops an explanatory framework that is 
based on the logic of informational theories of legislative choice.
Informational theories of legislative choice direct their attention towards the impact 
of legislators' problems of informational uncertainty on the organisational design of 
legislatures. The key feature of informational theories is the assumption that 
legislators in games with incomplete information are fundamentally outcome- 
oriented. Policies and outcomes are regarded as distinct. Policies or laws are subject 
to legislative choice. By contrast, outcomes are assumed to be a consequence of 
policies upon their enactment and implementation. As a result, the essence of 
informational theories of legislative choice is that "legislators are initially uncertain 
about the relationship between policies (which they see and choose directly) and 
outcomes (which they can only forecast as a function of the policy under 
consideration and a random variable). (...) The outcome (consequences of the 
implemented policy) coincides with a legislator's expectation only to the extent that 
she has precise information about how a policy is transformed into a final outcome 
or, alternatively, how a law is implemented and its consequences are felt" (Krehbiel 
1991: 67). This implies that the kind of incomplete information about the 
consequences of policies upon outcomes refers exclusively to policy information, 
that is, the technical aspects of a policy as opposed to political information, which 
concerns legislators' knowledge of other legislators' preferences.
Secondly, informational theories of legislative choice seek to capture that usually 
legislators have diverse skills, different expertise when it comes to policy-making or 
simply find different policy areas interesting. Hence, some legislators are assumed to
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be better informed about the effects of policies upon outcomes than other legislators, 
but the assumption of asymmetric information implies - as in agency theory - that 
legislators with superior knowledge may have an incentive to use their information 
strategically in order to reach outcomes that are closest to their most preferred 
outcomes. As a consequence, the challenge of a group of legislators that is plagued 
with problems of incomplete information is to devise strategies that tap the diverse 
expertise of its members in a way that it minimises both the uncertainty associated 
with a policy under consideration and the distributional losses that may arise from 
expert legislators' strategic use of information at the expense of the majority.
The logic of informational theories of legislative choices as one variant of the new 
economics of organisations can be well transferred to the relationship between 
politicians and bureaucrats in parliamentary democracies. Again, I will restrict myself 
to parliamentary democracies because the new democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe are either of a parliamentary or semi-presidential type. Consider a situation in 
which a government is replaced by another and has to consider whether or not to 
work with the senior bureaucrats, i.e. bureaucrats in managing ranks that are in office 
at the time of its investiture. On the one hand, it is probably no point of contention 
that every new government and its ministers in every parliamentary democracy is 
usually confronted with problems of uncertainty when it comes to the formulation of 
policies to solve corresponding policy problems. Governments usually take office 
with a set of policy goals that are formulated in party manifestos or governments 
have to develop legislation in order to respond to suddenly arising crisis situations. In 
either case, new governments can be assumed to be initially uncertain about the 
relationship between the policies they consider and choose and the outcomes, which 
they expect as a result of the enactment and implementation of the policy.
On the other hand, senior bureaucrats inherited from the previous government can 
unambiguously be labelled as policy specialists at least relative to the incoming 
government. Although the bureaucrats in office are unlikely to be able to reduce all 
uncertainty that surrounds the policy goals of the new government, they will 
inevitably have superior information about the details and ramifications of existing 
policies, which they have either prepared under the previous government or
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administered on a continuous basis. Moreover, inherited bureaucrats possess 
important procedural knowledge about the way policies are formulated and how 
future policies can be administered simply due to their experience in office. In fact, 
the (relative) specialist label applies to all senior bureaucrats that are in office at the 
time of a new government's investiture regardless of their professional or career 
background. Hence, even without invoking the Weberian features of public
i
bureaucracies, it is unquestionable that bureaucrats in office have superior technical 
and procedural information at the time of a new government's investiture, which puts 
them into a specialist position relative to the new government.
As a consequence, every new government has a natural interest in the specialist 
information of the bureaucrats that are in office at the time of its investiture. 
However, I argue that new governments will only be able to take advantage of 
existing bureaucratic expertise, if they are able to solve two problems. The first 
problem is compatible with informational theories of legislative choice as well as 
with second generation delegation studies. It takes the perspective of the incoming 
government and refers to 'problems of policy conflict' between incoming government 
ministers and inherited senior bureaucrats (Huber/Shipan 2002). Below, I take a more 
conventional interpretation of this problem and label it governments' problem of 
political trust (see Page/Wright 1999). The second problem is more compatible with 
standard agency theory. From the perspective of senior bureaucrats, it refers to their 
incentive to share the information with the new government and to possibly invest in 
the development of further expertise in order to help alleviate the incoming 
government's problem of uncertainty. Hence, if bureaucrats have no incentive to be 
informative, governments have a problem of inducing bureaucratic informativeness. 
Below, I argue that governments can overcome the problem of bureaucratic 
informativeness, if they forgo the possibility to intervene into personnel policy, i.e. if 
they reduce the degree of formal political discretion over personnel policy.
22 Admittedly, this assumption does not explicitly take into account the insight of recent studies of 
West European core executives, which emphasise the importance of information and expertise in the 
area of political management or 'political craft' in the process of co-ordinating government policy 
(Hayward/Wright 2002; Goetz 1997; Peters/Rhodes/Wright 1999).
23 Note for instance the British convention that the files of the outgoing minister are not passed on to 
new ministers. Kellner/Crowther-Hunt (1981) mention this as a major problem for new ministers to
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3.2. Problems of Political Trust and the Choice of Personnel Policy 
Strategies
Informational theories make several general propositions with respect to the 
composition of specialist committees in legislatures.
(i) A specialist committee member is less informative, the more extreme his 
preferences are relative to the preferences of a non-specialist legislators in the 
parent chamber.
(ii) Even a so-called preference outlier in a committee may be more informative, 
if the costs of specialisation are low for the specialist committee members 
with extreme preferences, i.e. the preference outlier. Hence, non-specialist 
legislators of the parent chamber may rely on an outlier committee, if both the 
distributional losses and the informational losses that result from relying on 
an outlier committee offset the costs of setting up a committee of moderates.
(iii) Committees that consist of specialist legislators with preferences from 
opposing sides of the political spectrum are collectively more informative for 
the non-specialist legislators of the parent chamber than committees that are 
composed of specialist legislators from one side only.
As a consequence, informational theories of legislative choice argue that legislators 
of the parent chamber will staff committees in a way that they have no extreme 
preferences, include legislators with preferences from different sides of the political 
spectrum and that the costs of specialisation are low because either of these strategies 
can enhance the informational position of the legislators collectively and keeps 
distributional losses low (Krehbiel 1991: 81-90).
Correspondingly, the first proposition of the informational logic of legislative choice 
suggests with respect to the relation between an incoming government and inherited 
senior bureaucrats that governments will only be able to take advantage of existing 
bureaucratic expertise, if senior bureaucrats' policy preferences are not extremely 
divergent from that of the incoming government. Hence, in accordance with second
effectively run their departments because it takes them several months to trace and understand the 
status quo policies let alone die procedural detail of a policy.
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generation delegation studies, it suggests that the occurrence of policy conflict 
between politicians and bureaucrats will create distributional losses that undermine 
politicians1 informational gains from delegating policy formulation tasks to inherited 
bureaucrats. As a consequence, an incoming government will have an incentive to 
replace an inherited bureaucrat with a candidate that is closer to its most preferred 
policy although this strategy implies that the incoming government forgoes potential 
gains to reduce uncertainty about the relationship between policies and outcomes by 
taking advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise.
This 'hard interpretation' raises the problematic question of determining senior 
bureaucrats' policy preferences. In legislative settings, legislators usually belong to a 
faction of a parliamentary party and hence their policy preferences are common 
knowledge to all legislators. By contrast, at the level of executive policy-making, an 
incoming government may often be entirely uncertain about the policy preferences of 
senior bureaucrats that are already in office.24 In practice, the proposition means 
essentially that new ministers who are uncertain about the relation between policies 
and outcomes they want to pursue will be reluctant to take cues from senior 
bureaucrats who have the reputation of having entirely different policy convictions 
and political worldviews or whose orientations they do not know at all - given the 
possibility that senior bureaucrats use their superior knowledge strategically, 
misrepresent it or fail to share it all together. Consequently, new ministers will have 
to evaluate as to whether they expect inherited bureaucrats to aid the development of 
policies that aim at reaching outcomes they desire. Hence, a more conventional 
interpretation of this proposition suggests that incoming governments may have a 
problem of trusting the bureaucrats they inherit from the previous government 
irrespective of the true policy preferences of the bureaucrats.
24 For instance, in their theoretical model of designing legislative statutes, Huber/Shipan (2002: 85) 
propose that "in all political systems, certain political actors stand at the apex of nearly every 
bureaucratic hierarchy and thus are privileged in their opportunities to influence policy 
implementation. (...) [W]e therefore assume that the preferences of these privileged political actors 
strongly influence the policy preferences of bureaucrats".24 In fact, Huber/Shipan (2002) seem to 
ignore that their assumption solves the problem of a potential policy conflict between senior civil 
servants and ministers in the policy formulation stage.
25 The qualification 'irrespective of their true policy preferences' is important because bureaucrats may 
be entirely indifferent between different policy preferences or they may not at all be opposed to the 
policy position of the incoming government. Yet, in practice it can happen that even the indifferent 
bureaucrat is pushed into one side of the political spectrum by an incoming government. Hence, at this
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On the one hand, bureaucrats can themselves seek to alleviate this problem for 
incoming governments. For instance, in countries like Austria and Germany it is a
common practice that bureaucrats are members of political parties, which enables
* ) ( \them to signal their policy preferences to a new government (Liegl/Miiller 1999). 
On the other hand, new governments and their ministers will almost inevitably form 
some opinion about the possible policy orientations of the senior bureaucrats, which 
they inherit from outgoing governments. Two possible criteria to evaluate and 
estimate the policy orientations of senior bureaucrats in office refer to their career 
path and their past policy-making record.
First, the typology of personnel policy regimes developed in the last Chapter suggests 
that the personnel policy strategies of the previous government signal to an incoming 
government and its ministers to what extent senior bureaucrats can be associated with 
the policy preferences of the outgoing government. Provided that governments can 
exercise some political discretion over personnel policy, a new minister will 
associate a bureaucrat in office more with the policy preferences of the outgoing 
governments, if he was recruited from outside public administration directly into 
senior ranks than a career bureaucrat who has effectively been promoted to a more 
senior rank while the outgoing minister was in office. By contrast, a new minister 
will be relatively least concerned about the policy orientations of a senior bureaucrat, 
if governments have generally no possibility to exercise political discretion over 
personnel policy because in that case the senior bureaucrat is unlikely to owe his 
career to the outgoing minister. As a consequence, the personnel policy strategy of 
the outgoing government is a critical means for an incoming government and its 
ministers to evaluate the extent to which senior bureaucrat can be associated with its 
predecessor and hence the extent to which it feels prepared to trust the bureaucrats in 
office.
stage, it does not matter whether or not a given bureaucrat has a specific policy preference and if so, to 
what extent it matches the policy preference of a minister. Rather, because a minister is concerned with 
policies, he has to evaluate whether the bureaucrats in office qualify as an aid to reach his goals.
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However, even if a bureaucrat owes his career to a minister of the outgoing 
government, the new minister will not necessarily perceive a serious problem of 
political trust. For instance, consider a change in government that has only been 
partial, but one or several ministers of the party that stays in government have been 
replaced. Under these conditions, a new minister will not be particularly troubled by 
the fact that the bureaucrat has been promoted or recruited by his predecessor, for the 
policy preferences of the incoming and the outgoing minister are likely to be very 
similar if not identical. Hence, an incoming government and its ministers will also 
take into account the party composition and the policy record of the previous 
government in order to evaluate the policy orientations of a bureaucrat on the basis of 
the policies he has drafted or helped to adopt. As a result, if the policy preferences of 
the incoming and the outgoing governments are convergent, new ministers will be 
more able to trust the senior bureaucrats in office than in case of divergent policy 
preferences.
In sum, it is reasonable to expect that any change in the political leadership of a 
ministry creates a certain degree of distrust of a new minister towards the senior 
bureaucrats that are in office. However, problems of political trust between the 
ministers of an incoming government and the senior bureaucrats inherited from the 
outgoing government increase the more the policy positions between incoming and 
outgoing government diverge and the more outgoing ministers have evidently 
exercised political discretion over personnel policy. Table 3.1. summarises the 
discussion and gives some clues about the intensity of incoming governments' 
problem of trust under different constellations.27
26 Also note that in Central and Eastern Europe, senior bureaucrats before the change of regime were 
members of the ruling communist party virtually without exception (Csanadi 1997). I will discuss the 
point in more detail in the next Chapter.
27 Because the problem of trust is essentially a belief held by human beings, I suggest that the rankings 
in Table 3.1. should be interpreted as an approximation. Hence, it may be possible that different 
governments and their ministers interpret the same problem of trust as conceptualised in the Table 
differently.
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Table 3.1. Problems o f Trust as Perceived by the Ministers o f Incoming Governments















Convergent Lowest Low Medium Medium to 
high
Divergent Low to 
medium
Medium High Highest
As a consequence, incoming governments that are uncertain about the relationship 
between the policies they consider and the outcomes they seek, will be willing to rely 
on the expertise of senior bureaucrats they inherit from the outgoing government to 
the extent that they are able to trust the senior bureaucrats in office. Conversely, 
disregarding - for the moment - the possibility frontier to exercise political discretion 
established by personnel policy regimes, if an incoming government feels unable to
on appointing trusted officials to key positions. This proposition is in so far relevant 
as governments may lack the possibility to implement sweeping changes in the 
bureaucracy, even if they wish to do so.29 Secondly, in accordance with the second 
proposition, there may be special circumstances, under which incoming governments 
choose to work with the senior bureaucrats in office even if they perceive a severe 
problem of political trust. For instance, it is conceivable that an incoming 
government has no personnel alternative or that the costs, effort and time of training 
a new senior bureaucrat are too high relative to working with a rather mistrusted 
senior bureaucrat in office.30
As a result, we are left with the dilemma that an incoming governments' problem of 
political trust tends to shape their personnel policy strategies, but governments may 
still (be forced to) do exactly the opposite. However, we may argue that, in executive 
settings, the latter two options are merely variants of the personnel policy strategy, 
which governments will choose under conditions of major problems of political trust. 
Hence, if incoming governments are troubled by severe problems of political trust 
towards inherited senior bureaucrats, they will try to replace them, but they may be 
limited in the extent to which they can do so. In sum, we cannot exactly determine 
the personnel policy strategy of incoming governments as a function of problems of 
political trust. However, we can still distinguish two scenarios that differ with respect 
to the intensity of incoming governments' perceived problem of political trust 
towards senior bureaucrats that are in office at the time of their investiture and the 
kind of personnel policy strategy they will try to choose. Table 3.2. summarises the
31discussion of the choice of incoming governments' personnel policy strategies.
29 We will see later that this applies especially to Central and Eastern Europe.
30 There is the additional conceivable scenario that an incoming government is confronted with a 
comparably minor problem of political trust, but it still chooses to replace a senior bureaucrat in office. 
However, this appears to be a rather remote case because the incoming government would forgo the 
possibility to take advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise, while only marginally enhancing the 
degree of political trust towards senior bureaucrats.
31 For the time being, I will concentrate on the extreme cases of high and low problems of political 
trust. Below, I will also discuss the impact of intermediate problems of political trust.
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Table 3.2. The Choice o f Incoming Governments' Personnel Policy Strategies
Intensity of the Perceived Problem of Political Trust towards Inherited Senior
Bureaucrats
Low High
Incoming governments will seek to work with 
inherited senior bureaucrats.
Incoming governments will seek to replace 
inherited senior bureaucrats, but the scope of 
replacements may be limited.
3.3. Bureaucrats1 Incentive to be Informative and the Institutionalisation 
of Political Discretion
Regardless of its personnel policy strategy, an incoming government will generally 
not be able to take properly advantage of bureaucratic expertise unless bureaucrats 
have an incentive to share their superior information with the new governments. 
Informational theories of legislative choice propose that "restrictive amendment 
procedures can provide incentives for committees to specialise and to be informative" 
(Krehbiel 1991: 90). Krehbiel (1991) and Gilligan/Krehbiel (1987) try to suggest that 
it is practically impossible for a legislature to staff committees with legislators whose 
preferences are exactly representative of the parent chambers' preferences. Therefore, 
committees will not have an incentive to be informative to the parent chamber, unless 
they can reap a distributional gain from specialisation. However, in combination with 
the first proposition of informational theories of legislative choice mentioned above, 
this means that the legislators of the parent chamber have an incentive to use 
restrictive amendment procedures "as long as the preferences of the committee and 
the parent body are not extremely divergent" and hence the informational gains 
exceed the distributional losses from committing to a restrictive procedure 
(Gilligan/Krehbiel 1987: 288). This logic implies that, if legislators commit to 
restrictive procedural rules, informational gains from specialisation will entail 
distributional losses.
At the level of executive policy-making, it appears less appropriate to assume that 
senior bureaucrats are reaping distributional gains, if they manage to propose policies 
that shift the expected outcome closer to their most preferred outcome at the expense 
of the government. Firstly, I argued above that it is problematic to assign specific
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policy preferences to bureaucrats. Secondly, notwithstanding an incoming 
government's problem of trust, which does not imply that bureaucrats are motivated 
by policy outcomes, it is questionable to what extent senior bureaucrats are 
unambiguously policy-seeking animals. Certainly, in every bureaucracy, one will find 
bureaucrats with and without policy preferences, politically committed bureaucrats 
and uncommitted ones who are ready to change their political dress whenever a new 
government takes office (cf. Campbell/Peters 1988, Aberbach/Rockman 1988). 
Hence, while bureaucrats are unlikely to be entirely indifferent towards policy 
outcomes, I suggest that bureaucrats are much more concerned with their personal 
career prospects than with the outcomes, which policies are intended to affect.
This perspective is compatible with standard agency theory, which assumes that 
agents are concerned with their levels of wage and effort, that is, an agent will only
demand a prospect of staying or getting close to political power centres. Therefore, 
governments have to evaluate to what extent they are confronted with a problem of 
bureaucratic informativeness. The informativeness of bureaucrats, however, depends 
fundamentally on the personnel policy strategy of incoming governments, and, as I 
will argue below, on the institutional arrangements governing the exercise of political 
discretion over personnel policy.
Consider first the extreme case that an incoming government has pursued a personnel 
policy strategy of unbounded politicisation, given the formal possibilities to do so, 
that is, a party official has effectively been assigned a patronage post in the top ranks 
of a ministry and hence nominally becomes a senior bureaucrat in office. Such a 
'partisan amphibian' (Campbell 1988) in the senior ranks of a ministry is likely to be 
highly informative and does not require any special inducements because he knows 
that his job close to the centre of political power depends on the tenure of the 
government, while any future government will associate him closely with the 
government that has appointed him. In fact, the willingness to share information with 
the government and to invest in additional expertise may also pay off in the future 
career of this kind of partisan senior bureaucrat because it may promote his political 
career ambitions. At the same time, when taking office, the government has taken a 
clear position by maximising political trust towards the newly appointed senior 
bureaucrat while foregoing the possibility to take advantage of existing bureaucratic 
expertise.
Contrast this with a situation in which an incoming government wants to take 
advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise and hence no politically induced changes 
in the composition of the senior bureaucracy have been initiated. In this case, 
inherited bureaucrats will effectively fail to share their information with the new 
government and its ministers unless the government can credibly commit to the 
promise that it will not seek to minimise problems of political trust at some point in 
the future. The reason for senior bureaucrats concern is that every change in 
government creates at least a minimum level of distrust between them and the 
incoming government. Moreover, I argued above that under special circumstances 
incoming governments may want/have to work with inherited senior bureaucrats
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although they perceive a severe problem of political trust simply because they are 
lacking alternatives, time and resources to replace existing staff. Therefore, new 
governments may merely ’postpone1 their attempt to enhance trust towards senior 
bureaucrats whenever they do not replace senior bureaucrats at the time of taking 
office.
North/Weingast (1989: 1) who address this - isomorphic - problem with respect to 
economic growth in medieval societies argue that ”[t]he more likely property rights 
are to be altered by the sovereign for his own benefit, the lower the expected returns 
from investment and the lower in turn the incentive to invest. A necessary condition 
for economic growth is that the sovereign or government, beyond establishing the 
relevant set of rights, establish a credible commitment to them". Accordingly, senior 
bureaucrats in office are aware that problems of political trust may provide 
governments with enough of an incentive to initiate changes in the senior ranks of the 
ministerial bureaucracy in the near future. Moreover, senior bureaucrats that gain 
promotion during the government's tenure are well aware that they will become 
subject to considerable distrust as long as governments are not committed to de­
politicised personnel policy strategies. As a consequence, they will effectively fail to 
share their information with governments and their ministers unless governments are 
willing to commit that the senior jobs close to political power remain reserved for 
them.
If governments want to overcome a problem of bureaucratic informativeness, they 
can rely on formal and informal means to achieve credible commitment. Informal 
means of commitment like communicating political non-interference into personnel 
policy in order to shape the expectation among bureaucrats will often lack credibility 
because they bear the potential that governments and their ministers break their 
promise at a later stage. Consequently, if governments rely on informal means of 
commitment, the bureaucrats in office will anticipate the possibility that the 
government might deviate from its original position and thus bureaucrats will have 
less incentive to be informative in the first place. Miller (1992: 181) argues with 
respect to the design of organisations that "[cjentral to this signalling problem is the 
appropriate dispersion of political and property rights within the organisation".
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Hence, from the perspective of organisational economics, "the leader has a central 
role in committing the organisation to what is in effect the "constitution" of the 
hierarchy - the allocation of generally accepted responsibilities, rules of the game, 
and property rights that provide the long-run incentives for investment in the firm" 
(Miller 1992: 217). Accordingly, similar to the use of restrictive amendment 
procedures in legislative settings, governments will only be able to achieve credible 
commitment towards senior bureaucrats by means of establishing formal institutional 
arrangements that reserve the senior ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy for senior 
bureaucrats in office and second tier bureaucrats who are striving for promotion to 
the top. However, this is equivalent to institutionalising a low degree of formal 
political discretion over personnel policy.
As a consequence, if governments want to take advantage of existing bureaucratic 
expertise, they have to institutionalise restrictions upon political interference into 
personnel policy, for instance, by delegating the management of personnel policy to 
an independent body such as a civil service commission. In other words, incoming 
governments have to reduce the degree of formal political discretion, if they want to 
take advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise, which, in turn, enables them to 
enhance the informational role of bureaucrats who seek to pursue a career in public 
administration in the process of policy formulation. Moreover, restrictions upon the 
exercise of political discretion over personnel policy also help bureaucrats to signal 
their willingness to work with any future government of any political colour. 
Conversely, if governments choose to commit towards bureaucrats in office they 
forego future opportunities to intervene into personnel policy and hence to enhance 
trust towards senior bureaucrats.
In sum, the incentive of senior bureaucrats to be informative depends on the 
personnel policy strategy of the incoming government and the rules governing the 
exercise of political discretion over personnel policy (see Table 3.3.). Provided 
governments have the formal-legal possibility to intervene into personnel policy, the 
more political discretion a government directly exercises at the time of taking office, 
the more intense the incentive of bureaucrats to share their information with the 
government and its ministers. Therefore, incoming governments are not required to
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devise any further strategies to achieve bureaucratic informativeness, if they have 
exercised political discretion and hence newly appointed bureaucrats will be 
informative under conditions of high degrees of formal political discretion built into 
civil service legislation. By contrast, if governments have not exercised political 
discretion over personnel policy at the time of taking office, then the informativeness 
of higher-level bureaucrats will depend on the ability of new governments to credibly 
commit towards bureaucrats that they will not break their promises at a later stage 
and hence that they will not exercise political discretion. As a consequence, 
governments have to pursue institutional reforms that reduce the degree of formal 
political discretion or, if it is the status quo arrangement, they have to maintain a low 
degree of formal political discretion.
Table 3.3. The Determinants o f  Bureaucratic Informativeness
Personnel Policy Strategy of Incoming 
Governments






Degree of Formal 
Political Discretion 
Built into Civil 
Service Legislation
Low Yes Option is not available
High No Yes
However, the logic of using restrictive amendment procedures in the US Congress 
outlined above suggests that governments will only have an incentive to establish or 
maintain a low degree of formal political discretion built into civil service legislation, 
if they are not confronted with a major problem of political trust towards senior 
bureaucrats in office. In other words, incoming governments have to strike a balance 
between the benefits that result from the informativeness of inherited bureaucrats and 
the costs of forgoing the possibility to enhance trust towards the bureaucracy in the 
future. As a result, we can distinguish two basic scenarios that will lead to the 
establishment of either a high or a low degree of formal political discretion built into 
civil service legislation.
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Firstly, if incoming governments can trust the senior bureaucrats in office, they will 
seek to take advantage of their expertise (i.e. they will not replace them), and they 
will have an incentive to establish or maintain a low degree of formal political 
discretion. As a consequence, governments can enhance the informational role of 
bureaucrats who seek to pursue a career in public administration in the process of 
policy formulation. A low degree of formal political discretion encourages these 
bureaucrats to invest in the development of expertise or to share their expertise with 
governments because it safeguards bureaucratic career expectations by credibly 
committing governments not to intervene into personnel policy and hence not to 
meddle with bureaucratic careers. As a result, governments can develop better- 
informed policies, which reduce the uncertainty about the relationship between 
policies they choose and outcomes they desire.
Conversely, in the second scenario incoming governments cannot trust the senior 
bureaucrats in office. As a result, they will seek to replace them, and they will have 
an incentive to establish or maintain a high degree of formal political discretion. 
However, in this case, the trade-off between potential gains from bureaucratic 
informativeness and potential losses from forgoing the possibility to enhance 
political trust towards the senior bureaucracy will be more ambiguous when 
compared with the first scenario. On the one hand, new appointees will be 
informative regardless of the degree of formal political discretion and, thus, 
governments have no need to restrict their possibilities to intervene into personnel 
policy. On the other hand, however, I argued above that incoming governments will 
be unable to implement sweeping changes in the senior bureaucracy. As a result, they 
will have to work (at least) with some bureaucrats inherited from previous 
governments, but these inherited bureaucrats will fail to be informative unless the 
new government is willing to establish restrictions upon the exercise of political 
discretion over personnel policy. Informational theories of legislative choice suggest 
that under these circumstances, governments will have little incentive to establish or 
maintain a low degree of formal political discretion. The reason is simply that they 
would commit not to exercise political discretion towards mistrusted bureaucrats. As 
a consequence, incoming governments will prefer to retain possibilities for the 
reduction of problems of political trust rather than trying to enhance the
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informational role of the ministerial bureaucracy in policy formulation. Moreover, 
the second scenario will create the peculiar constellation that only the new appointees 
of the incoming government will be informative. By contrast, bureaucrats who 
continue to stay in office when incoming governments are confronted with major 
problems of political trust, will have little incentive to be informative, while these 
new governments do not or cannot replace them as a result of conceivable constraints 
such as a lack of personnel alternatives or the costs of training a new appointee. 
However, the extent to which either of these two basic scenarios arises is heavily 
influenced by the personnel policy regime that is in place before a new government 
takes office.
3.4. Discussion: Stability and Change of Personnel Policy Regimes
Once a certain degree of formal political discretion has been established through 
legislation, it does not only affect bureaucrats' incentive to be informative but also 
develops its own impact on governments' problems of trust and their personnel policy 
strategies. Firstly, if governments cannot exercise virtually any discretion over 
personnel policy, as is the case in a de-politicised personnel policy regime, problems 
of political trust will continuously tend to be low and they will only vary in 
accordance to the ideological positions of alternating government parties. As a result, 
they will have an incentive to take advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise rather 
than demanding a replacement of inherited senior bureaucrats. At the same time, 
senior bureaucrats and those who strive for senior office will remain informative 
because it enhances their prospects of career advancement in the ministerial 
hierarchy. Hence, a de-politicised personnel policy regime tends to be stable once it 
has been institutionalised.
Contrast this with personnel systems with high degrees of formal political discretion 
like personnel policy regimes that allow open or unbounded politicisation. If 
governments do also exercise the discretion at hand, severe problems of political trust 
will arise whenever governments change while the ideological positions of 
alternating government parties could reinforce the problem of trust. As a
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consequence, an incoming government will be reluctant to tap the expertise of 
inherited senior bureaucrats. Rather, the incoming government will seek to replace 
inherited senior bureaucrats due to a severe problem of political trust, the new 
appointees will be informative because their time in office will effectively be bound 
to that of the government, while remaining bureaucrats will fail to be informative due 
to a lack of government commitment to non-intervention into personnel policy. 
Hence, in either case, the personnel policy regime that is in place when a new 
government takes office tends to reproduce the degree to which governments are 
confronted with problems of political trust, their personnel policy strategies and 
bureaucrats' incentive to be informative.
At the same time, the stability of a status quo regime goes hand in hand with the 
existence of continuous pressures towards the adjustment of the degree of formal 
political discretion to day-to-day perceptions of governments and bureaucrats. Firstly, 
pressures towards the reform of a de-politicised personnel policy regime will 
exclusively result from changes in the way incoming governments perceive a 
problem of political trust vis-a-vis inherited senior bureaucrats. On the one hand, new 
governments will probably always find some reason to question the reliability of 
inherited bureaucrats given that every change in government sets off some distrust 
between new government politicians and old bureaucrats. As a result, because a de- 
politicised personnel policy regime minimises governments' possibilities to intervene 
into the composition of the senior bureaucracy, governments have more or less but 
every government has probably some desire to increase political influence over 
senior appointments. However, pressures towards a proper reform of a de-politicised 
personnel policy regime will primarily result, if a polarisation of inter-party 
competition translates into 'wholesale changes of government' (Mair 1997) that are 
characterised by large policy differences between incoming and outgoing 
governments. Under these circumstances, incoming governments will either seek 
ways and means to intervene into personnel policy despite a low degree of formal 
political discretion or they will initiate institutional reforms that increase the 
possibility to exercise political discretion over personnel policy to enhance trust 
towards the ministerial bureaucracy. However, this move would be strongly opposed
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by the senior bureaucrats in office and in particular bureaucrats who are striving for 
senior office because it would undermine their career prospects.
By contrast, the impetus to change a personnel policy regime that allows 
governments to exercise a high degree of political discretion will primarily arise 
under three conditions. Above, I argued that, for practical reasons, incoming 
governments may have difficulties to replace all mistrusted bureaucrats. Hence, 
governments will inevitably have to work with a certain proportion of inherited 
bureaucrats, in particular, below the very top ranks. However, a non-replacement 
strategy triggers pressures for institutional reforms with de-politicising effects 
because bureaucrats would otherwise have little incentive to be informative towards 
new governments and their ministers. As a consequence, bureaucrats that have stayed 
in office would demand government commitment to non-intervention into personnel 
policy. This argument implies that civil service systems with high degrees of formal 
political discretion are constantly exposed to more or less but always to some kind of 
de-politicisation pressures that is mounted by bureaucrats that have stayed and seek 
to stay in office. However, the pressure towards the reform of a personnel system 
with high degrees of formal political discretion will increase, the less new 
governments choose to replace inherited bureaucrats.
As a consequence, governments have to strike a balance between the benefits of 
enhanced bureaucratic informativeness and the costs of forgoing the possibility to 
enhance political trust in the future. I argued above that governments are likely to 
remain reluctant to commit not to exercise political discretion towards mistrusted 
bureaucrats despite increasing bureaucratic demand for institutional reform. 
Therefore, it is only reasonable to expect that governments will take on board 
bureaucratic demand for the initiation of a civil service reform with de-politicising 
effects upon personnel policy, if the salience of problems of political trust as 
perceived by incoming governments happens to decrease, if incoming governments 
have some opportunity to mitigate (potentially severe) problems of political trust 
and/or if they perceive increasing costs resulting from a lack of bureaucratic 
informativeness despite severe problems of political trust.
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First, even if an incoming government is confronted with senior bureaucrats who owe 
their career to an outgoing government, it is conceivable that problems of political 
trust decrease. As argued above, this scenario will occur, if changes of government 
are only partial or if they are not characterised by large policy differences between 
incoming and outgoing governments, for instance, as a result of a moderation of 
inter-party competition (cf. Sartori 1976). Consequently, incoming governments 
would be encouraged to take advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise and given 
bureaucratic demand for institutional reforms with de-politicising effects upon 
personnel policy and given a rather minor problem of political trust, incoming 
governments will become willing to forgo the possibility to intervene into personnel 
policy. Second, the same dynamics will be set off, if incoming governments have the 
ability to mitigate (potentially severe) problems of political trust, which depends 
essentially on an opportunity for governments to learn about the policy orientations 
of bureaucrats before taking office.32 Hence, this second scenario for lowering a high 
degree of formal political discretion is effectively a variant of the first one.
Third, perceived costs resulting from a lack of bureaucratic informativeness will 
simply result from a lack of co-operation between bureaucrats and politicians in 
policy-making. In the long run, such costs will typically take the form of a 
deteriorating policy-making capacity of the central government apparatus due to the 
departure of skilled personnel and the inability to attract talent into the 
administration, which contradicts governments' desire to reduce uncertainty about the 
relationship between policies and outcomes. As a consequence, governments may 
become more receptive towards bureaucratic demand for a de-politicisation of 
personnel policy and initiate a civil service reform. However, as long as problems of 
political trust persist, it is unlikely that this pressure will lead to the formal 
institutionalisation of significant islands of de-politicised bureaucratic career paths.
32 For instance, in France, many ministers take office with a career background in the senior civil 
service. Hence, when taking office, ministers do often have a good picture of the personnel in the 
ministerial departments (Bimbaum 1982). By contrast, Germanpolitische Beamte in the top two 
positions of the ministries tend to be in regular contact with politicians of the opposition parties, for 
instance, in the different readings of the legislative process. As a result, after a change in government, 
inherited senior bureaucrats are often well known to new ministers (Goetz 1997, 1999). I will provide 
another example for Central and Eastern Europe in the next Chapter.
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In addition, one might argue that incoming governments have an incentive to adopt 
civil service legislation with a low degree of political discretion after they have 
initiated changes in the senior bureaucracy. In the literature, this argument is usually 
raised in the context of governments’ commitment problems referring to the incentive 
of the incumbent government to bind its successors (Thatcher/Stone-Sweet 2002). 
Accordingly, it is conceivable that an incumbent government seeks to safeguard 
public administration careers of trusted appointees that have replaced inherited 
bureaucrats. However, there are two reasons why this strategy will not be beneficial 
for incumbent governments. First, trusted bureaucrats that have been appointed to 
replace inherited bureaucrats will be informative regardless of the degree of formal 
political discretion. Hence, incumbent governments cannot enhance bureaucrats' 
incentive to be informative by tying their own hands towards trusted appointees. 
Moreover, if an incumbent government did so for the personal benefit of trusted 
bureaucrats, it can be expected that a succeeding government will have a strong 
incentive to initiate institutional changes to re-establish a high degree of formal 
political discretion in order to address a severe problem of political trust. Second and 
more importantly, because governments may not be able to implement large-scale 
personnel changes in the bureaucracy, they will not take on board the demand of 
remaining bureaucrats as long as they cannot trust them. As a result, the benefits that 
could possibly arise for the newly appointed senior bureaucrats after the next change 
in government are well offset by the arising loss of control over remaining 
bureaucrats in the short term due to inability to address problems of political trust 
while being the incumbent government.
However, even if the change of the degree of formal political discretion reaches the 
government agenda as part of a civil service reform proposal given the pressures to 
change and the incentives of the government in office to initiate change, it is not 
guaranteed that such reform will be enacted and implemented. The reason is that 
governments may not agree internally or that they may meet resistance in the 
legislature. For instance, regardless of the reform direction, it is conceivable that 
different ministers or different parties of a government coalition do not share the 
same incentives towards civil service reform. Under these conditions, Tsebelis1 
(2002) veto player theory suggests that institutional pressures will only materialise in
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a change of an existing personnel policy regime, if none of the veto players prefers to 
stick to the status quo arrangement. However, even if all veto players prefer a 
departure from the status quo personnel policy regime, Tsebelis (2002) suggests that 
the outcome of the civil service reform process will reflect the ideal position of the 
veto player that is closest to the status quo arrangement. In other words, a lowest 
common denominator outcome will result. At the same time, Tsebelis (2002: 93) is 
unambiguous in that governments' agenda-setting powers in parliamentary 
democracy ensure that "every government as long as it is in power is able to impose 
its will on parliament (...) whether or not it controls a majority of legislative votes" 
(emphasis in original).
The last argument also sheds some light on the fourth political context factor put 
forward by second generation delegation studies, which suggests that conflict 
between multiple principals will reduce the degree of formal political discretion built 
into civil service legislation. It is clear that the number of political principals and the 
degree of conflict between them, i.e. the number of veto players and their ideological 
distance, matter for the change of an existing personnel policy regime. However, 
contrary to the standard argument raised in the delegation literature, the argument 
raised in this discussion suggests that the conflict among multiple principals has only 
an indirect effect upon the degree of formal political discretion written into civil 
service legislation. In other words, if there are many relevant political actors in the 
civil service reform process and if their incentives differ, it will be more difficult to 
change an existing civil service regime, but this does not tell us whether they prefer 
more or less possibilities to exercise political discretion. Table 3.4. summarises the 
discussion of this section.
33 For Western democracies this assumption approximates the reality quite well. However, after the 
change of regime, Central and Eastern European democracies were characterised as 'over- 
parliamentarised' (Agh 1997c), i.e. a comparably large influence of parliaments in the legislative 
process. Hence, while useful as a working assumption, it is required to be careful during the empirical 
analysis, in particular, when investigating Central and Eastern European cases.
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Table 3.4. Stability and Change o f Personnel Policy Regimes
Factors that 
affect stability 
and change of 
personnel 
policy regimes





Usually low unless the salience of the 
problem increases as a result of 
diverging policy preferences of 
alternating governments.
Usually high unless past governments 
did not exercise political discretion 
and/or unless the salience of the 
problem decreases as a result of 





Governments seek to work with 
inherited bureaucrats because of 
comparably low problems of trust, but 
also due to the formal-legal constraints 
upon the exercise of discretion.
Unless the salience of the problem of 
political trust decreases and/or unless 
governments have an opportunity to 
mitigate problems of trust, they will 
seek to replace as many mistrusted 
bureaucrats as possible, but practical 
reasons may limit the scope of 
replacements.
Bureaucrats' 
incentive to be 
informative
All bureaucrats share an incentive to be 
informative because they are aware that 
informativeness will pay off with career 
progression.
New appointees will be highly 
informative because their tenure is 
effectively bound to that of the 
government. By contrast, remaining 
bureaucrats will have little incentive to 
be informative because it may 
undermine their career prospects after 
the next change of government.
In-built
tension
Governments will occasionally voice 
dissatisfaction over their inability to 
enhance political trust.
Remaining senior bureaucrats and 
especially those who seek promotion 
will voice dissatisfaction that they can 




Increasing salience of problem of 
political trust resulting from diverging 
policy preferences of alternating 
governments.
Governments replace only few inherited 
bureaucrats because
(i) the salience of the problem of 
political trust has decreased; and/or
(ii) they have had an opportunity to 
mitigate problems of political trust.
(iii) Governments incur increasing costs 








(i) Bureaucratic opposition may 
increase costs o f reform.
(ii) Possible existence of veto players 
within government may prevent 
departure from the status quo.
(i) Governments will be reluctant to 
commit to reduced degree of formal 
political discretion as long as the 
problem of trust is perceived as too 
high.
(ii) Possible existence of veto players 
within government may prevent change.
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4. Conclusion
In conclusion, this Chapter has developed a theoretical framework that serves to 
explain why governments incorporate a higher or lower degree of formal political 
discretion into civil service legislation. Paraphrasing Gilligan/Krehbiel's (1987: 288) 
argument about the use of restrictive amendment procedures in the legislative 
decision-making process of the US Congress, we can conclude that a low degree of 
formal political discretion can enhance the informational role of ministerial 
bureaucrats in the process of policy formulation. A low degree of formal political 
discretion can encourage bureaucrats that seek to pursue a career in public 
administration to invest in the development of expertise or to share their expertise 
with governments because it safeguards bureaucrats1 career expectations by credibly 
committing governments not to intervene into personnel policy and, hence, not to 
meddle with bureaucrats' careers. As a result, governments can develop better- 
informed public policies, which reduce the uncertainty about the impact of public 
policies upon policy outcomes they desire.
However, governments will only have an incentive to establish a low degree of 
formal political discretion, if they have no problems of political trust towards the 
bureaucracy or if they can (at least partially) overcome problems of political trust. By 
contrast, if governments are confronted with major problems of political trust, they 
will seek to replace inherited senior bureaucrats with trusted appointees. New 
appointees, in turn, will be informative regardless of the degree of formal political 
discretion built into civil service legislation and as a result, governments have no 
need to restrict their possibilities to intervene into personnel policy in the first place. 
At the same time, remaining bureaucrats, which a government has not been able to 
replace despite problems of political trust, will fail to be informative, while 
governments will have little incentive to solve the problem by reducing the degree of 
formal political discretion because they are reluctant to commit not to exercise 
political discretion towards mistrusted bureaucrats. Yet, in the long term, 
governments may respond to increasing costs resulting from a lack of bureaucratic
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informativeness by initiating institutional reforms with partially de-politicising 
effects upon personnel policy.
Finally, I argued that the personnel policy regime that is in place when a government 
takes office tends to reproduce the degree to which governments are confronted with 
problems of political trust, their personnel policy strategies and bureaucrats' incentive 
to be informative. By contrast, the potential to change a given degree of formal 
political discretion will only arise, if particular circumstances alter the way incoming 
governments perceive problems of political trust towards inherited bureaucrats. In the 
next Chapter, I will discuss the implications of this conclusion for the course of civil 
service reform in post-communist Europe.
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Chapter 4
Civil Service Reform Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe after 
the Change of Regime: The Bumpy Road towards De-politicisation
1. Introduction
In Chapter 2, I argued that at the time when the first democratically elected 
governments were formed, Central and Eastern European personnel systems shared 
features of personnel policy regimes that allow unbounded politicisation. As a 
consequence, the discussion in the last Chapter suggests that unless the change of 
regime represents a 'critical juncture' (Ikenberry 1994; Thelen 1999) that triggers 
fundamental institutional change, personnel policy regimes that allow unbounded 
politicisation have a good chance to persist in post-communist Europe. Moreover, 
even when a government is willing to 'break the stalemate' as suggested by 
Verheijen/Rabrenovic (1999), i.e. when a government is willing or forced to work 
with inherited bureaucrats, although it may doubt their reliability, the theoretical 
discussion in the last Chapter suggests that a civil service reform with de-politicising 
effects upon personnel policy is unlikely to get on course. The reason is that although 
this kind of personnel policy strategy will increase bureaucratic demand for 
minimising possibilities of political intervention into personnel policy, governments 
will be reluctant to endorse the enactment of civil service legislation with a low 
degree of formal political discretion because it implies that they would commit 
towards mistrusted bureaucrats. Therefore, the prospects of de-politicisation in post­
communist Europe appear to be gloomy.
However, this general scenario ignores that the first democratic elections after the 
change of regime do not need to lead to the investiture of governments that are 
severely troubled by problems of political trust. Firstly, if a communist (successor) 
party wins the first democratic elections, it is more plausible to assume that the first
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government was not particularly worried about the reliability of senior bureaucrats in 
office. Consequently, governments formed by communist successor parties should be 
willing to adopt civil service legislation with a low degree of formal political 
discretion, provided bureaucrats voice demand for institutional reforms in the first 
place. Secondly, it is conceivable that first governments formed by parties of the 
former democratic opposition have an opportunity to (at least partially) overcome 
problems of political trust towards senior bureaucrats inherited from the last 
communist government. In this case, governments should be ready to take advantage 
of existing bureaucratic expertise and they should also be less reluctant to pass civil 
service legislation with a low degree of formal political discretion in order to enhance 
the informational role of the ministerial bureaucracy in policy formulation. Finally, 
there is the longer-term perspective, that is, even if personnel policy regimes that 
allow unbounded politicisation persist for some time after the change of regime, 
governments of any political colour may perceive increasing costs resulting from a 
lack of informativeness of bureaucrats that have continuously stayed in office. As a 
result, governments may become less reluctant to endorse bureaucratic demand for 
institutional reforms possibly leading to de-politicised islands within their civil 
service systems.
Therefore, the discussion in this Chapter begins with an analysis of three different 
scenarios for the course of civil service reform dynamics in the immediate period 
after the change of regime in post-communist Europe. Subsequently, the discussion 
turns to the civil service reform dynamics that may occur in later periods. The first 
part of this Chapter briefly outlines the personnel policy dynamics and the potential 
pressures for institutional reform during the communist regime and how they differ 
from democratic regimes. The second part of this Chapter discusses three different 
scenarios that could arise after the change of regime and their impact on the direction 
of civil service reform, that is, in our case whether institutional reforms tend to 
reduce or maintain the high degree of formal political discretion over personnel 
policy that has been inherited from the communist regime. The first section discusses 
the scenario that the first democratically elected governments can well trust the 
senior bureaucrats in office, and that they therefore choose to take advantage of their 
expertise, i.e. they do not replace them. I suggest that this scenario applies to
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governments that were formed by communist successor parties. However, I will 
argue that, in the context of regime change, this scenario produces only very minor 
pressures towards civil service reform. Instead, it can be better understood as a 
continuation of the pre-transition scenario. The second section turns to the scenario 
that new governments cannot trust the senior bureaucrats in office, and that they 
therefore try to replace them. This scenario applies primarily to governments that 
were formed by parties of the democratic opposition. Again, I will argue that in this 
scenario only minor pressures towards institutional reform arise. Finally, the third 
section discusses the scenario that the first democratically elected governments are 
able to (at least partially) overcome problems of political trust towards senior 
bureaucrats, and that therefore they try to take advantage of their expertise, i.e. they 
choose rather not to replace them. I suggest that this scenario applies, if parties of the 
democratic opposition form the first elected government after a pacted transition. I 
will argue that this scenario creates the only reasonable prospect of establishing 
formal-legal frameworks that de-politicise personnel policy. However, the road to de­
politicisation is plastered with obstacles. The final two sections of this Chapter 
account for the dynamics that occur in subsequent periods and the impact of other 
factors such as the prospect of accession to the European Union. Moreover, they 
derive several conclusions as to which of the four personnel policy regimes is likely 
to emerge under different scenarios. I will show that both the personnel policy 
dynamics of later periods and the role of external factors will increase demand for a 
civil service reform with de-politicising effects, but that these pressures may at best 
lead to a very partial de-politicisation of personnel policy regimes.
2. Personnel Policy and Civil Service Reform at the Eve of Regime 
Change: The Status Quo
In Chapter 2 ,1 argued that, at the time of regime change, the personnel systems of 
Central and Eastern European public administrations exhibited primarily features of 
personnel policy regimes that allow unbounded politicisation. This type of personnel 
policy regime was stable in the sense that it reproduced the same kinds of personnel 
policy dynamics. One party rule ensured that effectively no change in government 
could occur. As a result, whenever the composition of government changed, new
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ministers were hardly troubled by problems of political trust. On the one hand, the 
policy preferences of new ministers were identical or at least very similar to that of 
their predecessors. On the other hand, the bureaucratic career path to senior ranking 
positions in the ministry made sure that incoming ministers did not have to have 
doubts about the political reliability of senior bureaucrats in office.
Firstly, although professional and managerial qualifications had gradually gained 
importance for the selection and promotion of senior bureaucrats especially since the 
late 1970s, political and ideological reliability remained dominant criteria until the 
eve of regime change (Balazs 1993). Secondly, the inclusion of senior positions in 
the ministerial hierarchy into the nomenclature system implied that senior 
bureaucrats were effectively selected by the communist party organisation or their 
appointment was at least approved by the party (Konig 1992). Thirdly, a common 
feature of the nomenclature system was the interweaving of individual career paths in 
the party, the state administration and/or the economy (Komai 1992: 39). For senior 
bureaucrats, this meant that young administrators would enter on the bottom ranks of 
a ministry and seek promotion to the lowest managing ranks. At least at this point, 
they were expected to join the communist party, which would give them an 
opportunity to work in the party headquarters to acquire 'political craft' (Goetz 1997). 
Eventually, they would be appointed to positions in the ministries as senior 
bureaucrats. For instance, Csanadi (1997: 15) shows for the case of Hungary that 
100% of the bureaucrats in the top three positions below the minister and 70-90% of 
the lower ranking managers in the ministerial hierarchy were party members.
As a consequence, one party rule and the compulsory rather than optional exercise of 
political discretion over the allocation of senior bureaucrats to the ministerial 
organisation ensured that new ministers were not confronted with problems of 
political trust. Hence, new ministers had an incentive to rely on the expertise of the 
senior bureaucrats in office rather than replacing them. This does not mean that 
changes in the composition of governments would not entail changes in the senior 
bureaucracy. Rather, there was no need for new ministers to use their discretionary 
powers in order to bring senior bureaucrats in line with their policy preferences.
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At the same time, bureaucrats were aware that career progression depended on their 
ability to signal political commitment to the party, for instance, by means of 
becoming member of the communist party. Moreover, the power monopoly of the 
communist party and the interweaving of political and bureaucratic career paths 
meant that senior bureaucrats and those who strove for senior ranks had an incentive 
to be informative towards the government and its ministers at all times because 
failure to do so would have halted their career at an early stage. Conversely, 
politically non-committed bureaucrats (to the extent that they existed) had no 
prospects of gaining promotion to senior positions close to political power centres. 
Therefore, these politically non-committed bureaucrats had much to gain from a 
disentanglement of political and bureaucratic career paths. Hence, if any pressures for 
the reform of the socialist personnel system had ever been voiced, they would have 
emerged from politically non-committed bureaucrats in lower ranking managing 
positions or below, who could not gain promotion to senior ranks as long as the 
communist career system continued to exist.
In democratic regimes with regular alternation of political parties in governments, 
low problems of political trust and the desire to tap existing bureaucratic expertise 
tend to lead towards pressures for institutional reforms that imply government 
commitment to low degrees of formal political discretion. By contrast, in communist 
regimes, one party rule and the specific structure of senior bureaucrats' career path 
ensured that governments did not have to worry about neither problems of political 
trust and problems of bureaucratic informativeness and hence no or only marginal 
pressures for institutional reforms arose. However, the introduction of multi-party 
competition after the change of regime inevitably destroyed the cosy relationship 
between politicians and bureaucrats in Central and Eastern Europe or the 'politicised 
village life' of the communist regime, as I argued elsewhere (Meyer-Sahling 2001a). 
At the same time, it represented the status quo that shaped the way the first 
democratically elected governments perceived problems of political trust towards 
senior bureaucrats, their personnel policy strategies and the resulting incentives of 
bureaucrats to be informative towards democratically elected governments.
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3. Personnel Policy and Civil Service Reform after the Change of 
Regime
Before we turn to the civil service reform dynamics that will occur under different 
scenarios, let us briefly begin by trying to appreciate the nature of governments' 
problems of uncertainty at the outset of the transformation process. Central and 
Eastern European 'triple transitions' (Offe 1991) implied for the first democratically 
elected governments that there was in fact no misreading about the tasks that were on 
their policy-making agenda. However, in practice the policy-making tasks went much 
further than the establishment of constitutional democracy, a market economy and 
the consolidation of the nation state. Rather, it is worth highlighting that the 
transformation essentially required a massive, large scale change of virtually each 
and every policy area because established policies had either lost their functionality 
or their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens and policy-makers after the end of 
communist rule (Offe 1995).
Therefore, Elster et al. (1998: 18) suggest that
''the items on the post-communist agenda have in common that they can 
be largely accomplished by legislation, including the law-making 
activities with which constitutional assemblies and the parties to 
international treaties are concerned. But there are also many changes, 
widely considered as urgently required, which cannot be, or not fully, 
accomplished by legislative means alone. This pertains to social, 
economic and cultural initiatives of citizens which new laws may 
facilitate and encourage but do not determine their outcomes. At any rate, 
the warning seems to be in place that transformation and systemic change 
is something that is only to a limited extent a matter of law making. 
Cultural patterns, identities and legacies, associative practices that help or 
hinder the solution of collective goods problems, and the vigor with 
which entrepreneurial and other economic interests are pursued among 
those determinants of change that cannot easily legislated into - or out of 
- being".
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In other words, new democratically elected governments were confronted with the 
challenge of drafting vast amounts of legislation that was supposed to affect 
fundamental policy reversals. However, the complexity of the tasks involved and the 
inability to anticipate the consequences of policies upon outcomes implied that new 
governments were heavily confronted with problems of incomplete information or 
policy-making uncertainty (Wiesenthal 1996). On the other hand, bureaucrats that 
were in office at the time of regime change were policy specialists relative to the new 
governments because they had knowledge, which new governments were lacking, 
especially, when they were formed by parties of the former democratic opposition. 
Western as well as Eastern scholars and in particular politicians from the democratic 
opposition (see below) emphasised the politicised or 'trained incompetence' (Konig 
1999) of the communist bureaucracy. However, it is unquestionable that regardless of 
their career background and their political commitment to the communist party, the 
mere experience of bureaucrats in office provided them with superior knowledge 
about the details and the history of the existing policies and circumstances in 
different policy areas. As a consequence, notwithstanding the assumption that every 
incoming government is puzzled by problems of policy-making uncertainty, one of 
the key governance challenges for the first democratically elected governments was 
to device strategies that would reduce their uncertainty about the relationship 
between policies and outcomes they desire.
3.1. Scenario I: Sticking with the Old Guard
The first scenario concerns the first democratically elected governments that were not 
troubled by problems of political trust and that chose not to replace the senior 
bureaucrats in office. In other words, the governments sought to take advantage of 
existing bureaucratic expertise by sticking with the old guard of senior bureaucrats 
that had already served in the top positions before the change of regime. In the real 
world, the most suitable candidates for this scenario are the countries, in which 
communist successor parties formed the government after the first democratic 
elections. Hence, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania approximate this scenario most 
closely.
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In these countries, governments did not have to worry much about the reliability of 
senior bureaucrats in office for the last government of the communist regime was 
effectively formed by the same political party. On the one hand, even if the policy 
preferences of the new government differed from the last communist government, for 
instance, because the post-communist government was formed by reform minded 
communists, the shift in policy preferences was not as large as if a new party or a 
new coalition of parties would have taken office. Moreover, the communist party had 
previously selected the senior bureaucrats in office on the basis of their political 
reliability. Hence, there was no reason for these governments to initiate politically 
motivated changes in the composition of the senior bureaucracy. Quite to the 
contrary, the career path and past policy records of the senior bureaucrats in office 
represented the luxurious situation that new governments could simultaneously 
maximise political trust and the prospects of reducing policy-making uncertainty.
The basic theoretical model developed in the last Chapter suggests that under these 
conditions, bureaucrats will only be informative, if governments are willing to 
commit to non-intervention into personnel policy and hence to pursue institutional 
reforms, which establish a civil service system with low degrees of formal political 
discretion. However, this chain of events was unlikely to occur in these Central and 
Eastern European cases directly after the change of regime. Firstly, the senior 
bureaucrats in office had strong incentives to be informative towards a government 
that was formed by the communist successor party. The reason is that senior 
bureaucrats explicitly owed their career to the party that had already ruled during the 
communist regime. Hence, at least to the extent that senior bureaucrats had made 
their way through the party headquarters or even if they had not done so, but owede 
their appointment to the communist party, they were aware that a future change in 
government would probably terminate their time in office even if the government had 
adopted civil service legislation with a low degree of formal political discretion 
because a future non-communist government would associate them with both the 
communist party and the communist regime more generally. As a result, the senior 
bureaucrats that were kept in office by a government formed by a communist 
successor party did not need any special inducements to be informative.
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On the other hand, the demand for the adoption of civil service legislation that 
curtails governments' possibilities to exercise political discretion arose from 
bureaucrats in lower managing ranks or young administrators who were striving for 
promotion to senior ranks. With or without past political commitment, these second 
tier bureaucrats had at least not been close to political power and the communist 
party before the change of regime. Therefore, they had much to lose, if the personnel 
policy regime allowing unbounded politicisation persisted. The reason is that even if 
a career stop-over in the party headquarters and party membership were no longer a 
requirement for reaching ministerial top jobs, promotion to the senior ranks implied 
for second tier bureaucrats that future governments would associate them with the 
communist party. Hence, promotion to the senior ranks entailed the risk that one's 
career is terminated after the next change in government. For instance, a survey in the 
Bulgarian state administration concluded that "[t]he objective of the administration is 
the preservation of the status quo. Civil servants are in a constant fear of change, 
there is an absence of cohesion and team spirit and a lack of joint objectives. (...) 
This generally leads to a situation where most civil servants prefer to take a 
'defensive position' and attempts to perform their work by taking minimum risks thus 
avoiding responsibility for any conceivable error" (quoted in: 
Bozhidarova/Kolcheva/Velinova 1999: 8). As a consequence, after the change of 
regime, second tier bureaucrats had in fact no longer an incentive to be informative 
towards a government formed by a communist successor party. Instead, they tended 
to be defensive in their policy-making approach unless personnel policy would be de­
politicised.
However, the demand of second tier bureaucrats for de-politicisation could not 
translate into strong enough pressures to establish a de-politicised personnel policy 
regime. Firstly, because the incentive structure of top tier senior bureaucrats and 
second tier bureaucrats differed, bureaucrats did not present a homogeneous 
preference over institutional reforms. Secondly, second tier bureaucrats were 
confronted with the strategic disadvantage that they were not in the influential policy­
making posts close to political power, which were instead occupied by senior 
bureaucrats who were either indifferent or opposed towards institutional reforms with
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de-politicising effects. Finally, second tier bureaucrat had to overcome a collective 
action problem, if they wanted to make their demand for institutional reform heard 
(cf. Dunleavy 1991). Hence, they either needed an agent among the senior 
bureaucrats or conceivably among politicians who would promote their cause or they 
needed to rely on the thrust of public service unions, which themselves underwent a 
process of transformation. As a consequence, if a communist successor party formed 
the first post-communist government, it can be expected that only very minor 
pressures towards civil service reform with de-politicising effects arose, which were 
unlikely to gather support in the political arena. Rather, the personnel policy 
dynamics of the communist regime tended to persist after the change of regime to 
democratic rule because no effective change in the partisan composition of 
government occurred and therefore civil service reform pressures were only 
marginally stronger than before the change of regime.
3.2. Scenario II: Getting rid of the Old Guard
The second scenario refers to governments that were heavily plagued by problems of 
political trust and that, therefore, tried to replace the senior bureaucrats inherited 
from the communist regime. Hence, these governments did not want to or could not 
tap the expertise of old guard bureaucrats. In the real world, the most suitable 
candidates for this case were the first democratically elected governments that were 
formed by parties of the democratic opposition. Hence, at first glance, Poland, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, and Slovenia fit this scenario most 
closely, although I will differentiate this diverse group further below.
In these cases, the new governments were severely troubled by problems of political 
trust because the change in government was embedded in a change of regime. Firstly, 
the governments formed by parties of the democratic opposition did not merely 
associate the inherited senior bureaucrats with the policies of the outgoing 
government but with the policies of the former non-democratic regime. Hence, the 
policy differences between the outgoing and the incoming government could not be 
larger than they were in these cases. Secondly, the career path of the senior
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bureaucrats in office suggested that they had been both co-opted by and that they had 
actively co-operated with the former communist ruling party. Moreover, the unity of 
political and bureaucratic elite during the communist regime suggested to the 
members of the new governments that former senior bureaucrats were to be held 
responsible for the performance crisis of the communist regimes, too. Hence, they 
were regarded as both party politicised and incompetent. Therefore, from the point of 
view of political trust, the new government formed by parties of the democratic 
opposition had little incentive to listen to the knowledge held by senior bureaucrats 
that were in office at the time of regime change. Instead, they sought to replace the 
senior bureaucrats inherited from the communist regime with 'new bureaucrats' that 
promised to be both competent and trustworthy, i.e. unrelated to the communist 
regime.
As a result, the central problems for governments that were formed by parties of the 
democratic opposition effectively concerned the scope of replacements and the tricky 
question of who shall actually fill the vacancies in the senior ranks of the ministries 
(Nikolova 1998). Firstly, because a new government can impossibly replace an entire 
state bureaucracy, it became a practical imperative that changes at the top had to be 
selective. In accordance with the third proposition of informational theories of 
legislative choice discussed above, this suggests that these new governments could at 
least change strategically important positions in order to alter the composition of 
policy orientations held by the senior bureaucracy. Thus, taking into account that 
decision-making processes in hierarchical organisations are difficult to control, 
ministers could enhance the control over ministerial policy-making by appointing 
trusted bureaucrats to key positions (cf. Hammond 1986,1996).
Secondly, the over-politicised nature of the real-existing socialist administration 
implied that new governments had difficulties finding bureaucrats at the central 
government level that promised to combine expertise and a career that was not owed 
to the communist party unless they would dig deep into the administration. Hence, 
governments formed by parties of the democratic opposition were confronted both 
with a problem of political trust towards inherited senior bureaucrats and a second 
problem concerning the small supply of bureaucrats that could fill the vacancies in
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the senior ranks. As a consequence, it was virtually unavoidable for the new 
governments to recruit a new guard of senior bureaucrats from outside public 
administration, in particular academia and the oppositional movement, both of which 
promised to combine expertise and no connection to the communist regime.34 
However, this implied that, technically spoken, severe problems of political trust for 
incoming governments and the lack of personnel alternatives inside public 
administration reproduced the same (over-politicised) personnel policy dynamics that 
had prevailed during the communist regime.
The theoretical model developed in the last Chapter suggests that under these 
conditions senior bureaucrats will have an incentive to share their expertise with the 
new government and, therefore, governments are not required to establish specific 
institutional arrangements that imply a reduction of the degree of formal political 
discretion. However, while newly recruited bureaucrats will certainly always have an 
incentive to be informative, their position towards institutional reforms also depends 
on their career aspirations, in particular the extent to which they seek to pursue a 
career in public administration. In practice, it is reasonable to believe that some of the 
new appointees became converted career bureaucrats, but the number of new 
appointees that sought a career in politics rather than public administration or that 
sought to return to academia or similar settings was probably as large as the first 
group. Yet, the group of converted career bureaucrats must still be regarded as 
trustees of the new governments and their ministers and hence they shared their 
problem of political trust towards the lower ranks in the ministries or the remaining 
senior bureaucrats of the communist regime. Hence, the group of converted career 
bureaucrats could hardly become a major proponent of civil service reform for they 
shared the suspicion of the new government towards the remaining bureaucracy.
As a consequence, the problem of bureaucratic informativeness concerned again 
second tier bureaucrats who feared that promotion to senior ranks under the first 
democratically elected government alongside the recruitment of (in many cases
34 These appointees can be assumed to have held technical expertise. At the same time, they lacked 
administrative expertise, which was included in the last Chapter as one of the determinants that turn 
bureaucrats in office into specialists relative to incoming governments.
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politically) faithful bureaucrats to senior ranks would threaten their career prospects 
after a future change in government. However, in addition to the three obstacles to 
promoting their cause, second tier bureaucrats were also confronted by a lack of 
incentive of the new governments to support civil service reforms with de- 
politicising effects. The reason is that new governments formed by parties of the 
democratic opposition did not only share a general distrust towards the 
administration, above we also suggested that they were practically limited in their 
effort to replace bureaucrats that were associated with the communist regime. Hence, 
if the new governments had endorsed the demand for institutional reforms, they 
would have committed not to exercise political discretion over personnel policy even 
though the bureaucracy was still partially staffed with mistrusted bureaucrats. As a 
consequence, new governments were confronted with a problem of informativeness 
of second tier bureaucrats and remaining inherited senior bureaucrats, but they had no 
incentive to alleviate the problem.35 In other words, although the pressures towards 
the initiation of civil service reform were relatively greater than in the first scenario, 
they remained minor and it can be expected that they did not make it onto the 
government agenda.
3.3. Scenario III: From Pact to De-politicisation?
The last scenario concerns governments that were troubled by problem of political 
trust but they still tried to work with the old guard of senior bureaucrats. Hence, the 
new governments sought to take advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise. In the 
basic theoretical model, I suggested that governments may want to take advantage of 
existing bureaucratic expertise because they have a chance to at least partially 
overcome problems of political trust. Therefore, the most suitable candidates for this 
scenario are governments formed by parties of the democratic opposition that were 
able to lower the salience of their problem of political trust due to an opportunity to 
learn about the policy orientations of the senior bureaucrats in office.
35 In Hood's (2001) words, the result of this scenario is a 'low trust poker game' between politicians 
and bureaucrats, in which both sides take the position that the other side is cheating.
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The most obvious setting where politicians of the democratic opposition and senior 
bureaucrats of the former regime could meet were the Round Table Talks. On the one 
hand, politicians of the democratic opposition had the opportunity to learn about 
bureaucrats' policy orientations and on other hand, bureaucrats had an opportunity to 
signal their orientations towards the politicians that might form the government after 
the first democratic elections. However, while Round Table Talks were initiated in 
all countries except Romania, the most appropriate setting for this scenario arose 
during the kind of pacted transitions in Hungary and Poland. In these countries, the 
Round Table Talks lasted longer than in countries like Czechoslovakia where the 
communist regime collapsed within a few weeks (Merkel 1999).36 Moreover, pacted 
transitions were effectively negotiated between softliners of the communist regime 
and moderate opposition forces (Colomer 1995; Colomer/Pascual 1994), which 
reduced the ideological gap between alternating governments at the time of regime 
change. Finally, it can be argued that the Round Table Talks represented quasi- 
goveming-coalitions of the ruling communist party and parties of the democratic 
opposition that were formed across the centre of the emerging party systems. Hence, 
from the point of view of the theoretical discussion in the last Chapter, pacted 
transitions can also be understood as two partial changes of government from one 
party rule to the Round Table Talks and from the Round Table Talks to the 
investiture of the first democratically elected governments, which happened to be 
formed by parties of the democratic opposition. As a consequence, governments in 
countries that underwent a pacted transition had an opportunity to alleviate their 
problems of political trust during the negotiated transition, which enabled them to 
take advantage of the expertise held by inherited senior bureaucrats.
However, this is not to say that no changes among senior bureaucrats occurred. 
Rather, senior bureaucrats that had simultaneously held political positions in the 
communist party were unlikely to qualify for a senior post under the new 
government. Moreover, the demise of the communist regime and the investiture of a 
government formed by parties of the democratic opposition must have inevitably led 
to one or another resignation among senior bureaucrats. However, the essence of a
36 The Round Table Talks during Bulgaria's 'regime controlled transition' are o f even less relevance in 
this scenario because the communist party won the first elections.
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non-replacement strategy under this scenario refers to the reactive use of political 
discretion by the new government. In other words, these new governments did not 
actively initiate the replacement of senior bureaucrats but recruited a limited number 
of former second tier bureaucrats from inside the ministerial bureaucracy in response 
to the emergence of vacancies in the senior ranks.
Secondly, the approach to work with the inherited bureaucrats even under conditions 
of generally high problems of trust is based on the condition that politicians of the 
democratic opposition had an opportunity to learn about senior bureaucrats' policy 
orientations. However, this condition could only be met by a minority of politicians, 
which had actively participated in the Round Table Talks. Consequently, the 
personnel policy strategy was not stable because ministers who had not participated 
in the Round Table Talks had to be much more suspicious towards inherited senior 
bureaucrats. Moreover, members of the parliamentary factions or politicians outside 
parliament did often not share the same experience as only a minority of government 
politicians had been participant at the Round Table Talks. As a consequence, this 
strategy had only the potential to be stable to the extent that either all politicians 
shared the same confidence towards senior bureaucrats or that confident politicians 
had control over suspicious politicians.
Given a particular balance between confident and suspicious politicians, the basic 
theoretical model suggests that bureaucrats will be more informative towards the new 
government the more they have exercised political discretion. Hence, in this scenario, 
senior bureaucrats should be less informative unless the government was willing to 
commit not to exercise political discretion over personnel policy. The reasons are, 
firstly, that senior bureaucrats were entirely aware that the new government had a 
problem of political trust and that they had stayed in office from the grace of 
confident politicians. Hence, senior bureaucrats in office feared that the purges of the 
senior ranks were simply postponed to the near future. Moreover, the senior 
bureaucrats in office had to fear that future governments would associate them with 
the present government the longer the present government waited with institutional 
reforms that implied a reduction of the degree of formal political discretion. Hence, 
the senior bureaucrats in office faced a dilemma in that non-informativeness would
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lead to their dismissal, while informativeness may threaten their future career in 
public administration. By contrast, second tier bureaucrats had the same incentive 
structure than under the previous scenarios. Consequently, regardless of the incentive 
dilemma of senior bureaucrats, it is clear from this discussion that bureaucrats would 
be united in their demand for rapid institutional reforms that lowered the degree of 
formal political discretion.
The question then is whether these new governments will endorse bureaucratic 
wishes for institutional reform. On the one hand, these governments will not have 
forgotten that they inherited the bureaucracy from the communist regime, which had 
over-politicised personnel policy. As a result, a constellation arises that is similar to 
the one discussed in the second scenario. Because the problem of political trust is 
generally high, these governments will fail to subscribe to civil service reforms 
because of the fear that the policy orientations of the inherited bureaucrats may 
ultimately be too far outlying, which implies that governments would not engage in 
civil service reform efforts. Alternatively, governments may simply adopt a 'wait and 
see approach' and postpone the initiation of civil service reform until they feel 
prepared to wholly trust the inherited senior bureaucrats. Hence, civil service reform 
could occur but only in the near future.
On the other hand, these governments had a clear incentive to commit to de- 
politicising reforms because they were relatively less puzzled by problems of 
political trust than governments in the second scenario and because it was a necessary 
condition to tap the expertise held by bureaucrats in office. Hence, given the 
confidence of at least some politicians, civil service reform dynamics will take off 
right after the change of regime and the investiture of a new government. However, 
confident politicians within government will only be able to enact institutional 
reforms with de-politicising effects, if they are able to overcome the potential 
opposition of politicians in government that are suspicious towards inherited 
bureaucrats. In other words, exactly because not every member of the government 
may have had the luxury of learning about bureaucratic preferences at the Round
37 For instance, the Mazowiecki government in Poland was in fact hardly able to initiate a reform 
because it had been formed after the semi-democratic elections in 1989.
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Table Talks, the proponents of civil service reform are confronted with obstacles that 
result from the veto potential of opposing politicians within and outside government. 
Consequently, even though it can be expected that these governments have actively 
pursued the introduction of a de-politicised civil service, it remains an open question 
whether opposing forces within the political system were present and to what extent 
these governments were able to overcome their veto potential. Table 4.1. summarises 
the three scenarios of civil service reform dynamics that may occur after a change of 
regime in Central and Eastern Europe.
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Table 4.1. Civil Service Reform Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe after the Change o f  Regime
I. Scenario II. Scenario HI. Scenario
Mode of Transition Imposed or regime controlled Regime collapse Pacted transition
Government after first 
democratic elections
Communist successor party Parties of the democratic opposition Parties of the democratic opposition
Problem of Political Trust Lowest Highest Intermediate
Personnel Policy Strategy Government will not initiate replacement of 
senior bureaucrats in office, although a few 
changes may occur.
Government will initiate as many 
replacements as possible, but the scope of 
replacements is limited for practical 
reasons. Vacancies will be filled with 
outside recruits and to a lesser extent 
internal candidates.
Government will initiate very few 
replacements. Vacancies that arise due to 
resignations will be filled with second tier 
bureaucrats.
Agents of Civil service 
reform pressures
Second tier bureaucrats because they want 
to enhance their career prospects.
Second tier bureaucrats and remaining 
senior bureaucrats because they want to 
enhance and/or protect their career.
Second tier bureaucrats and new generation 
of senior bureaucrats because they want to 
enhance and/or protect their career.
Obstacles to civil service 
reform
Senior Bureaucrats and governments have 
no incentive to initiate reform. No reform 
dynamics occur.
Newly appointed senior bureaucrats and 
governments have little incentive to initiate 
reform. In particular, governments will not 
want to commit to mistrusted bureaucrats. 
No or very few reform dynamics occur.
Governments may be reluctant to commit to 
mistrusted bureaucrats and possible veto 
players within or outside government may 
prevent change. Major reform dynamics 
will occur'




3.4. Civil Service Reform Dynamics in Later Periods
So far, this Chapter has suggested that directly after the change of regime, the road to 
de-politicisation of the civil service in Central and Eastern Europe poses many 
obstacles. The question, therefore, is whether the conditions for the establishment of 
a de-politicised civil service improve in subsequent periods, i.e. after subsequent 
changes in government. In the last Chapter, I argued that the personnel policy 
regimes that are in place when a government takes office tend to develop strong 
reproductive mechanisms. Although a change of regime upsets the dynamics that 
prevailed during the communist regime, the discussion in this Chapter has suggested 
that a departure from the status quo will be difficult to achieve. Moreover, the 
scenario, which leads to the emergence of stronger de-politicisation pressures does 
arise under exceptional circumstances that are bound to the period of regime change, 
i.e. governments formed by parties of the democratic opposition that take office after 
a pacted transition.
As a consequence, the discussion suggests that, as time goes on, in particular the 
second scenario is most likely to occur, unless a low degree of formal political 
discretion has been formally institutionalised shortly after the change of regime. 
Consider first the possibility that a communist successor party is replaced by a 
government that is formed by parties of the democratic opposition after the second 
elections. Obviously, the most likely scenario is that the dynamics of the second 
scenario will ensue for the new government will be confronted with major problems 
of political trust but has no special opportunity to learn about senior bureaucrats’ 
policy orientations. Alternatively, consider the option that a government formed by 
parties of the democratic opposition is replaced by other parties that had been either 
in opposition before the change of regime or that have been newly formed thereafter. 
Again, the most likely scenario is that the second scenario will reproduce itself, 
although it will matter to what extent the incoming and the outgoing government are 
ideologically opposed to each other.
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Finally, consider the possibility that a communist successor party replaces a 
government that was formed by parties of the democratic opposition. Under these 
circumstances, the dynamics are more complicated. In brief, the government formed 
by a communist successor party will not trust the senior bureaucrats that were 
brought in by the first government and less so the senior bureaucrats that were 
promoted to senior ranks. Hence, the degree of distrust towards the senior 
bureaucrats in office depends effectively on the extent to which the first government 
has exercised political discretion. At the same time, a government formed by a 
communist successor party will always find some bureaucrats in lower ranks that had 
been in office before the change of regime and hence that can be well trusted. This 
means that this kind of government does not distrust the bureaucracy per se, and that 
there are still opportunities to recruit lower ranking bureaucrats into senior office. As 
a result, if the second government is formed by a communist successor party, alone 
or in coalition, it will replace more senior bureaucrats, the more political discretion 
had been exercised by the first government. Second, if the first government has been 
able to implement sweeping changes in the bureaucracy, it can be expected that a 
government formed by a communist successor party has less opportunity to recruit its 
senior bureaucrats from inside the administration. At the same time and bearing in 
mind that many senior bureaucrats left the administration during or when the first 
post-communist government had taken office, more of these senior bureaucrats that 
had been in office before the change of regime will (be available to) return with the 
communist successor party to government.
As a consequence, there is a strong tendency that the second scenario will reproduce 
itself in later periods, unless the immediate post-transition period has led to the 
adoption of civil service legislation that de-politicises personnel policy. However, 
this conclusion hinges on the assumption that the patterns of inter-party competition 
remain polarised and that subsequent changes in government are wholesale rather 
than partial. Moreover, even if a high degree of formal political discretion built into 
civil service legislation persists, it is still conceivable that, in the long run, 
governments become increasingly puzzled by costs resulting from the lack of 
bureaucratic informativeness, which may undermine the policy-making capacity of 
the central government apparatus. Hence, governments may develop an incentive to
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pursue a civil service reform with de-politicising effects upon personnel policy, 
although severe problems of political trust reproduce themselves. Under these 
circumstances, however, it is unlikely that governments will be ready to significantly 
lower the degree of formal political discretion, but that they would pursue a partial 
de-politicisation, for instance, for the lower ranks or for certain elements of the senior 
civil service only. This leads us to the final point: Can we, in light of the typology of 
personnel policy regimes, determine more precisely the outcomes of civil service 
reforms?
3.5. What Kind of Personnel Policy Regime for Central and Eastern 
Europe?
So far, the discussion has concentrated on civil service reform dynamics with respect 
to two kinds of institutional reform directions. Either pressures towards de­
politicisation may be strong or they may be minor if not absent. This raises the 
question whether it is possible to determine the outcomes of civil service reform 
more precisely, in particular with respect to the typology of personnel policy regimes 
developed in Chapter 2. If we begin with the scenario that is most conducive for the 
de-politicisation of personnel policy, it is unlikely that a fully fledged de-politicised 
personnel policy regime will be written into civil service legislation. The reason is 
that even if governments have a strong incentive to support a de-politicising reform 
and even if they are able to overcome potential veto players, they will not have 
forgotten that they have inherited the bureaucracy from the communist regime. 
Hence, the remaining suspicion towards senior bureaucrats and second tier 
bureaucrats will make them reluctant to forgo all their personnel powers right after 
the change of regime. Instead, it appears most likely that these governments will at 
least retain some discretion over the allocation of the senior ranks, that is, the most 
likely compromise will lead to a personnel policy regime that allows structured 
politicisation. At the same time, a personnel policy regime that allows structured 
politicisation has a good chance of appeasing second tier bureaucrats because it 
effectively reserves senior posts in the ministerial bureaucracy for them. However, 
this also implies that the establishment of a civil service system that exhibits features 
of a de-politicised personnel policy regime is the least likely outcome of reform.
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Contrast this with the first two scenarios. We argued that only minor pressures 
towards civil service reform will be present and that governments have little 
incentive to endorse the wishes of second tier bureaucrats for de-politicisation. In 
general, this suggests that a personnel system with the features of a personnel policy 
regime that allows unbounded politicisation will persist, and for the immediate post­
transition period, this is the most likely outcome. However, given the demand of 
second tier bureaucrats and given the possibility that governments perceive 
increasing costs from a lack of bureaucratic informativeness, it is conceivable that 
reforms in later periods will lead to reforms that partially de-politicise personnel 
policy, for instance, for the lower ranks of the civil service or parts of the senior civil 
service. If this is the case, we should witness the emergence of hybrid personnel 
policy regimes, in which, for instance, particular groups of the senior civil service are 
subject to personnel policy regimes that allow structured or even de-politicisation. 
However, any such attempt to partially de-politicise personnel policy will be highly 
contentious because it contradicts the incentive of members of governments or other 
politicians to retain a high degree of formal political discretion under conditions of 
severe problems of political trust.
Moreover, given the fact that the personnel policy dynamics are embedded in a 
transition from one-party rule to constitutional multi-party democracy, it is 
conceivable that the regime change sets off a 'paradigm change' (Hall 1993) when it 
comes to the re-organisation of public administration. In particular, the objective to 
bring politics and public administration under the rule of law has implications for the 
legal status of administrative personnel. The legal perspective suggests that because 
the state is responsible to ensure that public administration operations are performed 
in accordance with the principles of enshrined in the constitution and administrative 
law, civil servants fulfil the special role of exercising public authority on behalf of 
the state. In a constitutional democracy, the state is therefore required to provide 
conditions that enable civil servants to effectively execute their tasks and to establish 
mechanisms of control and accountability in order to prevent the abuse of state power 
(Cardona 2000; SIGMA 1999: 20-23). Consequently, the introduction of 
constitutional democracy in Central and Eastern Europe should be followed by the
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adoption of civil service legislation, which grants a public law status to 
administrative personnel, distinguishes the civil service from other forms of 
employment, and defines the rights and duties of both civil servants and the state.
In the present discussion, this suggests that the governments that have been elected 
into office after the change of regime may support the 'idea of a professional civil 
service' as an essential component of a constitutional democracy. However, a 
generally positive approach of government politicians towards civil service reform 
does not imply that legislation is adopted that also restricts their possibilities to 
exercise political discretion over personnel policy. Therefore, it is conceivable that 
the new governments in Central and Eastern Europe take on board the idea of a 
professional civil service, but without establishing institutional arrangements that 
have the capacity for de-politicising personnel policy, in particular, with respect to 
the senior and higher ranks of the bureaucracy - a point that is usually not recognised 
in the discussions surrounding civil service reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This implies that if civil service legislation is adopted in the absence of de­
politicisation incentives and pressures, civil service systems are likely to share the 
features of personnel policy regimes that allow open politicisation because the 
restrictions upon the exercise of political discretion may be kept at a marginal level. 
Moreover, it can be expected that because ideas usually take longer to trickle down in 
the policy process, a civil service reform -light will not be initiated in the first period 
after the change of regime.
In addition to the (limited) 'power of ideas', there is a growing literature that assesses 
the impact of European integration on institutional change at the domestic level 
(Borzel/Risse 2000; Goetz/Hix 2000; Radaelli 1999). It argues that as much as the 
upward delegation of policy functions to the European Union (henceforth EU) 
follows the logic of different mechanisms of integration (Scharpf 1994), the 
downward impact of European integration on national administration creates 
different 'mechanisms of Europeanisation' (Knill/Lehmkuhl 1999). For instance, in 
areas of positive integration the EU legislative activities lead to a prescription of "a 
concrete institutional model for domestic compliance, which leaves a comparably 
low level of room for adaptation in the light of the domestic institutional context"
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(Knill/Lehmkuhl 1999: 4). Yet other mechanisms of Europeanisation have merely 
indirect effects. For example, they influence the institutional set up of national 
administrations as a result of changing opportunity structures for national actors or 
the beliefs of domestic actors. Whether or not either of the these mechanisms of 
Europeanisation occur in Central and Eastern Europe, however, still depends on the 
'goodness of fit' (Knill/Lehmkuhl 1999) and the existence of some 'facilitating 
factors' like actors or institutional arrangements that respond to adaptive pressures 
and allow a response respectively (Borzel/Risse 2000: 1-2).
As a consequence, administrative reforms in Central and Eastern Europe as the result 
of 'anticipated Europeanisation' (Lippert et al. 2001) may be at best selective, i.e. in 
areas subject to mechanisms of positive integration. However, the not-yet-realised- 
EU-membership of Central and Eastern European countries is likely to reduce the 
pre-accession enforcement capacity of the EU in these areas. Within the jurisdiction 
of the EU Treaties, the European Court of Justice guarantees the enforcement of EU- 
policies, if a member state fails to meet the obligations arising from EU legislative 
activities. In policy areas that are subject to the mechanism of positive integration, 
this implies the quasi-enforcement of institutional arrangements associated with these 
policies. By contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe, institutional reforms in the areas 
of positive integration will only be properly subject to enforcement by the European 
Court of Justice after their accession to the EU. At the same time, wherever the EU 
requires the 'adjustment of administrative structures' in order to built the 
administrative capacity necessary for the implementation of the acquis communitaire, 
the EU has to rely on the candidate countries in adapting the institutional set-up of 
their public administrations before accession to the EU resulting from its lack of legal 
competencies in this field.
Given the lack of well probed enforcement mechanisms, the EU's impact upon the 
institutional reorganisation of Central and Eastern European public administrations 
has been extended by adding the 'dimensions of conditionality and a negotiating 
process' (Grabbe 2001). Among the different mechanisms of EU-influence Grabbe 
(2001: 1021) suggests that the most important one is "the EU's gate-keeping role in 
determining when each candidate can progress to the next stage towards accession".
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In other words, the enforcement of institutional adaptation towards EU-compatibility 
of Central and Eastern European public administration is supposed to be ensured by 
the EU's sanctioning power to keep the gates closed and hence to postpone East 
enlargement, if candidate countries fail to fulfil the adaptation conditions. As a result, 
common wisdom suggests that the successful completion of the transformation of 
Central and Eastern European administrations is just a matter of time. In fact, even 
the problem of timing is essentially resolved, as Central and Eastern European 
countries will pursue administrative reforms with maximum speed in order to meet 
the conditions for EU-accession, given the will to join the EU in the first place.
However, the problem is that in the area of national governance, the EU has 
stipulated only very general requirements to be met by candidate countries given its 
limited legal competence in the area. The criteria stated at the Copenhagen Summit 
in 1993 and the Madrid Summit in 1995 primarily referred to the establishment and 
consolidation of institutions of democracy and ensuring the functioning of a market 
economy. By contrast, the issue of public administration was only addressed with 
reference to the need to the 'adjustment of their administrative structures' (Fournier 
1998: 112). In various reports, the European Commission has eventually sought to 
specify the requirements for administrative adjustment including the need to create a 
professional and impartial civil service as a precondition to eventually meet the 
obligations that arise from EU membership. To this end, the Commission demands 
from Central and Eastern European governments to adopt civil service legislation 
that creates a professional civil service that is separated from politics and whose 
remuneration levels are aligned with private sector wages (Fournier 1998). However, 
while the Commission requires candidate countries to legally define a functional 
differentiation between politics and administration, it does not make specific 
stipulations with respect to the degree of formal political discretion built into civil 
service legislation.
Without going into the details of the Europeanisation Eastern Style debate (e.g. 
Grabbe 2001; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2002), we can therefore draw four general 
conclusions with respect to the prospects of Europeanising Central and Eastern 
European civil services. Firstly, EU conditionality criteria have only emerged on the
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agenda of Central and Eastern European policy-makers during the mid/late 1990s. 
This is particularly true for the requirements that concern the civil service. As a 
result, if any pressures towards the initiation of civil service reform have emerged 
from EU conditionality they could only arise towards the end of the 1990s. Secondly, 
the EU conditionality criteria do effectively not go beyond the stipulation that a civil 
service defined in public law shall be established. Hence, Central and Eastern 
European governments are in fact free to choose to what extent they want to retain 
the discretion to intervene into personnel policy as long as they pass a law that 
establishes a functional differentiation between politics and administration. Thirdly, 
the perspective that executive actors, especially senior bureaucrats, are strengthened 
as a result of EU accession negotiations (Goetz 2000) does not imply that additional 
pressure towards the institutionalisation of a low degree of formal political discretion 
emerges, because these senior bureaucrats may have joined the senior ranks only after 
the last change in government and hence on a party ticket. Rather, governments may 
even have less incentive to reduce the degree of formal political discretion because it 
would undermine political leverage upon EU-accession negotiations. Finally, it is 
also not very plausible to expect that the diffusion of norms and beliefs resulting 
from 'framing integration' (Knill/Lehmkuhl 1999) strengthens the pressure towards 
the adoption of civil service legislation with a low degree of formal political 
discretion, although it may nurture a reform 'discourse' to legitimise institutional 
reforms (Schmidt 2002). The reason is that, like in the case of ideas discussed above, 
changing norms and beliefs will trickle down only slowly and hence take some time 
to translate into institutional reform pressures. In addition, they can also not be 
expected to easily offset the 'hard incentives' of governments and senior bureaucrats, 
especially when they are trusted appointees of the government of the day. As a 
consequence, there is good reason to believe that the striking wave of civil service 
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the 1990s mentioned in the 
Chapter 1 can be attributed to EU conditionality criteria (Dimitrova 2003). At the 
same time, the discussion in this Chapter suggests that these reforms do hardly have 




This Chapter has suggested that the road towards the de-politicisation of Central and 
Eastern European civil services is a bumpy one. All three scenarios that may arise 
directly after the change of regime give rise to more or less bureaucratic demand for 
institutional reforms. In the first two scenarios, institutional reform pressures were 
effectively mounted by second tier bureaucrats. However, because their incentives 
did not coincide with senior bureaucrats' incentives and because governments formed 
by either communist successor parties or parties of the democratic opposition after a 
regime collapse did not have an incentive to engage in civil service reform with de- 
politicising effects, the pressures were unlikely to translate into the initiation of civil 
service reforms.
As a consequence, the only reasonable prospect for the de-politicisation of the civil 
service arises, if parties of the democratic opposition form the first democratically 
elected government whose members have participated in the Round Table Talks of a 
pacted transition and if these politicians are able to control suspicious forces within 
and outside government:. Under these conditions, the new governments are able to 
mitigate problems of political trust, which enables them to take advantage of the 
expertise of senior bureaucrats in office. The strategy to rely on inherited senior 
bureaucrats however leids to the emergence of unified bureaucratic demand for the 
de-politicisation of personnel policy. As a result, governments will pursue civil 
service reform efforts and they will be able to realise the de-politicisation of 
personnel policy to the extent that they overcome the potential veto power of reform 
opponents (see Table 4.1.). The first government in Hungary and to a lesser extent 
the first government in Poland are the only ones in the region that come closest to 
this scenario, but as I vill show in Chapter 7, not even the Hungarian government 
could overcome the resistance of opposing groups in parliament. As a consequence, 
directly after the change of regime, the road to de-politicisation of the civil service in 
Central and Eastern Europe has posed too many obstacles to lead to rapid and 
successful reforms.
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In addition, the discussion has shown that the prospects of de-politicisation do not 
necessarily improve when times goes on. Rather, subsequent periods tend to 
reproduce personnel policy and civil service reform dynamics that stabilise high 
degrees of formal political discretion. However, conceivable reform pressures may 
emanate from the desire to reconcile civil service governance with the doctrine of 
constitutional government. Moreover, some reform leverage will be mounted by 
external pressures namely the requirements for institutional adaptation that result 
from EU accession. Both the power of ideas and EU conditionality criteria may 
provide an incentive for Central and Eastern European governments to initiate and 
pass civil service Acts. However, in the discussion, we concluded that these Acts are 
unlikely to incorporate low degrees of formal political discretion. It results that 
unless patterns of party competition become less polarised and patterns of 
government formation provide conditions that lower the salience of problems of 
political trust for incoming governments, in the medium term, civil services in 




The Institutionalisation of Political Discretion: Hungarian Civil 
Service Legislation between 1990 and 2001
1. Introduction
Hungary held its first democratic elections in March and April 1990. Between 1990 
and 2001, the Hungarian Parliament passed six Acts that defined and amended the 
formal-legal governance structure of the civil service. Still in May 1990, shortly 
before the investiture of the first democratic government, Parliament adopted the 
Temporary Act on State Secretaries that regulated the allocation of the top two ranks 
in the ministerial hierarchy. In the spring of 1992, Parliament adopted the Act on the 
Legal Status of Civil Servants (henceforth Civil Service Act) including state 
secretaries. Hence, until 1992, central government employees except state secretaries 
continued to be regulated by the Labour Code of 1967 that made no distinction 
between employees in public administration and other employees. The 1992 Civil 
Service Act covers the central state administration, their regional and local agencies, 
de-concentrated agencies with nation-wide authority and several non-governmental 
agencies. Moreover, the Civil Service Act includes employees of local self- 
governments and public corporations like the Secretariat of the Hungarian Academy 
of Science and until 1998 the social security organs. In 1997, the Hungarian 
Parliament adopted the Act on the Legal Status of Members of the Government and 
State Secretaries which substituted the 1990 Act on State Secretaries. Moreover, the 
1992 Civil Service Act was amended in autumn 1997. Finally, in June 2001 and in
May 2002 Parliament passed two more amendments of the Civil Service Act.\
The limited scope of the Civil Service Act implies that public sector employment in 
Hungary has been differentiated since 1990. This is reflected in the adoption of 
legislation for other groups of public sector employees at the time of enacting the 
first Civil Service Act and in subsequent years. In 1992, the Hungarian Parliament
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passed the Act on the Legal Status of Public Servants covering public employees who 
serve the interest of the public or exercise communal work, for instance, employees 
in the educational, health or cultural sectors. Moreover, in 1992, the Hungarian 
Parliament adopted a new Labour Code to regulate private sector employment. In 
subsequent years, Parliament passed the Attorneys' Act (1994) applying to 
prosecutors and other officials in the attorney’s office, the Act on Public Employees 
in Uniform (1996) including members of the Hungarian Army, the Customs Guard, 
the Police, etc. and two Acts on Judges and Employees at the Judiciary (1997).
As a consequence, civil servants make up a small proportion of general government 
employment. The civil service as a proportion of public sector employees has 
marginally increased from about 12% in 1992 to around 14% in 2001, which is 
equivalent to more or less exactly 100.000 civil servants (see Table 5.1. at the end of 
the Introduction). The scope of the Civil Service Act, however, implies that civil 
servants employed at central government ministries have represented only a small 
proportion of all employees covered by the Civil Service Act. It reached an all time 
low in 1997 with 6455 civil servants and grew by 16% until the end of 2000, when 
7455 civil servants were employed in the ministries excluding the Prime Minister's 
Office (Table 5.2.). Since the coming into force of the first Act in 1992, civil servants 
have been employed in either 12, 13 or 14 ministries and the Prime Minister's Office. 
However, the number of civil servants employed per ministry has varied considerably 
all through the 1990s. In 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employed 21 times 
more civil servants than the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the smallest ministry. 
Moreover, the staff trajectory of different ministries has taken very different 
directions. On the one hand, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and its predecessors 
shrank by 45% between 1994 and 2000. On the other, the Ministries of Cultural 
Heritage, Education and Youth and Sports as the successor ministries of the Ministry 
of Culture and Education grew by 62% between 1993 and 2000.38
This Chapter analyses the formal-legal frameworks that have governed the exercise 
of political discretion in so far as they have concerned the civil servants employed in 
central government ministries, hence, a small subset of the entire civil service. The
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emphasis will be placed on institutional arrangements that apply directly and 
indirectly to categories of civil servants that together make up the senior civil service. 
Accordingly, the first part of this Chapter outlines the structure and the size of the 
civil service and define the boundaries and internal structure of the Hungarian senior 
civil service as it has evolved since 1990. The second and third part turn to the 
discussion of the legal frameworks and the way they regulate the exercise of political 
discretion by governments and their ministers. The second part discusses the 
personnel policy domain of allocating civil servants to the ministerial organisation 
and the third part discusses the domain of determining their levels of remuneration.
The Chapter argues that the institutional reforms since 1990 have led to the 
emergence of a hybrid personnel policy regime. On the one hand, I will conclude that 
the allocation regime has continuously retained the potential for the open 
politicisation of personnel policy, although there have been small differences from 
one rank of civil servants to another. By contrast, the remuneration regime has 
gradually moved from a personnel policy regime that allows unbounded politicisation 
between 1990 and 1992 towards a de-politicised personnel policy regime that has 
been formalised in the 2001 amendment of the Civil Service Act. As a consequence, 
governments have gradually forgone the possibility to apply discretionary 
instruments in the domain of setting civil servants' remuneration levels but not in the 
domain of allocating civil servants. The last section of part three therefore provides a 
short discussion of the application of political discretion in the domain of 
remuneration policy in order to identify the extent to which governments and their 
ministers have taken advantage of their formally granted powers. By contrast, an in 
depth discussion of how governments have exercised political discretion in the 
allocation of civil servants follows in the next Chapter.
38 The reorganisation efforts of the central government apparatus will be discussed in the next Chapter.
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Table 5.1. Number o f  People Employed in the Public Sector, 1999-2001 (Source: Prime Minister's 
Office 2002: 53)
1999 2000 2001 % 2001
People employed in budgetary 
institutions
According to legal categorisation:
Civil servants 108100 109800 109800 13.9
Public employees 569300 557500 550800 70.9
In service at the armed organs 87300 86400 86900 11.0
Court, prosecutors' office 11200 11400 11700 1.5
Individuals employed in public work 23800 26300 29100 3.7
Total 799700 791400 788300 100
By function
Public Administration, defence, social 
security
282800 277900 277500 35.2
Education 234300 232900 232400 29.5
Health, social welfare 198300 194700 192900 24.5
Other 60500 59600 56400 7.2
Individuals employed in public work 23800 26300 29100 3.7
Total 799700 791400 788300 100
132
Table 5.2. Distribution o f  Civil Servants by Employing Ministry (Source: Ministry o f  Interior)
1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 % in 
2001
Mean
Interior 594 569 549 526 648 640 538 7.2 580.6
Health
Welfare 438 477 427 344 381
309 335 4.5 387.3






652 1369 1087 1005 677
805 755 10.1 846.8*
Defence 120 124 111 135 131 143 191 2.6 136.4
Justice 315 267 335 318 283 297 321 4.3 305.1
Environment 383 374 381 370 464 454 528 7.1 422
Transport 389 337 342 342 301 331 378 5.1 345.7
Foreign Affairs 1633 1618 1745 1578 1772 1835 1887 25.3 1724
Cultural Heritage 241 253 3.4 247
Education 458 653 8.6 555.5
Youth & Sport 89 117 1.6 103
Culture & 
Education
630 696 584 506 551 593.4
Finance 579 569 591 572 620 576 520 7.0 575.3
Social & Family
Affairs
Labour 237 225 236 286 318
324 252 3.4 268.23
Mean 528.6 593.3 569 534.9 549.8 507.9 532.5 545.1
Total 6872 7120 6828 6419 6597 7110 7455 100 6914.4
*) For 1993, the number of civil servants that was employed in the Ministry of Industry and Trade and 
in the Ministry of International Economic Affairs were added together.
2. The Structure and Size of the Civil Service
The evolution of the formal structure of the Hungarian senior civil service since 1990 
has closely followed the evolution of the internal structure of executive branch 
ministries. Ministers stand at the apex of the ministerial organisation. They represent 
the political leadership of the ministry and the link between executive branch 
ministries and the Government. In Hungary, the Government consists of the Prime
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Minister, the Ministers heading various branches of the state administration falling in 
their respective scopes of competency, Ministers without portfolio and since 1998 a 
Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office. The Prime Minister is the only member 
of the Government who is elected by Parliament, for in the selection of the 
Government, the Parliament only votes on the Prime Minister and the government 
programme. Conversely, the Prime Minister is the only member of Government who 
is accountable to Parliament. Like in Spain and Germany, the Hungarian Prime 
Minister can only be removed by a constructive vote of no-confidence. The Prime 
Minister proposes the appointment and dismissal of Ministers to the President, who 
is himself elected by Parliament. Conversely, Ministers are accountable to the Prime 
Minister and not to Parliament.40
Ministers are assisted in their work by a Political State Secretary, an Administrative 
State Secretary, a French-style ministerial cabinet and a communication unit that is 
responsible for the relations between the ministry and the media. Departments are the 
main working units of the ministry, although larger departments are usually divided 
into several divisions or sections. Departments with similar policy responsibilities are 
grouped together under the responsibility of Deputy State Secretaries, while 
departments with ministerial management responsibilities are directly subordinated 
to the Administrative State Secretary. As a result, the Administrative State Secretary 
is the crucial link between the political leadership represented by the Minister and the 
departments as the main organisational units of the ministries. The number of Deputy 
State Secretaries as intermediate links between the Minister and the ministerial 
departments varied during the 1990s between three and six per ministry, although the 
average number increased slightly from 3.2 in the early 1990s to 4.3 per ministry in 
2000. However, as I will show in more detail in the next Chapter, there is no direct 
relationship between the size of a ministry and the number of appointed Deputy State
39 In 1989, the National Round Table Talks had provided for explicit ministerial accountability by 
granting Parliament the right to table a motion of no-confidence against individual ministers. However, 
the provision was deleted in the 1990 wave o f constitutional amendments. At the same time, the 
constructive vote of no-confidence against the Prime Minister was introduced and hence strengthened 
the Prime Minister both vis-a-vis his ministers and Parliament (Korosenyi 1999: 161).
40 From the point of view of delegation studies, the Hungarian constitution formalises rather neatly the 
principles of singularity and indirect delegation as features of Strom's (2000) ideal typical 
parliamentary system of government.
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Secretaries, since for instance the small Ministry of Youth and Sports has employed 
six Deputy State Secretaries since its creation in 1999.
The ranks of different state secretaries were introduced in the 1990 Act on State 
Secretaries in the context of the transformation of the central government apparatus. 
Political State Secretaries belong to the political leadership of the ministry. They are 
political appointments of the government and may deputise for the Minister both in 
Government meetings - though without voting rights - and in the plenary of 
Parliament. By contrast, Administrative State Secretaries are formally responsible for 
managing the organisation and the professional affairs of the ministry. They may 
deputise for the Minister only in the absence of the Political State Secretary, but they 
may not speak on the floor of Parliament. Moreover, the Act on State Secretaries 
established the rank of Deputy State Secretary as being responsible for the 
management of ministerial departments that cover a particular policy area within the 
jurisdiction of the ministry. Hence, the 1990 Act on State Secretary formalised a 
functional division between the administrative and the political leadership of a 
ministry. The 1997 Act on the Legal Status of Members of the Government and State 
Secretaries did not introduce any changes to the structure of the two top ministerial 
positions.
Between 1990 and 1992, ministries distinguished internally between 'managers' and 
'employees', but there was no formal distinction between the heads of ministerial 
units and their staff, as all employees of the branch ministries continued to be 
governed by the 1967 Labour Code.41 Hence, between 1990 and 1992, the senior 
civil service effectively lacked a formal institutional definition, although it is 
appropriate to refer for that period to Administrative State Secretaries, Deputy State 
Secretaries (henceforth, state secretaries) and managers of organisational units as the 
senior officials of executive branch ministries.
The 1992 Civil Service Act defined the ranks within the ministerial hierarchy. Below 
the Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries who are included in the scope of the
41 See the top rows in Table 5.5., which includes data for the Ministry of Interior before the adoption 
of the Civil Service Act.
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Civil Service Act, the 1992 Act differentiated the staff of ministerial units into four 
general categories of civil servants distinguished on the basis of their educational 
qualifications and their functional responsibilities. Civil servants of category I 
(henceforth, higher civil servants) comprise officials with a university degree. Middle 
ranking civil servants of category II have completed secondary school and lower 
ranking civil servants of category IE and IV are referred to as administrators and 
blue-collar workers respectively. The 2001 amendment of the Civil Service Act 
excluded lower ranking civil servants from the scope of the Act and subjected them 
to the Labour Code.
Moreover, the 1992 Civil Service Act formalises a category of senior civil servants 
defined as higher civil servants who are leaders of organisational units. The Act 
refers to senior civil servants as Heads of Departments, their Deputies and Heads of 
Divisions. Hence, in accordance with the typical structure of a ministerial 
organisation outlined above, these ranks are the levels three, four and five in the 
ministerial hierarchy. However, in practice, the rank of senior civil servant was also 
granted to Ministers' chiefs of staff and/or their personal secretaries. As a result, 
according to the 1992 Civil Service Act, the senior civil service consisted of state 
secretaries and senior civil servants as all those ranks that are in managing positions 
in the ministry.42
Except for state secretaries, the Government of Hungary only provides data that 
distinguishes between different ranks of the civil servants for the entire civil service. 
Table 5.3. shows the distribution of civil servants according to their rank in all 
institutions covered by the Civil Service Act. According to an internal document of 
the Ministry of Interior, 9.7% of all employees covered by the Civil Service Act were 
ranked as senior civil servants in 2000, excluding state secretaries. However, data 
collected from the Ministry of Transport for the period from 1994 to 2001, the 
Ministry of Environment from 1998 to 2000 and from the Ministry of Interior from 
1990 to 2000 suggests that higher civil servants make up around 50% of the
42 It is important to note that I distinguish between the senior civil service as a group of managers and 
senior civil servants as a subset of this group. Interestingly, in the Hungarian documents, senior civil 
servants continue to be labelled 'managers' like before the change of regime.
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ministerial civil servants and that their proportion has slightly increased during the 
1990s (see Table 5.4.). On the other hands, the proportion of middle ranks remained 
stable at 15-20% in the Ministries of Transport and Environment, while the 
proportion of lower ranks has continuously decreased during the 1990s.
Table 5.3. Development o f the Number o f  Civil Servants, 1999-2001 (Source: Prime Minister's 
Office 2002: 54)
I. Class II. Class III. Class IV. Class Total
1999
Central Public Administration 28564 25436 5888 4988 64876
Non-governmental bodies 829 475 88 299 1691
Local municipalities 11396 20742 3856 5371 41365
Public bodies 65 56 26 4 151
Other 60 91 13 2 166
Total 40914 46800 9871 10664 108249
2000
Central Public Administration 30370 26078 5531 4674 66653
Non-governmental bodies 869 465 79 291 1704
Local municipalities 12310 21603 3849 5226 42988
Public bodies 78 63 24 4 169
Other 73 145 11 3 232
Total 43700 48354 9494 10198 111746
2001
Central Public Administration 32885 27532 60417
Non-governmental bodies 1005 493 1498
Local municipalities 13965 24129 38094
Public bodies 69 70 139
Other 76 136 212
Total 48000 52360 100360
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Table 5.4. The Distribution o f  Civil Servants according Rank in Selected Ministries (Source: 
Ministries o f  Interior, Environment and Transport)
Year Senior % I % II % III % IV % Total
Ministry of Interior*
1990 203 32.1 430 67.9 633
1991 95 17.1 459 82.9 554
1992 70 12.4 494 87.6 564
1993 71 12.4 349 61.1 140 24.5 11 1.9 571
1994 71 12.9 331 59.9 139 25.2 11 1.9 552
1995 79 15.8 283 56.7 127 25.5 10 2.0 499
1996 81 16.1 285 56.7 127 25.2 10 1.9 503
1997 79 16.8 285 60.5 100 21.2 7 1.5 471
1998 77 16.1 302 63.2 94 19.7 5 1.0 478
1999 77 14.7 356 67.9 86 16.4 5 1.0 524
2000 98 18.6 356 67.4 71 13.4 3 0.6 528
Mean** 79.1 15.4 318.4 61.7 110.5 21.4 7.75 1.5 515.6
Ministry of Transport
1994 53 16.1 125 37.9 58 17.6 35 10.6 59 17.9 330
1995 61 19.1 125 39.1 52 16.3 36 11.3 46 14.4 320
1996 61 19.3 124 39.2 51 16.1 37 11.7 43 13.6 316
1997 57 18.3 130 41.7 52 16.7 31 9.9 42 13.5 312
1998 60 17.6 145 42.5 60 17.6 31 9.1 45 13.2 341
1999 69 20.5 135 40.1 66 19.6 27 8.0 40 11.9 337
2000 76 21.5 148 41.8 61 17.2 29 8.2 40 11.3 354
Mean 62.4 18.9 133.1 40.3 57.1 17.3 32.3 9.8 45 13.7 330
Ministry of Environment
1998 70 22.9 147 48.2 46 15.1 26 8.5 16 5.2 305
1999 72 23.7 150 49.3 46 15.1 24 7.9 12 3.9 304
2000 75 20.4 197 53.5 52 14.1 32 8.7 12 3.3 368
Mean 72.3 22.3 164.7 50.4 48 14.8 27.3 8.4 13.3 4.2 325.7
*) Higher civil servants and middle ranks are grouped together. 
**) Means calculated for 1993 to 2000
Moreover, Table 5.4. suggests that around 15-20% of the ministerial civil servants 
were ranked as senior civil servants (excluding state secretaries). The proportion of 
senior civil servants in the three ministries is inversely related to the overall size of 
the ministry and thus, it appears to be reasonable to assume that the proportion of
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senior civil servants is higher in small ministries and lower in large ministries. On the 
other hand, recall the example of the Ministry of Youth and Sports above, which 
suggests that the relationship between the size of the ministry and the proportion of 
senior civil servants is at best ambiguous. Therefore, we can only estimate that a 
proportion of 15-20% is equivalent to 1000-1400 senior civil servants that have been 
employed in central government ministries at any point during the 1990s. However, 
in all three ministries the proportion of senior civil servants per ministry increased 
towards the late 1990s. In 1994, the mean proportion of senior civil servants in the 
Ministries of Transport and Interior was at 14.5%. This value rose to 20.05% in 
2000.
Finally, Figure 5.1. shows the distribution of ranks among senior civil servants as 
they were placed on the payroll of the Ministry of Transport between 1994 and April 
2001.43 First, it shows the gradual increase in the number of senior civil servants 
during the 1990s, especially since 1999. Second, it clearly confirms the centrality of 
departments as basic working units in the ministries, for Heads of Departments 
represent the largest group of senior civil servants accounting for approximately 40% 
of the senior civil servants. Conversely, Deputy Heads of Departments are only 
occasionally appointed and only some departments may be further divided into 
smaller divisions led by a Head of Division.
43 Occasionally, there are two Administrative State Secretaries shown and five or six Deputy State 
Secretaries. These specific values result from personnel changes when the outgoing official continued 
to be on the payroll for a maximum of six months.
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The amendments of the Civil Service Act in 1997 and 2001 have further 
differentiated the structure of the civil service, especially the senior civil service. 
Firstly, the 1997 amendment formalised the power of Ministers to establish 
ministerial cabinets. Accordingly, it defined 'ministerial advisors' and 'political 
advisors' as particular groups of higher civil servants working in ministerial cabinets. 
Ministerial advisors are simply defined by their workplace in the ministerial 
secretariat or cabinet, while political advisors are defined as performing functions 
directly related to the activities of the Minister. Advisors are included within the 
scope of the senior civil service for they are responsible for strategic and partly co­
ordinating functions within the ministry.
Structures equivalent to ministerial cabinets had already existed before 1997 as 
Ministers tended to establish directly subordinated advisory units in the ministries. 
The heads of these units were variously labelled chief of staff or chief of secretariat. 
However, there was no uniform method of ranking chiefs of cabinets. For instance, 
the Ministry of Defence tended to rank chiefs of staff as Deputy State Secretaries, 
and the ministry of Welfare did so in 1993 and 1994. By contrast, most ministries 
ranked chiefs of cabinets or ministerial secretariats as senior civil servants. However, 
after the enactment of the 1997 amendment, the chief of cabinet in the Ministry of 
Interior for example continued to be ranked as a senior civil servant and it is only 
since the end of 1998 that ministries rank political advisors, ministerial advisors and 
senior civil servants separately. Between July 1998 and April 2001, the Ministry of 
Transport employed two to seven political advisors, between 1998 and 2000, the 
Ministry of Interior employed either five or six advisors, and the Ministry of 
Environment employed five advisors in 2000. Hence, all three ministries employed 
more or less the same number of advisors since 1998, although it has been reported 
during personal interviews that, in some ministries, more than ten advisors worked in 
ministerial cabinets.
Finally, the 2001 amendment has created a Senior Executive Service as an entirely 
new group of civil servants. It is defined as a 'corps of experts specifically dealing 
with global governmental questions, the efficiency of operating the budget, the
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effectiveness of activities related to European integration, the elevation of 
management and control, and the preparation of strategic administrative decisions'. 
Moreover, it is stated explicitly that members of the senior executive service perform 
Various ad hoc tasks set forth by the Prime Minister (or acting on his behalf, the 
Minister leading the Prime Minister's Office)'. The members of the senior executive 
service are selected from the group of state secretaries, senior civil servants and other 
higher civil servants that may apply given the functional definition of the Senior 
Executive Service. Hence, the creation of the senior executive service further 
differentiates the senior civil service, but it only affects the size of the senior civil 
service, if higher civil servants (who are otherwise outside the scope of the senior 
civil service) become members of the senior executive service. Finally, the 2001 
amendment states that the size of the senior executive service may not exceed 300 
members. All of these positions were filled by early 2002.
In sum, the Hungarian civil service has continuously been differentiated since 
1990/92. The senior civil service as a subgroup of the ministerial civil service 
consists of all those civil servants that hold managing positions and/or strategic 
planning positions in central government ministries. Therefore, since 2001, the 
Hungarian senior civil service comprises Administrative and Deputy State 
Secretaries, senior civil servants, advisors and members of the senior executive 
service as categories of civil servants. The next two parts analyse the formal-legal 
frameworks that have governed the Hungarian civil service since 1990 to identify the 
extent to which governments and their Ministers wield discretionary powers over the 
determination of personnel policy outcomes. Because senior civil servants and 
advisors are effectively ranked as special groups of higher civil servants, I will 
include a discussion of the possibilities for the exercise of political discretion 
inherent to the formal-legal frameworks that apply to higher civil servants. By 
contrast, unless necessary, I will not discuss specific provisions that apply to lower 
and middle ranking civil servants.
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3.The Allocation Regime: Varieties of Regimes that Allow Open 
Politicisation
This part assesses the formal-legal rules that govern the personnel policy domain of 
allocating civil servants to the ministerial organisation. It argues that a personnel 
policy regime that grants governments the possibility to openly politicise the 
allocation of civil servants has increasingly stabilised in Hungary since 1990. This 
argument is unambiguous with respect to state secretaries and political advisors, but 
rather ambiguous when considering the other members of the senior civil service. 
However, I will argue that the institutional basis of allocating higher civil servants 
continues to provide enough opportunities for governments to exercise indirect 
political discretion. Governments are likely to have more interest in taking advantage 
of indirect means to exercise political discretion the higher the vacant position in the 
ministerial hierarchy. Hence, the exercise of indirect political discretion that allows 
governments to openly politicise the allocation of civil servants to the ministerial 
organisation tends to be most relevant for senior level positions. In addition, the 
discussion shows that the creation of the senior executive service in 2001 has led to 
the establishment of several provisions that point towards the emergence of a 
personnel policy regime that allows structured politicisation for a subset of the senior 
executive staff. However, I will conclude that the establishment of the senior 
executive service does ultimately not undermine the possibility of governments to 
openly politicise the allocation of civil servants to the ministerial organisation. The 
discussion begins with the allocation regime for state secretaries. It then turns to the 
higher civil service and ultimately discusses the allocation regime for senior civil 
servants, advisors and the senior executive service.
3.1. State Secretaries: An Unambiguous Case for Open Politicisation
Since 1990, the rules governing the allocation of state secretaries to ministerial top 
positions have continuously corresponded to a personnel policy regime that allows 
open politicisation. According to the 1990 Temporary Act on State Secretaries,
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Administrative State Secretaries are appointed by the President upon the proposal of 
the Prime Minister who has to consult the relevant Minister. By contrast, Deputy 
State Secretaries are appointed by the Minister upon the proposal of the 
Administrative State Secretary. In either case, there is no explicit recruitment 
procedure for state secretaries and their selection is only constrained by general entry 
criteria such as holding a Hungarian citizenship and the requirement to have a 
university degree. The 1997 Act on the Legal Status of Members of the Government 
and State Secretaries added the requirement for state secretaries to pass a special 
public administration examination within one year of their appointment. The special 
examination is regulated by a Government Decree that has come into force in 1998. It 
emphasises legal knowledge and assesses civil servants in areas such as European 
Union law, Hungarian constitutional law, the workings of public administration, its 
modernisation, the budget process and an optional topic chosen from a list of 47 
topics. Hence, the educational criteria for entry of state secretaries have been 
tightened since 1990, but they do not pose a serious constraint upon the selection of 
candidates, as it effectively assesses whether or not a new state secretary has become 
acquainted with his job responsibilities in the area of legal knowledge within one 
year after his appointment. As a result, governments can recruit state secretaries from 
inside the ministerial organisation, another administrative agency or from any social 
or political sector outside public administration.
Both kinds of state secretaries are appointed for an indefinite period but their 
appointment may be withdrawn at any time without giving reasons. Hence, the Act 
on State Secretary makes no distinction between admitting state secretaries to the 
civil service and appointing them to their position, while posing no restrictions upon 
transfer and dismissal to create vacancies in either case. However, since 1997, state 
secretaries receive a severance pay of up to three months' salary upon dismissal. The 
1990 Act restricts state secretaries’ rights to pursue political and professional 
activities. They may become member of a political party but may not hold any 
official post in the party nor may they appear in public on its behalf. State secretaries 
may also run as candidates for elections at the central government level but must 
resign from the civil service in case they are elected to office. Moreover, they have to 
resign from their post, if they are appointed member of the government. At the same
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time, government can appoint state secretaries who have previously pursued a 
political career, for the appointee can resign from his post right before taking office 
and hence may continue to play an important though informal political role. Finally, 
the 1990 Act stipulates that state secretaries are not allowed to pursue alternative 
professional activities outside public administration. Consequently, in the domain of 
allocation, the personnel policy regime for state secretaries allows governments to 
pursue a strategy of open politicisation. On the one hand, the allocation regime is 
clearly distinguished from a personnel policy regime that allows unbounded 
politicisation because governments are unable to select candidates who want to 
simultaneously hold political office or pursue a private sector career. On the other, 
governments are not restricted in recruiting state secretaries from either the central 
government apparatus or elsewhere. I will devote the entire next Chapter to an 
analysis of governments' personnel policy strategies with respect to state secretary 
ranks in order to see the extent to which governments have used their discretionary 
powers.
3.2. Higher Civil Servants: Potential for Open Politicisation through 
Indirect Political Discretion
In the first part, I showed that senior civil servants since 1992 and advisors since 
1997 are classified as special higher civil servants. Therefore, I will begin the 
analysis with the allocation regime of the higher civil service and ultimately turn to 
senior civil servants, advisors and the senior executive service. The analysis shows 
that in 1992 the allocation regime has moved from a personnel policy regime that 
allows unbounded politicisation to a regime that allows open politicisation. However, 
although the reforms in 1997 and especially in 2001 have both tightened procedural 
constraints for the allocation of higher civil servants, governments have retained 
important opportunities to exercise indirect political discretion and are able to openly 
politicise the allocation of civil servants.
Before 1992, the personnel policy domain of allocating both managers and staff of 
ministerial units exhibited all the features of a personnel policy regime that allows 
unbounded politicisation. Because there was no separate legal basis for ministerial
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employees as civil servants, no formal admission procedure for ministerial employees 
existed. Employees were directly recruited and appointed by the ministry to their 
position and employment was formalised in a contract with individual ministries. 
Consequently, between 1990 and 1992, Ministers retained the formal authority to 
take all allocation decisions because the Hungarian constitution defined Ministers as 
heads of executive branch ministries. At the same time, procedural constraints were 
entirely self-imposed. For instance, it was customary practice that managers of 
ministerial units hold a university degree, but in the end this educational standard 
remained optional. Moreover, Ministers were free to unilaterally initiate the transfer 
or dismissal of managers and employees in the ministries. Finally, Ministers were not 
confronted with any indirect constraints, for, in principle, all ministerial staff other 
than state secretaries had unlimited rights to pursue political activities and alternative 
professional activities.
The 1992 Civil Service Act formally institutionalised an allocation regime for higher 
civil servants that allows open politicisation, although it shifted the authority for 
taking allocation decisions from the Minister to the Administrative State Secretary as 
the entity exercising employer's rights in the ministry. The main reasons why a 
formal governance structure that assigns decision-making authority to an 
administrative actor should be classified as a personnel policy regime allowing open 
politicisation is the unrestricted opportunity for Ministers to exercise indirect 
political discretion over personnel policy decisions. At least until the enactment of 
the 2001 amendment of the Civil Service Act, Administrative State Secretaries were 
quite unrestricted in the exercise of their powers. New civil servants had to meet the 
same general entry criteria like state secretaries, the educational qualification 
required for their rank as mentioned above, and they had to pass a basic examination 
within one year after their appointment to the civil service. The basic examination is 
regulated in a Government Decree adopted in 1993. It assesses primarily legal 
knowledge about the organisation and procedures of Hungarian public 
administration. In Table 5.5., it can be seen that, by 2000, many civil servants had 
taken a basic examination. However, although the majority of civil servants is 
reported to work in central government ministries, the data does not differentiate 
among the institutions subject to the scope of the Civil Service Act. The Civil
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Service Act also established a general recruitment procedure, but it was neither 
compulsory nor properly formalised. The 1997 amendment of the Civil Service Act 
stipulated that ministries shall report vacancies of non-managing civil servants to the 
Ministry of Interior to be disclosed in its Officials Gazette, unless they are filled 
within 15 days. However, the attempted centralisation of advertising vacancies did 
not challenge the Administrative State Secretaries' formal recruitment powers 
because firstly they were able to manipulate the 15 days' deadline and secondly the 
procedure was not compulsory but optional. By contrast, the 2001 amendment of the 
Civil Service Act has introduced several restrictions upon the Administrative State 
Secretaries' recruitment powers. The amendment has stipulated further entry criteria 
such as foreign language skills. Moreover, it is now compulsory to report vacancies 
to the Ministry of Interior and to disclose them in its Official Gazette, although the 
fifteen days' period to fill a vacancy with an internal candidate has been retained. 
Finally, the 2001 Act formalises open competition for entry. The procedure stipulates 
detailed prescriptions for advertising a vacancy and includes the possibility of 
rejected candidates to appeal against the outcomes of the recruitment process.
Table 5.5. Number o f  Basic Examinations Taken in Every Year since 1993 (Source: Hungarian 
Institute o f  Public Administration)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001* Total
674 3417 3606 658 796 829 1046 1153 612* 12791
* only the first six months of 2001
As a result, Ministers lost unilateral, unrestricted authority over the recruitment and 
appointment of civil servants to ministerial units in 1992 with the enactment of the 
Civil Service Act. However, Ministers retained the opportunity to exercise indirect 
political discretion over allocation decisions. As shown above, governments are 
confronted with very soft constraints when it comes to the selection of 
Administrative State Secretaries. Therefore, Ministers have effectively the 
opportunity to exercise political discretion through their Administrative State 
Secretary if deemed necessary. This possibility is especially relevant because 
between 1992 and 2001 Administrative State Secretaries were quite unconstrained 
when taking recruitment decisions.
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On the one hand, we might argue that the relevance of indirect political discretion 
depends on an analysis of governments' personnel policy strategies. If governments 
tend not to take advantage of their far-reaching discretionary powers to appoint 
Administrative State Secretaries, then, the exercise of indirect political discretion 
through the Administrative State Secretaries will be less relevant. Therefore, the 
possibility to openly (but indirectly) politicise the allocation of civil servants to the 
ministry may be considered to be conditional upon governments' personnel policy 
strategy. On the other hand, it is important to note that it is unlikely from an 
institutionalist point of view that an Administrative State Secretary would resist a 
specific recruitment desire of his Minister. Ministers have the possibility to dismiss a 
state secretary at all times without giving reasons, which implies that a defiant state 
secretary would put his career at risk. It results that the restrictions upon the open 
politicisation of the allocation of senior civil servants are so minimal that it is most 
appropriate to speak about a personnel policy regime that allows open politicisation.
At the same time, the allocation regime for civil servants has been clearly 
distinguished from a personnel policy regime that allows unbounded politicisation 
since 1992, when the Civil Service Act defined the same restrictions upon civil 
servants' political activities as for state secretaries. Since 2001, the possibilities to 
exercise indirect political discretion have been reduced due to the formalisation of 
the recruitment procedure. In principle, however, Ministers can continue to exercise 
indirect political discretion, if job advertisements are tailored in a way that allows 
Administrative State Secretaries to exercise rather unrestricted authority over 
recruitment decisions. Hence, the allocation regime for civil servants continues to 
allow for open politicisation of recruitment decisions. In fact, possibilities for the 
open politicisation of recruitment decisions remain in place unless a non-political and 
veritably de-politicised institution is decisive in the recruitment process.44 The 
institutional arrangement commonly chosen in Western democracies is a civil service 
commission. So far, the discussion of the Hungarian case implies that personnel
44 Because the government retains the formal leadership over the civil service in a de-politicised 
personnel policy regime, it has always veto powers over personnel policy decisions, but it effectively 
looses agenda setting powers. Hence, in this case, I refer to agenda-setting powers when I mean 
decisive.
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management has been almost exclusively decentralised since 1990. The Ministry of 
Interior has had several civil service related functions such as the administration of 
the civil service records, the preparation of civil service reforms and the supervision 
of the legality of the personnel management, but the Civil Service Department in the 
Ministry of Interior has gained only a minimal set of functions in the area of 
personnel management. However, even if the Civil Service Acts had established a 
civil service commission with decisive decision-making rights, it would have not 
directly led to the establishment of a de-politicised allocation regime. Regardless of 
whether allocation decisions are taken by a decentralised or a centralised authority, 
the necessary condition for the minimisation of indirect formal political discretion are 
procedural constraints that ultimately restrict any kind of political intervention into 
the allocation of civil servants to a minimum.
This conclusion is reinforced, if we consider the nature of indirect constraints 
resulting from the rules governing the dismissal of civil servants. The 1992 Civil 
Service Act stipulates that an appointment to the civil service is for an indefinite 
period and that fixed term appointments apply only in exceptional circumstances. 
Conversely, the (involuntary) dismissal of individual civil servants is restricted, as it 
can only occur as a result of a disciplinary procedure, or when a civil servant has 
been judged incapable of performing his or her work responsibilities. In both cases 
the Administrative State Secretary has to prove the case by means of tight 
procedures. For instance, between 1992 and 2001, the Ministry of Environment 
dismissed one civil servant (a senior civil servant) as a result of disciplinary process 
in 1999, which may serve to illustrate the difficulty in applying this procedure. 
Similarly, mass work force cuts in the civil service have to be authorised by 
Parliament or the Government and require the involvement of civil service unions in 
a cumbersome procedure.
However, the 1992 Civil Service Act established several provisions that undermine 
civil servants' right to permanent tenure. Firstly, it created options for Ministers to 
unilaterally dismiss groups of civil servants of all categories by means of different 
kinds of ministerial re-organisation and restructuring, for instance, if an 
administrative agency or unit is dissolved without legal successor, if the activities of
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an administrative agency is terminated, and in the case of reorganising a ministry. It 
is primarily the latter option of re-organisation that provided Ministers with nearly 
complete discretion to dismiss civil servants because Ministers’ right to reorganise 
the internal structure of their ministry is explicitly included in the Hungarian 
Constitution. The only significant change that was introduced in 1997 concerned the 
right of civil servants to a severance pay that ranges from one month's salary for civil 
servants with a minimum of three years of civil service employment to a maximum 
of eight months' salary after more than twenty years in the civil service. By contrast, 
the 2001 amendments of the Civil Service Act did not alter the rules governing the 
dismissal of civil servants.
An interesting example of the re-organisation clause at work occurred in 1998 in 
relation to the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture. After the 
change in government in 1998, the departments responsible for regional development 
were transferred from the Ministry of Environment to the Ministry of Agriculture 
affecting 125 civil servants and senior civil servants, and one Deputy State Secretary. 
As a result of the reorganisation, six senior civil servants and twelve higher and 
middle ranks were dismissed. However, they appealed to the courts against their 
dismissal arguing that the reorganisation did not alter their work responsibilities. The 
courts ruled eventually in favour of the civil servants, which would not have 
occurred, if the reorganisation had altered the responsibilities of the affected 
departments. This example illustrates that Ministers have been well aware of the 
reorganisation clause. While they have not been able to apply it to their own 
advantage in the case of the reorganisation of the regional development units, they 
have been able to successfully apply the provision in other cases all through the 
1990s.
In sum, the formal-legal rules governing the allocation of civil servants in the 
ministry that has been in place since 1992 have sufficient features that allow them to 
be characterised as a regime that allows open politicisation. However, it is reasonable 
to argue that the potential for open politicisation of the higher civil service is of little 
relevance in personnel policy processes for within the ministerial organisation higher 
civil servants are located rather far away from the political leadership. Hence, in case
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of higher civil servants, Ministers are likely to take advantage of their discretionary 
powers only in exceptional cases.
3.3. Senior Civil Servants: Restricted Potential for Open Politicisation
The rules governing the allocation of senior civil servants combine features of the 
allocation regime of both higher civil servants and state secretaries, and thus also 
exhibit the features of a regime that allows open politicisation. Senior civil servants 
are higher civil servants who are assigned to their managing position by the Minister 
for an indefinite period but their assignment may be withdrawn at any time without 
giving reasons. In case of senior civil servants, however, admission to the ranks of 
the higher civil service and appointment to the respective leadership position are only 
nominally distinct. Admission to and dismissal from the civil service follow the 
standards and procedures of higher civil servants outlined above.45 Hence, Ministers 
have the opportunity to exercise indirect political discretion. By contrast, the 
unilateral discretion of Ministers to appoint/assign heads of ministerial units is only 
subject to the requirement that senior civil servants must pass a special examination 
(see above) within one year after their appointment. Hence, the rules that govern the 
appointment of senior civil servants to their leadership position are the same as in the 
case of state secretaries.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the assignment procedure allows Ministers to 
choose higher civil servants irrespective of the time they have spent in the civil 
service. Hence, the institutional arrangements governing the admission and 
assignment of senior civil servants can effectively be performed in a single act and 
Ministers are confronted with few constraints in choosing a candidate from inside the 
ministry, another administrative agency or from anywhere outside public 
administration. We argued above that the possibilities for exercising indirect political 
discretion become more relevant the higher the appointment of a civil servants is 
located in the ministerial hierarchy. Accordingly, it is reasonable to argue that the
45 The 2001 Civil Service Act has explicitly tightened the recruitment procedure Heads of 
Departments, as outside recruits have to undergo the formalised recruitment procedure of higher civil
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opportunity to exercise indirect political discretion is especially important when it 
comes to the selection of senior civil servants as heads of ministerial units.
Similarly, the withdrawal of senior civil servants' assignments is unconstrained, too, 
and their transfer to other administrative agencies subject to the scope of the Civil 
Service Act does not require their consent. Rather than being reclassified as a higher 
civil servant after their senior assignment has been withdrawn, however, senior civil 
servants like all other civil servants can take advantage of a provision in the 1992 
Labour Code that grants the possibility of negotiating a compensation for a 
resignation upon mutual consent. However, Ministers do not have to offer a 'soft 
dismissal' to a senior civil servant, for they have the right to transfer a senior civil 
servant to administer the archives of the ministry or an attached institution.46 Hence, 
it is very much in the interest of the senior civil servant to be co-operative and to 
offer his resignation upon mutual consent in combination with a freely negotiated 
severance pay. Finally, indirect constraints resulting from senior civil servants' rights 
to pursue political activities do not differ from the limited rights defined for non­
managing civil servants and state secretaries. By contrast, in case of professional 
activities, the Act stipulates that senior civil servants cannot pursue alternative 
business activities except for being appointed to the executive boards of state-owned 
enterprises. In particular the Ministers of economic ministries have considerable 
latitude to recruit senior civil servants that are or can gain (various) lucrative 
membership(s) of executive boards of state-owned enterprises. Consequently, the 
admission and appointment of managers was subject to the possibility of unbounded 
politicisation until 1992. Since the introduction of the 1992 Civil Service Act, 
Ministers have had the possibility to openly politicise the allocation of senior civil 
servants to ministerial departments and divisions.
servants outlined above. Interestingly, the 2001 Act does not address Deputy Heads of Departments 
and Heads of Divisions.
46 It has apparently happened several times that a senior civil servant has been transferred to administer 
the archives. However, interviewees tended to use this example with a good dose of cynicism in order 
to illustrate the discretionary powers of Ministers.
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3.4. Advisors: Formalising the Unrestricted Use of Political 
Appointments
The rules governing the allocation of ministerial and political advisors combine 
features of the allocation regime for senior civil servants and state secretaries, and 
thus in either case the allocation regime allows open politicisation. Firstly, ministerial 
advisors are higher civil servants who are assigned to their position by the 
Administrative State Secretary. Their assignment is for an indefinite term and can be 
withdrawn at any time without giving a justification. By contrast, 'political advisors' 
are explicitly appointed by the Minister for the period of the Minister’s assignment 
only. In either case, the assignment of advisors is virtually unconstrained because 
candidates have to meet the same entry criteria as higher civil servants. In addition, 
they are required to demonstrate three to five years of professional experience 'inside 
or outside' the administration, which, however, can hardly be considered a serious 
constraint upon the selection of a particular candidate. In fact, it only means that 
Ministers cannot employ persons as advisors who have just graduated from 
university. As a result, political advisors are explicitly political appointments, 
whereas the allocation of ministerial advisors is subject to the same degree of indirect 
discretion as for other higher civil servants. However, in contrast to the bulk of the 
higher civil service, the opportunity to exercise indirect political discretion is much 
more relevant, as ministerial advisors work close to the Minister.
3.5. The Senior Executive Service: The Prime Minister's New Squad
The allocation regime for the senior executive service, which has been established in 
2001, combines features of personnel policy regimes that allow open and structured 
politicisation. At the recruitment stage, the 2001 amendment of the Civil Service Act 
set up a formal governance structure of the senior executive service that allows open 
politicisation. Members of the senior executive service are appointed by the Prime 
Minister following a recommendation of the Administrative State Secretary of the 
parent ministry and a recruitment procedure administered by the Prime Minister's 
Office. Moreover, it is subject to the discretion of the Prime Minister to appoint 
members of the senior executive service to ministerial posts. In principle, all higher
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civil servants and state secretaries are eligible for membership in the Senior 
Executive Service. However, formally, applicants have to meet (i) the criteria of the 
functional definition of senior executive staff, and (ii) the conditions for the specific 
membership positions as advertised by the Prime Minister's Office. Moreover, the 
Act does not state whether the application for membership is restricted to internal 
candidates or generally candidates that have already served in public administration 
for a certain time. Instead, the Act states that the standards and procedures for the 
recruitment of senior executive staff shall be subject to a Government Decree, which, 
however, has still not been adopted. Moreover, the 2001 Act provides for the 
establishment of a unit in the Prime Minister's Office, which is headed by a Deputy 
State Secretary responsible for the management of the senior executive service. 
However, the staffing of this unit is subject to the exercise of a good deal of indirect 
political discretion and it has in fact no particular decision-making authority. 
Therefore, it is the Prime Minister who is formally authorised to take recruitment 
decisions, while procedural constraints have effectively remained undefined. 
Consequently, the Prime Minister formally has the opportunity to openly politicise 
the recruitment process of the senior executive service and it is quite possible that 
new recruits to the civil service are directly recruited into the senior executive 
service.
On the other hand, the 2001 amendment has restricted the opportunities for the 
dismissal of members of the senior executive service. Members of the senior 
executive service are appointed for an indefinite term and can only be dismissed in 
accordance with the general rules of dismissal outlined above with the exception of 
ministerial re-organisation. Hence, the constraints upon the dismissal are much 
stricter than for state secretaries but also more effective than for higher and senior 
civil servants, since the re-organisation option does not apply. Members of the senior 
executive service can be transferred at any time without requiring their consent and 
failure to accept a new position is a reason to dismiss the person from the civil 
service. If a member of the senior executive service is not assigned to any position, 
he is put into a stand-by position for a maximum of five years. Hence, members of 
the senior executive service do not enjoy positional security but their membership in 
the corps is protected. This means that members of the senior executive service are
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essentially not left out in the cold if their appointment is revoked. Rather, the stand­
by provision is similar in kind to an early retirement provision found in Germany or 
France. Consequently, although the rules that govern the dismissal of members of the 
senior executive service do not provide for permanent tenure, they point in the 
direction of a personnel policy regime that allows structured politicisation.
One year later, the rules governing the senior executive service were modified. These 
were the only significant changes that were introduced in the 2002 amendment. 
However, the 2002 arrangements continue to combine features of personnel policy 
regimes that allow structured and open politicisation, although it reinforces the 
features that point in the direction of structured politicisation. According to the 2002 
amendment, state secretaries and heads of the office of Ministers without portfolio 
are automatically appointed by the Prime Minister as members of the senior 
executive service. By contrast, other civil servants are only eligible for membership 
in the senior executive service after at least five years of experience in public 
administration. As a consequence, the recruitment of currently more or less one third 
of the senior executive service is subject to open politicisation, while the rules 
governing the recruitment of the other two thirds correspond more closely to a 
personnel policy regime that allows structured politicisation because eligibility for 
the senior executive service is effectively limited to candidates from inside public 
administration. At the same time, however, the 2002 amendment reduced the period 
of guaranteed tenure after an assignment is revoked to two years. Hence, when 
compared with the governance structure that was established in 2001, the 
membership in the senior executive service has become less protected and it may be 
argued that the rights of the members of the senior executive service tend towards a 
generous severance payment of a two years' salary rather than a right towards 
permanent tenure.
As a consequence, we have to conclude that the recruitment and the dismissal from 
the senior executive service are less subject to the potential exercise of political 
discretion than the allocation of the other ranks of the senior civil service because, at 
least for parts of the senior executive service, the rules governing their recruitment 
and dismissal point in the direction of a personnel policy regime that allows the
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structured politicisation. However, we have to bear in mind that the rules governing 
the senior executive service do ultimately not undermine the possibility of Ministers 
to fill the positions in the senior bureaucracy by following a personnel policy strategy 
of open politicisation. The essence of a personnel policy regime that allows 
structured politicisation is that ministers are restricted in the choice of appointees to 
senior ranks in the ministerial hierarchy. By contrast, the rules governing the 
Hungarian senior executive service do not restrict the possibility of Ministers to 
choose appointees. Rather, they restrict the access to an elite corps of civil servants 
that is granted particular rights such as a higher level of membership protection and, 
as we will see below, a higher level of remuneration.
We can therefore conclude that in the personnel policy domain of allocating civil 
servants to the ministerial organisation, the Hungarian allocation regime has 
continuously allowed open politicisation for state secretaries since 1990 and for all 
other ranks of civil servants since 1992. State Secretaries and political advisors are 
the most clear cut cases in that the allocation regime approximates most closely a 
personnel policy regime that allows open politicisation except that neither of the two 
ranks is allowed to pursue alternative professional activities. By contrast, the 
allocation regime for senior civil servants is more ambiguous. In fact, the definition 
of senior civil servants as higher civil servants who are assigned leadership positions 
in the ministries suggests a personnel policy regime that allows structured 
politicisation in that higher career civil servants are promoted to senior positions. 
However, we argued that the allocation of higher civil servants provides ministers 
with the possibility of exercising indirect political discretion. Because the 
possibilities for the exercise of indirect political discretion have been far-reaching 
since 1992, we concluded that the higher civil service has itself been susceptible to 
open politicisation. As a result, the restrictions upon the open politicisation of the 
allocation of senior civil servants are so minimal that it is most appropriate to speak 
about a personnel policy regime that allows open politicisation. In principle, the same 
conclusion applies to higher civil servants, but it is unlikely that Ministers display 
great interest in the allocation of non-managing civil servants. Finally, the rules 
governing the admission to and the dismissal from the senior executive service 
combine features of personnel policy regimes that allow open and structured
156
politicisation. However, although one might argue that the 2001 reform and its 2002 
revision have laid the foundations for an allocation regime that allows structured 
politicisation, we concluded that the rules governing the entry to and the exit from 
the senior executive service do ultimately not undermine the possibility of Ministers 
to openly politicise the allocation of civil servants to the ministerial organisation. As 
a consequence, the discussion has shown that an allocation regime that allows open 
politicisation has been a rather stable formal structure since 1990/92 and this 
conclusion applies above all to the allocation of members of the senior civil service 
to the ministerial organisation.
4. The Remuneration Regime: The Long Road towards De-Politicisation
This part assesses the formal-legal rules that govern the personnel policy domain of 
determining civil servants' levels of remuneration. I will argue that the institutional 
reforms between 1992 and 2001 have gradually institutionalised a de-politicised 
remuneration regime. Since 1990, the rules that have governed the personnel policy 
domain of setting civil servants' remuneration levels have only marginally differed 
between the higher and the senior civil service. Therefore, I will discuss the evolution 
of the remuneration regime across time (rather than ranks) starting with the 
immediate post-transition period in 1990 and then evaluating the 1992 Civil Service 
Act and its amendments in 1997 and 2001. For each period, I will identify the general 
policy instruments provided for in the remuneration regime and the (few) 
particularities for different ranks of the civil service.
4.1. 1990-1992: Remuneration By the Grace of Ministers
Between 1990 and 1992, the remuneration regime exhibited all the features of a 
personnel policy regime that allows unbounded politicisation. There were no separate 
formal-legal rules that governed the remuneration setting of either ministerial 
employees or state secretaries, since the 1990 Act on State Secretaries only regulated 
the domain of allocating state secretaries except the provision that state secretaries 
are not allowed to pursue alternative professional activities. As a result, Ministers
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had formally unlimited possibilities of exercising political discretion over levels of 
remuneration. The remuneration regime differed from one ministry to another and the 
actual levels of remuneration heavily depended on the budgetary situation of the 
individual ministries.
For instance, in the Ministry of Transport a classification system was established that 
distinguished staff on the basis of educational qualification, length of service in the 
ministry, their workload and their job responsibility. At the same time, the Minister 
was formally free to adjust an individual employee's salary, if he wanted to reward 
good performance. In practice, however, the management of the remuneration system 
and the adjustment of individual employees' salaries was under the responsibility of 
the Administrative State Secretary, while the Minister took interest only in the case 
of managers and state secretaries. Moreover, it should be mentioned that the 
ministerial employees except state secretaries were free to pursue professional 
activities outside the ministry, which provided them with an opportunity to draw an 
additional income.
4.2. 1992-1997: Running on Two Tracks: The Standardised 
Remuneration Regime and its Exceptions
In 1992, the Civil Service Act established a hybrid remuneration regime that stayed 
effectively in place until 2001. On the one hand, remuneration levels were 
determined by a mixture of a system of career advancement based on seniority and a 
system of performance based incentives to enhance civil servants' remuneration 
levels. This standardised remuneration regime granted Ministers virtually no 
possibilities to exercise any political discretion. On the other hand, the 1992 Act 
included an important exception to the standardised remuneration regime that granted 
Ministers almost unlimited political discretion and had the potential to offset the 
workings of the entire standardised remuneration regime. Therefore, the 
remuneration regime that was in force from 1992 to 1997 was primarily characterised 
by the possibility for the open politicisation of remuneration policy.
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The 1992 Act established a classification system that differentiated higher civil 
servants in nine grades and 17 salary groups (see Table 5.6.) 47 The base 
remuneration of civil servants could easily be calculated by multiplying a 
remuneration base that is annually fixed in the Budget Act with incremental 
multipliers associated with each salary group. Between 1992 and 2001, the 
multipliers for higher civil servants ranged from 1.25 for trainees at the bottom of the 
scale to 3.4 for specialised senior councillors at the top of the scale. State secretaries 
and senior civil servants were considered as separate grades in the remuneration 
regime, but the logic of calculating their base remuneration functioned in the same 
way (Table 5.7.). Between 1992 and 2001, the multipliers ranged from 3.5 for Heads 
of Divisions to 5.5 for Administrative State Secretaries. The progression of 
multipliers was almost perfectly linear from the entry rank of trainee to the very top 
rank of Administrative State Secretary. In addition, all ranks of civil servants 
employed in the central government ministries as opposed to other groups of civil 
servants covered by the scope of the Civil Service Act, were also entitled to a bonus 
pay of 50% of their basic salary.48
47 Middle ranks were classified in seven grades and 15 salary groups and until 2001 both lower ranks 
were classified in one grade and seven salary groups.
48 During the first three years after enactment, i.e. until the end of 1995, supplementary pay was still 
subject to transitional rules which fixed the amount at 10% of civil servants basic salary.
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Table 5.6. Classification System for Higher Civil Servants between 1992 and 2001
Denomination of 
payroll placement




Trainee 1 0-1 1.25
Drafter II 2 1-3 1.55
3 3-5 1.65
Drafter I 4 5-7 2
5 7-9 2.1
Secretary II 6 9-11 2.35
7 11-13 2.5
Secretary I 8 13-15 2.6
9 15-17 2.65
Councillor II 10 17-19 2.8
11 19-21 2.85
Councillor I 12 21-23 2.9
13 23-25 2.95






Table 5.7. Classification System for the Senior Civil Service since 1992
Rank Multiplier between 1992 and 
2001
Multiplier since 2001
Administrative State Secretaries 5.5 9
Deputy State Secretaries 5 8.5
Heads of Departments 4.5 8
Deputy Heads of Departments 4 7.5
Heads of Divisions 3.5 7
Political Advisors Personal Remuneration Personal Remuneration
Ministerial Advisors As (Deputy) Heads of 
Departments
As (Deputy) Heads of 
Departments
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Senior civil servants and state secretaries were allocated to the classification system 
as a result of their assignment to managing positions. By contrast, higher civil 
servants were allocated to the classification system in accordance with the system of 
career advancement which was effectively governed by seniority-based promotions. 
Between 1992 and 2001, higher civil servants could expect a promotion every four to 
six years and a pay raise every one to four years given the distinction of grades into 
one, two or three salary groups. A civil servant had to pass a performance appraisal 
conducted by the Administrative State Secretary, whenever he was promoted. The 
performance appraisal was of a general kind. It assessed a civil servant on a five 
point scale in 12 subject areas ranging from professional knowledge or sense of 
responsibility to ability to maintain work related contacts or work organisation. 
Outstanding results in the performance evaluation entitled civil servants to 'jump' into 
the highest salary group of the next classification grade. Hence, there existed a very 
limited possibility to accelerate promotions by means of a performance appraisal 
system. By contrast, an insufficient result in the performance appraisal could slow 
down the automatic promotion by a maximum of one year. At the same time, the 
1992 Act granted civil servants the right to appeal against personnel policy decisions, 
but this did not include a right to appeal against the outcomes of a performance 
appraisal.
In principle, Ministers were therefore not able to influence the remuneration levels of 
senior civil servants and state secretaries once they had been appointed to their 
managing position. At the same time, it was common practice in the early 1990s that 
Ministers would nominally create additional managing positions in the ministries in 
order to increase the remuneration level of individual civil servants by means of 
appointing them to quasi-management positions. This practice is well reflected in the 
gradual increase of the number of senior civil servants during the 1990s, discussed in 
part 1. However, this was but one option to adjust remuneration levels, as we will see 
below. By contrast, in case of higher civil servants, Ministers were able to exercise 
the same kind of indirect political discretion as in the domain of allocating higher 
civil servants, because the rules of the performance evaluation system hardly posed 
major constraints upon Administrative State Secretaries. On the other hand, however, 
the rules for career advancement implied that promotions could only marginally be
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speeded up by means of the performance evaluation system because it was taken only 
once every few years and a civil servants could, on average, only bypass one salary 
group. Therefore, seniority rules were the dominant principle of career advancement 
for higher civil servants and Ministers had only very little opportunity to influence 
higher civil servants' career path.
In addition, the 1992 Act established several standardised performance incentives for 
higher civil servants. First, higher civil servants who had served in public 
administration for a certain number of years and who have received outstanding 
results in the performance appraisal could be awarded different kinds of honorary 
titles by the Administrative State Secretary to increase their remuneration level. 
Second, civil servants receive bonus pay, if they have been able to provide an official 
proof of foreign language skills and, until 2001, after having passed a special 
examination. Because the different kinds of performance incentives were all linked to 
clear standards such as time spent in office or examinations taken, these measures did 
not allow Ministers to adjust civil servants' remuneration levels.
On the other hand, the 1992 Act defined one significant exception to the standardised 
determination of civil servants' remuneration levels. It granted Ministers the right to 
define a 'personal remuneration' for civil servants 'displaying outstanding 
performance' different from the rules governing the general remuneration system. In 
this case, the evaluation of 'outstanding performance' was based on the subjective 
judgement of the Minister so that there were no procedural constraints in the 
application of this provision. Moreover, there was no limit as to what proportion of 
ministerial civil servants could be awarded 'personal remuneration'. An additional 
loophole to increase the income of non-managing and senior civil servants resulted 
from the incompatibility rules for other professional activities. As mentioned above, 
senior civil servants could, for instance, be appointed members to supervisory boards 
of state owned companies, which could provide a significant additional source of 
income. As a consequence, the 1992 Civil Service Act effectively established a 
hybrid remuneration regime. On the one hand, a standardised remuneration regime 
was established that minimised Ministers' opportunities to exercise political 
discretion. On the other hand, the personal remuneration clause provided Ministers
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with an unrestricted possibility to offset the entire standardised remuneration regime 
and therefore it is most appropriate to classify the remuneration regime between 1992 
and 1997 as a regime that allows open politicisation. In fact, the difference to a 
remuneration regime that allows unbounded politicisation could only be attributed to 
the limits upon civil servants alternative professional activities, although even these 
restrictions were rather soft.
4.3. 1997 - 2001: Staying on Two Tracks: The Standardised 
Remuneration Regime and more Exceptions
The 1997 amendment of the Civil Service Act retained the standardised remuneration 
regime, especially the classification system and the rules governing the career 
advancement of civil servants. At the same time, the amendment introduced an 
additional supplement to the standardised remuneration regime for the senior civil 
service ranging from 10% for Heads of Division to 65% for Administrative State 
Secretaries. All members of the senior civil service were entitled to this kind of 
statutory supplement on appointment to senior positions in the civil service. 
Therefore, Ministers had no possibilities to exercise political discretion over this new 
provision. However, several changes were incorporated into the Act that effectively 
granted Ministers' additional possibilities to adjust the remuneration levels of the 
higher and the senior civil service.
On the one hand, the 1997 amendment restricted Ministers' possibilities to grant a 
'personal remuneration' to state secretaries and Heads of Department. By contrast, the 
Administrative State Secretary was authorised to grant a personal remuneration for 
all other civil servants. The Act stated that personal salaries were charged to the 
payroll budget of the ministry, thereby creating an indirect though rather soft 
constraint though the limited ministerial personnel budgets. Moreover, the Act 
stipulated that no more than 20% of the ministerial staff may be subject to the 
personal remuneration clause. At the same time, the definition of 'outstanding 
performance' remained subject to the subjective evaluation of Ministers and 
Administrative State Secretaries. As a result, Minister's opportunities for the exercise 
of direct political discretion had been reduced to the senior civil service only, but a
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considerable room for the exercise of indirect political discretion through the 
Administrative State Secretary remained in place. Moreover, it is very doubtful to 
what extent a limitation to 20% of the ministerial staff can be regarded as a proper 
restriction upon the scope of the personal remuneration clause for one fifth of the 
ministry was indeed a very large proportion. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
institutional changes to the personal remuneration clause did not have any substantial 
effect on the degree of political discretion Ministers can exercise in setting civil 
servants' remuneration levels.
On the other, the 1997 Act widened the application of the performance evaluation 
system to the adjustment of rank-specific levels of remuneration. The Administrative 
State Secretary was given the power to either raise or lower the salary of higher civil 
servants, Deputy Heads of Departments and Heads of Divisions by 20% upon 
outstanding or insufficient performance as judged in the performance appraisal. On 
the other hand, Ministers could raise but not lower the remuneration of state 
secretaries and heads of departments by up to 40% dependent upon outstanding 
performance, based on their personal judgement. As a result, Ministers had the 
discretion to use the performance oriented bonus pay as a means to adjust the 
remuneration levels of the senior civil service, while they could exercise indirect 
political discretion in the case of higher civil servants. However, the difference 
between the personal remuneration clause and the 40/20% clause must be regarded as 
minimal because in practice it made no difference whether a Minister lifted the 
remuneration base of a senior civil servant by up to 40% upon his personal 
judgement or whether he invoked the personal remuneration clause. Hence, the 
formal restrictions upon the application of the personal remuneration clause 
discussed above and the introduction of the 40/20% rule neutralised each other and 
retained the previously present possibilities for Ministers to exercise political 
discretion.
At the same time, the combination of introducing ceilings for ministerial personnel 
budgets on the one hand and introducing the performance related scheme and 
retaining the personal remuneration clause on the other, had the impact of creating 
hidden competition among civil servants in the ministries. In practice, an
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Administrative State Secretary had to lower the remuneration levels of some civil 
servants by means of the performance appraisal in order to be able to increase the 
wage of other civil servants on the basis of either the 'personal remuneration' 
provision or the 40/20% rule. Alternatively, Administrative State Secretaries had to 
make additional personnel budgetary means available for instance by retaining 
positions in the ministry as vacant. At this point it is therefore important to recall the 
recruitment procedure introduced in 1997 (see above). Because it was not 
compulsory for ministries to report their vacancies or disclose them in their own 
official gazettes, they were able to make savings from retaining vacancies in the 
ministries to be redistributed among the employees of the ministries.
Finally, the 1997 amendment integrated ministerial and political advisors into the 
existing hybrid remuneration regime. Both types of advisors were classified in one of 
the two highest grades of the higher civil service. However, ministerial advisors 
received the salary of Heads of Departments or Deputy Heads of Departments and 
political advisors were subject to the personal remuneration clause. As a 
consequence, the 1997 amendment of the Civil Service Act retained most of the 
hybrid remuneration regime for both the higher and the senior civil service that had 
been established in 1992. However, the changes that were introduced did effectively 
increase Ministers' possibilities to exercise political discretion over civil servants' 
remuneration levels because the 40/20% rule must be considered as a new, 
alternative mechanism to exercise political discretion in setting remuneration levels. 
In sum, the 1997 amendment of the Civil Service Act introduced several changes to 
the 1992 remuneration regime, but in effect, it did not change the hybrid nature of the 
remuneration regime as the standardised regime continued to coexist with 
exceptional non-standardised provisions such as the personal remuneration clause 
and the newly introduced 40/20% rule.
4.4. Since 2001: Formalising a De-politicised Remuneration Regime
The amendment of the Civil Service Act in 2001 led to a complete overhaul of the 
remuneration regime. On the one hand, the classification system was substantially
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modified and, on the other, all policy instruments that had granted Ministers the right 
to exercise direct or indirect political discretion in the domain of setting civil 
servants' remuneration levels were effectively removed from the Act. Firstly, the 
personal remuneration clause was eliminated from the Act. As a result, Ministers lost 
the crucial instrument to exercise political discretion in the domain of setting civil 
servants' remuneration levels. Secondly, the amendment altered the connection 
between the performance evaluation system and the system of career advancement. It 
has become compulsory for higher civil servants both to pass the performance 
appraisal with a mark of at least 'suitable' in order to be eligible for promotion to a 
higher grade, and to pass a special examination within three years of admission to the 
civil service. As a result, it is no longer possible to jump into a higher salary group by 
means of an outstanding performance appraisal or enhance one's remuneration base 
by means of passing a special examination.
Thirdly, the performance evaluation system has been considerably modified in order 
to use it for the performance related adjustment of rank determined wages. The 2001 
Act stipulates that civil servants' performance is evaluated annually on the basis of 
specific performance requirements discussed and passed to the respective civil 
servant in advance for the current year. The performance evaluation is undertaken by 
the Minister in case of state secretaries and heads of departments, while 
Administrative State Secretaries are responsible for the performance evaluation of all 
other civil servants. Based on the outcome of the performance evaluation, civil 
servants' remuneration can be either raised or lowered by 20%. At the same time, the 
highly discretionary 40/20% rule of the 1997 Act was removed from the Act. 
Moreover, civil servants have been granted the right to seek legal redress against the 
results of the performance evaluation. These provisions apply to all ranks of civil 
servants except political advisors.
Consequently, the potential for the use of the performance evaluation system to 
exercise direct or indirect political discretion has been practically removed because 
both Ministers and Administrative State Secretaries have to commit ex ante to 
performance criteria. These criteria can eventually be assessed and in case of 
disagreement, civil servants have the right to turn to an external referee, i.e. the
166
courts, to enforce the claims arising from the ex ante defined performance criteria. At 
the same time, the role of the seniority principle has been reduced and the 
performance principle has been strengthened because an increase of civil servants' 
remuneration by 20% following a successful performance appraisal implies that a 
civil servant can effectively bypass one grade or several salary groups at once. 
However, because it is very difficult to exercise some kind of indirect political 
discretion in the course of a performance evaluation, we can conclude in 2001, 
Ministers have in fact lost the possibility to exercise indirect political discretion 
through the Administrative State Secretary. The only effective means of exercising 
discretion has been retained by the failure of the Act to define the coefficients for 
successful or unsuccessful performance evaluation. In other words, unless a 
Government Decree comes into force that clearly defines the coefficients, Ministers 
or Administrative State Secretaries will remain effectively free in setting a 
performance bonus at 5,10 or 20%, if a civil servant achieves results 'above 
expectation'. The 2001 amendment has therefore virtually eliminated all the 
instruments that previously allowed Ministers to exercise political discretion in the 
domain of setting civil servants' remuneration.
At the same time, the 2001 amendment reformed the classification system for the 
higher and the senior civil service (Table 5.8.). In case of the higher civil service, the 
Act has retained the number of 17 salary groups, but it has reduced the number of 
grades to six.49 Moreover, it changed the multipliers associated with each salary 
group. Since 2001, the trainee grade stands at 2.1 and the top grade of senior 
councillor at 6.0. Most interestingly, the progression from one salary group to another 
is no longer linear. According to the new classification, higher civil servants double 
their multiplier after eight years of service, i.e. the multiplier increases by 0.26 per 
annum. In the second stage of the career, between year eight and year sixteen in 
service, the per annum increase is at an average of 0.11. By contrast, after year 
sixteen the increase of the multiplier falls to 0.04 annually. Hence, the new 
classification system rewards higher civil servants especially in the early stages of 
their career.
49 Middle ranks were classified in seven grades and 15 salary groups and until 2001 both lower ranks 
were classified in one grade and seven salary groups.
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Table 5.8. Classification System for Higher Civil Servants since 2001
Denomination of 
payroll placement




Trainee 1 0-1 2.1
Drafter 2 1-2 3
3 2-3 3.2
Councillor 4 3-4 3.5
5 4-6 3.7
6 6-8 3.9




Senior Councillor 11 16-19 5.1
12 19-22 5.2
13 22-25 5.3




Table 5.9. Classification System for the Senior Executive Service
Rank Multiplier and Bonus
Administrative State Secretaries +100%
Deputy State Secretaries +50%
Heads of Departments +25%
Senior Executive Service 13
The amendment has also lifted the multipliers for the senior civil service that range 
now from seven for Heads of Divisions to nine for Administrative State Secretaries 
(see Table 5.7. again). Moreover, the 2001 amendment introduced a separate 
classification system for the senior executive service (Table 5.9.). The base 
remuneration of all members of the senior executive service is calculated with a
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multiplier of thirteen and in addition they receive a managerial bonus according to 
their rank in the ministry that ranges from 25% for Heads of Departments to 100% 
for Administrative State Secretaries. This means that the base remuneration of an 
Administrative State Secretary who, since 2002, is automatically a member of the 
senior executive service is effectively the product of the remuneration base set in the 
annual Budget Act and the factor 26, which is 12.4 times the remuneration base of 
the lowest higher civil service grade. Moreover, if an Administrative State Secretary 
receives a performance evaluation that is 'above expectation', then the multiplier to 
calculate his remuneration base will increase up to 31.2. As a consequence, the 2001 
amendment re-organised the former hybrid remuneration regime into an 
unambiguous case of de-politicisation, in which remuneration levels are exclusively 
determined by the classification system, while the allocation of civil servants to the 
classification system is subject to the seniority based system of career advancement 
and further adjustment of civil servants' rank specific pay is the result of a densely 
regulated performance evaluation scheme with virtually no opportunities for the 
exercise of political discretion.
4.5. Remuneration Policy in a Hybrid Remuneration Regime: The Art of 
Circumventing the Standardised Remuneration System until 2001
The gradual de-politicisation of the remuneration regime implies that Ministers have 
lost the ability to intervene into the personnel policy domain of setting civil servants' 
levels of remuneration. However, the fact that Ministers could exercise political 
discretion for more than 10 years after transition does not mean that they have also 
done so in practice. Hence, it is quite possible that the policy instruments that involve 
the use of political discretion have either not been applied at all or have only been 
applied in exceptional cases rather than systematically. This section briefly discusses 
the main features of remuneration policy and assess its relationship to the 
remuneration regime as defined in legislation. The discussion will conclude that 
Ministers of Hungarian governments did indeed take advantage of the discretionary 
powers provided in the hybrid remuneration regime as it existed between 1992 and 
2001. Moreover, the use of discretionary instruments did increase until the enactment 
of the de-politicising amendment of the Civil Service Act in 2001 and reached a
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scope that was sufficiently large to conclude that Ministers systematically used their 
discretionary instruments systematically rather than in exceptional cases.
It proved very difficult to gather data on the remuneration policy of different 
governments or ministries. Therefore, I will only provide some brief illustrations 
with data received from the Ministry of Transport for the period from 1994 to 2001. 
The Ministry of Transport is an especially relevant case for assessment. Between 
1990 and 1999, the Ministry of Transport was usually cited by interviewees, together 
with the Ministry of Justice, as the 'most stable and the least politicised ministry' of 
the government.50 Therefore, the Ministry of Transport represents an 'extreme case' 
(Eckstein 1992) for the empirical analysis of personnel policy processes in the 
Hungarian government, that is, we can assume that the remuneration policy in the 
Ministry of Transport is most likely to exhibit the least use of instruments that 
involve the exercise of political discretion. Conversely, we can conclude that if direct 
and indirect political discretion has been exercised in remuneration policy of the 
Ministry of Transport, then other ministries are very likely to have used these 
discretionary instruments as well.
Table 5.10. and Figure 5.2. below show the proportion of different ranks of civil 
servants that were on the personal remuneration list of the Minister. The most 
important message of Table 5.10. is the fact that Ministers did indeed take advantage 
of the possibility to grant a personal remuneration to civil servants. However, Table 
5.10. and Figure 5.2. contain additional interesting results. First, although Ministers 
could take advantage of the personal remuneration list since 1992, the Minister of 
Transport did so for the first time in July 1995.51 Secondly, overall, the application of 
the personal remuneration clause has continuously increased. However, the 
development is mainly characterised by two major leaps in August/September 1998
50 The situation changed in the Ministry of Transport with the departure of the Administrative State 
Secretary in October 1999 and especially the replacement of the Minister in June 2000 (see also next 
Chapter).
51 The timing coincides actually with the coming into effect of the so-called Bokros austerity 
programme of 1995. Although the Bokros package included a staff reduction programme, it did not 
include nominal remuneration cuts. Yet, the real wage decrease in 1995/1996 of up to 15% is likely to 
have impacted upon the real wage level of civil servants. The personal remuneration list provided a 
possibility for ministers to counteract the financial impact of the Bokros package on the civil servants' 
remuneration levels.
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and in June/July 2000. The first change coincides more or less with the change in 
government in July 1998 and half of the higher civil servants that were paid a 
personal remuneration held a political advisor status. The second change coincides 
with a government reshuffle that led to the appointment of a new Minister of 
Transport and a new Administrative State Secretary in June 2000. In the summer of 
2000, the number of senior civil servants subject to the personal remuneration clause 
doubled in two months. As a consequence, there is strong reason to believe that the 
personal remuneration clause was indeed an instrument to exercise political 
discretion. Moreover, we have to bear in mind that the Ministry of Transport had 
been an extreme case until the turn of 1999/2000. Hence, the substantial increases in 
the application of the personal remuneration clause after the summer of 1998 and the 
summer of 2000 give an indication of how the personal remuneration clause was 
probably used in the years between 1992 and 2001 in other ministries.
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Table 5.10. Ministry o f  Transport: Percentage o f  S taff on the Personal Remuneration List








Jan 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jan 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0
July 1995 0.30 0 0 1.89 0 0
Jan 1996 0.62 0 0 4 0 0
Jan 1997 1.26 1.47 0.82 3.85 0 0
Jan 1998 0.96 1.59 0 3.92 0 0
Jan 1999 6.18 3.08 5 15.25 0 6.82
Jan 2000 10.23 6.76 5.15 28.79 0 10
O ct 2000 15.62 12.94 9.86 35.29 3.57 16.67
Jan 2001 13.73 12.99 9.46 27.87 6.90 14.63
Thirdly, Table 5.10. and the Figure 5.2. illustrate that middle ranking civil servants 
had continuously represented the largest share of civil servants who were paid a 
personal remuneration. While this may be unexpected at first glance, it is in fact not 
surprising at all. Because the standardised remuneration regime did not allow the 
allocation of civil servants without a university degree as higher or senior civil 
servants and because the standardised remuneration level was significantly lower for 
middle ranks, Ministers used the personal remuneration clause to circumvent the 
standardised remuneration regime. As a result, civil servants without a university 
degree but with important (effectively informal) management functions in the 
ministry and often with advisory tasks to the Minister were paid a personal 
remuneration by the Minister. At the same time, we have to take into account that 
Ministers could also refer to the 40/20% rule in order to raise senior civil servants' 
salaries, hence, there was in fact no major need to keep senior civil servants on the 
personal remuneration list of the Minister. Finally, Table 5.10. and Figure 5.2. show 
that the proportion of civil servants (all ranks) never exceeded 16% with the 
maximum being 15.6% in October 2000. This implies that the institutional change 
that was introduced in 1997, namely the restriction of the personal remuneration 
clause to a maximum of 20% of the staff in the ministry had no impact on the 
remuneration policy processes in the ministry. This finding corroborates the 
argument raised above that the restriction of the personal remuneration clause to 20%
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of the ministerial civil servants introduced in 1997 was effectively no restriction 
upon Ministers' discretion.
Finally, it is matter of concern to what extent Ministers have taken advantage of the 
40/20% rule that was introduced in 1997. Transport Ministers have started to grant 
performance related bonus pay right after the 1997 amendment came into force. 
However, until the summer of 1998, when the government changed, the Heads of 
Departments were granted between 5% and 20% bonus pay. By contrast, the full 
scale of paying out a remuneration bonus up to 40% was only used after the summer 
of 1998. Table 5.11. shows the values for Heads of Departments in the 1999 as a 
representative year. The proportions in column 1 demonstrate that all Department 
Heads except one received a performance related remuneration bonus and four out of 
five Department Heads received a bonus of 20% or higher. However, the most 
important message of Table 5.11. is certainly that the exercise of political discretion 
in setting managers' remuneration levels was not an exception but very much the rule.
Table 5.11. Application o f  the 40% rule fo r Heads o f  Departments, values for 1999, adjusted fo r  12 
months












The discussion in this section is by no means conclusive, as it has only provided 
illustrative data from the Ministry of Transport. However, we argued that the 
Ministry of Transport is an extreme case in that it was usually described by
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interviewees as one of two ministries that were characterised by stability and low 
levels of politicisation. Therefore, I argued that the Ministry of Transport is a useful 
case to test the exercise of political discretion until it was removed in 2001 
amendment of the Civil Service Act because if we find the systematic exercise of 
political discretion in the least likely case of the Ministry of Transport, we can 
assume that the remuneration policy of other ministries exhibits at least similar levels 
of politicisation. The discussion in this section has demonstrated that, firstly, 
Transport Ministers took advantage of the policy instruments that allow the 
unrestricted exercise of political discretion and, secondly, that the exercise of this 
discretion was not an exception but very much the rule. As a consequence, there is 
good reason to believe that between 1992 and 2001, Ministers did indeed 
systematically exercise political discretion in the personnel policy domain of 
determining civil servants' levels of remuneration.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, this Chapter has analysed the formal-legal frameworks governing the 
ministerial civil service in Hungary between 1990 and 2001 from the point of view of 
formal political discretion. The analysis has shown that the institutional reforms since 
1990 have led to the emergence of a hybrid personnel policy regime. On the one 
hand, the allocation regime has continuously allowed open politicisation for state 
secretaries since 1990 and for all other ranks of civil servants since 1992, which 
implies that the civil service legislation that was adopted and revised had little 
capacity for de-politicising personnel policy processes in so far as the allocation of 
civil servants is concerned. State Secretaries and political advisors are the most clear 
cut cases in that the allocation regime approximates most closely a personnel policy 
regime that allows open politicisation. By contrast, the allocation regime for senior 
civil servants, ministerial advisors, and higher civil servants is more ambiguous. 
However, I argued that the allocation regime for these categories of civil servants is 
primarily characterised by providing ministers with possibilities to exercise indirect 
political discretion, making it susceptible to open politicisation. Moreover, I argued 
that the exercise of indirect discretion becomes more relevant, the higher the
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appointment of a civil servant is located in the ministerial hierarchy. Finally, I argued 
that the rules governing the senior executive service combine features of allocation 
regimes that allow open and structured politicisation. However, although the 
restrictions upon the recruitment and dismissal of parts of the senior executive 
service indicate an institutional choice that points in the direction of a personnel 
policy regime that allows structured politicisation, I argued that the establishment of 
a separate senior executive service has ultimately not undermined the possibility of 
Ministers to openly politicise the allocation of civil servants to the ministerial 
organisation.
By contrast, I showed that the remuneration regime has gradually moved from a 
personnel policy regime that allows unbounded politicisation between 1990 and 1992 
and a regime that allows open politicisation between 1992 and 2001 to a de­
politicised personnel policy regime since the 2001 amendment of the Civil Service 
Act. Since 1992, the formal-legal rules governing the remuneration of civil servants 
have only marginally differentiated between different ranks of civil servants. Hence, 
governments have gradually forgone the possibility to apply discretionary 
instruments in the domain of setting remuneration levels of all ranks of civil servants. 
Moreover, the discussion of remuneration policy in the 'crucial' Ministry of Transport 
between 1994 and 2001 suggested that Ministers did systematically take advantage of 
their discretion to set civil servants' remuneration levels and that they did so 
increasingly until the discretionary powers were deleted from the Act in 2001. 
However, since the enactment of the 2001 amendment, it is no longer possible for 
Ministers to directly determine the outcomes of remuneration policy, for the attempt 
to politically adjust the remuneration levels of individual civil servants is only 
possible by means of exercising political discretion in the area of allocating civil 
servants to the ministerial organisation, for instance, by assigning a civil servant to a 
position as a senior civil servant. The next Chapter will assess in more detail how 
governments have exercised political discretion specifically over the allocation of 
state secretaries since 1990.
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Chapter 6
Making Use of Political Discretion: The Personnel Policy Strategies of 
Hungarian Governments Since 1990
1. Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to assess the extent to which Hungarian governments 
have used the discretionary instruments at their disposal in order to determine the 
allocation of civil servants to the ministerial organisation. The investigation of 
personnel policy processes concentrates on the allocation of state secretaries between 
1990 and 2000. In the last Chapter, I argued that the allocation regime for state 
secretaries resembles a personnel policy regime that allows open politicisation. 
Therefore, an analysis of governments’ personnel policy strategies serves to identify 
to what extent Hungarian governments ultimately used the discretionary powers 
written into the 1990 Act on State Secretaries and its 1997 successor Act. In 
principle, it is conceivable that Hungarian governments did not exercise political 
discretion over the allocation of state secretaries at all, they took advantage of the 
comparably high degree of formal political discretion all through the 1990s, or they 
did so at some points in time but not at others. Hence, the analysis of personnel 
policy strategies serves to assess to what extent formal-legal frameworks for the 
conduct of personnel policy correspond to the actual processes of personnel policy.
Moreover, in Chapter 3 ,1 argued that governments choose personnel policy strategies 
in light of the degree to which they can trust senior bureaucrats who are inherited 
from outgoing governments. Problems of political trust, I argued, derive from (i) the 
degree to which incoming governments associate the career path of inherited senior 
bureaucrats with discretionary decisions taken by outgoing governments, and (ii) the 
degree to which the policy preferences of incoming and outgoing governments differ. 
In the present context, it is methodologically problematic to assess the impact of 
differing policy preferences between incoming and outgoing governments on the
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choice of governments' personnel policy strategies because I am assessing Hungary 
as a single case. Moreover, no data was available to compare governments' policy 
specific preferences across time on a left-right continuum. However, an assessment 
of the Hungarian party system as it has evolved since the end of communist rule will 
provide clues as to whether changes in government had the potential to reinforce or 
mitigate problems of political trust of incoming governments towards the senior 
bureaucrats inherited from outgoing governments.
Therefore, this Chapter is divided in four parts. The first part distinguishes three 
kinds of personnel policy strategies, which governments could choose given the 
formal-legal frameworks governing the allocation of state secretaries to the 
ministerial organisation. The second part identifies the four governments that have 
governed Hungary since 1990. Subsequently, I will briefly discuss the extent to 
which the pattern of inter-party competition as it evolved since the late 1980s, has 
had the potential to influence governments' choice of personnel policy strategies. The 
remaining parts of this Chapter turn to the analysis of governments' personnel policy 
strategies since 1990. The third part introduces the population of state secretaries that 
was appointed to central government ministries during the period under investigation. 
Subsequently, it provides a comparative assessment of the extent to which incoming 
governments either replaced or retained state secretaries inherited from outgoing 
governments. The fourth part discusses in more detail the personnel policy strategies 
of the three governments that were in office between 1990 and 2000 and derives 
several tentative conclusions for the period since 2000. Moreover, the analysis in the 
fourth part seeks to provide an explanation of the key features of each government's 
personnel policy strategy. It therefore discusses the career background of state 
secretaries in order to explore the extent to which the career path of state secretaries 
had the potential to shape incoming governments' problems of political trust and, 
thus, influenced governments' personnel policy strategies. In addition, the discussion 
in the fourth part seeks to identify the conditions under which governments recruit 
new appointees from either the ministerial bureaucracy or from elsewhere.
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2. How to Make Use of Political Discretion: Three Kinds of Personnel 
Policy Strategies
Since the adoption of the Temporary Act on State Secretaries in May 1990, the rules 
governing the allocation of state secretaries to the ministerial organisation have 
exhibited primarily features of a personnel policy regime that allows open or 
unstructured politicisation. This implies that Hungarian governments have had 
considerable latitude in determining the composition of the senior bureaucracy. In 
brief, governments and their ministers can replace state secretaries with new 
appointees at any time without giving reasons. At the same time, the choice of a new 
appointee is only marginally limited, i.e. a new state secretary has to hold a university 
degree and may not pursue alternative business activities nor hold a post in a political 
party or any other branch of the state. Consequently, if Hungarian governments want 
to replace state secretaries, they can recruit new appointees from various 
backgrounds. Firstly, they may recruit state secretaries from the ministerial 
bureaucracy and thus they may promote or transfer state secretaries. In fact, neither 
the 1990 Act on State Secretaries nor its 1997 successor Act provide rules that 
govern the formal promotion and transfer of state secretaries. However, whenever a 
new state secretary is appointed, who has held a position within the same ministry, 
we can consider this a de facto promotion. Alternatively, if a state secretary has been 
promoted from another ministry, we can call this a lateral promotion and if he has 
held the same rank in another ministry, we can speak about a transfer of a state 
secretary.
Secondly, governments and their ministers may recruit state secretaries from other 
settings than the ministerial bureaucracy. 'Other settings' refer to other organs of 
public administration under government control including offices that are clearly 
outside the core structure of the ministries but within their wider jurisdiction. In 
addition, the broad group of 'other settings' covers for instance the private sector, 
academia, or other backgrounds such as non-governmental organisations or interest 
groups. Moreover, it includes the possibility of recruiting new state secretaries from 
political parties and political institutions such as Parliament. However, the formal-
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legal basis of personnel policy requires appointees with a political background to 
resign from their political posts before taking on their position as state secretary.
As a result, when choosing a personnel policy strategy, governments make effectively 
two choices: first, they have to decide whether or not to replace the state secretary in 
office. Second, if they choose to replace a state secretary, they have to decide whether 
to select a new appointee from the ministerial bureaucracy or some other setting. In 
accordance with the typology of personnel policy regimes, a combination of the two 
choices translates into three basic personnel policy strategies that are available to 
Hungarian governments when it comes to the allocation of state secretaries to the 
ministerial organisation. Firstly, governments can retain the state secretaries inherited 
from the previous government and hence do not replace state secretaries in office. If 
vacancies arise at the time of government change or at other points in time, for 
instance, due to the retirement of a state secretary or if governments choose to 
establish a new state secretary position, they could promote a new state secretary 
from among the ministerial bureaucrats. Hence, even if governments are 'forced' to 
effectively exercise political discretion given their legal role in appointing state 
secretaries, they could select new state secretaries from among the inherited state 
secretaries or senior civil servants. I will call this a de facto de-politicised personnel 
policy strategy.
Alternatively, governments may choose to replace state secretaries that have been 
inherited from the previous government. If they do so, and if they recruit the new 
state secretaries from the ministerial bureaucracy either by (lateral) promotion or 
transfer, then governments exercise limited or structured political discretion over the 
allocation of state secretaries. Hence, I will speak about a personnel policy strategy of 
structured politicisation. Finally, if governments choose to replace state secretaries 
that have already served the previous government and if they recruit new appointees 
from the other settings mentioned above, then governments maximise the use of 
political discretion at their disposal. I will refer to this strategy as a personnel policy 
strategy of open politicisation. As a result, we can distinguish three kinds of 
strategies that have been available to Hungarian governments since 1990, which
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differ with respect to the degree to which governments exercise political discretion 
over the allocation of state secretaries to the ministerial organisation.
3. Governments and Party System in Hungary since 1990
Since the first democratic elections in March/April 1990, Hungary has been governed 
by four governments that differed in their partisan composition. In brief, the 
Hungarian transition from communist to democratic rule gained momentum when the 
Oppositional Round Table Talks were set up in March 1989 and especially after the 
National Round Table Talks between the ruling MSZMP, representatives of the 
parties of the democratic opposition and the so-called third side, for instance, the 
trade unions, were convened in May 1989. The round table negotiations paved the 
way for the first wave of constitutional amendments in the autumn of 1989 and the 
scheduling of the first democratic elections since 1946 for March 1990. The 1990 
elections brought to government a three party coalition formed by parties of the 
former democratic opposition: the Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF, the 
Independent Smallholder Party, FKGP, and the Christian Democratic People's Party, 
KDNP. The government was led by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall from the senior 
coalition party MDF who replaced the last socialist Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth. 
In December 1993, Peter Boross from the MDF was elected Prime Minister after the 
death of the first Prime Minister Antall. Although the Boross government was 
formally a new government, the change of Prime Minister did not affect the partisan 
composition of the government and thus I will consider the period from 1990 to 1994 
as one period.
In July 1994, the Antall/Boross government was replaced by a two party coalition 
that was formed by the successor party of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 
MSZMP, the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP, and the Alliance of Free Democrats, 
SZDSZ. It was led by Prime Minister Gyula Horn from the MSZP, who had been the 
last Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Nemeth government before the change of 
regime. The 1998 national elections again led to a change in government when the 
Horn government was replaced by a three party coalition of the Alliance of Young
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Democrats, Fidesz, the FKGP and the MDF. Victor Orban from the Fidesz was 
elected Prime Minister of the third government. Finally, after the 2002 elections, the 
Orban government was replaced by another MSZP/SZDSZ coalition under Prime 
Minister Medgyessy, who had been the last Deputy Prime Minister before the change 
of regime.
The development of the Hungarian party system since the end of communist rule 
suggest that all four changes in government had the potential to reinforce rather than 
mitigate problems of political trust between incoming and outgoing governments. 
Since its formation, the Hungarian party system has moved on from a tripolar to a 
bipolar structure of party competition. Historically, the pattern of inter-party 
competition is dominated by a socio-cultural cleavage that divides the political class 
between 'Christian, national, and collectivist authoritarians on one side and secular, 
cosmopolitan, and libertarian individualists on the other' (Kitschelt et al 1999: 234- 
239, Markowski 1997). During the First (1990-94) and the Second (1994-98) 
Parliament, the national conservative MDF and two historical parties, the agrarian 
FKGP and the Christian catholic KDNP, represented the centre-right of this political 
division. On the other side, the socialist MSZP together with the two liberal parties 
SZDSZ and Fidesz, stood on the centre-left of the party system. Between 1987, when 
the MDF was formed as the first party of the democratic opposition and 
approximately 1992, a communist/anti-communist cleavage that concerned the 
question of how to deal with the communist past divided the MSZP from the other 
five parties. However, since 1992, this 'ideological regime divide' has no longer cut 
across the dominant socio-cultural cleavage. Rather, the rapprochement of the MSZP 
and the SZDSZ after 1991/92 and the gradual change in the ideological profile of the 
Fidesz from a radical liberal to a liberal conservative party between 1993 and 
approximately 1997 has reinforced the socio-cultural divide (see also the next 
Chapters for more detail).52
52 The programmatic change of the Fidesz is also expressed in the change of party label to Fidesz- 
Hungarian Civic Party, Fidesz-MPP. However, throughout the text, I will stick to the party label 
'Fidesz'.
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The 1998 and the 2002 elections brought about two minor changes in that the KDNP 
failed to clear the 5% electoral threshold in 1998, while the extreme right wing MIEP 
gained parliamentary representation. However, the MIEP had already formed a 
parliamentary party during the First Parliament after a faction of radical populist right 
wing MPs had split from the MDF. Finally, in 2002, both the FKGP and the MIEP 
dropped out of parliament and hence only four parties, the MSZP and the SZDSZ 
from the centre-left and the Fidesz and the MDF from the centre-right, have been 
represented in the Fourth Parliament. As a result, the Hungarian party system was 
effectively formed before the change of regime rather than after, since the same 
parties have clustered around political fault-lines that had already been relevant at the 
National Round Table Talks in 1989 (Agh 2001). Moreover, the party system has 
been very stable from the beginning, but especially since 1992, when a bipolar 
structure of inter-party competition around a dominant socio-cultural cleavage, 
reinforced by a communist/anti-communist cleavage, became entrenched. At the 
same time, all changes of the party systems since 1992 have either been 'temporary1 
or 'restricted' in their impact (cf. Smith 1989). Regardless of the precise left-right 
position of individual parties on particular policy issues since 1990, we can therefore 
conclude that four wholesale changes in government between centre-right and centre- 
left coalitions have had the potential to reinforce the degree to which incoming 
governments were troubled by problems of political trust towards senior bureaucrats 
inherited from outgoing governments. This is particularly the case for Administrative 
and Deputy State Secretaries who perform tasks as senior bureaucrats in the highest 
two ranks in the ministerial hierarchy close to the political leadership and hence are 
most likely to be subject to governments' incentive to exercise political discretion 
over personnel policy.
In addition to the impact of the pattern of inter-party competition on governments' 
personnel policy strategies, Chapter 3 suggested that incoming governments will tend 
to replace senior bureaucrats, the more evidently they owe their career to the
53 This is not to say that other political divisions are irrelevant. For instance, Korosenyi (1999) 
distinguishes an urban/rural cleavage, which is here subsumed in the socio-cultural cleavage. 
Moreover, while not entirely absent, the social class cleavage is of less importance in structuring the 
Hungarian party system like in other Central and Eastern European countries except the Czech 
Republic (Batory 2000, Kitschelt et al 1999).
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outgoing government, although incoming governments may be limited in the scope 
of replacements they can implement. Furthermore, if incoming governments have an 
opportunity to learn about bureaucratic preferences, for instance, during the Round 
Table Talks of Hungary's pacted transition, they may mitigate problems of political 
trust and hence may choose to work with senior bureaucrats inherited from the 
previous government. Therefore, apart from merely identifying the extent to which 
Hungarian governments have used the discretionary instruments at their disposal, the 
remainder of this Chapter explores the relation between the career path of state 
secretaries and governments' personnel policy strategies, in particular, the extent to 
which governments replace state secretaries who owe their career to an outgoing 
government and work with state secretaries who cannot be associated with the 
exercise of political discretion by outgoing governments. Finally, the discussion 
seeks to identify the conditions under which governments choose a personnel policy 
strategy of either structured politicisation or open politicisation. In other words, it 
seeks to shed light on governments' choice to recruit state secretaries from the 
ministerial bureaucracy or from other settings than the ministerial bureaucracy. The 
analysis comprises the period from 1990 and 2000. Hence, it covers only two and 
half out of four years of the Orban government and effectively excludes the most 
recent developments that have occurred after the 2002 change in government. 
However, in the conclusion, I will also refer to the post-2000 developments.
4. Appointment and Replacement Strategies between 1990 and 2000
The analysis of personnel policy strategies in Hungary between 1990 and 2000 is 
based on data gathered from the Hungarian Political Yearbooks that have been 
published annually since 1989 and the so-called Government Almanachs of the 
Antall and the Horn government published in 1994 and 1998 
(Kajdi/Marmovich/Muller 1994; Kiss/Toth/Muller/Lorant 1998). Both sources 
contain the parent ministry of state secretaries, their date of appointment and their 
date of dismissal. The Government Almanachs also contain short one-page 
curriculum vitae of state secretaries and ministers of the first two governments, 
which have been used to investigate state secretaries' career path. The data has been
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complemented with information from the Public Administration Almanachs of 1996 
and 2000, which list most personnel in managing ranks that were employed in public 
administration in the respective years (Kiss/Nyeki/Latkoczy/Kodela/Galambos 1997; 
Stumpf/Bartfai 1999). The Public Administration Almanach provides some career 
information of civil servants and state secretaries, although it is much more basic 
than in case of the Government Almanach and at least in case of state secretaries not 
every appointee is included. Therefore, the analysis of the Orban government could 
only be done on the basis of sample data, while I could gather data of almost the 
entire population of state secretaries that were appointed under the Antall and Horn 
governments. Finally, between June 2000 and September 2001, I conducted 
approximately 80 interviews with ministers, state secretaries, senior civil servants 
and academics in Hungary, many of whom I have been able to interview several 
times. Although many of these interviews dealt with the civil service reform 
dynamics since the 1980s, which will be subject to analysis in the next Chapters, all 
of them dealt at least indirectly with the background of ministers' personnel policy 
decisions.
Between May 1990 and December 2000, 68 Administrative State Secretaries and 247 
Deputy State Secretaries were formally registered as appointments to central 
government ministries including the Prime Minister's Office. The number of 
Administrative State Secretaries in office at a certain point of time usually varied 
with the number of ministries including the Prime Minister's Office (Table 6.1.). The 
Antall government inherited from the last socialist government led by Prime Minister 
Nemeth twelve ministries, the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and the 
National Planning Office. The most visible of the governmental reorganisations that 
were implemented by the Antall government was the merging of the National 
Planning Office into the Ministry of Finance. As a result, the Antall government 
began its work with thirteen ministries and a Prime Minister's Office as the successor 
of the former Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. In 1994, the Horn government 
merged the Ministries of Industry and Trade and International Economic Relations 
into a single Ministry of Industry and Trade, thereby reducing the number of 
ministries to twelve plus the Prime Minister's Office.
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Table 6.1. Appointments o f  Members o f  Governments and State Secretaries for Every Year between 
May 1990 and December 2000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Ministers and 
Prime Ministers
16 3 0 8 13 4 6 0 15 1 8 74
Administrative 
State Secretaries
15 5 2 6 9 3 3 0 13 5 9 70
Deputy State 
Secretaries
49 19 9 17 27 18 16 8 43 14 26 246
All State 
Secretaries
64 24 11 23 36 21 19 8 56 19 35 316
Finally, in 1998/99, Orban government increased the number of ministries to 
fourteen plus the Prime Minister's Office for the Ministry of Culture and Education 
was effectively split into three ministries. After the formation of the government, the 
two Ministries of National Heritage and the Education were established. Six months 
later in January 1999, a Ministry of Youth and Sports was established. Youth and 
sports issues had previously been dealt with by a department in the Ministry of 
Culture and Education and a secretariat in the Prime Minister's Office. In Table 6.1., 
the values for the number of Administrative State Secretaries in office in December 
of every year between 1990 and 2000 differ from the number of ministries because in 
the years 1991, 1992, 1995 and 2000, one or even two Administrative State 
Secretaries had left their position but a replacement had not been appointed before 
the end of the year.
Neither the 1990 Act on State Secretaries nor the 1997 Act on the Legal Status of 
Members of the Government and State Secretaries specify the number of Deputy 
State Secretaries per ministry. As a result, the average number of Deputy State 
Secretaries in office in December of every year between 1990 and 2000 varied across 
ministries and time. The average number of appointed Deputy State Secretaries 
gradually increased from 3.2 to 4.3 per ministry or roughly one third. At the same 
time, differences between ministries persisted during the 1990s. For instance, 
between 1990 and early 1992, there was only one Deputy State Secretary in the 
Ministry of Defence, while most ministries had four appointed Deputy State 
Secretaries. By contrast, during the Orban government, the number of Deputy State 
Secretaries in office varied between six in several ministries and three in the Ministry 
of Health. Since May 2002 when the Medgyessy government took office, the number
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of ministries was kept at fifteen including the Prime Minister’s Office despite several 
reorganisations and the establishment of a new Ministry of Communication and 
Informatics. Most of these ministries are staffed with six Deputy State Secretaries 
and hence the number of state secretaries appointed at one time in central 
government ministries has remained more or less unaltered after the most recent 
change in government.
In the remainder of this part, I will first assess the appointment/replacement strategies 
of the three governments that ruled between 1990 and 2000 from a comparative point 
of view. At this stage, this analysis serves to provide an overview over personnel 
policy processes since 1990. Moreover, an assessment of governments' appointment 
strategies will enable us to draw a basic distinction between a de-politicised 
personnel policy strategy and personnel policy strategies of either structured or open 
politicisation. Hence, if incoming governments have replaced the majority of state 
secretaries inherited from their predecessors when taking office, then we can exclude 
the possibility that Hungarian governments pursued de-politicised personnel policy 
strategies in the 1990s. Table 6.2. shows that although all three changes in 
government differed in the extent to which inherited state secretaries were replaced 
and new state secretaries were appointed, it can generally be stated that every change 
in government triggered nearly a complete substitution of personnel in the top two 
ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy. Table 6.2. distinguishes state secretaries that 
were appointed between 1990 and 2000 into six generations or two generations per 
government. The first generation of appointees includes all state secretaries that were 
appointed within six months after a change in government. I assume that these 
appointments can quite unambiguously be related to changes in the partisan 
composition of government and hence demonstrate the purposeful exercise of 
political discretion by incoming governments.
Before the change of regime, Hungarian ministries were headed by a Minister, one or 
two State Secretaries and three to eight Deputy Ministers who were responsible for 
managing specific policy areas. At the eve of the 1990 national elections, the central 
government ministries or ministry-like structures were staffed with 18 State 
Secretaries and 56 Deputy Ministers excluding the Council of Ministers. In 1990, all
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of the Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries were formally newly appointed by 
the Antall government due to the adoption of the Act on State Secretaries. However, 
the Antall government took over the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Somogyi, that had already served under the last socialist government led by 
Prime Minister Nemeth so that in real terms the proportion of newly appointed 
Administrative State Secretaries amounts to less than 100%. Similarly, in real terms, 
the proportion of newly appointed Deputy State Secretaries is lower because five 
Deputy Ministers of the Nemeth government were re-appointed by the Antall 
government. For instance, in the Ministry of Transport, two of the four first 
generation Deputy State Secretaries had been Deputy Ministers under the Nemeth 
government.
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Table 6.2. Six Generations o f State Secretaries (May 1990 - December 2000)
Government Administrative State Secretaries Deputy State Secretaries All State Secretaries
•  Number o f  state secretaries appointed within six months after government investiture 
• Proportion o f  newly appointed state secretaries in office six months after government investiture
AntalVs First Generation 14 100.0 48 100.0 62 100.0
Horn's First Generation 9 69.2 29 57.9 38 63.6
Orban's First Generation 13 86.7 45 71.4 58 79.1
Total o f  First Generation 36 85.7 122 76.4 158 80.8
• Number o f  state secretaries appointed during a government's term 
• Proportion o f  second generation state secretaries
Antall's Second Generation 14 50 49 50.1 63 50.4
Horn's Second Generation 7 43.8 42 59.2 49 56.3
Orban's Second Generation 11 45.8 34 43.0 45 43.7
Total o f  Second Generation 32 47.1 125 50.6 157 49.8
Total of 
First & Second Generation 68 247 315
Both changes in government in 1994 and 1998 produced a major turnover among 
state secretaries. In 1994, the Horn government appointed new Administrative State 
Secretaries to all ministries except the Ministries of Transport, Labour, Justice and 
Environment. In 1998, the Orban government took over only two of possible thirteen 
Administrative State Secretaries that had served under the Horn government. These 
were Administrative State Secretaries who had already been appointed by the Antall 
government in the Ministries of Transport and Labour, Gyurkovics and Pulay. The 
Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Environment had been replaced in 
1995 by the Horn government. It was only the Administrative State Secretary in the 
Ministry of Justice that had originally been appointed by the Antall government in 
1993 but was not taken over by the Orban government. Moreover, all Administrative 
State Secretaries that were appointed during the Horn government were replaced. The 
fact that only the two Administrative State Secretaries in the Ministries of Transport 
and Labour 'survived' the 1998 change in government indicates that, at least among 
the very top rank, it, therefore, mattered to whom state secretaries owed their 
appointment to the apex of the ministerial hierarchy. Finally, it is worth adding that 
the most recent change in government in 2002 led the replacement of 12 out of 15 
Administrative State Secretaries. Although he had been transferred to the Ministry of 
Health during the Orban government, Administrative State Secretary Pulay is one of 
the three remaining Administrative State Secretaries. Moreover, the other two 
remaining Administrative State Secretaries had been the only Administrative State 
Secretaries in office in the sprint of 2002 who had already served in other top 
positions during the Horn years.
At the same time, both the Horn and the Orban governments replaced fewer Deputy 
State Secretaries than Administrative State Secretaries. However, there were 
considerable differences between ministries. For instance, in 1994, the Ministry of 
Defence changed all four Deputy State Secretaries that had been inherited from the 
outgoing Antall government right after the investiture of the Horn government. 
Similarly, after the reorganisation of the Ministry of Culture and Education into three 
new ministries, the Orban government kept only one out of five Deputy State 
Secretaries in office, but appointed fourteen new ones to the three ministries that
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inherited the policy responsibilities of the Ministry of Culture and Education. At the 
same time, no changes at the level of Deputy State Secretaries were initiated in 1998 
in the Ministry of Transport.
Table 6.2. takes six months as a cut off point to distinguish between first and second 
generation state secretaries. Six months takes into account that a new political 
leadership has a few months to evaluate whether or not it wants to work with an 
'inherited' state secretary. Moreover, six months as a cut off point was a pragmatic 
choice to take into account the new appointments that were made to the newly 
established Ministry of Youth and Sports in January 1999, i.e. six months after the 
Orban government took office in July 1998. In fact, 35 out of 36 first generation 
Administrative State Secretaries were appointed within two months after the 
investiture of the new government and the only (nominal) exception is the first 
Administrative State Secretary that was appointed to the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports in January 1999. Moreover, excluding the six Deputy State Secretaries that 
were appointed to the Ministry of Youth and Sports in January 1999, 94 out of 122 
first generation Deputy State Secretaries were appointed within two months rather 
than six. As a result, Table 6.2. shows that governments have indeed taken advantage 
of their discretionary powers to replace inherited state secretaries when taking office. 
These findings suggest that we can effectively exclude the possibility that Hungarian 
governments have pursued de-politicised personnel policy strategies since 1990.
In addition, Table 6.2. reveals that all three governments appointed a remarkable 
proportion of approximately one half of all state secretaries during their term in 
office. Second generation appointees include state secretaries that were appointed 
after more than six months after a change in government but before the next 
elections. On the one hand, this simply suggests that the chair of a state secretary is 
highly unstable. Bearing in mind that the Orban government had only been in office 
for 30 months in December 2000, state secretary appointments were indeed not long 
lasting. For instance, the average time Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries 
stayed in office between 1990 and 2000 stands at 24.1 months and 26.4 months 
respectively. The time spent in office is only marginally longer than that of ministers 
who stayed in office for an average of 23.6 months during the same period. At the
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same time, there were considerable differences between individual state secretaries 
and between state secretaries of different ministries. For instance, only one Deputy 
State Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office and one in the Ministry of Interior, i.e. 
two out of 62 state secretaries who were initially appointed by Antall, were still in 
office in December 2000. By contrast, the longest serving Administrative State 
Secretary was initially appointed by the Antall government to the Ministry of 
Transport and stayed in office until October 1999. On the other hand, the large 
degree of turnover among Administrative State Secretaries during a government's 
term in office and the tendency of new governments to replace almost all 
Administrative State Secretaries that were appointed by the previous government 
meant that, for instance, in 1998 several Administrative State Secretaries were 
replaced who had only been in office for a few months. For instance, the last 
Administrative State Secretary of the Horn years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was appointed in March 1998 and stayed in office for only four months.
Moreover, when considering the differences between ministries, it turns out that only 
the Administrative State Secretaries in the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry 
of Interior were never replaced during a governments' term in office. By contrast, ten 
Administrative State Secretaries in the Ministry of Economic Affairs and its 
predecessor ministries stayed in office for an average of merely 13.5 months. Finally, 
among Deputy State Secretaries, the differences between ministries were not as large 
as among Administrative State Secretaries, but they still ranged from an average of 
21 months in the Ministry of Culture and Education and its successor ministries to 43 
months in the Ministry of Transport. The large proportion of second generation 
appointments is somewhat surprising because one would expect that new 
governments take advantage of their discretionary appointment powers to replace old 
and appoint new state secretaries when they take office and not on a continuous 
basis. However, as we will see in the next section by analysing governments 
successively, new governments tended at least to reshuffle almost the entire team of 
state secretaries at the time of their investiture, but they sought to shape the 
composition of the state secretary ranks on a continuous basis according to their 
desires. As a consequence, the almost complete substitution of the group of state 
secretaries followed a more gradual path that lasted all through a government's term
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in office. To illustrate this claim, I will direct my attention to the recruitment practice 
of the three governments that were in office between 1990 and 2000. Moreover, I 
will explore the relationship between state secretaries' career paths and the 
appointment strategies of the three governments. I will begin the assessment with an 
in depth discussion of the personnel policy strategies of the Antall and the Horn 
government. At the end, I will discuss the Orban government and briefly refer to the 
Medgyessy government and derive conclusions that identify the key features of 
senior personnel policy in Hungary since 1990.
5. Recruitment Strategies between 1990 and 2000
5.1. The Delayed Take-over: Personnel Policy during the Antall 
Government
Between 1990 and 1994, the personnel policy strategy of the Antall government 
gradually shifted from a strategy of structured politicisation to a strategy of open 
politicisation. As shown above, in 1990, the Antall government replaced the 
overwhelming majority of top tier bureaucrats of the last socialist government, but it 
filled the vacancies primarily with former State Secretaries, Deputy Ministers and 
managing officials of the ministerial bureaucracy of the Nemeth government. 
However, between 1991 and 1994, most of these first generation state secretaries 
were replaced with appointees who had not worked in government before the change 
of regime. By the time the second national elections took place in spring 1994, most 
of the state secretaries in office had been recruited to the ministries after the Antall 
government had taken office. Hence, the Antall government gradually increased the 
exercise of political discretion over the allocation of states secretaries, which led to a 
delayed take-over of the senior bureaucracy by the governing parties after the end of 
1990.
Between May and November 1990, 56 out of 62 first generation state secretaries 
were newly appointed by the Antall government. However, Table 6.3. shows that the 
Antall government recruited 12 out of 14 Administrative State Secretaries including 
the former State Secretary from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somogyi, and more
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than one half of all Deputy State Secretaries from the ministerial bureaucracy. At first 
glance, this is surprising in so far as the ideological differences between an incoming 
and an outgoing government should be largest when a change in government is 
embedded in a change of regime. Moreover, the over-politicised nature of personnel 
policy during the communist regime suggests that a new government should be 
highly suspicious towards the inherited senior bureaucrats for they clearly owe their 
career advancement to the communist party. However, I will show that the 
circumstances of the 1990 regime change in Hungary allowed the Antall government 
to mainly recruit their new state secretaries from the ministerial bureaucracy 
including the most senior ranks rather than turning to the recruitment of outsiders.
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Table 6.3. Recruitment Strategy o f  the Antall Government: First Generation State Secretaries (May 1990-November 1990)
Missing: 1 Deputy State 
Secretary
T o t a l I n s i d e O u t s i d e P r o m o t i o n s T r a n s f e r s  &  
l a t e r a l  
P r o m o t i o n s
O t h e r  P u b l i c  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
A c a d e m i a P o l i t i c s P r i v a t e  S e c t o r O t h e r
B a c k g r o u n d
Administrative State Sec. Numb. 14 12 2 9 3 2
% 100 85.7 14.3 64.3 21.4 14.3
Deputy State Secretaries Numb. 47 26 21 22 4 6 10 1 1 3
% 100 55.3 44.7 46.8 8.5 12.8 21.3 2.2 2.2 6.4
All State Secretaries Numb. 61 38 23 31 7 8 10 1 1 3
% 100 62.3 37.7 50.8 11.5 13.1 16.4 1.6 1.6 4.9
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Among Administrative State Secretaries, the Antall government transferred the 
former State Secretary of the Council of Ministers, Kiss, to the Administrative State 
Secretary post in the Ministry of Environment. Moreover, two lateral promotions 
concerned the former Deputy Minister, Martonyi, from the Council of Ministers who 
was appointed Administrative State Secretary in the reorganised Ministry of 
International Economic Relations and the former Deputy Head of Department, Kajdi, 
from the Ministry of Justice to the apex of the Prime Minister's Office. At the same 
time, two thirds of the new Administrative State Secretaries had already worked in 
the same ministry during the Nemeth government. However, the career path of these 
new appointees differed considerably.
First, four of the internally promoted Administrative State Secretaries had held a 
position as Deputy Minister at the eve of the 1990 elections, but all of them had only 
been appointed to their posts after Nemeth had been appointed Prime Minister in 
November 1988. Nemeth's personnel policy strategy had already significantly 
deviated from that of his predecessors. In fact, half of all Deputy Ministers that were 
in office in early 1990 and four out of five State Secretaries had only been appointed 
during the Nemeth years. Nemeth tended to rely on bureaucrats that were affiliated to 
the reformist circles of the communist party or he recruited professionals from other 
settings especially academia who could demonstrate much less political commitment. 
For instance, the Administrative State Secretaries in the Ministries of Interior and 
Culture & Education appointed by Antall in 1990, Verebelyi and Manhercz, had both 
been Deputy Ministers under Nemeth. However, they had pursued a career in 
academia and had only been 'invited' by Nemeth in 1989 as senior officials to prepare 
reform policies and when the change of regime became increasingly likely, to prepare 
transition related reforms in the respective policy sectors.
Second, four of the internally promoted new Administrative State Secretaries had 
previously been in senior official ranks during the Nemeth years. On the one hand, 
these managers had pursued their entire career in the ministerial bureaucracy. For 
instance, the first Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Transport, 
Gyurkovics, had worked in the same ministry since 1968. On the other hand, the first
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Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Welfare, Javor, is an example of a 
senior official who had long been on the payroll of the ministry but took on 
responsibilities within the core structure of the ministry only in 1989 when the Round 
Table Talks began. During the 1980s, Javor had been in charge of the so-called 
health reform secretariat within the jurisdiction of the then Ministry of Health. 
However, there was virtually no interaction between both institutions until the 
National Round Table Talks were convened. At that time, Javor was 'invited' to 
represent the Ministry of Health and the MSZMP at the round table negotiations to 
pave the way for a health reform after the first democratic elections. Finally, although 
two Administrative State Secretaries are formally registered as recruited from other 
organs of public administration, both of them had been employed in institutions that 
were within the wider jurisdiction of the ministries, for instance, the first 
Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Defence was a high ranking officer 
in the Hungarian Army.
As a result, none of Antall's first generation Administrative State Secretaries was 
recruited from a background that was entirely unrelated to their new parent ministry. 
However, only the Administrative State Secretaries in the Ministries of Transport, 
Welfare, Interior and in the Prime Minister's Office stayed in office until the change 
in government in 1994. The Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of 
International Economic Relations, Martonyi, was transferred to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and hence stayed in the administration. Among the other nine cases, 
the Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture died in early 1991. 
By contrast, the remaining eight first generation Administrative State Secretaries left 
the administration and the majority were replaced within one year of their 
appointment. In most cases, these Administrative State Secretaries eventually became 
managers of private sector companies. Hence, there is no clear cut relationship 
between the career path of the first generation Administrative State Secretaries and 
their replacement before mid 1994. However, it is instructive that three of the 
'survivors' had been career bureaucrats who had previously held a position as a senior 
official and not in the top two ranks during the Nemeth government. The exception is 
Verebelyi from the Ministry of Interior who, however, had previously pursued a
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career in academia and hence was less associated with the Nemeth government or 
any previous governments of the communist regime.54
With respect to first generation Deputy State Secretaries, the recruitment strategy 
somewhat differs from that of Administrative State Secretaries, while the pattern of 
eventually replacing first generation Deputy State Secretaries between 1991 and 1994 
is very similar. Firstly, the largest proportion of newly appointed Deputy State 
Secretaries was again promoted within the same ministries. To give an example, in 
the wake of the merger of the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Office, 
the first Minister of Finance, Rabar, appointed two Deputy State Secretaries who had 
previously been Heads of Department in the Ministry of Finance and two Heads of 
Department from the National Planning Office. Secondly, among the group of 
transfers and lateral promotions there are two odd cases because they include two de 
facto demotions of former State Secretaries to positions as Deputy State Secretaries. 
In 1990, two State Secretaries from the Ministry of Environment and former Ministry 
of Trade, Barath and Gombocz, became Deputy State Secretaries in the respective 
ministries, but both of them left the ministries within two years after their 
appointment.
At the same time, slightly less than half of the first generation Deputy State 
Secretaries were not recruited from the ministerial bureaucracy but from other 
settings. Many of these new recruits came from other organs of public administration. 
In some cases, these include offices or research institutes that belonged to the parent 
ministry of the new Deputy State Secretaries. In others, the new appointees had not 
been in touch with their new ministry, as one Deputy State Secretaries in the Ministry 
of Interior demonstrates who was recruited from the Hungarian National Bank. 
However, the largest group of 'outsiders' was recruited from universities or research 
institutes that were either in the periphery of the central government or under the roof 
of the Hungarian Academy of Science. For instance, the first Minister of Industry and 
Trade, Bod, who had himself worked as an economist in one of the Budapest
54 Moreover, it is interesting to note that Verebelyi was the only 'surviving' Administrative State 
Secretary who had also been a member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, MSZMP. However, 
after his appointment in 1990, he suspended his membership.
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economic research institutes, recruited one Deputy State Secretary from among the 
senior officials of the Ministry of Justice and three new appointees from different 
economic research institutes in Budapest. Similarly, the Minister of Welfare, Suijan, 
asked two university professors to initiate the social policy reforms of the first 
government. At the same time, the private sector and interest groups are virtually 
missing in the list of possible career backgrounds of new state secretaries. This is not 
surprising because at the time of transition, the Hungarian private sector was still 
very small and interest groups that could be associated with the new centre-right 
government had not been formed.
Finally, the Ministry of Welfare also provides a good example for the recruitment of 
Deputy State Secretaries who unambiguously had some political background. In 
general, I have taken a very 'soft' approach to classifying new appointees as political. 
I have only included cases where the activities of the state secretary suggest a clear 
political affiliation, for instance, if state secretaries held political positions before, if 
they had worked for a party before, if the recruitment process suggests clearly 
political considerations or if the state secretary has eventually taken on a political 
post. At the same time, it is out of question that close observers of Hungarian politics 
would have little difficulties to name many more appointees who can be quite 
unambiguously associated with a particular political party and who owe their 
appointment exclusively to party political considerations. However, I have kept a soft 
line that may not capture all political appointees but those who can be more or less 
easily verified.
In the Ministry of Welfare, for instance, the first Deputy State Secretary for health 
policy was a practitioner recruited from among the influential group of doctors within 
the MDF. The MDF parliamentary group urged Antall and Suijan to appoint one of 
its representatives (who had not been elected MP) because the MDF felt 
underrepresented in the health policy sector where the Minister came from the junior 
coalition party KDNP and the Administrative State Secretary, Javor, from the wider 
environment of the former ministry. After the first appointee of 1990 left the ministry 
after less than one year, the pattern of recruiting a new Deputy State Secretary for 
health policy repeated itself in 1991. However, although it may be tempting to
199
generally associate state secretaries recruited from outside the ministerial bureaucracy 
and wider public administration with political parties, considerations of political 
representation or mere patronage were an exception among first generation 
appointees rather than a rule.
In sum, the recruitment of Antall's first generation of Administrative State Secretaries 
fits quite unambiguously a personnel policy strategy of structured politicisation. By 
contrast, the recruitment of Deputy State Secretaries was subject to the exercise of 
more political discretion, but it still has as many features of a strategy of structured 
politicisation as of an openly politicised personnel policy strategy. At the same time, 
around 70% of the first generation state secretaries were replaced before the change 
in government in 1994. At first glance, Table 6.4. suggests that 13 out of 14 second 
generation Administrative State Secretaries but less than 50% of the second 
generation Deputy State Secretaries were recruited from the ministerial bureaucracy. 
Hence, according to Table 6.4., the recruitment pattern of second generation state 
secretaries was similar to that of first generation state secretaries.
However, Table 6.4. conceals especially for Administrative State Secretaries that the 
8 out of 13 appointees that were technically promoted, were not inherited bureaucrats 
from the Nemeth government (see Table 6.5.). Rather, second generation 
Administrative State Secretaries had entered the administration in 1990 or shortly 
after and were initially appointed as senior civil servants or Deputy State Secretaries. 
When the first generation of Administrative State Secretaries resigned or was forced 
to leave, these recruits were de facto promoted to the apex of the ministerial 
hierarchy. For instance, the second Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Rasko, had worked at various international organisations including the 
World Bank before returning to Hungary and entering the Ministry in March 1991. 
Three months later in June 1991, he was appointed Administrative State Secretary. 
Similarly, the Administrative State Secretaries in the Ministries of Culture & 
Education and Defence had worked in academia before 1990 and 1991 respectively 
when they were first appointed as Deputy State Secretaries. In 1991 and 1993, both 
were appointed Administrative State Secretaries. The proportion of Deputy State 
Secretaries that was not inherited from the Nemeth government and initially
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appointed as senior civil servants during the Antall government is much lower. 
However, among this group of technically promoted Deputy State Secretaries were 
also two chiefs of ministerial cabinets who were formally in senior civil servant ranks 
but in practice were clearly political appointments.
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Table 6.4. Recruitment Strategy o f  the Antall Government: Second Generation State Secretaries (December 1990-April 1994)
Missing: 1 Deputy State 
Secretary
T o t a l I n s i d e O u t s i d e P r o m o t i o n s T r a n s f e r s  &  
l a t e r a l  
P r o m o t i o n s
O t h e r  P u b l i c  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
A c a d e m i a P o l i t i c s P r i v a t e  S e c t o r O t h e r
B a c k g r o u n d
Administrative State Sec. Numb. 14 13 1 10 3 1
% 100 92.8 7.2 71.4 21.4 7.1
Deputy State Secretaries Numb. 48 21 27 16 5 8 8 5 1 5
% 100 43.7 56.3 33.3 10.4 16.7 16.7 10.4 2.1 10.4
All State Secretaries Numb. 62 34 28 26 8 8 8 6 1 5
% 100 54.8 45.2 41.9 12.9 12.9 12.9 9.7 1.6 8.1
Table 6.5. State Secretaries' Career Path: Antall's Second Generation
Missing: 1 Deputy State Secretary







Administrative State Secretaries Numb. 1 4 9 14
% 7..1 28.6 64.3 100
Deputy State Secretaries Numb. 1 15 32 48
% 2.1 31.3 66.6 100
All State Secretaries Numb. 2 19 41 62
% 3.2 30.7 66.1 100
202
Generally, Table 6.4. shows that the second key difference between first and second 
generation state secretaries is the higher proportion of Deputy State Secretaries with a 
political background. For instance, in May 1993, the MDF politician Szucs resigned 
his seat in parliament and became a Deputy State Secretary in the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade. Similarly, in addition to the cases mentioned above, another 
Deputy State Secretary in the Ministry of Welfare had been a member and activist of 
the MDF since 1988. After 1993, he officially dealt with social crises programmes, 
but in practice he could begin to prepare the social policy programme of the MDF for 
the upcoming national elections from within the ministry. Moreover, several second 
generation state secretaries ran as candidates of the centre-right parties, especially the 
MDF, in the parliamentary elections in 1994. For instance, the Deputy State 
Secretary in the Ministry of Culture and Education, Dobos, took over a vacant seat in 
parliament already in September 1993 and her colleague, Fekete, was elected 
Member of Parliament in 1994.
Consequently, at closer scrutiny, the personnel policy strategies for the first and the 
second generation of state secretaries clearly differ in that most of the second 
generation appointees were not inherited from the Nemeth government and that many 
more appointees with party political backgrounds were appointed to state secretary 
ranks. Hence, with respect to second generation appointees, the personnel policy 
strategy of the Antall government has primarily features of an openly politicised 
strategy. Although approximately one quarter of all second generation state 
secretaries did not last in their post until the 1994 elections, the continuous use of 
political discretion fundamentally altered the composition of the top two ranks in the 
ministerial hierarchy within 3 years (see Table 6.6.). At the eve of the 1994 
parliamentary elections, state secretaries that had served as Deputy Ministers during 
the Nemeth government had become a tiny minority. At the same time, the 
proportion of state secretaries that had been in managing ranks below the Deputy 
Minister during the Nemeth years had shrunk only slightly. In contrast, state 
secretaries that had only been recruited by the Antall government to the 
administration had begun to represent more than half of all state secretaries that were 
in office in mid 1994. This development raises two broader questions. First, why did
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Prime Minister Antall and the ministers of his government initially chose to work 
mainly with senior officials who were inherited from the Nemeth government but 
what explains the influx of outsiders among Deputy State Secretaries. Second, what 
accounts for the change in personnel policy strategy from the first to the second 
generation state secretaries and to what extent it is possible to locate the change 
during the four years of the Antall/Boross government.
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Table 6.6. State Secretaries' Career Path: Antallfs Legacy (May 1994)
Missing: 1 Deputy State Secretary







Administrative State Secretaries Numb. 2 4 8 14
% 14.3 28.6 57.1 100
Deputy State Secretaries Numb. 3 22 25 50
% 6.0 44.0 50.0 100
All State Secretaries Numb. 5 26 33 64
% 7.8 40.6 51.6 100
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The main reason for the initially 'friendly take over' of the senior bureaucracy by the 
Antall government after the change of regime can be found in the peculiar 
circumstances that preceded the formation of the first democratically elected 
government in May 1990. At the time of their appointment in May/June 1990, most 
of the new Administrative State Secretaries were in fact well known to the new 
Prime Minister Antall and to a lesser extent to the new ministers. Many of them had 
represented the ministries in the National Round Table Talks since spring 1989 and 
hence had been able to signal to the representatives of the parties of the democratic 
opposition that they were supporting the change of regime and the policy changes 
that were involved. Hence, the Antall government did clearly have an opportunity to 
learn about the policy preferences and orientations of the senior bureaucrats it 
inherited from the Nemeth government. Moreover, both Nemeth's personnel policy 
strategy and his policy record made it much easier for the members of the Antall 
government to work with inherited State Secretaries and Deputy Ministers. On the 
one hand, political hard-liners among senior bureaucrats had effectively been forced 
to leave the administration during the Nemeth years, while reform oriented officials 
had been brought into the administration, for instance from academia. On the other 
hand, the Nemeth government pursued far-reaching economic reforms that sought to 
pave the way for the establishment of a market economy. Hence, many of the top two 
senior bureaucrats of the outgoing Nemeth government had in fact demonstrated their 
willingness to co-operate with a government that would seek to realise the objectives 
of the 'dual transformation'.
Furthermore, Antall was clear in his position that it is impossible to replace the entire 
Hungarian bureaucracy after the change of regime. Instead, because Hungary is a 
small country with a small elite, it was imperative to continue to work with those 
senior bureaucrats that were expert staff but had not held formal positions in the 
MSZMP in order to make the far-reaching reform ambitions of the first post- 
communist government work. Consequently, Antall was less worried about a lack of 
loyalty of inherited senior bureaucrats but he also saw no viable alternative to 
working with senior bureaucrats that had already served under the Nemeth 
government. This position was by and large supported by the ministers of the Antall
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government, regardless of the political party they represented. On the other side, the 
main opposition against the replacement of state secretaries with senior bureaucrats 
of the Nemeth government came from Members of Parliament and forces within the 
extra-parliamentary organisation of the governing parties. Especially, MPs were often 
not aware of the severity of policy-making uncertainty in government and, in most 
case, had not had the luxury of meeting Nemeth's senior bureaucrats at the round 
table negotiations. Consequently, pressure towards the replacement of inherited 
senior bureaucrats was primarily mounted by suspicious members of the 
parliamentary factions outside the government. Moreover, although the parliamentary 
elections in 1990 had brought about a convincing victory of the MDF, not all 
ambitious party activists had managed to get a seat in parliament. As a result, 
dissatisfied party activists pressed for both the representation of their interests and 
access to government offices.
Secondly, the rationale behind the recruitment of first generation state secretaries 
from other settings than the ministerial bureaucracy are quite diverse. On the one 
hand, new ministers felt simply unable to recruit new state secretaries from the 
ministerial hierarchy because senior officials preferred to leave the administration to 
work in the emerging private sector, but the new ministers did not know capable 
officials in the lower managing ranks who could fill the vacancies. On the other hand, 
the first generation of ministers had only entered the political scene shortly before or 
during the period of regime change as representatives of the MDF or one of its 
coalition partners. None of the first generation Ministers had previously worked in a 
government ministry close to political power centres. Hence, especially in the 
absence of personnel alternatives within the ministerial organisation they turned to 
people from their own professional environment or sought the advice of academics 
who had a reputation of expertise in their field. Moreover, many of the state 
secretaries and senior officials that were recruited from other settings than the 
ministerial bureaucracy in the first years after transition had effectively not been able 
to work in the ministries before 1990 because they did not want to demonstrate 
political commitment to the communist party, which had been necessary for career 
advancement before 1989/90. Hence, the change of regime and the investiture of a
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government formed by parties of the democratic opposition opened a door for this 
type of professional to work in the senior ranks of a ministry.
In addition, it is worth mentioning that the recruitment of academics to senior ranks 
in the ministries was greatly encouraged by the members of the new government 
because they could often contribute specific expertise to the solution of policy 
problems that only arose due to the transition to market-cum-democracy. At the same 
time, career bureaucrats who continued to stay in office after the change of regime 
did not view the recruitment of academics with major suspicion unless established 
bureaucrats considered the new state secretaries as political appointees.55 On the 
other hand, however, we have to mention that in addition to former State Secretaries 
and Deputy Ministers, the Antall government tended to replace especially first 
generation Deputy State Secretaries that had been recruited from other settings still 
before mid 1994. As I showed above, in some cases, these Deputy State Secretaries 
were promoted to Administrative State Secretary positions but the by far larger 
proportion left the administration and went back to academia within a short period. 
Although the reasons for this short time in office are diverse, one of the often-raised 
arguments has been the inability of new recruits to adapt to the working requirements 
and style in senior positions of the ministerial bureaucracy mainly as a result of a lack 
of apprenticeship in public administration, in other words, a lack of administrative 
expertise.
Finally, it is difficult to set a clear date for the change of strategy to recruit state 
secretaries. However, we might consider the appointment of the second 
Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Industry and Trade in December 
1990 as an early turning point towards more open politicisation of senior personnel 
policy. In autumn 1990, the Antall government faced its first severe political crisis 
when taxi drivers demonstrated against the liberalisation and ensuing increase of 
petrol prices. Shortly after the taxi-driver blockade, the first Administrative State
55 Interestingly, career bureaucrats who stayed in office after 1990 tended to blame Political State 
Secretaries as 'political commissars'. The position of Political State Secretary was only created in May 
1990 and belonged to the political leadership of the ministry. Yet, often times, career bureaucrats 
interpreted the split of the former State Secretary into an Administrative and a Political State Secretary 
as the creation of a political commissar in disguise.
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Secretary, Auth, who had been a Deputy Minister during the Nemeth years, resigned 
and chose to take on a position in the private sector. On the one hand, the resignation 
resulted from financial considerations as the emerging private sector provided the 
prospect of salaries many times higher than employment in public administration. On 
the other hand, the transition to a market economy created a situation in which top 
officials in ministries like the Ministry of Industry and Trade had to close down state 
owned enterprises and had to dismiss executives who had previously been their 
colleagues and partners in the day-to-day work between government and industrial 
enterprises.
Hence, after half a year into the first government's term in office many first 
generation state secretaries felt increasingly uneasy with the (partly unpleasant) 
obligations of their job and attracted by the opportunities in the emerging private 
sector. As a consequence, together with situational pressures created by public unrest 
following an unpopular government decision, the first Administrative State 
Secretary, Auth, resigned in December 1990. His replacement, however, was not 
recruited from the ministerial civil service, but from MDF circles. In fact, a similar 
constellation occurred as in the Ministry of Welfare in May 1990 mentioned above. 
Because the State Secretaries and the Minister were almost without exception 
economists, the group of engineers within the MDF pushed Antall to propose a 
candidate with a background in engineering to Minister Bod in order to better 
represent the interests of the MDF and the engineers in economic and industrial 
policy.
Moreover, in the wake of the decision to liberalise petrol prices, not only Members of 
Parliament but also ministers became increasingly worried that professional 
arguments tended to systematically prevail over their political objectives. Prime 
Minister Antall sought to diffuse suspicion of MPs and the growing unease of several 
ministers. However, first generation ministers were not only lacking experience in 
government or senior administrative positions, but the governing parties were also 
lacking any infrastructure to get significant specialist support for development of 
policies from outside the ministries. As a result, ministers were almost exclusively 
dependent on their ministerial staff in the policy-making process. In addition, in
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summer 1990, Antall had set up a Meeting of Administrative State Secretaries 
convened on a weekly basis by the Administrative State Secretary of the Prime 
Minister's Office as a professional filter for Government Meetings. Hence, only 
government proposals that would be cleared on professional grounds would be 
submitted to the weekly cabinet meetings.56 For instance, the decision to liberalise 
the petrol prices had essentially been taken by the Administrative State Secretaries in 
the Ministries of Finance and Industry and Trade in the preparation of a Meeting of 
Administrative State Secretaries. As a consequence, ministers felt occasionally held 
at the short leash by state secretaries who had been inherited from the Nemeth 
government.
As a result, the suspicion of MPs and the occasional perception of ministers to face a 
'government by state secretaries' tended to create pressures towards the substitution 
of state secretaries who had been employed in top positions under the Nemeth 
government with appointees from other settings whose career had not been promoted 
by the MSZMP. In this context, it becomes somewhat understandable that, after the 
end of the honeymoon period for the Antall government in autumn 1990, the strategy 
to recruit state secretaries to some extent, and the strategy to recruit and appoint 
Deputy State Secretaries more evidently, became more and more subject to the 
exercise of political discretion. In other words, the option to keep the inherited 
bureaucrats in office or to merely reshuffle them was only a viable strategy in the 
short term. Eventually, suspicion towards inherited top bureaucrats was too strong to 
prevent a shift towards filling state secretary positions from the top and from outside 
with political considerations gaining growing influence.
5.2. 'Let Competence Govern'? The Partial Return of Nemeth's Senior 
Officials during the Horn Government
Four year of personnel policy until 1994 also represented the legacy of the Antall 
government for the MSZP/SZDSZ government that took office in July 1994. As
56 For instance, the adoption of the 1991 compensation Acts was delayed because state secretaries 
were opposed to the radical re-privatisation stance of the small coalition partner FKGP on the 
professional ground that the Hungarian economy and in particular the agricultural sector would not be 
able to cope with the implementation of a policy close to the FKGP position.
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indicated above, the change in government in 1994 triggered an almost complete 
substitution of personnel in the state secretary ranks. After three months, the 
incoming Horn government had already replaced 10 out of 14 Administrative State 
Secretaries and 23 out of 52 Deputy State Secretary. However, in the years that 
followed, the Horn government replaced one more Administrative State Secretary 
and 16 more Deputy State Secretary inherited from the Antall government. As a 
result, by 1998, three quarters of both inherited Administrative and Deputy State 
Secretaries had been replaced by the Horn government. Among these replaced state 
secretaries, new recruits of the Antall years and (may be surprisingly) Deputy 
Ministers who had become state secretaries under Antall had to leave in larger 
proportions than senior officials who had effectively been promoted by Antall. 
Furthermore, although the bulk of the state secretaries inherited from the Antall 
government were replaced shortly after the change in government, these figures also 
suggest that the Horn government pursued a gradual personnel policy strategy similar 
to that of the Antall government. And indeed, Table 6.2. above showed already that 
the Horn government appointed less state secretaries in the six months after the 
change in government than in the time until the 1998 elections.
Table 6.7. shows that most first generation state secretaries appointed by the Horn 
government were recruited from other settings than the ministerial bureaucracy. 
However, the most striking feature of the recruitment strategy pursued by the Horn 
government is the return of state secretaries who had served during the Nemeth 
government or during the Nemeth and early Antall years (see Table 6.8.). In fact, out 
of 36 state secretaries appointed by the Horn government within six months after its 
investiture and whose career path is known, 13 had originally been first generation 
secretaries of the Antall government and 5 more state secretaries had served in top 
posts until the Antall government took office in 1990. Hence, the dominant role of a 
successor party of the communist party in government after the second elections 
almost led to the re-establishment of the status quo ante in the top ranks of the 
ministerial bureaucracy. In fact, the appointment of second generation state 
secretaries reinforced this trend because state secretaries inherited from the Antall 
government were often replaced with appointees who had gathered experience in 
senior positions of the administration before 1990 but had left the administration
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during the Antall years. As a result, the Horn government recruited the majority of 
state secretaries from other settings than the ministerial bureaucracy but most of these 
state secretaries were not at all new faces in the administration.
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Table 6.7. Recruitment Strategy o f  the Horn Government: First Generation State Secretaries (July 1994-January 1995)
Missing:
1 Administrative and 
1 Deputy State Secretary
T o t a l I n s i d e O u t s i d e P r o m o t i o n s T r a n s f e r s  &  
l a t e r a l  
P r o m o t i o n s
O t h e r  P u b l i c  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
A c a d e m i a P o l i t i c s P r i v a t e  S e c t o r O t h e r
B a c k g r o u n d
Administrative State Sec. Numb. 8 2 6 2 0 1 4 1
% 100 25.0 75.0 25.0 0 12.5 50.0 12.5
Deputy State Secretaries Numb. 28 7 21 4 3 7 2 2 7 3
% 100 25.0 75.0 14.3 10.7 25.0 7.1 7.1 25.0 10.7
All State Secretaries Numb. 36 9 27 6 3 7 2 3 11 4
% 100 25.0 75.0 16.7 8.3 19.4 5.6 8.3 30.6 11.1
Table 6.8. State Secretaries' Career Path: Horn's First Generation
Missing:
1 Administrative and 













Administrative State Sec. Numb. 1 5 2* 8
% 12.5 62.5 25.0 100
Deputy State Secretaries Numb. 10 4 7 7 28
% 35.7 14.3 25.0 25.0 100
All State Secretaries Numb. 10 5 12 7 2 36
% 27.8 13.9 33.3 19.4 5.6 100
*) Both Administrative State Secretaries had been in senior official and Deputy Minister ranks under Nemeth (and before). They returned as Deputy State 
Secretaries during the Antall government within seven months and two years respectively.
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If we look first at Administrative State Secretaries, we find that the new 
Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Dunai, had 
been a former State Secretary and Deputy Minister in the Nemeth government. 
Secondly, the two State Secretaries who had served in the Nemeth government and 
who had initially been taken over by the Antall government in 1990, Somogyi and 
Kiss, were re-appointed as Administrative State Secretaries in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office. Thirdly, the Administrative State 
Secretaries in the Ministry of Finance, Draskovics, and the Ministry of Culture and 
Education, Honti, had served as Deputy State Secretary between 1990 and 1991 and 
the former had previously worked as senior official in the 1980s in the same ministry. 
None of these new appointees had worked as a party official before 1994, and none 
of them pursued a political career after the change in government in 1998. The 
exception may be the new Administrative State Secretary in the SZDSZ-led Ministry 
of Culture and Education, Honti. After 1991, she had been recruited by the Mayor of 
Budapest, Demsky, from the SZDSZ to a high-level position in the administration of 
the capital Budapest. By contrast, the other four examples who were appointed in 
MSZP-led Ministries, had bridged the three to four years since 1990/91 in the private 
sector and returned in 1994 as Administrative State Secretaries. Moreover, without 
exceptions, these newly appointed Administrative State Secretaries have to be 
regarded as representatives of the 'late Kadarist technocrats' (Szalai 1998) who had 
gained growing influence over government management since the early 1980s and 
had begun to dominate the MSZMP in the late 1980s. Hence, due to their career 
background all these recruits of the Horn government may well be regarded as close 
to the government parties.
Furthermore, the result that two Administrative State Secretaries appointed by the 
incoming Horn government in 1994 must be technically classified as promotions 
does not undermine the argument of the previous paragraph. In fact, by 1994 neither 
of the promoted Administrative State Secretaries had served in the ministerial 
bureaucracy without interruption for more than three years but all of them had served 
in top ministerial posts during the 1980s. Firstly, the new Administrative State 
Secretaries in the Ministry of Interior, Zsuffa, had been a high ranking official in the
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Secretariat of the Council of Ministers since the 1970s. In 1990, he left the 
administration and served for two years at the Constitutional Court before he was 
recruited to the Ministry of Interior as Deputy State Secretary. Hence, after the 
transfer of the first Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, 
Verebelyi, to the Prime Minister's Office as Government Commissioner for Public 
Administration Reform, he was promoted to the top administrative post of the 
ministry. A similar pattern applies to the Administrative State Secretary of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Szerdahelyi, who had served as a Deputy Minister in the 
National Planning Office until 1990 and was recruited to the Ministry of Agriculture 
at the end of 1992.57 Hence, the entire set of Administrative State Secretaries that 
was appointed in 1994 shared a rather similar profile.
For Deputy State Secretaries the 1994 recruitment strategy hardly differs from that of 
Administrative State Secretaries. Several ministries witnessed the return of former 
Deputy Ministers from the Nemeth years and Deputy State Secretaries or senior 
officials of the first Antall year. Moreover, many of the new Deputy State Secretaries 
had been brought back from the private sector, although the proportion of Deputy 
State Secretaries that has been recruited from other settings like other organs of 
public administration or academia was larger than in case of Administrative State 
Secretaries. For instance, all of the (rather few) Deputy State Secretaries appointed in 
the Ministries of Interior and Transport that were both under the leadership of the 
SZDSZ, were recruited from among long serving senior civil servants or from 
institutions within the jurisdiction of the ministries, notably the National Police Force 
and the National Customs Guard in the Ministry of Interior. By contrast, the large 
number of new Deputy State Secretaries in the third ministry under the leadership of 
the SZDSZ, the Ministry of Culture and Education, were exclusively recruited from 
academia, the cultural sector and the national press and media. Moreover, in contrast 
to the MSZP Ministers, all three SZDSZ Ministers were confronted with pressures 
from the SZDSZ parliamentary group to avoid the promotion of senior civil servants, 
as they were associated with the political views of the MSZP, i.e. their coalition
57 However, although the recruitment pattern of both Zsuffa and Szerdahelyi looks very similar, it must 
be qualified that Szerdahelyi left the government in 1995 but returned in 1998 with the Orban 
government. By contrast, Zsuffa was dismissed in 1998 and returned with the Medgyessy government 
in 2002 as Administrative State Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office.
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partner. However, the pressure led only to the departure of the Administrative State 
Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, Verebelyi, already two months after the 
government investiture in 1994 (see above). Hence, at first glance, the recruited 
Deputy State Secretaries in the SZDSZ-led ministries cannot be as clearly associated 
with a political background or affiliation as the recruits in the MSZP ministries. Yet, 
in particular the example of the Ministry of Culture and Education suggests that in 
addition to the Administrative State Secretary, Deputy State Secretaries were 
recruited from elite sectors, in which the SZDSZ drew proportionally higher political 
support and was well connected, notably, the cultural and academic intellectuals from 
the capital city Budapest.
Apart from the large proportion of returnees from the Nemeth and the early Antall 
years to the administration during the Horn government, the second striking feature is 
the large proportion of new appointments made between 1995 and 1998 or more 
precisely in 1995 and 1996 (Table 6.9.). Firstly, many of Horn's first generation state 
secretaries, especially Deputy State Secretaries who had been brought back in 1994, 
left the administration within a short time and tended to return mainly to the private 
sector. At the same time, the largest proportions of new appointees were either career 
civil servants who had been in office since Nemeth without interruption or 
newcomers who had never worked in the administration before. For instance, the 
second and the third(!) Administrative State Secretaries in the Ministry of Welfare 
and the Ministry of Industry and Trade that were appointed during the Horn years, 
Pordan and Gilyan respectively, had served in various ministries since the early and 
mid 1980s. Similarly, all of the second generation Deputy State Secretaries in the 
economics ministries had either been brought in from the private sector or they had 
served in the ministries without interruptions, though in many cases the latter group 
of senior civil servants also held membership on executive boards of state owned 
enterprises.
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Table 6.9. Recruitment Strategy o f  the Horn Government: Second Generation State Secretaries (February 1995 - Aprill998)
Missing: 3 Deputy State 
Secretaries
T o t a l I n s i d e O u t s i d e P r o m o t i o n s T r a n s f e r s  & 
l a t e r a l  
P r o m o t i o n s
O t h e r  P u b l i c  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
A c a d e m i a P o l i t i c s P r i v a t e  S e c t o r O t h e r
B a c k g r o u n d
Administrative State Sec. Numb. 7 5 2 4 1 2
% 100 71.4 28.6 57.1 14.3 28.6
Deputy State Secretaries Numb. 39 20 19 15 5 6 4 3 4 2
% 100 51.3 48.7 38.5 12.8 15.4 10.3 7.7 10.3 5.1
All State Secretaries Numb. 46 25 21 19 6 6 4 3 6 2
% 100 54.0 46.0 41.3 13.0 13.0 8.7 6.5 13.0 4.3
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Finally, many interviewees pointed out that the second generation of state secretaries 
appointed by the Horn government were no longer just professionals who had taken 
their apprenticeship during the 1980s but were clearly politically affiliated. This 
claim proved difficult to verify, as the proportion of state secretaries with political 
backgrounds is not higher than during the Antall government (see Table 6.7. and 
6.9.). However, apart from the Ministry of Culture and Education mentioned above 
and the rather obvious connection between state secretaries who returned with the 
Socialist to office between 1994 and 1998, it is evident that the borders between 
political and administrative posts in government had become even more permeable 
than before 1994. For instance, the office carousel in the Ministry of Industry of 
Trade represents a specific but instructive example. The first Minister in 1994, Pal, 
had been one of the last two State Secretaries in the Ministry of Industry until 1990. 
The first Administrative State Secretary, Dunai, had been State Secretary in the 
Ministry of Trade at the same time. When Pal resigned in 1995, Dunai succeeded him 
as Minister of Industry and Trade, while the new Administrative State Secretary, 
Fazakas, had been in the rank of a Deputy Minister in the Secretary of International 
Economic Relations. In 1996, Dunai resigned from his post and was succeeded by the 
Administrative State Secretary Fazakas, who in 1998 became MSZP Member of 
Parliament. This pattern of ’promotion' was unique during the Horn government, but 
it is very familiar to the communist regime where a distinction between political and 
administrative posts did not exist.
In sum, the personnel policy strategy of the Horn government does clearly reflect 
patterns of open politicisation when it comes to the appointment and recruitment of 
first generation state secretaries. This conclusion applies less to second generation 
state secretaries. Ultimately, however, we have to bear in mind that slightly less than 
one half of all state secretaries that were in office at the eve of the elections in 1998 
had served in some position during the Antall years (see Table 6.10.). At the same 
time, there were only 2 out of 69 state secretaries who had entered the administration 
between 1990 and 1994 and who had gained a promotion during the Horn 
government. On the other hand, more than half of all state secretaries had either been 
newly recruited by the Horn government or they had already been in office during the
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Nemeth government and possibly the early Antall government but not in the later 
Antall years. Hence, more than half of all state secretaries in office in 1998 owed 
their career exclusively to the exercise of political discretion by the Horn 
government. As a result, two questions arise with respect to the Horn government. 
First, regardless of the high level of turnover among state secretaries initiated by the 
incoming Horn government, what explains the partial return of officials who had 
served before 1990/91. Second, to what extent can we account for the shift towards 
the recruitment of second generation state secretaries from the ministerial 
bureaucracy relative to first generation state secretaries.
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Table 6.10. State Secretaries' Career Path: Horn's Legacy (May 1998)
Missing: 2 Deputy State 
Secretaries
New under Horn In office under 
Nemeth
In office under 
N6meth and early 
Antall
In office since 
Nemeth
In office since 
Antall
Total
Administrative State Sec. Numb. 1 1 4 5 2* 13
% 7.7 7.7 30.8 38.5 15.4 100
Deputy State Secretaries Numb. 13 7 8 19 7 54
% 24.1 13.0 14.8 35.2 13.0 100
All State Secretaries Numb. 14 8 12 24 9 67
% 20.9 11.9 17.9 35.8 13.4 100
*) One of the Administrative State Secretaries had been a senior official under Nemeth (and before). He returned as Deputy State Secretaries in February 1991.
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The strategy of the MSZP ministers to replace the state secretaries inherited from the 
Antall government with people who had already worked in the administration during 
the 1980s and possibly the early Antall years can be well explained with reference to 
the election campaign of the MSZP. In the 1994 elections the MSZP managed to 
become the largest party with the slogan 'Let Competence Govern'. As Markus 
(1999b: 148) argues, "[t]he vote contained a twofold message: a refusal of 
ideologically determined policy-making (...) and moderate support for 
Westernisation. The voters were not interested in making the time-trip back into the 
twenties and thirties; a shorter trip into the late eighties had greater appeal. The well- 
known faces and familiar style of the ex-Communists offered a sense of stability and 
security, after the turmoil of the first post-89 government and its policies". 
Accordingly, the MSZP did not only promise a 'government by experts', but more 
precisely a government of those experts that had handed over the country 'in good 
order', i.e. the Nemeth government in spring 1990 (Bozoki 1997: 78). However, 
Bozoki (1997) also suggests that when asked to return to government by the MSZP, 
many experts of the Nemeth years declined the offer and we might add that many of 
those who did return, did ultimately not like to stay for a long time. Therefore, the 
changes among state secretaries that were initiated in summer and autumn 1994 were 
not merely a reaction to the politicising tendencies of the later Antall years. Rather, 
the 1994 personnel policy strategy of the MSZP fits into the wider picture of the 
party's identity at the time and its electoral campaign in 1994 to bring expertise back 
into government.
This perspective does obviously not apply to the small coalition partner SZDSZ that 
was in charge of three ministries. In fact, the personnel policy strategy of the SZDSZ 
and its ministers was rather incoherent. Before taking office the leaders of the 
SZDSZ had agreed that in principle the new ministers should be unconstrained by 
party guidelines in the selection of senior personnel in order to be able to react to the 
senior official appointments that had been made during the Antall years. At the same 
time, it became policy of the SZDSZ that firstly the professional leadership of the 
ministries should be respected and secondly that no political officeholders should be 
appointed to formally administrative positions. However, from the outset, SZDSZ
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ministers shared the perception of ministers during the Antall government that they 
were overly dependent on the ministerial staff in the policy-making process. Like 
there predecessors from the centre-right government, SZDSZ ministers were lacking 
both experience in government and an organisation outside government that could 
support them in their policy-making efforts.
In practice, however, SZDSZ ministers tried to solve the twin problem of expertise 
and control in ministerial policy-making in different ways. Culture and Education 
Minister Fodor replaced all state secretaries in his ministry within six months after 
taking office because many of the inherited state secretaries had been politically 
affiliated to the MDF and hence were not considered trustworthy by the new 
Minister. At their place, he appointed trusted professionals from outside the 
administration to prepare and supervise the reforms he intended to pursue in the 
cultural field and in higher and public education. Similarly, his successor Magyar 
who was appointed in January 1996 implemented sweeping personnel changes at the 
top of the Ministry. Although the change from Fodor to Magyar meant the 
replacement of one SZDSZ Minister with another, Magyar changed most state 
secretaries shortly after taking office. During the first one and a half years, Fodor had 
hardly been able to implement any of the SZDSZ reforms in culture and education. 
Rather, the Bokros austerity programme had forced Fodor to implement heavy 
budgetary cuts in both policy areas, e.g. the introduction of tuition fees for university 
students. As a result, Magyar felt essentially forced to change many of the senior 
officials in order to kick off a fresh start with a new team of state secretaries because 
the state secretaries in office were effectively discredited in the multi-actor policy 
community governed by the Ministry of Culture and Education. Hence, he had to find 
appointees that were accepted by outside interests, e.g. the universities, and who 
promised to accelerate the reforms given that he had only two years left until the next 
elections.
By contrast, except for Administrative State Secretary Verebelyi, Interior Minister 
Kuncze initially relied on inherited state secretaries and senior civil servants because 
he had made it his policy to respect the professional leadership of the ministries. 
However, this friendly policy towards the ministerial senior personnel was enforced
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due to a lack of an appropriate pool of area specific experts close to the SZDSZ and 
Kuncze. Hence, in contrast to the MSZP ministers, Kuncze was essentially lacking 
the luxury of brining back any experts from outside public administration. Moreover, 
in contrast to his colleagues Fodor and Magyar, Kuncze could not tap the backbone 
of SZDSZ support in cultural and academic institutions. Hence, the rationale of 
Kuncze's personnel policy strategy shares many features of Antall's personnel policy 
strategy in 1990. Although Kuncze was initially respected by state secretaries and 
senior civil servants, his main problem quickly became the leadership of the National 
Police Force. As a result of the 1994 Act on the reform of the police, it was planned 
to separate the police from the direct supervision of the Interior Minister. To this end, 
Kuncze appointed a Deputy State Secretary responsible for police affairs. Yet, 
because the then President of the National Police, Pinter (who also became Kuncze's 
successor in 1998), was opposed to the new institutional arrangements, he regularly 
circumvented Kuncze by communicating directly but informally to Prime Minister 
Horn. As a consequence, Kuncze and his chief of staff were constantly suffering a 
lack of control over police affairs. For instance, the first serious political defeat of 
Interior Minister Kuncze in the government occurred at the beginning of 1995 as a 
result of Prime Minister Horn's decision to go ahead with the construction of new 
headquarters for the National Police after Kuncze, who was supported by Finance 
Minister Bekesi, had originally rejected the request of Police President Pinter.58 
Hence, Kuncze's respect for the established officials of the Ministry of Interior and 
the institutions under its jurisdiction began to backfire shortly after he had taken 
office. However, the problem of handling the police affairs in the Ministry of Interior 
is a somewhat extreme example of a general governance constraint perceived by 
ministers.
Contrast the starting conditions of SZDSZ ministers with that of MSZP ministers. In 
principle, MSZP ministers shared the dependence on the senior staff in their 
ministries. However, MSZP ministers were much less puzzled by this constraint. 
Firstly, they had the possibility to rely to some extent on the expertise of the
58 Pinter was only dismissed in November 1996 (see above). At that point, he had also lost the 
confidence of Prime Minister Horn. Hence, although Kuncze could have dismissed Pinter at an earlier 
stage, he would have faced considerable opposition from the MSZP, in particular Prime Minister 
Horn.
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organisational infrastructure of the Socialist party (cf. Agh 1995). Secondly, all(!) 
MSZP Ministers had gained experience in the administration or in government before 
1990. As a result, the average MSZP Minister could rely on his knowledge of 
administrative processes and some outside support. Thirdly, MSZP Ministers could 
take advantage of their knowledge of the professional community in their policy 
sector. In most cases, MSZP Ministers knew the professional capabilities and 
preferences as well as the political orientations of the senior staff inside the 
administration, and they knew a pool of professionals outside administration, who 
had worked with them in the ministries before 1990.59 For instance, in the economic 
and social policy ministries, most Ministers had known their senior staff already 
since their graduate training because the universities in Budapest had virtually held a 
monopoly in supplying economists for the respective ministries before the 
transition.60
As a consequence, MSZP Ministers had a very 'pragmatic' approach towards policy­
making in their ministries. On the one hand, they were aware of the limited capacity 
to control and co-ordinate policies in a hierarchically organised ministry, and hence 
they were quite aware of their dependence on the ministerial staff. On the other hand, 
they effectively applied senior personnel policy as a strategic instrument to manage 
affairs in their policy sectors. To this end, they could draw from the large pool of 
trusted and known professionals inside and outside the administration and pursue a 
strategy of allocating (their) experts to established or emerging policy problems 
rather than allocating policy problems to organisational structures in the ministries. 
However, the differences between SZDSZ and MSZP ministers also shed some light 
on the development of personnel policy strategies during the Horn government. On 
the one hand, SZDSZ ministers retained inherited state secretaries unless they could 
take advantage of personnel alternatives outside the ministerial bureaucracy. On the
59 Recall Antall's position in 1990: Hungary is a small country with a small elite. This argument goes 
into the same direction but adds that members of this small elite also know each other.
60 We might say that until the change of regime and probably for most of the first decade after the 
change of regime, the large majority of senior officials and politicians had been supplied by the four 
big universities of Budapest, the University of Economics, formerly Karl-Marx University, the Eotvos 
Lorand University (ELTE), the Faculty of Law and the Technical University (Muszaki) training 
mainly engineers. Consequently, it can be quite well assumed that the political and administrative elite 
knew each other pretty well. However, although many members of the parties of the democratic
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other hand, MSZP ministers did initially implement a strategy of 'brining their 
experts back'. However, as time went on, they could take a much more flexible 
approach by also tapping the expertise of senior officials within the ministerial 
bureaucracy whose political and policy orientations they knew from their past 
experience in government. Hence, MSZP ministers were effectively in the position of 
looking for the best fit in the ministries.
5.3. Towards the Consolidation of Senior Personnel Policy? The 
Reproduction of Past Strategies during the Orban Government and 
Beyond
As in 1994 when the four years of personnel policy under the Antall/Boross 
government represented the starting point for the Horn government, the four years of 
personnel policy under the MSZP/SZDSZ coalition became the starting point for the 
Orban government in 1998. Although the data basis is much less complete, we can 
still conclude that many of the features that were generated by the personnel policy 
strategies of the later Antall years and the early Horn government were reproduced 
between 1998 and 2000 by the Orban government. Firstly, as shown above, the 
change in government in 1998 triggered almost a complete substitution of the 
personnel that were appointed to state secretary positions. Among Administrative 
State Secretaries all Horn appointees were dismissed within a three months and only 
the Administrative State Secretaries in the Ministries of Transport and Labour that 
had already been appointed by Antall in 1990 and 1993 respectively were kept in 
office. Among Deputy State Secretaries the picture hardly differs. By 2000, 26 out of 
30 Deputy State Secretaries that had been newly recruited during the Horn 
government or that been in office during the Nemeth years and possibly the first 
Antall years, were replaced. The proportion of Deputy State Secretaries that were in 
office without interruption since Nemeth or since Antall was a good deal lower, but, 
ultimately, we have to acknowledge that four out of five Deputy State Secretaries that 
had been in office at the eve of the 1998 elections were replaced by the end of 2000. 
Hence, the strategy of replacing the inherited state secretaries did not only take the
opposition had their cradle in the same university, they were obviously much less connected to the 
governing elite.
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same direction than under the Horn and the Antall government, it went much further 
than in the previous years.
Secondly, as in 1994 when the Horn government took office, the change in 
government in 1998 triggered a similar trend towards the partial return of state 
secretaries and senior civil servants who had served during the Antall government. 
Most of these returning state secretaries had belonged to Antall's second generation 
appointees (see Table 6.11. and 6.12.). The Administrative State Secretaries in the 
Ministries of Economic Affairs, Health, Foreign Affairs, and the Prime Minister's 
Office had all held Deputy State Secretary positions at the end of the Antall 
government. Moreover, the Administrative State Secretary appointed to the Ministry 
of Education, Szemkeo, had been a Head of Department between 1992 and 1994 and 
had served as an acting Deputy State Secretary in the last year of the Antall 
government. These five appointees had bridged the period between 1994 and 1998 in 
diverse settings including academia, the private sector and in one case as an 
ambassador. All of them had maintained close relations to the centre-right parties, in 
particular the Fidesz who had gained the dominant position on the centre-right 
between 1994 and 1998. Hence, although the Fidesz had substituted the MDF as the 
senior coalition party, the return of a centre-right government led to the partial return 
of the set of state secretaries that had already served the first centre-right government 
between 1990 and 1994. The same trend applies to the second generation of 
Administrative State Secretaries that were recruited by the Orban government in 
1999 and 2000.
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Table 6.11. Recruitment Strategy o f  the Orban Government: First Generation State Secretaries (July 1998 - January 1999)
Missing: 1 Administrative 
and 18 Deputy 
State Secretaries
T o t a l I n s i d e O u t s i d e P r o m o t i o n s T r a n s f e r s  & 
l a t e r a l  
P r o m o t i o n s
O t h e r  P u b l i c  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
A c a d e m i a P o l i t i c s P r i v a t e  S e c t o r O t h e r
B a c k g r o u n d
Administrative State Sec. Numb. 12 2 10 2 0 2 5 2 1
% 100 16.7 83.3 16.7 0 16.7 41.7 16.7 8.3
Deputy State Secretaries Numb. 27 8 19 3 5 3 2 1 7 6
% 100 29.6 70.4 11.1 18.5 11.1 7.4 3.7 25.9 22.2
All State Secretaries Numb. 39 10 29 5 5 5 2 6 9 7
% 100 25.6 74.4 12.8 12.8 12.8 5.1 15.4 23.1 17.9
Table 6.12. State Secretaries' Career Path: Orban’s First Generation
Missing: 1 Administrative 
and 18 Deputy 
State Secretaries
New under Orban In Office 
during Antall and 
incl. early Horn
In office since 
Nemeth
In office since Antall In office since 
Horn
Total
Administrative State Sec. Numb. 5 5 2 12
% 41.7 41.7 16.7 100
Deputy State Secretaries Numb. 12 7 3 4 1 27
% 44.4 25.9 11.1 14.8 3.7 100
All State Secretaries Numb. 17 12 5 4 1 39
% 43.6 30.8 12.8 10.3 2.5 100
227
Thirdly, similar to the second generation recruitment of state secretaries during the 
Antall government, the Orban government appointed at least three Administrative 
State Secretaries who were unambiguously associated with either the Fidesz or the 
smal coalition partner FKGP. The Administrative State Secretary in the FKGP-led 
Ministry of Defence, Wachsler, was a Fidesz party official who had competed with 
Prime Minister Orban for the presidency of the Fidesz in the mid 1990s. Moreover, 
the Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Youth and Sports, Wootsch, 
appointed in January 1999, had been a Fidesz official who had been appointed as 
Political State Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office in July 1998. Thirdly, the 
Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, Tarnas, under the 
leadership of the FKGP Minister, Torgyan, had been elected member of parliament in 
1998, but resigned from his seat in order to take the position in the ministry. Finally, 
one night want to add to this list the Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry 
of Education, Szemkeb (see above), who was appointed Political State Secretary in 
the Ministry of Social and Family Affairs in June 2000. Hence, comparable to the 
recruitment strategy during the later Antall years, the Orban government filled the top 
positions in the ministries from above by recruiting political officials or close 
affiliates of the centre-right governing parties.
Finaly, comparable to the Horn government in 1994, the Orban government 
promoted only two Administrative State Secretaries from the ministerial bureaucracy. 
For instance, the new Minister of Finance, Jarai, who had been a Deputy Minister in 
the Finance Ministry under Nemeth, promoted the Deputy State Secretary and career 
civil servant, Csaba Laszlo, from the Ministry of Finance to the Administrative State 
Secretary post. However, Laszlo resigned after one year and, interesting enough, was 
appointed Minister of Finance in 2002 when the Medgyessy government took office. 
In 1599, Laszlo was replaced by Naszvadi who had spent a few years in a public 
opinbn research institute close to the centre-right parties after he had been dismissed 
as a Deputy State Secretary in the Ministry in 1995 when MSZP Minister Bokros 
took office. Moreover, in addition to the Administrative State Secretary who had 
served as Hungarian ambassador to Greece, the Minister of Interior, Pinter, recruited 
a hi^h ranking official from the National Police Force. The recruitment of state
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secretaries from institutions within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior had 
been a familiar pattern all through the 1990s. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that 
Minister Pinter had been President of the National Police from 1991 to 1996 and 
hence recruited a candidate from a setting that was well known to him.
For Deputy State Secretaries, the recruitment strategy during the first two and half 
years of the Orban government hardly differed from that of Administrative State 
Secretaries. The Orban government recruited fewer Deputy State Secretaries from the 
ministerial bureaucracy, but tended to choose its new appointees more from other 
settings. Moreover, a smaller proportion of Deputy State Secretaries that was 
appointed in 1998 and thereafter had gathered experience in the ministries during the 
Antall years or before. Hence, whereas many Deputy State Secretaries that were 
appointed between 1994 and 1998 had been recruited from the ministries or had been 
known faces in the ministries, the Orban government recruited many more entirely 
new faces into Deputy State Secretary positions.
Finally, as indicated in Table 6.2. above, the Orban government had already 
appointed almost as many second generation state secretaries in the two years until 
December 2000 as the Horn government had appointed in the three and a half years 
until the spring of 1998. This suggests that the Orban government used the political 
discretion over the allocation of state secretaries like the Antall government to 
continuously shape the composition of the senior bureaucracy. At the same time, the 
Deputy State Secretaries that were recruited in 1999 and 2000 shared a background 
similar to the first generation of appointees that was recruited in 1998, that is, the 
majority was new to the administration. A telling example of the continuous exercise 
of political discretion at a maximum possible level can be found in the Ministry of 
Transport. After 1990, the Ministry of Transport had been the most stable of all 
ministries and in 1998 when the Fidesz took responsibility of the ministry, no 
changes at all were undertaken. However, in the summer of 1999, the Minister of 
Transport, Katona, recruited a new Deputy State Secretary who had previously not 
been in the ranks of the ministry. Shortly after, one of the long serving Deputy State 
Secretaries left the ministry. In October 1999, the Administrative State Secretary, 
Gyurkovics, who had been in office since 1990 went into early retirement due to
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disagreement over the working style and the division of labour between the political 
leadership and the professional staff of the ministry. In June 2000, Minister Katona 
was dismissed and the new Minister, Nogradi, brought with him a new 
Administrative State Secretary and two new Deputy State Secretaries. In January 
2001, after the political leadership had changed again in October 2000, another two 
new Deputy State Secretaries were appointed and one of the June appointees was 
dismissed. As a result, while two of the long serving Deputy State Secretaries stayed 
in office during the period of personnel instability, the other state secretaries were 
substituted twice within one and a half years.
This raises finally the question of how can we account for the trend that the personnel 
policy features of the later Antall and the early Horn years were reinforced during the 
first two and a half years of the Orban government. Firstly, the Fidesz and its political 
allies regarded the Horn government essentially as a reincarnation of a pre-transition 
socialist government, especially due to the appointment of the same faces to the helm 
of government and administration. Bearing in mind also that the communist/anti­
communist cleavage had come to reinforce the dominant socio-cultural cleavage 
since the early/mid 1990s, the members of the Orban government felt entirely 
unprepared to work with state secretaries and to a good extent senior civil servants 
who had co-operated with the Horn government. As a result, in 1998, from the point 
of view of the Orban government, it was virtually impossible to trust the state 
secretaries in office in 1998 and hence none of them qualified for an appointment to 
the top ranks in the ministries. At the same time, the discussion has shown that state 
secretaries who had been in office without interruption since the Nemeth years were 
slightly less likely to fall victim to the exercise of political discretion by the Orban 
government.
Secondly, similar to the parties that formed the Antall government and also similar to 
the SZDSZ between 1994 and 1998, the ministers of the Orban government entered 
the government with a twin problem of a lack of experience in government and 
suspicion towards senior officials who had served the Horn government and, 
generally, lower managing ranks who had often stayed in office since the 1980s and 
earlier. For instance, data collected from the Ministries of Environment and
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Transport suggests that, in 1998, higher civil servants and many lower ranking senior 
civil servants who were somewhat beyond the practical reach of political discretion 
had been in office for an average of 22 and 23 years respectively. By contrast, only a 
tiny minority like the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Martonyi, and the Minister of 
Finance, Jarai, had previously gathered experience in government.
At the same time, in contrast to the Antall government, the Orban government had 
the benefit of being the second centre-right government that took office eight years 
after transition to democracy. As a consequence, the Orban government did not have 
to pursue a similarly gradual personnel policy strategy like the Antall government. 
Rather, the new ministers could implement the personnel policy strategy of the later 
Antall years at the time of taking office by re-activating state secretaries who had 
gathered experience in government in the early 1990s and by relying on a far larger 
pool of potential appointees in other sectors of society for the Fidesz had put a lot of 
effort into establishing networks in society while being an opposition party (see Fricz 
1999). Hence, first, the Orban government did not have to wait with replacements 
when taking office and, second, it did not have the constraint that no personnel 
alternatives were available in other settings than the ministerial bureaucracy.61 As a 
result, there was no need for the Orban government to follow a delayed take-over of 
the administration as the Antall government had done. Instead, right after taking 
office, the personnel policy features of both the later Antall and the early Horn year 
were more than reproduced.
By way of conclusion, it may be worth summarising the features of personnel policy 
that have evolved since the change of regime by referring to the most recent change 
in government in 2002. In fact, the last change in government has set off virtually the 
same personnel policy processes than the government changes in 1994 and in 
particular in 1998. Although it may be too early to judge the most recent 
developments, at first glance, the personnel policy strategies of the MSZP and the 
SZDSZ have exhibited very familiar features. Firstly, the large majority of inherited
61 Although it is commonly argued that the FKGP had even more appetite for state secretarial positions 
than the Fidesz, the data does not confirm this, as the recruitment and appointment patterns for both 
coalition partners hardly differ.
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state secretaries was replaced within a few months after the investiture of the new 
government. Secondly, to the extent that state secretaries were retained by the new 
government, these tended to be appointees who had already been in office before 
1998. Thirdly, the largest proportion of new appointees has been recruited from other 
settings than the ministerial bureaucracy. Fourthly, many of the new appointees were 
already appointed in state secretary or senior positions during the Horn years, were 
replaced by the Orban government and have returned in 2002 with the MSZP/SZDSZ 
coalition. Moreover, after 2002, the tendency that state secretaries return after 
bridging several years in academia or the private sector also applies to the SZDSZ 
ministries. Finally, a considerable proportion of state secretaries with political 
backgrounds has been recruited into the top ranks of the ministries. For instance, 
several new states secretaries had been working for one of the new governing parties 
in various functions, which indicates that a new ’bridge' that was less commonly 
taken by state secretaries before 2002 has been built over the last few years. As a 
consequence, the most recent developments since 2002 suggest that, by 1998, senior 
personnel policy in Hungary had already undergone a process of partial 
consolidation.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
This Chapter has demonstrated that, since 1990, Hungarian governments have 
continuously taken advantage of the discretionary personnel policy instruments at 
their disposal in order to determine the allocation of state secretaries to the 
ministerial organisation. Between 1990 and 2000, three changes in governments in 
1990, 1994 and 1998 tended to produce almost a complete substitution of the state 
secretaries that an incoming government inherited from an outgoing government. 
Moreover, all three governments that were in office between 1990 and 2000 tended 
to use their political discretion to shape the composition of the senior bureaucracy 
during the term in office and not only after their investiture. Secondly, all three 
governments tended pursue a personnel policy strategy of open politicisation in that 
they recruited new state secretaries from other settings than the ministerial 
bureaucracy. However, the initial recruitment strategy of the Antall government in
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1990 can be regarded as an exception in that the majority of newly appointed state 
secretaries had previously pursued a career in the ministerial bureaucracy. Moreover, 
to a lesser extent the latter feature applies to the second generation of state secretaries 
that were appointed by the Horn government between 1995 and 1998. By contrast, 
the later Antall years, the early Horn years and the Orban years witnessed primarily 
an influx of outsiders who were directly appointed to state secretary positions. As a 
consequence, overall all three governments exercised the maximum degree of 
political discretion they could exercise given the formal possibility frontier that was 
established in the 1990 Act on State Secretaries and the 1997 Act on the Legal Status 
of Members of the Governments and State Secretaries.
However, in addition to these two core components of governments' personnel policy 
strategies, the discussion revealed that both the Horn and the Orban government 
recruited many state secretaries who had previously been in office under 
governments of the same political colour. The Horn government relied on many state 
secretaries who had served during the Nemeth government and in several cases the 
early Antall years. Similarly, the Orban government brought back many officials that 
had belonged to the second generation of state secretaries appointed by the Antall 
government. Meanwhile, these state secretaries had bridged the period between two 
governments of the same political colour in other settings such as the private sector 
or academia. Fourthly, beginning with the second generation of state secretaries 
appointed by the Antall government, all governments relied more heavily on state 
secretaries who could be quite unambiguously related to party political backgrounds.
In addition, the Chapter explored the relationship between governments' personnel 
policy strategies and governments' problems of political trust, in particular state 
secretaries' career record. It would be exaggerated to state that there is a perfect 
correlation between the extent to which state secretaries owe their career to the 
exercise of political discretion by one government and the likelihood that they are 
replaced by the next government. However, the discussion has demonstrated that an 
incoming government tends to replace especially state secretaries who have only 
been recruited into the administration by the outgoing government. By contrast, state 
secretaries who have already served a government of the same political colour in the
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same position in the past or state secretaries who have served a government of the 
same political colour in a senior civil servant position, are more likely to be retained 
by an incoming government. Bearing also in mind that the bipolar pattern of inter­
party competition in Hungary has tended to reinforce problems of political trust of 
incoming governments towards state secretaries in office, we can therefore conclude 
that the use of political discretion has reproduced severe problems of political trust 
for incoming governments, which have then shaped their personnel policy strategies. 
The exception, in which an incoming government did not exercise full political 
discretion over the allocation of state secretaries despite nominally severe problems 
of trust, concerns the appointment of first generation state secretaries during the 
Antall government. However, in accordance with the theoretical discussion of 
Chapter 3 and 4, this Chapter could demonstrate that Hungary's pacted transition and 
especially the Round Table Talks provided a setting where members of the Antall 
government could learn about the preferences and orientations of senior bureaucrats 
who had served during the Nemeth government.
The latter finding is also important in so far as the analysis of personnel policy 
strategies in Hungary was more conducive for an assessment of the impact of state 
secretaries' career path than their policy-making records on governments' problems of 
political trust and hence on their choice of personnel policy strategies. The reason is 
that the Hungarian party system has been relatively stable during the period of 
analysis. At the same time, the variation in state secretaries' career records has 
provided enough variation to assess their impact on governments' personnel policy 
strategies. Because the development of the Hungarian party system has only provided 
the opportunity to research the case that a change of government has the potential to 
reinforce incoming governments' problems of political trust but not the opposite case, 
i.e. a change of government has the potential to lower the salience of problems of 
political trust for an incoming government, it is therefore much more problematic to 
draw conclusions with respect to the impact of policy or ideological differences 
between incoming and outgoing governments on the choice of incoming 
governments' personnel policy strategy.
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However, Chapter 4 suggested that the Round Table Talks between softliners of the 
communist regime and moderate forces of the democratic opposition during Central 
and Eastern European pacted transitions could also be conceptualised as a chain of 
two partial changes of government from one party rule to the Round Table Talks and 
from the Round Table Talks to the investiture of the first democratically elected 
government, which happened to be formed by parties of the former democratic 
opposition. As a consequence, the ideological and policy differences between 
incoming and outgoing governments were much more moderate when compared to 
one wholesale change of government from a socialist government to a centre-right 
government formed by parties of the democratic opposition. It is therefore reasonable 
to expect that incoming governments, which have an opportunity to learn about 
bureaucratic policy orientations before taking office in a setting like a pacted 
transition and incoming governments, which have only minor problems of political 
trust due to comparably small ideological and policy differences from their 
predecessors in government, have a very similar incentive towards the choice of 
personnel policy strategies. As a consequence, the initial personnel policy strategy of 
the Antall government can shed also some but still inconclusive light on the 
theoretical proposition that the ideological and policy differences between incoming 
and outgoing governments matter for the choice of an incoming government's 
personnel policy strategy.
Moreover, the analysis has sought to identify the conditions under which 
governments recruit new state secretaries from outside public administration rather 
than the ministerial bureaucracy. The recruitment strategies of the Antall and the 
Orban government as well as of the SZDSZ Ministers during the Horn government 
demonstrated that parties of the former democratic opposition did often have 
difficulties to find trusted appointees within the ministerial bureaucracy but less so in 
other settings outside public administration, unless they had an opportunity to 
mitigate problems of political trust before taking office like the Antall government 
had. An openly politicised personnel policy strategy may therefore be the only 
available strategy for governments that are formed by parties of the former 
democratic opposition; at least for some time after the change of regime. By contrast, 
the personnel policy strategies that were pursued by MSZP Ministers between 1994
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and 1998 suggest that a government formed by a communist successor party has a 
much larger supply of trusted appointees who can be recruited from the lower 
managing ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy as well as many social sectors outside 
public administration. Hence, if governments seek to replace inherited senior 
officials due to a major problem of political trust, for communist successor parties, 
an openly politicised personnel policy strategy may be regarded as a choice by 
convenience, which implies the appointment of both outsiders and senior officials 
from the ministerial bureaucracy, rather than by default as is the case for parties of 
the former democratic opposition.
Finally, the discussion in this Chapter raises several expectations with respect to the 
nature of civil service reform dynamics in Hungary after the change of regime. In 
Chapter 3 ,1 suggested that governments' personnel policy strategies are important in 
determining whether or not bureaucrats demand institutional reforms with de- 
politicising effects upon personnel policy. Hence, an analysis of governments' 
personnel policy strategies can tell us already much about the course of civil service 
reform that has been pursued after the change of regime. In Hungary, which had 
entered the post-communist era without specific formal-legal frameworks that govern 
personnel policy, governments should have been exposed to civil service reform 
pressures from bureaucrats when they sought to work with senior bureaucrats that 
were inherited from outgoing governments. Conversely, when governments pursued 
personnel policy strategies that implied a far-reaching use of political discretion, then 
pressures for civil service reform should have been rather soft.
As a consequence, the personnel policy strategy pursued by the Antall government 
right after its formation suggests that the Antall government should have started its 
political life with pressures for de-politicising civil service reforms mounted by the 
new state secretaries and senior civil servants in lower managing ranks. Moreover, 
the opportunities to at least partially overcome problems of political trust towards 
inherited senior bureaucrats suggests that the Antall government should have been 
ready to endorse bureaucratic demand and hence to initiate and support a civil service 
reform with de-politicising effects upon personnel policy. By contrast, the personnel 
policy strategy of the Antall government pursued with respect to second generation
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state secretaries suggests that the pressures for institutional reforms should have 
decreased until the 1994 elections and that the incentive of the Antall government to 
reduce the degree of formal political discretion built into civil service legislation 
should have gradually faded away. However, we know from the last Chapter that the 
Act on State Secretary that was adopted in 1990 did not lead to the establishment of a 
de-politicised personnel policy regime for state secretaries, which is somewhat 
surprising in light of the initial personnel policy strategy of the Antall government. 
By contrast, the establishment of a personnel policy regime that allows open 
politicisation in the 1992 civil service Act appears more consistent with the personnel 
policy strategy of the Antall government after the turn of 1990/91.
Secondly, the personnel policy strategies of open politicisation pursued by both the 
Horn and especially the Orban governments suggests that no major pressures towards 
the de-politicisation of personnel policy should have arisen. However, as we know 
from the last Chapter, Hungary pursued two more civil service reforms during the 
Horn and the Orban government. At the same time, we concluded in the last Chapter 
that both reforms in 1997 and 2001/2002 did not or hardly reduce the degree of 
formal political discretion in so far as the allocation regime was concerned and thus 
the outcomes of reform correspond to the expectations that arise from the problems 
of political trust and the senior personnel policy strategies of the Horn and the Orban 




Getting on Track: The First Reform of the Civil Service in 1990/92
1. Introduction62
In the last Chapter, I concluded that the initial personnel policy strategy of the Antall 
government in 1990 had the potential to generate unified bureaucratic demand for the 
establishment of a de-politicised civil service system. The main reason is that the 
Antall government chose to recruit its new senior officials primarily from among the 
career bureaucrats of the ministerial bureaucracy who had already served in the 
ministries during the communist regime. Moreover, the Round Table Talks 
accompanying Hungary's pacted transition provided the Antall government with an 
opportunity to mitigate problems of political trust towards senior bureaucrats that 
were inherited from the last socialist government led by Prime Minister Nemeth. As a 
consequence, I suggested that the Antall government could have had an incentive to 
accommodate bureaucratic demand for a civil service reform with de-politicising 
effects upon personnel policy, which would clarify the career expectations of 
bureaucrats that sought a career in public administration and enable the Antall 
government to take advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise. The analysis in this 
chapter will discuss both the origin of the first civil service reform in Hungary after 
the change of regime as well as the constellation of actors and their positions in the 
civil service reform process.
The first part will show that civil service reform in Hungary did not suddenly reach 
the agenda after the change of regime. Instead, the first Hungarian reform in 1990/92 
has a much longer history. In a broad interpretation, it originates in the institutional 
reforms such as the founding of the National School of Public Administration in 
1977 that accompanied and followed the economic reforms of the late 1960s to
62 This Chapter is a revised version of an article published in the Journal of European Public Policy 
(Meyer-Sahling 2001b).
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strengthen the professional skills of the Hungarian state administration. In a more 
narrow interpretation, the history of the first civil service reform dates back to the 
early and mid 1980s when first attempts to prepare a Civil Service Act and to 
introduce a civil service career system were made.
Before the change of regime, civil service reform had become an important issue on 
the administrative reform agenda as well as strong proponents of reform had emerged 
such as the trade unions and academics from the National School of Public 
Administration. However, opponents of civil service reform, in particular, the 
Ministry of Finance on budgetary grounds and senior bureaucrats on the basis of the 
personal career interests, were twice able to halt the reform process in the 1980s. The 
constellation changed during the Nemeth government when academics from the 
National School of Public Administration were appointed to high-ranking positions 
in the Ministry of Interior. Moreover, during the National Round Table Talks, senior 
and higher-ranking bureaucrats turned from being opponents of reform to being 
strong supporters of civil service reforms with de-politicising effects upon personnel 
policy. By contrast, representatives of the parties of the democratic opposition were 
reluctant to endorse a fast-track reform unless the senior and higher-ranking 
bureaucrats had proven their loyalty to the democratic regime. Hence, the discussion 
will show that although the parties of the democratic opposition recognised the need 
to rely on the expertise of bureaucrats in office already during the period of regime 
change, their representatives were (still) too worried about the potential emergence of 
problems of political trust towards the bureaucracy and, therefore, the proper 
initiation of a civil service reform was postponed until after the formation of the first 
democratically elected government.
The second part of this chapter will discuss the civil service reform dynamics that 
occurred after the change of regime. It will show that the transformation to 
constitutional democracy, the consensus among the new political elite on following 
Western European examples, the pragmatism of members of the government, 
especially the new Prime Minister Antall, and the dynamics of Hungary's pacted 
transition fostered a fast-track civil service reform right after the change of regime in 
accordance with the position represented by senior and higher ranking bureaucrats. In
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the language of Kingdon (1995), the regime change in 1990 opened a 'window of 
opportunity' for the supporters of de-politicising civil service reform efforts. 
However, the window of opportunity remained open for a short time after the second 
round elections in 1990 only. In this period the proponents of reform, in particular, 
Prime Minister Antall, were able to gain support for the Act on State Secretaries, but 
they were prevented by a lack of time from institutionalising a low degree of formal 
political discretion right at the time of government investiture.
By contrast, after the autumn of 1990, the proponents of a de-politicising civil service 
reform in government lost the capacity to impose their will upon opponents of reform 
in parliament. In particular the anti-communist position of radical factions within the 
senior governing party, MDF, generated political demand for tough transitory rules 
and/or an open system for the allocation of civil servants to the ministerial 
organisation. Hence, the opponents of civil service reform were unwilling to commit 
to a de-politicised civil service system because of a perceived distrust in the loyalty 
of bureaucrats inherited from the communist regime. As a consequence, the 
opponents to a civil service reform with de-politicising effects were first able to delay 
the enactment of reform and ultimately succeeded in amending the government 
proposal in favour of their own, most preferred civil service system, which led to the 
establishment of a personnel policy regime that allows open politicisation.
2. Reform Attempts before the Change of Regime: The Origins of the 
First Civil Service Reform
2.1. First Reform Attempts in the 1980s
The first initiative to reform the personnel system of the state administration was 
essentially triggered by an article written by Lajos Lorincz in 1982. His ideas were 
taken up and promoted by the sectoral trade union, and eventually reached the 
government agenda. The reform proposal failed, however, because of resistance from 
both the Ministry of Finance and senior and higher ranking bureaucrats. Lorincz 
(1982), at that time an academic at the National School of Public Administration 
(NSPA), suggests that the modernisation of the Hungarian state administration
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requires a professionalisation of the administrative personnel system by means of 
introducing a closed career system based on merit and separated from politics. 
During the period of communist rule, the state administrative personnel was 
governed by the Labour Code. The best known feature of state administrative 
personnel under communism was the existence and predominance of the 
nomenclature or cadre list. In this system, selection and "appointment to top-level 
positions of state administration was subject to the recommendation or approval of 
the party committee corresponding to the given level" (Balazs 1993: 55). A so-called 
triple requirement was applied to promote and appoint personnel to leading positions 
in the administration. These were academic and professional qualifications, personal 
suitability to the respective leadership position, and political reliability.
The latter criteria dominated the selection of administrative personnel until the early 
1970s. But when the economic reforms of the late 1960s took root the political 
leadership increasingly accepted that the administrative organisation cannot 
adequately perform without an unprofessional staff, and professional and managerial 
requirements gained relevance in managing administrative personnel (Gyorgy 1999; 
Lorincz 1983). One of the reform steps taken to improve the professional skills of the 
state administration was the founding of the NSPA in 1977. Prior to 1982, research at 
the NSPA had begun to emphasise the study of the Hungarian public administration 
system of the day in comparison to the inter-war period and Western models of 
public administration. Until the take-over of the communists in 1948, the historical 
development of the Hungarian civil service shared many features of European 
developments more generally (Raadschelders/Rutgers 1996). Since the end of the
lh19 century a closed career system had evolved that was by and large protected from 
political interference and dominated by the recruitment of law graduates (Lorincz 
1985a). Although no unified Civil Service Act was enacted, this development was 
completed during the inter-war period when government decrees for the regulation of 
different aspects of personnel policy were adopted (Gyorgy 1999). In this context, the 
NSPA circle around Lorincz became the main advocate of a modernisation of the 
personnel system of the Hungarian state administration combining Hungarian 
traditions from before the Second World War and the experience of Western 
European countries.
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Moreover, in the late 1970s, the public service union had initiated a research project 
on the Hungarian personnel system, which led to the publication of a collection of 
essays that analysed the structure and processes of personnel policy from an inter­
disciplinary perspective (Fonyo 1980). However, as Lorincz (1983: 373) argues, the 
"results of the investigation of facts (...) were not properly appreciated" until 
academics from the NSPA drew conclusions with respect to the possible reform 
direction of the personnel system in the Hungarian state administration. They argued 
that the personnel system of the day was not conducive to enhancing the professional 
skill of officials in the state administration (Illisz 1983; Lorincz 1982, 1983). On the 
one hand, several professionalisation measures had been adopted for the state 
administration during the 1970s. For instance, the NSPA had been envisaged as an 
(additional) feeder institution for the education and training of administrative experts 
and a system of educational standards had been developed to strengthen the merit 
element of ministerial personnel policy (Szamel 1980). Moreover, detailed job 
classifications had been established for individual organs of the state administration 
to regulate the remuneration of state administrative personnel up to the level of 
Heads of Departments (Lokkos 1980).
However, at that time, a successful career of higher and senior level bureaucrats still 
involved a high degree of mobility between industry, academia, societal organisations 
such as trade unions, public administration and - especially at later stages of the 
career, the party apparatus (see also below). For instance, the remuneration of 
officials that had worked in public administration for a long time without interruption 
was consistently lower than the remuneration of officials that had often changed their 
working places, which in turn encouraged a high degree of mobility between 
institutions of different sectors (Banati 1980; Kulcsar 1980). Moreover, in a typical 
career, officials continued and finished their university studies while being employed 
in public administration rather than being recruited into public administration after 
the completion of their studies. Finally, Lorincz (1983) criticised the high degree of 
discretion involved in determining individual careers. Although he could not 
explicitly challenge the exercise of political discretion by the ruling communist party, 
he argued that "we cannot speak about a career-system since to its essence belongs
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the fact that the career should be planned in advance and mainly independent of the 
benevolence or malevolence, of the discretion of the superiors and other leaders. The 
career - if the employee fulfils the condition - is not subject to bargain and 
deliberation, it is not a possibility (in Hungary it is today only a possibility!) but an 
indisputable right" (Lorincz 1983: 377).
Therefore, Lorincz and other academics of the NSPA concluded that the 
professionalisation of the Hungarian personnel system requires the introduction of a 
closed career system that is formalised in law and minimises possibilities for the 
exercise of discretion by administrative and political leadership of the state 
administrative organisations as well as the party apparatus. However, it remained 
virtually a taboo until the change of regime in 1989/1990 to adopt a formal-legal 
framework for the governance of state administrative personnel because it would 
have granted a privileged status to employees of the state administration. Although 
the Kadar-regime pursued a soft interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology, it 
remained official policy that administrative personnel should not enjoy a status or 
salary that would elevate them over other employees, in particular workers and 
peasants (cf. Lorincz 1998). Therefore, Lorincz (1985b, 1988) and colleagues 
circumvent this constraint by introducing their suggestions under the heading of 
'modernisation' rather than emphasising the need to pursue a wholesale civil service 
reform including the adoption of legislation.
The reference to 'modernisation of public administration' coincided with the 
emergence of a modernisation rhetoric more generally during the same period. As 
Bozoki (1997: 62) argues, "in the late 1980s, the reform rhetoric [emphasised] 
catching up with Europe and modernisation successfully defeated the arguments of 
hard-line politicians trying to avert change". The ideology of modernisation during 
the 1980s reflects a development from early to late Kadarism in Hungary. By that 
time, "the Hungarian political leadership [had] allowed more technocrats into the 
power circles than any other communist party in the Soviet bloc. The regime was 
flexible enough to co-opt technocrats, experts, degree-holders, intellectuals into its 
ranks, so the communist party increasingly became the mass party of intellectuals and 
technocrats while remaining the 'vanguard party' for the workers" (Bozoki 2001:
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183). As a consequence, the hope of administrative reformers around Lorincz at the 
NSPA was that an emphasis on the modernisation of the personnel system would 
provide sufficient leverage to establish a merit based closed career system in the 
Hungarian state administration.
Although Lorincz himself did not personally push his suggestions into the political 
debates of the day, they were taken up by journalists and promoted by the public 
service union. The public service union had long criticised the low wage levels of 
employees in the state administration as an impediment to a professionalisation of 
public administration. Moreover, it had continuously searched for modernisation 
options in the West in order to cope with the impact of economic reforms. The 
inability to justify an increase of wage levels as long as administrative employees are 
governed by the generally applicable Labour Code, and the search for modernisation 
strategies caused the public service union to increasingly advocate the introduction of 
a closed career system in public administration. The advocacy of the public service 
union brought Lorincz' proposal to the attention of government officials and reached 
the government agenda in 1985. However, the discussions came to an abrupt end in 
the same year when the Ministry of Finance vetoed the financial implications of a 
possible reform of the personnel system broadly along academics' and union's 
suggestions due to a heavily burdened public budget. Hence, in addition to 
ideological reservations, financial pressures undermined the possible success of the 
first civil service reform attempt. A second attempt by the public service union to 
introduce a reform of the administrative personnel system in 1987 failed practically 
for the same reasons.
In addition, senior and higher ranking state bureaucrats only partially supported the 
suggested modernisation project, as it contradicted their personal career interests. 
Despite the failed attempt to reform the administrative personnel system, the 
processes of personnel policy increasingly reflected professionalisation tendencies 
since the late 1970s. Balazs (1993), for instance, argues that at the end of the 1980s 
the personnel system increasingly shared features of a career system comparable to 
Western European public administrations. Young state administrators were primarily 
recruited and appointed to the bottom positions of the administrative hierarchy on the
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basis of their professional skills and eventually pursued a career in public 
administration. Yet, the criteria of political reliability did not disappear. It rather 
seems that the internal changes of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 
(MSZMP) during the 1970s and in particular the 1980s favoured a combination of 
political and professional qualifications. For instance, Szalai (1998) argues that 'late- 
Kadarist technocrats' increasingly gained influence in the MSZMP during the 1980s. 
This group emphasised a set of liberal, pragmatic and technocratic values, had gone 
through Hungary's best educational institutions and had acquired highest professional 
skills. In this context, a career pattern evolved that led to the entry of young 
administrators at the bottom of the state bureaucracy, and their promotion to the 
lowest ranks of the managing positions of the ministries. At least at this point of their 
career, these young high-flyers were expected to join the party, which would give 
them the opportunity to work in the party headquarters and to acquire more 'political
(\Xcraft' (Goetz 1997). Eventually, they would be appointed to top positions in the 
ministries such as Head of Department or Deputy Minister.
Consequently, the personnel system of the Hungarian public administration had 
already evolved towards a specific late-socialist type of career system that integrates 
career steps in the ruling party and the state administration as a result of an 
increasingly perceived need to professionalise and modernise both institutions. It is 
obvious that under these conditions large parts of the bureaucracy were opposed to 
the introduction of an encompassing career system that is separated from politics and 
reduces the discretion of senior officials, the government and the ruling communist 
party. Such an institutional arrangement would have undermined the career prospects 
of the generation of officials that was at the top of the ministries, currently took their 
apprenticeship in the party headquarters, or was close to joining it. Hence, the most 
influential group of senior bureaucrats had no interest in a major change of the 
system, in particular the allocation system, as long as the one party state would 
continue to exist. Their support would be limited to those elements of the proposals 
that foster the professionalisation of both the early stages of the career of future 
higher ranks and generally the lower and middle ranks of the state bureaucracy.
63 Goetz (1997) develops this term for the German federal executive, but it also nicely applies to the 
present context.
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2.2. The Nemeth Government and the Negotiations at the Round Table 
Talks
This situation changed significantly after Grosz replaced Kadar as First Secretary of 
the MSZMP in May 1988 and in particular after the appointment of Nemeth as Prime 
Minister in November 1988. The new First Secretary Grosz represented the faction of 
technocrats within the MSZMP that backed economic reforms but saw no need to 
change the political system. Grosz had selected Nemeth in the expectation that 
Nemeth would implement the economic reforms necessary to stabilise the growing 
crisis of the Hungarian economy in the late 1980s. However, Nemeth increasingly 
asserted the independence of his government from the influence of the MSZMP 
leadership and shifted towards the radical reform factions that supported the change 
of both the economic and the political system (Romsics 1999: 428).64 When it 
became increasingly obvious that the political system would change, i.e. after the 
formation of the Oppositional Roundtable in March 1989, Nemeth also started to 
include more rigorous reform attempts in the realm of public administration next to 
the economic reforms of that period. In this context, several academics of the NSPA 
were appointed to ministerial positions in May 1989 and could pursue their reform 
agenda from within the government and the state administration.
One of the main decisions was to appoint Imre Verebelyi, an academic from the 
NSPA, as Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Interior. Verebelyi's task was to prepare 
the reform of public administration, in particular the reintroduction of local self- 
government. The units headed by Verebelyi were granted a high degree of autonomy 
in preparing administrative reform proposals that would aim at creating the 'best and 
most effective institutional arrangements for Hungary'. Verebelyi recruited around 30 
persons among trustworthy state bureaucrats and his university colleagues; among 
them a young academic from the NSPA to head the unit in the Ministry of Interior 
that was supposed to prepare the reform of the public sector employment system. 
Hence, the academics from the NSPA gained a strong institutional position to pursue
64 By autumn o f 1989, the Nemeth government had essentially become a 'caretaker government1 that 
prepared the change o f the political and the economic system (Bihari 1991: 34).
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their reform agenda over the future shape of what was to become a civil service. 
Moreover, the continuity of personnel helped to maintain the strong informal 
connections between the new unit in the Ministry of Interior and respective trade 
unions that advocated essentially the same kind of civil service system.
After the start of the National Round Table Talks in June 1989 between the MSZMP, 
the representatives of opposition parties, and the organisations making up what was 
referred to as the ’third side' (e.g. the trade unions), the Nemeth government began to 
prepare two 'baskets' of reform proposals to facilitate the political and economic 
transition. In one 'basket' there were ready made reform Acts that would only require 
the approval of a new, democratically elected parliament. The second 'basket' was 
filled with concept Acts that consisted of guidelines and main principles of the 
possible new reforms. The National Round Table Talks themselves consisted of 
several committees that prepared agreements for the reform of the governance of the 
future political, economic and social system. Although there was a committee for 
public administration reform, headed by Deputy Minister Verebelyi from the 
Ministry of Interior, this committee primarily dealt with issues of local government 
reform, while the reforms of the central government and the personnel system were 
left to the decision of the first democratically elected government.
However, the department in the Ministry of Interior that dealt with the reform of 
public sector employment began its preparations for the drafting of an encompassing 
public service Act that would not only include state administrative personnel but 
future public sector personnel in general. The result of these efforts entered the 
basket consisting of concept Acts. Hence, further thinking was required but the main 
principles of a future encompassing public service Act were already put on paper. In 
their conceptual approach to a future public service Act, the department of the 
Ministry of Interior followed closely the discussions and propositions of the two 
reform attempts pursued during the 1980s. Hence, the concept Act corresponded to 
the views of the academics from the NSPA and the unions that sought to introduce a 
closed career system independent of political interference and operating on the basis 
of merit principles.
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During the National Round Table Talks, these efforts were also supported by senior 
and higher ranking state bureaucrats. With the prospect of regime change looming, 
bureaucrats in managing positions were aware that the specific late-socialist career 
path outlined above would inevitably disappear. At the same time, a future 
alternation of political parties in government could de-stabilise their positions unless 
they were protected by law. Moreover, in the wake of the growing distance between 
the MSZMP leadership and the government, the Nemeth government had further 
reduced the impact of political criteria on selecting top officials since the beginning 
of 1989. In 1989, non-party members could gain promotion to the lower managing 
ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy and only the very top positions in the ministries 
were foreclosed to non-party members. The Nemeth government also began to 
sideline the generation of top officials who was taking their apprenticeship in the 
headquarters of the MSZMP. The appointment of Verebelyi to the Deputy Minister 
position in the Ministry of Interior serves as a case in point.
The change of personnel policy strategy by the Nemeth government and the 
anticipated separation between political and administrative career paths created a 
generation of 'disappointed top officials' already before the change of regime had 
been institutionalised. Senior bureaucrats who were about to return from the party 
headquarters to the top ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy had to witness 
simultaneously a sudden end of their career prospects and an emerging 
marginalisation of their influence over government policy. By contrast, the changing 
pattern of personnel policy created a 'great opportunity' for the succeeding generation 
of senior bureaucrats that had gained promotion to lower management positions in 
the ministries in 1988/89 and higher ranking bureaucrats who strove for promotion in 
the future. In particular, bureaucrats that had maintained an image of expertise and 
competence without joining the party expected to benefit from an institutional change 
of the personnel system. As a consequence, senior and higher ranking bureaucrats 
essentially turned from being opponents to civil service reform in the 1980s to major 
supporters of reform during the National Round Table Talks in 1989.
In principle, the diverse group of bureaucrats, the academics of the NSPA, and the 
sectoral unions were in a favourable position to conclude the reform of the civil
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service already before the first democratic elections. The academics of the NSPA had 
been appointed to key positions in the Ministry of Interior, the unions were respected 
'third side' partners at the National Round Table Talks and in many cases senior and 
higher ranking bureaucrats from the ministries represented the MSZMP in its 
committees. However, one of the main reasons not to continue the reform discussions 
about a possible civil service draft Act was a division at the National Round Table 
Talks between the modernising wings of the MSZMP, mainly represented by 
ministerial bureaucrats, and parties of the democratic opposition. Although the 
parties of the democratic opposition shared many elements of the modernisation 
doctrine, in particular the objective of 'catching up with Europe', they generally 
hesitated to support reform proposals that would aim primarily at modernisation 
without due consideration of their implications for political democracy.
With respect to a Civil Service Act, this meant that the parties of the democratic 
opposition were opposed to stabilising the bureaucracy before being able to see 
whether or not 'old' state bureaucrats would serve the 'new' political power holders. 
On the one hand, the representatives of the opposition parties shared the view that the 
reforms implied by political and economic transition require the de-politicisation and 
parallel professionalisation of administrative personnel. On the other hand, they 
feared that the institutionalisation of an independent civil service before the change 
of regime would undermine their possibilities to ensure the success of the 
transformation because they would forego the possibility to steer the bureaucracy 
towards their ends without having checked upon the loyalty of its personnel in the 
first place. Therefore, the discussion about the timing and the shape of a Civil 
Service Act was postponed until after the first democratic elections because it was 
considered as a reform project that emphasises modernisation without sufficiently 
taking into account issues of democratisation. This, at that time still low profile, 
controversy already signalled the main divisions that would emerge after the 
elections in 1990.
In sum, it would be exaggerated to describe the outcomes of the civil service reform 
process during the Nemeth government and the Round Table Talks as a reform 
failure. Rather, the appointment of Nemeth as Prime Minister opened the door for a
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new attempt to initiate and prepare a civil service reform. In contrast to the two 
reform attempts in the 1980s, the constellation of reform proponents and opponents 
had changed. Reform proponents like the academics from the NSPA had gained 
access to government authority and opponents like top bureaucrats had turned into 
proponents of reform. Moreover, the ideological and programmatic climate of the 
pre-transition period had become more favourable to the proponents of civil service 
reform. On the other hand, the parties of the democratic opposition cannot 
unambiguously be classified as opponents of civil service reform. Rather, both their 
concern for the loyalty of administrative personnel and their argument that the 
enactment of a civil service reform requires the legitimacy of a democratically 
elected government were recognised by other participants of the Round Table Talks. 
At the same time, it appears reasonable to argue that representatives of the Ministry
f
of Finance were not actively drawn into the discussion because civil service reform 
efforts remained in the preparatory stage of conceptual deliberations. As a 
consequence, the civil service reform discussions during the Nemeth government and 
the Round Table Talks primarily, sought to pave the way for the anticipated 
completion of reform shortly after the first democratic elections.
3. Negotiating the First Civil Service Reform after the Change of 
Regime: Trapped in Transition Politics
3.1. The 1990 Temporary Act on State Secretaries
The first democratic elections in spring 1990 brought to government the centre-right 
coalition led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). Before the work on the 
civil service law was continued, it was first the Act on State Secretaries that was 
passed in May 1990 by the new parliament. This Act was passed with little 
controversy, although the main political divisions between a ‘moderate’ group within 
the governing parties including the members of the government on the one hand, and 
‘radical’ groups within the governing parties in Parliament and the opposition on the 
other that would eventually shape the negotiations over the Civil Service Act became 
already apparent. The Act was initiated, drafted and passed by Parliament within a
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period of five to six weeks and it can hardly be separated from the actual personnel 
decisions taken at that time.65
The initiative to define the status of state secretaries was explicitly taken by the 
designated Prime Minister Jozsef Antall. After the second elections on 8 April, it 
became apparent that Antall would lead a coalition of centre-right parties as Prime 
Minister. In accordance with the position of the parties of the democratic opposition 
at the National Round Table Talks, the designated government was granted the 
discretion to shape the central government apparatus according to its own goals. 
Antall approached two senior bureaucrats from the Ministry of Justice to assist his 
efforts to re-organise the central government and to select appropriate candidates for 
the professional management of the ministries. Both the then Deputy Minister 
Bogdan and the Deputy Head of Department Kajdi had represented the MSZMP in 
different committees at the National Round Table Talks and Antall appointed both to 
Administrative State Secretary positions in the Ministry of Justice and the Prime 
Minister's Office respectively. Hence, although the shape of the Act on State 
Secretaries cannot be separated from the reform discussion of the 1980s and in 
particular the founding moments of the new democratic regime, it originated almost 
exclusively within an actor triangle dominated by the designated Prime Minister 
Antall.
The importance of Antall's evaluation of the status quo and his vision for the 
reorganisation of government generally and senior personnel policy more specifically 
cannot be underestimated. He strongly advocated the creation of a government in 
which political leadership and professional management of the ministries are strictly 
separated. These views were primarily shaped by factors like the Hungarian past and 
the experience of his own father who had been a member of the Independent 
Smallholder Party during the Horthy era.66 Furthermore, Antall was known to have 
extensive knowledge of the institutional architecture of Western European 
democracies and sought to follow the patterns of Western European governmental
‘5 See Sandor/Kodela (1992) for details of government decrees and state secretary remuneration prior 
to 1992.
<6 Miklos Horthy was Regent o f Hungary from 1920 to 1944.
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systems where possible. Therefore, Antall held the position that a separation of 
political and administrative spheres would not only bring Hungary back to 
continental European models of public administration, it would unquestionably be 
the best arrangement to create conditions for effective governance.
Antall's normative views were combined with pragmatism in the sense that he 
represented a moderate strand in the range of different opinions about the treatment 
of state administrative personnel after the change of regime. He argued that it is 
impossible to fully 'cleanse' the Hungarian bureaucracy. Instead, because Hungary is 
a small country with a small elite, it is imperative to continue to work with those 
senior bureaucrats of the former administration that are expert staff but have not held 
formal positions in the MSZMP in order to make the far-reaching reform ambitions 
of the first government work.67 Therefore, having worked in the bureaucracy before 
1990 or having been member of the MSZMP was not regarded as a criterion of 
exclusion, but expertise, experience and the ability to show loyalty to the new 
government became the criteria of selection.
Antall decided to adapt the former ministerial structure to his own objectives. Until 
May 1990, the Hungarian ministries were headed by a Minister, one or two State 
Secretaries and three to eight Deputy Minister who were responsible for managing 
specific policy areas. In the new structure, the position of State Secretary was divided 
into two positions: on the one hand, the Political State Secretary who would be a 
political appointment but who would not have any role in managing the internal 
affairs of the ministry. On the other hand, the Administrative State Secretary who 
would be responsible for the professional management of the ministry. Thirdly, the 
Deputy Minister was transformed into a Deputy State Secretary position responsible 
for the management of specific policy areas and was made subordinate to the 
Administrative State Secretary only. Antall and his advisors regarded the role of 
Deputy State Secretaries as necessary in order to be able to cope with the continued 
merging of ministries that had begun in the early 1980s. Hence, at that time, the 
establishment of the position of Deputy State Secretary was regarded as a somewhat
67 This argument has also been made among Hungarian academics. For instance, Balazs (1992) argues 
in favour of the need to retain experienced expert staff in the administration.
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transitional arrangement. At the same time, there was no major thinking about the 
implications of different appointment procedures and criteria. The Act was classified 
as temporary from the outset. Antall and his advisors regarded it as sufficient for the 
circumstances of the day and in particular the lack of time that a formal separation of 
political and administrative positions and a definition of their functions had been 
created. Therefore, the revision of the Act was considered as an integral part of the 
wider civil service reform that was to become a priority item of the Antall 
government's legislative agenda (Verebelyi 1993).
The draft Act was introduced by the MDF parliamentary leadership to Parliament in 
its opening session (2 May 1990). The discussion that followed was mainly driven by 
normative arguments about the virtues and need to separate politics from 
administration and to develop a de-politicised and professional public bureaucracy. 
On the one hand, political parties in parliament shared Antall's view that the 
establishment of a professional bureaucracy requires its de-politicisation. On the 
other hand, in particular the standpoint of the parties of the former democratic 
opposition was driven by their rejection of an over-politicised administration and the 
nomenclature system under the socialist regime era. No major disagreement over the 
shape and content of the Act emerged. Rather MPs aimed at committing the 
designated government to a practice of selecting experts to the ministries and not to 
politicise the top positions of the ministries. The matter of disagreement, though 
marginal, was rather about the question of whether any former party member and 
generally former member of the state administration could be trustworthy or whether 
Antall's moderate and pragmatist approach would be acceptable. In this respect, the 
debate was a continuation of the arguments raised at the National Round Table Talks 
and a first indicator of conflicts that emerged during the later discussion of the Civil 
Service Act.
As shown in the last Chapter, there is little doubt that Antall eventually selected 
senior personnel on the basis of his words and that Antall implemented his pragmatic 
evaluation of the status quo and his vision of the future shape and functioning of 
Hungarian public administration. Furthermore, Antall was less suspicious about the 
loyalty of former senior and higher ranking bureaucrats. As outlined above, many
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high-ranking state bureaucrats from the ministries had represented the MSZMP at the 
National Round Table Talks. However, they were either not member of the MSZMP 
and regarded themselves as experts in their policy field or they supported the radical 
reformist faction of the MSZMP and hence favoured the change of political regime. 
Moreover, during the National Round Table Talks, Antall and his partners from the 
parties of the democratic opposition had the opportunity to assess the willingness of 
senior and higher ranking bureaucrats to co-operate with a new government 
composed of parties of the former democratic opposition. Consequently, the fears 
that a democratic government would be confronted with a lack of bureaucratic loyalty 
were diffused already before the investiture of the Antall government.
Antall in consultation with his advisors, therefore, decided to choose the new 
Administrative State Secretaries and many Deputy State Secretaries from the group 
of high-ranking bureaucrats he had encountered in the National Round Table Talks. 
On the one hand, it met his motivation to set up a central government administration 
staffed with loyal experts. On the other hand, it represented a good opportunity for 
Antall to signal to state administrative personnel that the new government wants to 
co-operate and respect the expert position of the 'inherited' administration. In many 
cases, Antall proposed the candidates for the new administrative leadership of the 
ministries to his Ministers. The recruitment of academics to some ministries was 
appreciated from the standpoint of bringing additional much needed expertise to 
public administration in order to facilitate the political and economic transformation 
of the country. By contrast, the recruitment of (the very few) Deputy State Secretaries 
with a political background was regarded as a short-term deviation from the norm 
that was only reluctantly respected by Antall due to the internal politics of the 
governing parties. As indicated in the last Chapter, these cases usually originated in 
the demand of the parliamentary factions of the governing parties.
In sum, the Act on State Secretaries was initiated, drafted and passed by Parliament 
within a period of six weeks. On the one hand, it is a piece of legislation that was 
deemed necessary in order to formally institutionalise the change of regime in 1990. 
On the other hand, it cannot be de-coupled from the reform discussion at the National 
Round Table Talks and the reform attempts of the 1980s. The designated Prime
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Minister Antall was both the initiator and chief architect of the Act on State 
Secretaries, which, however, also reflected the position of senior and higher-ranking 
bureaucrats who were known to him since the Round Table Talks. Based on his 
evaluation of other - past and present - governmental systems, Antall assumed that a 
professional bureaucracy requires a clear separation between political and 
professional leadership in the ministries. Moreover, Antall’s pragmatic perspective on 
the nature of appropriate conditions for the successful implementation of the political 
and economic transformation and his confidence that former senior and higher 
ranking bureaucrats will be loyal to the new democratically elected government 
shaped both his personnel policy strategy and his approach to the design of the Act. 
At the same time, Antall's authority to take the decision over the structure and 
personnel of the central government apparatus was uncontested by members of the 
designated coalition of governing parties. Hence, to a large extent Antall's personnel 
policy strategy and his position on the future shape and personnel of the central 
government were simply formalised in the Act. The appointment of Administrative 
State Secretaries required the consent of both the Prime Minister and the Minister 
and although Antall also had a word in the appointment of several Deputy State 
Secretaries, it was unquestionable that Deputy State Secretaries would be important 
policy managers supporting primarily the Minister. Therefore their appointment was 
formally granted to Ministers. However, the Act on State Secretaries was regarded as 
temporary from the outset and it was assumed that procedural details would be added 
in combination with the enactment of a Civil Service Act that was on top of the 
agenda for the time after the investiture of the new government.
3.2. Brokering the Civil Service Act
The preparation of the Civil Service Act began again in July/August 1990, i.e. just 
two months after the new government had taken office. In the context of the 
structural and functional reorganisation of the government, Antall assigned the 
responsibility over public administration reform to the Ministry of Interior to 
continue the work that had begun during the Nemeth era. This is best demonstrated 
by the appointment of the former Deputy Minister, Verebelyi, to the position of
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Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Interior. The granting of 
responsibility over civil service reform to the Ministry of Interior, however, was not 
uncontested, as the newly established Ministry of Labour that was responsible for the 
Labour Code could equally claim responsibility over civil service affairs.
While the first item on the priority list of the Ministry of Interior was the preparation 
of the Act on local self-government, the staff in the Ministry of Labour prepared a 
draft Act for the establishment of a uniform public service including civil servants, 
and submitted it to other ministries for internal negotiations shortly after the 
investiture of the new government. However, Antall quickly intervened from above 
to terminate further deliberations of the draft Act proposed by the Ministry of Labour. 
In particular the Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, Verebelyi, 
was strongly opposed to the proposal of the Ministry of Labour. Instead, he had 
expected that the department established in 1989 in the Ministry of Interior would 
retain responsibility for the development of an Act that would create a uniform public 
service.
The controversy between the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Interior arose 
rather over prospective institutional responsibilities than over the content of the 
proposed public service Act itself. Verebelyi was able to gain political support for his 
conception from the Interior Minister Horvath, and in particular Prime Minister 
Antall. From the outset, Antall had envisaged to transform the Ministry of Interior 
from a 'police ministry' into a 'public administration ministry' and accepted that civil 
service reform is a key component of administrative reform. Moreover, Antall sought 
to take advantage of the expert staff that had been appointed to the ministry in early 
1989 and whose views on administrative reform he knew and accepted from the 
discussions at the National Round Table Talks.
As indicated above, an encompassing public administration reform was also among 
the high priority issues on Antall's legislative agenda. Therefore, he favoured the 
delegation of responsibility over public administration reform issues including civil 
service affairs to a strong and politically sympathetic ministry. The Ministry of 
Interior was headed by Balazs Horvath, a close affiliate of Antall who also became
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Deputy Prime Minister after the investiture of the Antall government, while the 
Ministry of Labour was led by an FKGP-Minister. As a result, the decision to 
exclude the Ministry of Labour from civil service reform management also provided 
Antall with an opportunity to retain political control over the entire public 
administration reform agenda. At the same time, a compromise with the Ministry of 
Labour and the coalition partner FKGP was reached, providing that a public service 
Act excluding civil servants at central and local administration would be prepared by 
the Ministry of Labour.
Hence, the choice between a differentiated and a uniform public service in favour of 
the former was primarily a by-product of the authoritative decision by Prime Minister 
Antall to balance the institutional and political claims of different central government 
ministries and the internal dynamics of the government coalition. By contrast, 
substantive arguments over the implications of either conception of public sector 
employment management did only arise at later stages of the reform process, notably 
during the negotiations of the civil service and the public service Acts in parliament. 
A second by-product of the exclusive assignment of responsibility over civil service 
management authority to the Ministry of Interior was the marginalisation of the 
Ministry of Labour as an additional interested participant in the reform negotiations 
inside government, which eventually contributed to accelerated negotiations of the 
civil service draft Act at the executive level.
After the Act on local self-government was passed by Parliament in July 1990, the 
Civil Service Act became the next major priority of the Ministry of Interior, and it 
became a pressing issue because local self-governments had been created and 
elections were scheduled for autumn, but their employees were still lacking a legal 
status. The first civil service draft Act was written within a short period in August 
1990 and after short discussion it was submitted to Parliament in September 1990 
marked 'urgent1. Legislation marked 'urgent' usually takes about three to four months 
to pass Parliament, but in the case of the Civil Service Act, the process took almost 
two years. Meanwhile a lengthy discussion took place on the floor of Parliament and 
in the committees, leading to the withdrawal of the draft Act by the government in
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December 1991 and a re-submission to parliament shortly after. The Act was finally 
adopted on 31 March 1992.
Meanwhile the discussion about the structure and shape of the Act continued 
practically at all levels, as it became quickly obvious that the adoption of the Act 
would take longer than initially anticipated. Hence, the pattern of preparing the Act 
within a very short time span and the intention to pass it as quickly as possible was 
very similar to that of the Act on State Secretary in April/May 1990. However, by the 
autumn of 1990 the government had lost its capacity to gather support for a Civil 
Service Act without granting major compromises to alternative views held by 
members of the governing coalition parties in parliament. As a consequence, it 
became impossible both to induce a fast-track agreement over the Civil Service Act 
and to reach a reform outcome as desired by the government and the senior officials 
in the Ministry of Interior.
During the negotiations of the Civil Service Act several interests emerged and two 
main conflict areas arose that were broadly discussed under the heading of more or 
less flexibility, which is somewhat equivalent to the concept of degrees of formal 
political discretion. One controversy referred to the shape of the future 
remuneration system. It was mainly debated by top bureaucrats at the level of 
administrative co-ordination. The second controversy took place in Parliament and its 
committees between the top bureaucrats of the Ministry of Interior, the government 
and ‘moderate’ groups of the governing parties on the one hand, and ‘radical’ groups 
of the governing parties and the opposition on the other. It concerned primarily the 
rules for allocating personnel in the administration and the transitory rules for 
admitting former state bureaucrats to the ‘new’ civil service.
On the end of 'minimum flexibility' stood the Ministry of Interior including the 
specialists in the newly formed Civil Service Department69 and Administrative State 
Secretary, Verebelyi. The views of the Ministry of Interior coincided with the main
68 In the remainder of this Chapter, I shall stick to the terminology used in the negotiations by the 
participants.
69 The word by word translation of the Department was and today still is 'Public Service Department'.
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interests of the civil service trade unions. These protagonists of reform were either 
from or at least closely connected to the NSPA. However, it must be stressed that 
their was no longer a consensus among academics about what would be the most 
suitable institutional arrangements for the future civil service system. For instance, an 
alternative view suggested that economic transformation, in particular privatisation 
and its implications for ministerial management, require more flexible institutional 
arrangements that make possible the dismissal of personnel from the respective 
institutions. Hence, although the establishment of a civil service operating on the 
basis of merit was strongly supported, the permanent tenure was called into question 
- at least for a transitional period - by a minority of academics who, however, held no 
official position in the Ministry of Interior or the unions.
These two camps essentially advocated a rather centralised closed career system, a 
uniform and transparent remuneration system in which pay is linked to promotion, 
and a civil service commission that would have major impact on personnel 
management decisions, in particular recruitment policy and the promotion and 
appointment of civil servants. The main purpose of this system would be to create 
stability and a public bureaucracy based on expertise, de-politicised but loyal to the 
government of day (Verebelyi 1992). Moreover, the Ministry of Interior shared 
Antall's view discussed above that any kind of past and present party membership 
should not lead to an exclusion from the civil service.
3.2.1. Exit, Pay and Loyalty? Negotiations inside Government
The controversy over the shape of the remuneration system arose between the 
Ministry of Interior on the one hand, and the Ministry of Finance and several line 
ministries on the other. Line ministries had already started to set up and reform their 
ministerial pay systems right after the investiture of the new government in May 
1990. As a result, the remuneration systems and above all the wage levels of 
ministerial staff differed from one ministry to another. 'Richer ministries' like the 
economic ministries paid much higher salaries than 'poorer ministries' like for 
instance the Ministry of Culture and Education. Moreover, due to the lack of legal
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basis and the practice of paying salaries from the overall ministerial budget, no limits 
as to the maximum or the minimum wage level existed after the new government had 
taken office. As a consequence, several line ministries became initially opposed to 
the principles and the implications of remuneration system proposed by the Ministry 
of Interior, in particular, the determination of remuneration levels almost exclusively 
on the basis of seniority rules. However, during the negotiations at the inter- 
ministerial level and at the Meeting of Administrative State Secretaries that was 
established as a professional filter for government meetings, views other than the one 
initially propagated by the Ministry of Interior were denounced as being 
'conservative' and contrary to the 'European mainstream'. Hence, opposition to the 
proposal of the Ministry of Interior faded already during the pre-government 
decision-making stages.
The Ministries of Finance, Industry and Trade and International Economic Relations 
were the only ministries that could sustain their opposition. They were mainly 
opposed to the uniformity of the remuneration system that was supposed to be 
created by the proposal of the Ministry of Interior. Put simply, in particular the senior 
staff of the economic ministries argued that 'more important' and 'more highly 
qualified personnel' needs to be granted higher pay. As a consequence, the economics 
ministries supported a payment system that granted more flexibility in adjusting pay 
to performance and educational criteria. Moreover, they favoured the introduction of 
bonus payments and more flexible incompatibility rules, as the complete restriction 
on any business activities of senior civil servants would be untenable for their senior 
civil servants. For instance, although the remuneration system was rather uncontested 
during the later discussion in parliament, the second Minister of Finance, Kupa 
(appointed in December 1990), had to defend the introduction of soft incompatibility 
rules in a parliamentary plenary debate. Speaking practically on behalf of his senior 
officials, Kupa claimed that tough restrictions upon alternative business activities 
would trigger a wave of resignations of senior officials whose expertise is much 
needed for the success of the economic transformation.
At the same time, the Ministry of Finance continued its pre-1990 opposition to the 
financial implications of the Civil Service Act. The Ministry of Interior had proposed
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that ministerial personnel pay should be uniform across the ministries, but as no civil 
servant should receive a lower salary than before, all salaries should be lifted to the 
highest level at that time. It is obvious that this created support for the original 
proposal among those ministries that were supposed to receive higher salaries while 
the ministries like Finance, Industry and Trade, and International Economic Relations 
were strongly opposed to what they perceived as 'negative egalitarianism'. Under 
these conditions, the compromise over the payment system in the law is 
understandable. On the one hand, the Ministry of Interior prevailed with the 
introduction of the general structure of the civil service remuneration system that 
would provide the basic building blocks for the future development of a uniform 
remuneration system. On the other, the economic ministries prevailed in relaxing 
incompatibility rules, introducing general supplement payment for all central 
government civil servants in contrast to all other civil servants, and in particular the 
establishment of a 'personal remuneration list of the minister'. Moreover, in order to 
relax the financial burdens for the budget the Ministry of Finance agreed to the 
compromise that the wage increases for civil servants should be paid in stages over 
three years, hence, civil servants would only receive 100% of the their formally 
determined pay by 1995 (see also Zsuffa 1998).
Although the government and the political parties in parliament expressed an interest 
in the remuneration system, in particular the incompatibility rules as mentioned 
above, the conflict over rules relating to remuneration were primarily resolved at the 
administrative level of co-ordination. At the same time, neither the transitory rules of 
the Act nor the allocation system proposed by the Ministry of Interior were of 
relevance in the inter-ministerial negotiations because the state secretaries and 
managing bureaucrats in the ministries all supported the creation of a stable public 
administration that would grant few possibilities for political intervention into 
decisions of appointment and dismissal of civil servants. Senior and higher ranking 
bureaucrats agreed that the Act should stipulate only merit based conditions on the 
nominal admission of the existing staff into the new civil service. For instance, it was 
generally accepted that existing staff had to pass a public administration examination 
within a transitional period of several years as proposed by the Ministry of Interior.
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Conversely, only the failure to pass such examination should lead to the dismissal of 
existing staff rather than their attitudes towards the former communist regime.
In a Government Meeting in September 1990, the Head of Department of the Civil 
Service Department presented the draft Civil Service Act to the Government on 
behalf of Interior Minister Horvath, and the proposal passed the Government Meeting 
without opposition or any major questions. Prime Minister Antall himself concluded 
that the Civil Service Act as proposed was a significant step forward in the creation 
of a professional and effective public administration, was rooted in Hungarian history 
and would bring Hungary back into the European mainstream. Hence, Antall 
maintained the position he had adopted for the Act on State Secretaries and, at the 
time of submitting the civil service draft Act to Parliament, this perspective was 
shared by the other members of government. Moreover, Antall respected the 
compromise reached among top bureaucrats and between them and the Ministry of 
Finance over the remuneration system as a temporary arrangement that takes into 
account the budgetary circumstances of the day and the wage developments set off in 
the emerging private sector by the transition to a market economy.
In sum, the negotiations inside government were characterised by consensus as 
regards the general need to define the legal status of civil servants in a parliamentary 
Act. Moreover, it was uncontroversial that the adoption of a Civil Service Act should 
aim at the stabilisation of public administration and the creation of favourable 
conditions for the professionalisation of its personnel by means of institutionalising 
the merit principle and minimising possibilities for political interference into 
personnel policy. At the same time, the Civil Service Act was prepared in an as short 
time as the Act on State Secretaries. Hence, the subsequent revision of the Civil 
Service Act and the integration of the Act on State Secretaries were already 
anticipated by the officials in the Ministry of Interior at the time when the Act was 
submitted to parliament.
By contrast, the main issue of debate inside government concerned the disagreement 
among ministries and top bureaucrats over the rules that determine civil servants' 
levels of remuneration and the budgetary implications of the Civil Service Act.
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Although the negotiations over the remuneration system appear to be paradigmatic 
for bureaucratic self-interest, the suggested solutions, e.g. Ministers' personal 
remuneration list and soft incompatibility rules, meant the institutionalisation of high 
levels of political discretion. However, firstly, the proposed institutional 
arrangements were considered as transitional from the outset, and, secondly, senior 
bureaucrats did not expect to be dependent on political favours in order to secure a 
higher wage level because they could easily earn higher wages in the private sector. 
Hence, the suggested solutions provided a means to accommodate the budgetary 
concerns raised by the Ministry of Finance and the dynamic wage developments in 
the private sector rather than meeting conceivable concern of politicians to grant 
flexible wages to like-minded bureaucrats. Finally, during the negotiations inside 
government, Antall who remained firmly in control of his ministers supported, the 
proposed allocation system and accepted the compromise that was reached among 
top bureaucrats over the remuneration system. As a consequence, controversial 
debate over the shape of the proposed civil service system only started again after the 
draft Act had been submitted to parliamentary debate and scrutiny in the committees.
3.2.2. Coalition Building inside Parliament
During the debates in the plenary of Parliament and in the parliamentary committees, 
the main concerns of political parties were related to transitory rules of the Act and 
the degree of flexibility of the rules governing the allocation of personnel in the 
administration. Antall and the senior officials of the Ministry of Interior had the 
support of the moderate-pragmatic wing of the MDF in Parliament and the small 
coalition partners KDNP and - to a lesser extent - the FKGP. Moreover, the 
government proposal gained support from the parliamentary group of the MSZP. On 
the other end of the debate were those parliamentary forces that favoured tough 
transitory rules, more flexible civil service arrangements, and/or that did not perceive 
any pressure to adopt quickly a Civil Service Act. The most important among them 
were the 'radical-populist' wing of the MDF and to a lesser extent the 'conservative' 
wing of the MDF. On the opposition side, the SZDSZ, supported by the Fidesz, was 
the major force advocating greater flexibility written into the Civil Service Act.
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Hence, the division over the draft Civil Service Act cut across both the largest party 
of the governing coalition and the opposition parties.
The senior governing party MDF was founded in 1987 by populist writers and 
intellectuals as a political movement rather than a political party. Although the MDF 
adopted the broader image of a 'rightist-centrist people's party' (Korosenyi 1999: 36, 
italics in original), it became the main representative of the centre-right in the First 
Parliament. As briefly discussed in the last chapter, between its formation in the late 
1980s and late 1992, the Hungarian party system reflected a tripolar pattern of inter­
party competition. Historically, the party system is primarily structured by a socio­
cultural cleavage, which Markus (1999a: 73) describes as an "identity-based cleavage 
of traditionalism versus Westernisation, a product of the contradictions in Hungarian 
state-formation and nation-building under the pressure of exogenous modernisation 
in a semi-peripheral buffer zone". The 'traditionalist' centre-right is characterised by 
its historically rooted anxiety about the 'destiny problems of Hungarian nationhood' 
that go back to the lost war of independence in 1848/49, the ensuing Austrian- 
Hungarian Compromise in 1867, and the 'traumatic experience' of the 1920 Trianon 
peace treaty as a result of which Hungary lost two thirds of its historical territory. 
Moreover, the populist intellectuals who founded the MDF carried on basic ideas of 
'plebian (peasant) radicalism' and agrarian reform as a means of 'elevating the 
peasantry into the body of the nation' (Markus 1999a: 74).
After becoming the senior coalition party, the MDF continued to keep several 
political currents: a moderate-pragmatic, a conservative and a radical-populist right, 
under its roof. With the beginning of the Round Table Talks, the evolution of the 
MDF was strongly shaped by Antall who was the main representative of a liberal- 
conservative, pragmatic political orientation. Antall "tried to combine the West 
European ideal of a German style Christian Democracy with the moderate Hungarian 
"national-Christian course" tradition of Istvan Bethlen of the twenties"(Markus 
1999a: 74).70 Hence, on the one hand, Antall sought to foster the integration of 
Hungary into the family of capitalist democracies and in particular the European 
Communities and NATO as pillars of Western integration instead of a searching a
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'third road for Hungary. On the other hand, Antall stood for the continuity of the so- 
called 'gentlemanly Hungary, rather than for the values of the populist component of 
the traditionalist right. The notion of 'gentlemanly Hungary' refers to the tradition of 
nationalist elite democracy type of the pre-and in particular post-World War One 
period that combined a quest for the restoration of historical Hungary under the 
leadership of the aristocracy. This included a strong role for a permanent civil 
service, as also advocated by Antall after the transition to democracy in 1990 
(Markus 1999a: 7 0 ,1999b: 144).
Antall was critical of the populist component of the traditionalist political pole. The 
radical-populist wing of the political right was represented by Istvan Csurka who left 
the MDF in 1993 with 12 MPs to form the radical right Hungarian Justice and Life 
Party (MTEP) after having lost a bit for the MDF presidency against Antall. Szocs 
(1998: 1100) describes the MIEP as a type of liangover party, which argue that "the 
post-communist transition has been betrayed by the current elites [and that] there was 
no actual regime change" (italics in original). Hence, the successor party of the 
radical-populist wing within the MDF combined ideas of the radical traditionalist 
pole with radical anti-communism. As regards the deliberations about the Civil 
Service Act, the anti-communism of the radical-populist group implied that it 
favoured the 'thorough cleansing' of the state administration after Hungarys transition 
to democracy. Consequently, strong opposition to the civil service draft Act as 
proposed by the government was not merely a matter of detail. Rather, there was a 
general, fundamental opposition to the introduction of a law at all unless the 
administration was ‘cleansed’ from all former connections to the MSZMP and unless 
remaining state bureaucrats had proven their support to the new regime.
This policy was also supported by the more conservative currents within the MDF 
represented for instance by figures like Sandor Lezsak who later became party 
president of the MDF. After the local government elections in autumn 1990, Lezsak 
had agreed with members of the conservative platform of the MDF that his home 
district of Lakitelek should serve as a model for Hungary. He intended to dismiss all 
employees in one act and to re-employ the next day those who were clearly
70 Istvan Bethlen was Prime Minister from 1921 to 1931.
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unconnected to the former communist regime. This proposition was strongly opposed 
by the specialists in the Ministry of Interior and the government. The Ministry 
eventually took legal action against the local self-government of Lakitelek and the 
courts ruled against the practice of the 'Lakitelek model'. As a consequence, there was 
little interest among the conservative and the radical-populist groups within the MDF 
in finding a quick agreement over the civil service draft Act. Rather, they considered 
the transitory rules of the government proposal as an incomplete 'change of regime 
policy towards public administration'.
At the same time, Antall had the support of the two small coalition partners for the 
civil service reform as drafted by the Ministry of Interior. Both the KDNP and the 
FKPG are historical parties that were re-founded in 1989 and 1988 respectively. 
After the 1990 elections, the KDNP was the smallest party in parliament with just 
over 5% of the seats. In contrast to the other parties of the centre-right, the KDNP 
defined itself as a ' Weltanschauungs -party deeply rooted in the Catholic subcultural 
milieu (Enyedi 1996). However, during the years in government, the KDNP remained 
a silent coalition partner of the MDF as well as a loyal supporter of the government 
in parliamentary voting (Bihari 1991). By contrast, the support of the FKGP for 
government policies was more ambivalent. The FKGP was a party of rural areas and 
of the peasantry mainly in the southern and eastern plains of Hungary. It effectively 
campaigned on a single issue, that is, the re-privatisation of landed property and the 
restoration of the 1947 land ownership relations in order to re-establish small scale 
private farming. As a consequence, the FKGP support for government policy in 
parliament was somewhat conditional upon the rapid re-privatisation and 
compensation for losses incurred during the communist era. Because a hard-line 
faction of the FKGP regarded the 1991 compensation Acts as insufficient, a group of 
nine MPs around the later President of the FKGP, Torgyan, left the coalition in 
February 1992, thereby reducing the voting majority of the governing coalition in 
parliament still before the adoption of the Civil Service Act in March (Korosenyi 
1999). However, Antall's perspective upon public administration reform and in 
particular civil service reform remained unchallenged by the both the KDNP and the 
remaining so-called 'Smallholders 36'.
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Despite the support of the small coalition partners, the government was confronted 
with difficulties in building a winning coalition for its proposal in the legislature, as 
two important factions of the senior governing party were opposed to the civil service 
draft Act. Moreover, the government was essentially unable to build a cross-party 
coalition with the parties of the opposition. Firstly, although the MSZP supported the 
civil service draft Act, it was not acceptable as a partner of the governing parties for 
negotiation and co-operation. As a result of the low turnover of administrative 
personnel after May 1990 and the pattern of recruiting senior bureaucrats from the 
ministerial bureaucracy, the MSZP continued to have strong support within the 
administration. Moreover, although the trade unions underwent a process of re­
organisation and hence were lacking major action capabilities, a close relationship 
between them and the MSZP was continued. Hence, the MSZP strategy was mainly 
driven by their interest in representing a specific constituency that would benefit 
from the new Civil Service Act as proposed by the Ministry of Interior. Finally, the 
transformation of the former socialist state party MSZMP into the MSZP that was 
dominated by late-Kadarist technocrats who campaigned on an ’ideology of 
modernisation' (Bozoki 1997), made them natural supporters of a civil service reform 
along the lines discussed during the 1980 reform attempts. However, it has to be 
emphasised that the MSZP did not play a major role in the negotiation process. First, 
it had only 8,6% of the seats in parliament, although their votes could have played a 
crucial role in building a majority for the civil service draft Act. Second, given the 
initially tripolar structure of the party system after the change of regime, Agh (1997a: 
430) argues that "for 2 years the HSP [i.e. the MSZP] was forced into a political 
ghetto". As a result, the other five parliamentary parties sought to avoid any kind of 
co-operation with the MSZP inside or outside parliament.
Secondly, the government could not expect the co-operation of the SZDSZ as the 
then largest party of the opposition in the civil service reform negotiations. During 
the Round Table Talks and the First Parliament the SZDSZ was the main 
representative of the 'Westernisation pole' or the centre-left in the Hungarian party 
system. The 'Western universalist urbanist tradition' (Markus 1999a: 74) has its roots 
in the late 18th century standing for radical liberal political values and Hungary's 
radical socio-cultural adjustment to the West and the pursuit of catching-up
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modernisation as the central goal of political life. Contrary to the parties on the 
centre-right, the SZDSZ as well as the small opposition party Fidesz in the first three 
years after transition, considered the question of Hungarian minorities living abroad 
as a human rights problem. Although the MSZP had become the third representative 
of the Westernisation pole after its foundation in autumn 1989, the SZDSZ that had 
grown out of the democratic opposition shared the suspicion of the conservative and 
the radical-populist factions within the MDF towards the state bureaucracy as having 
been a natural ally of the former ruling party, MSZMP. Moreover, the liberal 
attitudes of SZDSZ politicians led them to favour more flexible and performance- 
oriented arrangements for the governance of the civil service rather than rigid 
seniority based rules. At the same time, the SZDSZ agreed with the moderate- 
pragmatic wing of the MDF that it is desirable to 'join Europe' with respect to the 
kind of public administration system, but they nonetheless favoured more flexible 
institutional solutions. As a consequence, suspicion towards the state administration 
and the liberal values of the SZDSZ, and the unavailability of the MSZP as an 
acceptable partner for co-operation led to further complications for the government to 
bridge the divisions in parliament and to a seek cross-party coalition.
However, the failure to pass the civil service draft Act shortly after its submission to 
parliament in September 1990 cannot exclusively be attributed to the diverging 
positions of political parties and their factions upon the civil service reform course as 
developed by the Ministry of Interior and supported by the Government. In fact, the 
viewpoints of the different parties and factions was known to all relevant participants 
of the civil service reform process at least since the National Round Table Talks in 
the summer and autumn of 1989. Moreover, as the adoption of the Act on State 
Secretaries indicates, Antall was able to impose his position upon the dissenting 
factions of the MDF in Parliament in the spring of 1990. The comparably smooth 
adoption of the Act on State Secretaries is even more striking when taking into 
account that Antall combined the reform Act with a personnel policy strategy that 
brought former top bureaucrats to the apex of the ministries, some of which had been 
former MSZMP members. Therefore, the failure of the government to build a 
parliamentary majority for its position as formalised in the civil service draft Act can
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only be explained with reference to the change in political climate in the autumn of 
1990 and the resulting change in the balance of forces within the MDF.
It is reasonable to argue that the autumn of 1990 was an important turning point for 
the life and functioning of the first government. On the one hand, the defecting 
factions of the governing coalitions, i.e. the later splits of the MDF and the FKPG, 
did not topple the government and Prime Minister Antall remained the strong figure 
of the MDF; partly because the Prime Minister can only be removed by a 
constructive vote of no-confidence. On the other, Antall and the moderate-pragmatic 
wing around him faced increasing difficulties in gaining loyal support for his policies 
in parliament. After the investiture of the government at the end of May, Antall had 
asked for a period of grace of one hundred days to develop a comprehensive 
government programme. However, by September the government had essentially not 
managed to develop such programme in particular in order to alleviate the severe 
problems of the economy. Instead, it carried on a campaign of the 'change of regime', 
fixed ever newer deadlines for its completion and extended its campaign to ever 
newer social sub-systems. For instance, the government initiated the replacement of 
numerous directors of state owned enterprises, directors of universities, the 
(nominally independent) print and television media and leading figures of cultural 
institutions. Moreover, the government sought to use its influence to establish a kind 
of 'official historical/national ideology, which combined ideas of the 1920s elitist 
right and the traditionalist, populist right. As a result of this 'national conservative 
challenge' (Agh 1991) and the so-called 'spring cleaning', "the government became 
entangled in political trench warfare with almost the entire society" (Bihari 1991: 36, 
italics in original).
As a response, the liberal parties SZDSZ and Fidesz embarked on a radical 
opposition strategy and joined forces with the national press which heavily criticised 
the policy of the government. Before the formation of the government, the MDF and 
the SZDSZ had agreed a 'pact' that the SZDSZ would be granted access to several 
high-level state offices in exchange for supporting constitutional changes to 
strengthen the government vis-a-vis the legislature. For instance, as a result of the 
'pact' the SZDSZ politician Goncz was elected President of the Republic. However,
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the attempt to set off a style of consensual politics between the two strongest parties 
on the centre-right and the centre-left collapsed within a few months. Instead, by late 
summer, the SZDSZ had embarked on a radical opposition strategy vis-a-vis the 
rhetoric and policies of the government led by Antall.
In this context, the Antall government faced its first severe political crisis when the 
taxi drivers demonstrated against the liberalisation and ensuing increase of gasoline 
prices at the end of October. Public unrest and a crushing defeat in the local 
government elections in November led to a 'spectacular weakening of the MDF' (Agh 
1992) and the loss of the hegemonic position it had initially held on the centre-right 
of the Hungarian party system. As a consequence, Agh (1994: 21-23) argues that the 
Hungarian party system began to exhibit the "permanent marks of a polarised 
pluralism which [was] alleviated or resolved by the changing order of moderate 
pluralism", for instance, the attempt to marginalise the MSZP. Thirdly, although the 
MSZP became the main representative party of the Western oriented pole by the end 
of the First Parliament, shortly after the transition to democracy, the other five parties 
were unified in their fundamental opposition towards the MSZP as the heir of the 
former socialist state party MSZMP. As a result, the continuously low showing in 
public opinion polls and the political polarisation after autumn 1990 both made it 
increasingly difficult for the Antall government to appease the radical-populist and 
the conservative wings of the MDF in parliament and to forge cross-party coalitions 
with either of the opposition parties.
To a good extent, the changing balance of forces within the MDF crystallised in the 
negotiations of the civil service draft Act. Firstly, both the conservative and the 
radical-populist factions of the MDF increasingly demanded the implementation of a 
'change of regime policy1 towards public administration, i.e. complete cleansing of 
the administration from all elements suspected of having co-operated with the former 
state party, MSZMP. Yet, as a result of the failure to implement the Lakitelek model, 
neither of the two factions felt committed to speed up the negotiations of the civil 
service draft Act in parliament. Secondly, the increasing influence of the radical- 
populist and the conservative MDF wings put pressure on Antall and his ministers to 
select senior personnel that had not previously co-operated with the MSZMP.
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However, Antall stood by his original position towards the civil service reform and 
senior personnel policy and sought to diffuse suspicion of MPs and the growing 
unease of several ministers in his cabinet towards the inherited senior bureaucrats.
As a result of the party political polarisation and the weakening of the MDF since the 
early autumn of 1990, the balance of forces within the senior governing party MDF 
changed. This in turn undermined Antall’s capacity to impose his civil service reform 
position on the dissenting MDF factions in parliament. In other words, the radical- 
populist and the conservative factions had not changed their position vis-a-vis a civil 
service reform between early 1990 and late 1991. Rather, the political constellation 
of the day gave rise to the opponents of a fast-track civil service reform and laid bare 
the general division within the senior governing party MDF as well as the division 
over the issue of civil service reform. Moreover, the radical opposition strategy of the 
SZDSZ towards the government policies including its opposition towards the 
proposed civil service reform, made it practically impossible for the Government to 
built cross-party coalitions in Parliament. The strong divisions inside the main 
governing party, MDF, and the radical opposition of the SZDSZ towards the Civil 
Service Act are the main reasons why it was impossible to reach a fast agreement on 
the floor of parliament and why the government was forced to withdraw the proposed 
Act in December 1991.
The second draft Act submitted to Parliament in early 1992 again created major 
debate, as more than 200 amendments introduced by the parliamentary committees 
indicate. During the discussions in the parliamentary committees, it was mainly the 
state secretaries and the senior civil servants of the Ministry of Interior who came to 
defend the government proposal. In fact, that served as another illustration of the 
suspicion of MPs that bureaucrats were pursuing a civil service reform that was in 
their own interest and that ministers were essentially unable to counter-balance the 
influence of state secretaries in the policy-making process. By the time the 
government proposal was submitted to voting in the parliamentary plenary session, 
the senior bureaucrats from the Ministry of Interior had been able to broker a 
compromise between the opponents and the proponents of civil service reform that 
was able to gain enough support from among the parties of the governing coalition.
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The main argument that finally convinced the opposing camps in the committees not 
to further delay the adoption of a Civil Service Act was the prospect to bring 
Hungary back in line with the European systems of public administration rather than 
opting for a 'Hungarian Sonderweg'. Hence, despite strong opposition to the reform 
proposal, the government and in particular the top bureaucrats of the Ministry of 
Interior were ultimately able to gain support for the general principles of their 
proposed allocation system.
However, the compromise made by the Act's opponents in following European 
mainstream models of public administration rather than entirely rejecting the 
adoption of a Civil Service Act, had been traded off for a second major compromise 
with respect to the kind of allocation system that was written into the Civil Service 
Act. For instance, restrictions on ministers' power to assign senior civil servants to 
managing positions and to withdraw their assignment were taken out of the draft Act, 
options for the dismissal of civil servants upon different kinds of re-organisation 
measures were introduced without limiting ministers' power to do so. Moreover, the 
kind of civil service commission originally suggested by the Ministry of Interior did 
not find support among MPs. As a result, the authority to take allocation decisions in 
the ministries was not assigned to an independent civil service commission but 
continued to stay with either the ministers or the Administrative State Secretaries as 
administrative heads of the ministries. Yet, the high degree of formal political 
discretion over the appointment and dismissal of state secretaries implied that 
Ministers retained considerable latitude to indirectly influence allocation decisions 
further down the ministerial hierarchy if they regarded this as necessary. The main 
reason for this solution was that a civil service commission was regarded as limiting 
the needs of ministers, and that MPs and the government could not agree on the 
appointment of a capable president of the commission that had minimal affiliation to 
the former communist regime.
As a result, the original version proposed by the Ministry of Interior and the final 
version that became law differed in many respects, but the general principles of a 
career system were left in place. The compromise solution chosen in the 
parliamentary committees created the possibility to effectively offset the career
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system of the civil service, if Ministers take advantage of their discretionary powers 
that were granted to them as additional instruments of exercising personnel policy. 
Given the opposition of the Ministry of Interior and in particular the reluctance of 
Antall to adopt far-reaching transitory rules, the opponents of the civil service reform 
sought to establish the freedom for governments to implement a 'change of regime 
policy towards public administration' at some point in the future. Hence, in exchange 
for the lack of tough transitory rules, opponents were successful in their attempt to 
include an allocation system that gives them the political discretion to 'cleanse' the 
administration from within the adopted civil service system. On the other hand, the 
senior bureaucrats in the Ministry of Interior concluded that the adoption of the Civil 
Service Act was a progress when compared to the status quo ante. In particular, they 
reckoned that the establishment of the principles of a career system for both the 
allocation and the remuneration of civil servants as well as the definition of the status 
of civil servants as neutral, party political independent and professional is the first 
step towards the establishment of a Western-type civil service system in the near 
future. Hence, although civil service reform had remained incomplete from the point 
of view of the senior bureaucrats in the Ministry of Interior, they expected that the 
revision of the adopted civil service system would soon bring about their most 
desired institutional solution.
4. Conclusion
Civil service reform had been an important issue on the administrative reform agenda 
for almost a decade before the change of regime. Strong proponents of reform had 
emerged such as the trade unions and academics from the NSPA who were 
eventually appointed to positions in the Ministry of Interior during the Nemeth 
government and retained their position after the change of regime. During the 
National Round Table Talks, senior and higher ranking bureaucrats had turned from 
being opponents to strong supporters of civil service reform and became crucial in 
promoting reform efforts that would lead to the de-politicisation of personnel policy. 
After the formation of the first democratically elected government in May 1990, 
senior and higher ranking bureaucrats and their main advocates in the Ministry of
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Interior gained the support of the governing parties, in particular Prime Minister 
Antall, for the initiation of a fast-track reform that would establish a civil service 
system that corresponds by and large to a de-politicised personnel policy regime for 
all ranks of the civil service. These core proponents of reform assumed that the far- 
reaching de-politicisation of the civil service system, especially the allocation system, 
is a necessary condition to establish a professional, de-politicised civil service and to 
bring Hungary back into the European mainstream as well as to re-connect the 
system of public administration to Hungarian historical roots. Moreover, the 
proposed solution provided an opportunity for Prime Minister Antall to signal to the 
administration that a government that is composed of parties of the former 
democratic opposition seeks the co-operation with the 'inherited' administrative 
personnel rather than pursuing a tough cleansing of public administration.
On the other side of the debate stood the conservative and the radical-populist wings 
of the MDF. These core opponents of civil service reform accepted a fast-track 
reform only under the condition that either tough transitory rules were included or 
that the allocation system is sufficiently open to grant future governments the 
freedom to implement a change of regime policy towards public administration staff 
from within the adopted civil service system. Hence, the core opponents of civil 
service reform favoured either no reform at all or a kind of civil service system that 
would by and large correspond to a personnel policy regime that allows open 
politicisation. The opponents assumed that a failure to thoroughly cleanse public 
administration from all those elements that had previously co-operated with the 
MSZMP would undermine the successful implementation of the government's policy 
programme as well as the successful completion of the transition to democracy more 
generally. However, the desire to follow Western European models of public 
administration in combination with the formula of opening up the allocation system 
in exchange for voting in favour of the government proposal in parliament created 
enough support for the adoption of the first Civil Service Act in March 1992.
In addition, the adoption of the proposed Civil Service Act shortly after its 
submission to parliament was complicated by the changing balance of forces within 
the governing coalition and the radical opposition strategy pursued by the SZDSZ
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after the autumn of 1990. On the one hand, the change in political climate, i.e. the 
tendency towards polarised pluralism after 1990, made it difficult for the government 
to appease dissenting factions of the governing coalition in parliament. On the other 
hand, the loss of popularity of the government coalition boosted the efforts of the 
largest opposition party SZDSZ to attack the government. As a consequence, when 
compared to the first half year after the second round elections, the government had 
difficulties both in imposing its will upon members of parliament and in building 
cross-party coalitions with the opposition. Therefore, the government was 
constrained in its effort to change the institutional basis of personnel policy from the 
arrangements inherited from the socialist administration. In other words, the 
government was unable to move the inherited over-politicised personnel policy 
regime substantially in the direction of de-politicisation because the most preferred 




Getting Stuck: The Second Reform of the Civil Service in 1997
1. Introduction
In Chapter 6 ,1 concluded that the initiation of the 1997 civil service reform is rather 
surprising in light of the personnel policy strategy pursued by the Horn government. 
The Horn government had replaced a large proportion of inherited senior bureaucrats 
with appointees that were recruited from other settings than the ministerial 
bureaucracy, although many of these new appointees had previously worked in senior 
positions of the administration. Therefore, especially the initial personnel policy 
strategy of the Horn government suggests that no or only minor civil service reform 
pressures should have arisen from the bureaucracy and, as a result, the government 
would have no need to restrict formal-legal possibilities to intervene into personnel 
policy. However, the conceivable exception to this scenario, mentioned in Chapter 4, 
is that the remaining 'second tier bureaucrats' are able to find an agent among senior 
bureaucrats or politicians who would promote their cause for a civil service reform 
with de-politicising effects upon personnel policy. To a great extent, this happened 
after the Horn government took office in 1994, but it ultimately did not lead to a 
major institutional change of the Hungarian civil service system when viewed 
through the lens of formal political discretion.
At first sight, the second wave of civil service reform enacted in 1997 was a 
continuation of the first reform wave in 1990/1992 rather than an entirely new reform 
project. The initiative for further civil service reform originated in the argument 
raised by senior bureaucrats of the Ministry of Interior, in particular Administrative 
State Secretary Verebelyi, and academics from the NSPA and the Hungarian Institute 
of Public Administration, that the 1990/92 civil service reform was incomplete. As 
argued in the last Chapter, in 1990/1992, the reform minded senior bureaucrats of the 
Ministry of Interior had sought to implement a civil service system that corresponds
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by and large to a de-politicised personnel policy regime. These key proponents of 
civil service reform sought to take advantage of an apparently favourable political 
climate that arose in July 1994 with the formation of the Socialist-Liberal 
government standing for an ‘ideology of modernisation’ and Westernisation (Bozoki 
1997; Markus 1999a).
Three months after the investiture of the new government, the chief architect of the 
1992 Civil Service Act, Verebelyi, was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to 
the Prime Minister's Office to head the newly established office of Government 
Commissioner for the Modernisation of Public Administration. Within two years, the 
office of the Government Commissioner developed a comprehensive Public 
Administration Reform Programme that presented a detailed strategy for the 
complete institutional overhaul of the central and local government structures and the 
civil service in the near future. However, although the political conditions to 
complete the post-transition civil service reform project appeared to be favourable 
after 1994 and although the second reform wave was based on a comprehensive 
reform programme, hardly any of the proposed institutional reform measures found 
their way into the revised civil service legislation of 1997. As a consequence, the
1997 reform of the civil service is commonly regarded as a reform failure.
This Chapter traces the origin and the negotiations of the 1997 civil service reform 
and identifies the causes of its failure. Firstly, it takes the position senior bureaucrats 
did not represent a unified interest in civil service reform because especially the state 
secretaries and senior civil servants that had been brought (back) in by the MSZP 
were effectively disinterested in the de-politicisation of personnel policy. Secondly, 
the two governing parties, MSZP and SZDSZ, were ultimately not interested in tying 
their hands to exercise political discretion over personnel policy either. Although 
they were hesitant supporters of a package of radical reform measures in the initial 
period of their preparation, they increasingly lost interest in a far-reaching civil 
service reform as a result of an anticipated victory of the MSZP in the approaching
1998 elections and the gradual political weakening of the SZDSZ after 1996. As a 
consequence, the reform proponents around Government Commissioner Verebelyi 
were only able to gain support for a small scale institutional adjustment of the
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1990/92 civil service system with virtually no impact on the degree of formal 
political discretion. The discussion in this Chapter initially discusses in detail the 
origins of the 1996 Public Administration Reform Programme. Then, the discussion 
turns to the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Act on the Legal Status of 
Members of the Government and State Secretaries and the amendment of the Civil 
Service Act in June and October 1997 respectively.
2. The Origins of the Public Administration Reform Programme
2.1. The Re-organisation of Civil Service Reform Management System
In May 1994, the MSZP had won a landslide victory in the national elections winning 
33% of the votes and 54% of the seats in parliament thanks to the electoral systems, 
which disproportionately favours the large parties. Although the MSZP could have 
formed a single party government, it opted for a coalition with the second largest 
party, the SZDSZ that had won 19.7% of the votes and 17.9% of the seats in 
parliament. Hence, together the MSZP and the SZDSZ held a 72.9% majority in the 
parliament. After the investiture of the government in July 1994, the new Prime 
Minister Horn appointed the president of the SZDSZ Kuncze as Minister of Interior. 
As a result, the Civil Service Department in the Ministry of Interior responsible for 
the management of the civil service and the development of further reform strategies 
was under the political leadership of the junior coalition partner SZDSZ.
Seven weeks after its investiture, i.e. on 31 August 1994, the Government therefore 
established a new position of Government Commissioner for the Modernisation of 
Public Administration. The position of Government Commissioner was a new type of 
position in the Prime Minister's Office responsible for the temporary strategic 
management of particular policy areas that cut across ministerial boundaries. 
Government Commissioners were appointed by and accountable to the Prime 
Minister on behalf of the Government and they were classified as Administrative 
State Secretaries rather than as Political State Secretaries. The task of the new 
Government Commissioner was to develop a comprehensive programme of public 
administration reform that promotes 'efficient and lawful operations of the public
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administration, [and simplifies] the public administration' (Government Decree 112 
of 1994). To this end, the Government Commissioner was supposed to co-operate 
with the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance and the newly established 
Deregulation Council convened by the Ministry of Finance.
Prime Minister Horn selected the Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of 
Interior, Verebelyi, for the position of Government Commissioner. At the same time, 
Interior Minister Kuncze appointed Istvan Zsuffa, the Deputy State Secretary in the 
Ministry of Interior responsible for legislation since 1991 as Verebelyi's successor to
71 ,the position of Administrative State Secretary. The new Government Commissioner 
Verebelyi set up a small Department within the Prime Minister's Office that would 
assist his efforts to evaluate the reform attempts of the previous government and to 
develop a public administration reform programme for the years to come. To this 
end, Verebelyi selected Istvan Balasz, a former director of the NSPA and first 
Director of the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration after 1990 as his Deputy 
and head of administrative reform department. As a result, former academics from 
the NSPA were transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Minister's 
Office.72
The reorganisation and the personnel changes in August/September 1994 are 
primarily the result of the new coalition constellation in government that cut across 
the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Minister's Office. Firstly, Interior Minister 
Kuncze did initially not want to change senior personnel in the Ministry of Interior. 
Rather, he sought to demonstrate his respect for the professional leadership as being 
separated from the political leadership. On the one hand, Kuncze assumed that he 
will only be able to reach his general reform goals, if he relies on the expertise of the 
senior staff and their experience in managing the policy areas in the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Interior. On the other hand, he expected that if he indicates his
71 Between 1978 and 1990, Zsuffa had been a Head of Department and Government advisor in the 
Council of Ministers, the predecessor of the Prime Minister's Office and before joining the Ministry of 
Interior, he had worked for one year at the newly established Constitutional Court.
72 The first Head of the Civil Service Department who had been recruited from the NSPA in 1989 had 
already left the ministry at the end of 1991.
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willingness to co-operate with the 'inherited' senior staff, then the state secretaries 
and senior civil servants will themselves respect his policy agenda.
However, after a few weeks in office, Kuncze was increasingly exposed to pressures 
from the SZDSZ parliamentary faction to change the Administrative State Secretary 
Verebelyi. SZDSZ MPs feared that the strong figure of Verebelyi would undermine 
the prospects of realising SZDSZ policies in the Ministry of Interior. As discussed in 
the last Chapter, during the Antall government is was common that state secretaries 
would report and defend legislative proposals on behalf of the government in the 
parliamentary committees. For instance, with respect to Verebelyi who had 
previously pursued a career in academia, SZDSZ MPs were critical that he would 
continue to 'lecture' the elected MPs what kind of policy worked and what not.
Moreover, the SZDSZ MPs identified Verebelyi with the interests of the MSZP and 
in particular the bureaucracy itself, although he had served the full term as 
Administrative State Secretary during the centre-right Antall government. On the one 
hand, Verebelyi had been member of the MSZMP before the change of regime and 
had since only suspended his party membership in the MSZP. Hence, SZDSZ MPs 
were suspicious that Verebelyi would become a political counterweight to Minister 
Kuncze within the coalition. On the other hand, the role of Verebelyi during the first 
wave of administrative reforms in the early 1990s raised concerns among SZDSZ 
MPs that Verebelyi represents primarily the interests of the civil service. By 1994, 
Verebelyi had essentially acquired a highly recognised status as the 'father of 
Hungarian public administration reform', but the MPs of the SZDSZ were suspicious 
of his entrepreneurial status and the true interests he is pursuing. Because Kuncze 
increasingly began to share the views of the SZDSZ MPs after the discussion of the 
government programme and its implications for the Ministry of Interior, Kuncze gave 
finally in to the pressures of MPs. As a result, Kuncze decided to appoint Zsuffa to 
the position of Administrative State Secretary as a compromise solution, that is, a 
compromise between respecting the professional leadership of the Ministry and 
addressing a lack of political trust as voiced by members of the SZDSZS faction in 
parliament.
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Secondly, as I will discuss in more detail below, the MSZP was originally not 
particularly committed to civil service reform. However, the appointment of an 
SZDSZ politician to the Ministry of Interior resulted in the MSZP's loss of political 
control over the policies under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. From the 
point of view of the MSZP, the critical policies were not civil service reform and 
management. Rather, the MSZP cared most about control over the National Police, 
local government affairs, and the territorial administration, in particular the county 
administration, which had been (re-)established in 1994 before the change of 
government and which was under the control of the central government. As a 
consequence, the MSZP succeeded in the coalition negotiations that the government 
would set up some kind of alternative unit for public administration affairs in the 
Prime Minister's Office that would be under the leadership of Prime Minister Horn. 
At the same time, the MSZP was not able to do the same for National Police affairs 
because in the negotiations for the formation of the government, the SZDSZ had 
made it a condition that it would gain control over the National Police.
In this context, the departure of Verebelyi from the Ministry of Interior became 
increasingly apparent. On the one hand, the dismissal or resignation would have 
meant the loss of a proven expert in public administration affairs. On the other hand, 
the anticipated change at the top of the Ministry of Interior initiated by the SZDSZ 
supplied Prime Minister Horn with a natural choice for the position to be created in 
the Prime Minister's Office. As a result, Verebelyi who was personally most 
interested in pursuing further work in the area of administrative reform and strategy 
was appointed to a position basically tailor-made for him as Government 
Commissioner for the Modernisation of Public Administration. At the same time, 
however, the appointment of Verebelyi as an outstanding expert with a high 
reputation in the politico-administrative system was an optimal solution for Horn to 
meet his demand for enhanced political control over public administration affairs 
under conditions of coalition government.
As a result, in contrast to Antall's initiative in 1990 to intervene into the conflict 
between the Ministries of Interior and Labour, the 1994 re-organisation of the central 
government implied that responsibility over future civil service reform activities was
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both politically and administratively shared. The establishment of the position of 
Government Commissioner in the Prime Minister's Office responsible for the more 
limited task of administrative reform became a vehicle for Prime Minister Horn and 
the MSZP to exercise a certain level of influence over public administration affairs 
and stay well informed about public administration developments. Moreover, the 
appointment as Government Commissioner for the Modernisation of Public 
Administration meant for Verebelyi that he would be in a strong position to pursue 
his reform ambitions from near the centre of government power, i.e. under the direct 
leadership of the Prime Minister. Finally, the establishment of a quasi-competing 
institution in the Prime Minister's Office was not completely at the expense of the 
Ministry of Interior. Rather, it weakened the political and 'administrative' role of the 
Ministry of Interior in public administration affairs because it created an institutional 
check for the ministerial staff and Interior Minister Kuncze.
2.2. Revision & Completion: Verebelyi's Reform Agenda
The reform agenda for an overhaul of the entire government organisation within the 
years to come consisted of five major items.
• The review of public administration responsibilities with an aim at deregulating 
and enhancing the efficiency of administrative activities.
• The renewal of governance at the central state administration in order to enhance 
the co-ordination capacity of the central government apparatus.
• The upgrading of the local self-government system mainly to improve the 
economic basis of local self-government.
• The reform of the territorial state administration aiming at rationalising the 
functional differentiation across tiers of government.
• The reform of the public administration personnel system in order to enhance the 
quality and recognition of the civil service.
Hence, the reform of the civil service was but one item of the public administration 
reform agenda. However, from the point of view of Government Commissioner 
Verebelyi, the reform of the civil service, in particular the senior civil service, cut
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across the other four reform items and it was therefore one of the crucial tasks in 
order to accomplish the desired modernisation of Hungarian public administration. 
Although the guidelines for the modernisation of public administration to be 
developed were intended to set the reform agenda for several years, Verebelyi 
regarded in particular civil service reform as one of those reform items to be 
accomplished before the next regular elections in 1998. The Public Administration 
Reform Programme that was presented to the Government in summer 1996 including 
its civil service reform component was primarily a technocratic development of 
Government Commissioner Verebelyi and his Deputy Balasz. On the one hand, 
Verebelyi - as well as Balasz - maintained their previous position discussed in the 
last Chapter that the establishment of a professional civil service requires the de­
politicisation of personnel policy, in particular senior personnel policy. On the other, 
the proposed civil service reform direction was largely driven by their assessment of 
the civil service developments since the transition to democracy in 1990 and in 
particular since the implementation of the Civil Service Act in 1992.
Firstly, as indicated in the last Chapter, Verebelyi as well as his Deputy Balasz 
considered the 1990/92 reform as incomplete. In 1990, they and their fellow 
academics from the NSPA had expected that the transition to democracy provided the 
conditions to establish a de-politicised civil service system operating on the basis of 
merit principles. Several elements of what they considered to be essential for the 
establishment of a professional civil service had not been incorporated into neither 
the Act on State Secretaries nor the Civil Service Act. In particular, they criticised the 
possibilities for members of the government to politicise personnel policy through 
the backdoor. In other words, although a civil service based on the principles of 
professionalism and neutrality had been adopted, the Act provided a considerable 
number of exceptions that granted ministers to exercise discretion to politicise 
personnel policy. For instance, they were critical of the several exceptions that 
effectively offset the principle of permanent tenure and the potential that soft 
incompatibility criteria would undermine the public interest orientation of the civil 
service. In particular, however, they considered incomplete the institutional basis of 
senior personnel policy, as they had failed both to establish an independent civil
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service commission and effective restrictions upon the exercise of political discretion 
over the appointment and dismissal of senior civil servants and state secretaries.
Secondly, Verebelyi and his Deputy Balasz had the ambition to correct dysfunctional 
developments in the civil service that had become apparent during the negotiations 
and after the implementation of the 1992 Civil Service Act. In the domain of 
allocating civil servants, Verebelyi sought to develop institutional solutions that serve 
to stabilise the civil service, in particular the senior civil service. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the positions of state secretaries remained unstable administrative posts all 
though the term of the Antall government, and the closer the elections in 1994 came, 
the more did ministers tend to appoint state secretaries that had a political 
background in the governing parties. Furthermore, after the investiture of the centre- 
left government coalition, it had become apparent that the change in government had 
triggered the large scale replacement of state secretaries and also many Heads of 
Departments. From the point of view of Verebelyi and Balasz, the instability and 
emerging politicisation was a highly undesirable development that required 
correction.
Finally, in the area of civil servants' remuneration, Verebelyi and Balasz were 
concerned about the increasing difference between pay levels in the civil service and 
in the private sector. Since the transition to democracy in 1990, civil service pay had 
steadily fallen behind when compared to pay in the private sector. This development 
affected in particular young entrants with university degrees and managing civil 
servants. Therefore, a reform of the remuneration system had to simultaneously 
address both issues. On the one hand, he had to gain support for an increase of civil 
servants' actual wage levels. On the other, the rules determining these wage levels 
had to be adjusted in order to enhance the salary position of young entrants to the 
civil servants and in order to retain highly qualified staff in the top ranks. Hence, it 
had become apparent that the 1992 classification system as the main basis of 
determining civil servants' levels of remuneration needed an overhaul already two 
years after the beginning of its implementation. As a result, Verebelyi viewed the 
establishment of the office of Government Commissioner for public administration 
reform and his assignment to the post as an opportunity to complete the reforms that
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had been launched under his auspices in 1989 and as a vehicle to correct 
dysfunctional developments that had become apparent over the recent past. However, 
Verebelyi had also learned from the experience in 1990/92 that any civil service 
reform proposal requires the high-level political commitment and disciplined support 
of the governing parties.
2.3. The Political Context for Reform
At first glance, the formation of the Socialist-Liberal coalition suggested favourable 
conditions for the successful completion of civil service reform. Firstly, by 1994, the 
MSZP and the SZDSZ had become the sole representatives of the Western-oriented 
pole or the centre-left of the Hungarian party system (Markus 1999b). In August 
1991, Gyorgy Konrad, a writer and member of the SZDSZ, had initiated the 
formation of the Democratic Charter as a movement of liberal, social-liberal and 
socialist intellectuals and groups in order to demonstrate popular discontent with the 
national-conservative radicalisation of the MDF-led government and the centre-right 
parties in parliament. The activism of the Democratic Charter led to a slow 
rapprochement of the SZDSZ and the MSZP and by early 1992 a social-liberal 
platform was formed within the SZDSZ. As a result, the MSZP - further boosted by 
good results in parliamentary by-elections - managed to escape from political 
ghettoization during 1992 (Agh 1995). At the turn of 1992/93, the Fidesz responded 
by moving its programmatic appeal towards the right of the political spectrum as a 
liberal party with national commitment because it remained reluctant towards any co­
operation with the MSZP. As a consequence, Verebelyi could reasonably expect that 
a civil service reform, which promised a 'radical adjustment' towards Western or 
European patterns of public administration, would find the support of the new 
governing coalition because a similar formula had already been crucial in brokering 
the 1992 Civil Service Act.
Secondly, there was good reason to assume that the record of the SZDSZ as an 
opponent of civil service reform in the previous reform round would not pose a major 
problem in a coalition with the MSZP. In principle, the MSZP appeared to be a
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potential supporter of civil service reform along Verebelyi's old and new approach. 
The MSZP consisted basically of the reform-oriented wings of the former ruling state 
party, MSZMP, that had already supported the reform and modernisation of the civil 
service during the Nemeth government and the Round Table Talks. Moreover, the 
MSZP had supported both the principles of the Act on State Secretaries in the spring 
of 1990 and the 1992 Civil Service Act. In particular, the disproportionately high 
electoral support for the MSZP within the ranks of the civil service promised to be a 
formidable instrument to push civil service reform including an increase of civil 
service salaries. At the same time, Verebelyi was aware that the SZDSZ had 
consistently been among the opponents of civil service reform. It had argued on the 
basis of its radical liberal ideology that a modem civil service requires more flexible 
and performance oriented elements and hence tended to contradict the institutional 
solutions Verebelyi had proposed for the stabilisation of the civil service. Moreover, 
the SZDSZ1 rejection of previous civil service reform had been rooted in their 
opposition to the over-politicised socialist administration and hence the failure to 
adopt tougher transitory mles. However, the formation of a government coalition 
between the MSZP as the successor party of the MSZMP and the SZDSZ suggested 
that the SZDSZ' anti-communist rhetoric and approach to institutional reform would 
be a matter of the past. Hence, Verebelyi expected that completion of the civil service 
reform would not meet intense opposition from the SZDSZ.
Finally, notwithstanding the ambiguous political conditions for civil service reform, 
the formation of the Socialist-Liberal coalition promised that a reform project that 
would find the support of the government would not be derailed in the parliamentary 
stage. In contrast to the MDF-led government, the new government had more than a 
two thirds majority in parliament. Moreover, in contrast to the experience of the 1992 
Civil Service Act, it seemed unlikely that parts of the parliamentary factions of the 
governing coalition would threaten to defect in parliamentary voting, although the 
MSZP consisted of several, very different factions.
However, although at first glance the formation of the Socialist-Liberal coalition 
promised generally favourable conditions for the successful completion of the civil 
service reform project, the investiture of the new government also sent several quite
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ambiguous signals to the Government Commissioner and his staff. Verebelyi could 
somewhat hope that the electoral campaign of the MSZP would positively feed back 
into the reform of the civil service. In the 1994 elections the MSZP managed to 
become the largest party with the slogan 'Let Competence Govern', which suggested 
that institutional reforms aiming at the professionalisation of the bureaucracy would 
be welcome. On the other hand, however, we argued in Chapter 6 that the MSZP's 
promise to establish a 'government by experts' meant in practice the replacement of 
Antall's senior bureaucrats and the partial return of senior officials who had already 
served the Nemeth government. Hence, the large-scale turnover of senior personnel 
created suspicion as to whether a stabilisation and a de-politicisation of the top 
administrative ranks would be a realistic scenario for the future. The personnel policy 
strategy of the SZDSZ and its ministers was similarly ambiguous. The SZDSZ stood 
for a policy that the professional leadership of the ministries should be respected. 
While Minister of Transport Lotz and Interior Minister Kuncze pursued this policy, 
Culture and Education Minister Fodor replaced the entire set of state secretaries in 
his ministry. As a result, the general SZDSZ position as a governing party appears to 
be favourable in a coalition with the MSZP, but the personnel policy strategy of its 
Ministers partially contradicted these plans.
Apart from the ambiguous personnel policy strategies of the new governing parties, 
the main point of concern for the Government Commissioner was the lack of a clear 
interest in civil service reform. In contrast to the MDF-led government and in 
particular the first Prime Minister Antall, neither the MSZP, the SZDSZ nor any of 
their leading politicians were strongly committed to civil service reform. The only 
points of connection between the government programme and civil service reform 
could be found in the ambition of the new government to enhance the efficiency of 
the public administration and the goal to establish a closer co-operation between 
government and the social interest representing groups in policy-making and 
implementation. However, the goal to increase government efficiency was mainly a 
product of the neo-liberal-monetarist views of the SZDSZ and the liberal- 
technocratic wing in the MSZP who sought to slim down the state and to reduce the 
costs of government operation while enhancing the quality of government output.
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Hence, it was doubtful to what extent costly reform elements would find the support 
of the coalition.
By contrast, the goal to improve the co-operation between government and interest 
groups was well suited to (re-)elevate the status of the civil service unions in public 
administration policy, in particular, personnel management. For instance, in 1993, 
Verebelyi had already successfully gained the backing of the Government for an 
informal co-operation between the Government and the civil service unions which 
provided a starting point for the formalisation of civil service union participation in 
administrative policy-making. Moreover, the close connection between the civil 
service unions and the 'popular-left wing' of the MSZP promised to create some 
leverage upon the government to complete the modernisation of the civil service and 
to adjust civil service pay levels to the private sector, although at that time it was the 
liberal-technocratic wing that was in a stronger position within the MSZP. The 
resulting key problem for the successful completion of the civil service reform 
project was the lack of explicit interest of the governing parties and any of its leading 
politicians in civil service reform. As a consequence, Verebelyi's goal to complete the 
civil service reform along the lines discussed since the late 1980s was dependent on 
his ability to create a political interest in civil service reform and to build political 
support for his plans in the government coalition.
2.4 Linking Senior Civil Service Reform and the Co-ordination Capacity 
of Government
Verebelyi found the solution in linking civil service reform and in particular senior 
civil service reform to one of the other items on the reform agenda: the goal to 
enhance the co-ordinating capacity of the central government apparatus. Initially, i.e. 
after the Socialist-Liberal government took office, it appeared rather unlikely that 
organisational structures for the improvement of cross-governmental co-ordination 
capacity around the Prime Minister and a strong Prime Minister's Office could easily 
be implemented before the next national elections scheduled for 1998. However, 
during the period of developing the Public Administration Reform Programme, the 
issue of government co-ordination became a problem that had to be dealt with sooner
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rather than later. As a consequence, the prospect of successfully linking civil service 
reform to building governmental co-ordination capacity gradually improved until the 
adoption of the Public Administration Reform Programme as a Government Decree 
in October 1996.
The co-ordination and strategic planning of government policy had been a continuous 
problem since the investiture of the Antall government in the spring of 1990. Until 
the change of regime, the preparation of policy guidelines and the co-ordination of 
government policy was primarily the responsibility of the headquarters of the 
MSZMP, which essentially mirrored the ministerial structure of the central 
government. By contrast, the ministries focused in their work on policy 
implementation. Moreover, the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers merely 
performed a secretarial or administrative role for the government as a whole and 
hence was neither a major co-ordinating structure nor a support structure for the 
Prime Minister to engage in strategic planning of government policy. As a 
consequence, the headquarters of the MSZMP provided the integrating force of 
government operations.
During the Round Table Talks, the parties of the democratic opposition unanimously 
rejected the monocratic socialist style in favour of a more collegial and collective 
style of executive governance. Initially, this perspective was reflected in the first 
wave of constitutional changes in the autumn of 1989 when much emphasis was put 
on cabinet government and ministerial responsibility as opposed to prime ministerial 
government. As discussed in the last Chapter, the second wave of constitutional 
changes enacted in May 1990 already created the institutional conditions for a 
German style 'Chancellor democracy', in particular through the introduction of the 
constructive vote of no-confidence. Moreover, the Government reduced the number 
of ministries by means of different kinds of re-organisation, but at the same time, 
Antall also set off a quasi-centralisation of the government despite his initial support 
for collegiality. Agh (2002: 12-13) notes that "the reduction of the number of the 
ministries is somewhat misleading, since it has been compensated with the increasing 
number of ministries of other kinds [located in the Prime Minister's Office as units 
under the responsibility of Ministers without Portfolio]. Also the number of Political
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State Secretaries - and other high officials - tended to increase in the PMO [i.e. the 
Prime Minister's Office] and in most cases they turned to be more influential and 
important decision-makers than the ministers themselves". As a consequence, the 
early Antall years witnessed a centralisation of government functions, but they did 
not create conditions for effective co-ordination nor for the strategic planning of 
government policy.73
Although the tendency towards government fragmentation was known to the 
governing parties MSZP and SZDSZ in 1994, the new government did initially not 
take any steps towards building a centre for strategic policy planning and co­
ordination around a strong Prime Minister and a supporting Prime Minister's Office. 
Rather, it opted for a "weak prime minister with a strong team" (Lengyel 1995: 47). 
Firstly, both the MSZP and the SZDSZ had publicly rejected the central executive 
governance structures established by Antall. Instead, they had promised to return to a 
more collegial style of governing based in particular on the idea of 'government by 
experts'. Secondly, Prime Minister Horn was the pivotal figure in the MSZP at that 
time as much as he was merely a compromise candidate for the Prime Ministership. 
Hence, Horn did not have the power to dominate other power centres within the 
MSZP.
After its transformation in 1989 and its 'partial consolidation' (Agh 1995) during the 
First Parliament, the MSZP had maintained a comparably large national organisation 
and a disciplined membership, but also retained a diverse set of interests under its 
roof. Among the most relevant factions, the 'radical modernisers' around Finance 
Minister Laszlo Bekesi mainly advocated neo-liberal monetarist policies and 
represented the business elite of Hungarian and international companies within the 
MSZP. This group was much closer to the SZDSZ in economic policy terms than to 
the 'popular left' wing of the MSZP around Sandor Nagy, which represented more 
traditional social and economic policies and maintained close contacts to the trade
73 For instance, the establishment of an Economic Policy unit in July 1990 headed by the Political 
State Secretary Matolcsy led to continuous conflict with the Minister o f Finance Rabar and his 
successor Kupa until the dissolution of the unit and the dismissal o f Matcolcsy at the end of 1991. 
Furthermore, the disintegration of the governing parties MDF and FKGP since 1992 and later the 
illness of Prime Minister Antall further weakened the coherence of government operations.
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unions. Although the third group of 'nationalist left' interests that had formerly been 
organised around Imre Pozsgay and Matyas Szuros had lost much of its influence 
after 1990, it remained a power centre that could not entirely be ignored by the party 
leadership. Since his election as President of the MSZP in 1990, Horn had held a 
pivotal position within the MSZP because he was able to balance the two most 
important groups with the MSZP, the liberal-technocratic and popular left wing.
Moreover, Horn was able to bridge the division between the popular left wing of the 
MSZP and the liberal SZDSZ. For the MSZP, it was beneficial to enter an oversized 
coalition with the SZDSZ, although it had gained an absolute majority of seats in 
parliament. Firstly, the MSZP had only won one third of the popular vote. Secondly it 
needed the participation of the SZDSZ as one of the key parties of the democratic 
opposition in order to gain credibility in the national and international political field 
as a recognised and fully transformed party that had emerged from the former 
socialist state party. Thirdly, the liberal technocrats of the MSZP pressed for a 
coalition with the SZDSZ in order to strengthen their political weight in the 
government (Bozoki 1997: 82). However, in order to avoid becoming a passenger in 
a car driven by the MSZP, the SZDSZ demanded procedural and programmatic 
guarantees from the MSZP in exchange for entering a government coalition. To this 
end, the two parties set up the Coalition Council for Mutual Agreement, which aimed 
at smoothing out political and policy differences and effectively formalised a veto- 
power for the SZDSZ inside government. Moreover, the Minister of Interior Kuncze 
became officially the Deputy Prime Minister rather than Finance Minister Bekesi 
(Racz/Kukorelli 1995). Therefore, at the time when the Socialist-Liberal government 
took office in 1994, Verebelyi had the clear support of Prime Minister Horn to set up 
a strong centre of government around the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's 
Office, but the MSZP internal dynamics and the coalition constellation essentially 
prevented its potential establishment in the short run.
However, during the first one and a half years in office, it became obvious that the 
postponement of tackling the problem of co-ordinating government policy may lead 
to co-ordination failures of the government. Although different power centres existed 
(and competed) within the government and within the parliamentary factions of the
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governing parties, the governing parties were much better able to deal with their 
political differences than with the more administrative co-ordination of government 
policy. For instance, Agh (1996: 23-25) argues for the years 1994 and 1995 that 
"conflicts did not necessarily originate in political or personnel debates between the 
coalition partners, but simply sprang from the difficulty in governmental structures 
and from lack of co-ordination" (my emphasis). As a consequence, the establishment 
of an institutional structure capable of co-ordinating government policy became a far 
more salient issue on the administrative reform agenda than initially anticipated.
Moreover, during the government's term in office, Prime Minister Horn gradually 
strengthened his power position in the government. Firstly, during the first six 
months in office, the government witnessed a continuous power struggles between 
Horn and Bekesi. After the resignation of Bekesi in February 1995, Horn appointed 
Bokros as Finance Minister. In contrast to Bekesi, Bokros had no strong power basis 
within the MSZP and hence was more dependent on Prime Minister Horn 
(Greskovits 2001). Moreover, the implementation of the Bokros austerity programme 
increased the loyalty of the SZDSZ to the government, as Prime Minister Horn 
successfully played the role of keeping in check the popular-left wing of the MSZP 
while backing liberal economic policies advocated by the SZDSZ. Hence, in addition 
to the substantial problem of co-ordinating government policy, Verebelyi could also 
rely on the strengthened political role of Prime Minister Horn.
Accordingly, in the negotiations with other ministries and members of the governing 
parties Government Commissioner Verebelyi began to explore to what extent the role 
of the Prime Minister in Government could be strengthened and to what extent the 
Prime Minister's Office could be transformed into a strong German-type Chancellery. 
To this end, he discussed in particular the suitability of setting up a prime ministerial 
cabinet in the Prime Minister's Office to perform strategic planning functions. 
Moreover, he explored the option of establishing ministries' desks that mirror the 
ministerial structure in order to enhance the co-ordination capacity of the government 
and to appoint a politician in ministerial rank to the apex of the Prime Minister's 
Office. In his negotiations with the line ministries and members of the government, 
the Government Commissioner could gain only partial support for his initial
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propositions. Both the SZDSZ and the line ministerial staff opposed in particular the 
establishment of a mirror structure in the Prime Minister's Office because it would 
raise too many bad memories of the socialist era and would lead to an unnecessary 
duplication of functions in government respectively. Moreover, the SZDSZ indicated 
that it would not support the appointment of a minister as head of the Prime 
Minister's Office. At the same time, members of the government supported the idea 
to set up a prime ministerial cabinet but only to the extent that Ministers may 
themselves set up ministerial cabinets. Hence, they were opposed to exclusively 
strengthening the Prime Minister.
As a result, Verebelyi had the support of Prime Minister Horn to centralise the co­
ordination of government policy in order to enhance executive capacity. However, 
the coalition arithmetic and the institutional self-interest of line ministries only 
allowed him to propose merely a partial centralisation of government operations 
around the Prime Minister and a strong supporting Prime Minister's Office. As a 
result, the Public Administration Reform Programme eventually incorporated several 
measures that fostered a 'gradual' centralisation of government co-ordination in the 
Prime Minister's Office. The establishment of a mirror structure in the Prime 
Minister's Office was rejected, but the Prime Minister was given the opportunity to 
further strengthen the units that deal with cross-governmental policy co-ordination, 
and to set up a cabinet for the sake of improving strategic planning and providing 
advice to the Prime Minister. Moreover, the idea of appointing a Minister as the head 
of the Prime Minister's Office was incorporated into the Reform Programme as an 
option to be explored further, that is, in practice, discussion was postponed until the 
preparation of legislation could begin. At the same time, the Reform Programme 
included the ministers' right to appoint a small number of advisors who would have a 
separate legal status as members of ministerial cabinets and were appointed for only 
as long as the Minister was in office.
However, the failure to gain full support for the institutionalisation of prime 
ministerial government around a strong Prime Minister's Office also provided 
Verebelyi with an opportunity to build a bridge between the problems of government 
co-ordination and civil service reform in particular senior civil service reform.
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Instead of establishing organisational structures that reflect the strong role of the 
Prime Minister, Verebelyi suggested the enhanced involvement of the Prime Minister 
and the Prime Minister's Office in appointing, dismissing and providing further 
training for senior civil servants and state secretaries in order to enhance the 
governmental unity of the senior civil service and to reduce the inclination of senior 
ministerial officials towards sectoral separatism. A senior civil service under the 
leadership of the Prime Minister was considered to provide the necessary glue for 
executive governance that had been missing since that transition to democracy in 
1990. At the same time, Verebelyi could expect that the solution to centralise senior 
civil service management will raise the interest of Prime Minister Horn in supporting 
his civil service reform plans, in particular the professionalisation and the de­
politicisation of the senior civil service.
Based on his experience during the Antall government, Verebelyi assumed that it was 
beneficial for the professionalisation of the senior civil service, if the authority over 
senior personnel policy was vested in the Prime Minister. When Antall was Prime 
Minister, he had consistently advocated a separation between the political and the 
professional leadership of the ministries. Hence, the assumption was that because the 
Prime Minister is constitutionally responsible for the government as a whole, he 
would be inclined to advocate the de-politicisation of the managing civil service in 
order to enhance its position as a staff of experts that guarantees well-informed 
policies. By contrast, for Ministers the assumption was that they tended to strive for 
ministerial autonomy and that they could enhance their autonomy by using their 
political discretion over senior personnel policy. Hence, political discretion in the 
hands of ministers would inevitably create pressures towards politicisation, in 
particular under conditions of coalition government. Therefore, Verebelyi essentially 
made up a package that sought to link the centralisation of government co-ordination 
to the reform of the managing ranks of the civil service. This in turn did provoke 
some interest of Prime Minister Horn who supported the reform of the managing 
civil service as a component of centralising government affairs more generally. At 
the same time, there was considerably more uncertainty as to whether the loyalty of 
the SZDSZ to the Prime Minister Horn would go sufficiently far to endorse this 
alternative mechanism of government centralisation.
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In addition, Verebelyi was well aware that an assignment of discretion over senior 
personnel policy to the Prime Minister was insufficient to guarantee the 
professionalisation and the de-politicisation of the managing civil service. Verebelyi 
therefore incorporated measures into the Public Administration Reform Programme, 
which he had already personally promoted during the first civil service reform and 
which sought to de-politicise personnel policy. Firstly, he revived the proposal to 
establish a ’Public Administration and Civil Service Commission'. In contrast to the 
original concept proposed in 1990 that such Commission would be headed by the 
Minister of Interior, the Public Administration Reform Programme suggested that the 
Prime Minister on behalf of the Government should formally preside over the 
Commission, whereas the Ministry of Interior should exercise secretarial tasks only. 
Moreover, the tasks of the Commission would concern primarily the senior civil 
servants and state secretaries, that is, their appointment, transfer and dismissal, as 
well as their training obligations. By contrast, line ministries would retain authority 
to manage all other civil servants, i.e. non-managing civil servants, though with the 
support of the Ministry of Interior.
Secondly, in addition to the establishment of ministerial cabinets, Verebelyi included 
a number of proposals to take into account the increased need for political control by 
ministers and the possibility to de-politicise personnel policy by means of functional 
re-organisation. For instance, the Reform Programme suggested that the political role 
of the Political State Secretary should be strengthened and that the appointment of 
more than just one Political State Secretary per ministry should be considered. By 
contrast, Administrative State Secretaries should be enjoined from speaking in 
government meetings on behalf of the Minister and their role in elaborating 
ministerial policy should be scaled down. Rather, Administrative State Secretaries 
should emphasise the co-ordination of Ministers' sectoral policy and the senior level 
control of generic administrative tasks that support the professional organisation of 
the ministry. The Reform Programme also suggested that the position of Deputy State 
Secretary should be eliminated and that larger ministerial departments of a 
Directorate General kind should be established instead. In connection to this point, 
the Government Commissioner proposed that new Heads of Department or Heads
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Directorates General should be recruited by means of a formalised procedure and 
open competition. They should eventually be appointed for a fixed term that exceeds 
the governments1 term and should only be dismissed in exceptional cases. Finally, 
Verebelyi suggested in the Reform Programme the introduction of a stand-by clause 
for senior personnel whose appointment had been revoked. This kind of reserve 
system should be administered by the Prime Minister’s Office and would grant 
managing civil servants continuous pay for one year after their dismissal unless a 
new position had been found for them. If, by contrast, no alternative position can be 
found for the candidate, he or she should receive a severance pay when dismissed 
from the civil service.
Verebelyi took the propositions for the reform of the managing civil service as a 
basis for the completion of wider civil service reform and the correction of 
dysfunctional developments that had become apparent over the previous years. 
Firstly, with respect to the allocation system, the Reform Programme suggested to 
apply basically the same principles that were proposed for the senior civil service. 
Hence, recruitment should be formalised to allow open competition for entry into the 
civil service and a new classification system and a revised performance appraisal 
should enhance the career prospects of young entries and well performing civil 
servants. Moreover, dismissal of civil servants should be restricted further, dismissed 
candidates should be held in a stand-by position for at least one year and if no 
position could be found for them, they should receive severance pay like senior civil 
servants and state secretaries. Secondly, with respect to the problem of low 
remuneration levels, the Reform Programme proposed to use the savings derived 
from the staff reductions of 17.2% that were part of the Bokros austerity plan 
implemented in the 1995 Budget Act for an increase of civil servants' wages. Hence, 
rather than making entirely new resources available for the increase of civil servants' 
wages, the Reform Programme suggested an implicit reshuffling of budgetary 
resources, i.e. to use the savings from a large scale work force cut.
Finally, in combination with the wage increases, it was suggested for the reform of 
the remuneration system to modify (and simplify) the classification system and to 
increase the compression ratio between higher and lower ranks in order to enhance
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the incentives for young entrants and for managing civil servants. Moreover, the 
reform programme proposed to introduce a performance related bonus pay of +/-20% 
for senior civil servants and state secretaries. This measure was proposed both in 
order to be able to pay competitive wages to managing civil servants and in order to 
take into account the position of the SZDSZ and the liberal-technocratic wing of the 
MSZP. Similarly, in order to strengthen performance incentives for non-managing 
civil servants, the reform programme suggested to establish additional honorary titles 
for well performing civil servants. Finally, the reform programme suggested to 
incorporate the 1993 agreement between the Government and civil service unions 
over mechanisms of interest reconciliation and participation in administrative policy­
making. Hence, the reform programme also sought to take into account the position 
of the popular-left wing of the MSZP.
As a result, from the perspective of members of the government and top civil 
servants, the Public Administration Reform Programme essentially offered a 
compromise involving the centralisation of government co-ordination and the de­
politicisation of senior personnel policy. However, the connection between the issues 
of government co-ordination and senior civil service reform can be well understood 
as the outcome of the failure to find support for a straight forward centralisation of 
government co-ordination around the Prime Minister and a strong Prime Minister's 
Office as well as the need to build political, in particular, prime ministerial support 
for the reform of the senior civil service. As a result, for the adoption of the package 
in the Reform Programme by the Government, the office of the Government 
Commissioner was essentially counting on the interest and support of Prime Minister 
Horn. Prime ministerial support was also considered as crucial for the overall success 
of the civil service reform proposal because Verebelyi was aware that the government 
internal support of the SZDSZ was limited and that the reluctance of the line 
ministries to endorse a centralisation of government affairs had the potential to derail 
the reform plans.74
74 Verebelyi certainly expected that the implementation of some of the propositions made in the 
Reform Programme would take until after the next national elections scheduled for spring 1998. For 
instance, it was not expected that the reorganisation of ministerial departments into large Directorates 
General and hence the abolishment of the position of Deputy State Secretary would be realised before 
the upcoming elections.
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Verebelyi presented the Reform Programme eventually as a coherent conceptual 
approach to the Government including the aspects that were surrounded by 
considerable uncertainty as regards their political support. However, at the 
government level, there was in fact no debate about the Reform Programme before 
the adoption of the Reform Programme as a Government Decree in October 1996. 
Rather, the adoption was merely a formality that sought to delegate the tasks for the 
realisation of the draft amendments of the respective Acts to the different line 
ministries. Hence, at the time of accepting the Reform Programme, it was already 
clear that the negotiations of the civil service reform would continue and that the key 
decisions had not been taken but were still lying ahead. However, despite the 
existence of obstacles and the nature of the Reform Programme as a mere guideline 
document, Verebelyi expected that at least the legal basis for the reform of the civil 
service would be established before the elections in 1998.
3. Getting Stuck: The Failure to Pass the Civil Service Reform before 
the Upcoming Elections
The Government Decree delegated the tasks for the preparation of the draft Acts to 
the line ministries in accordance with the formal division of competencies at central 
government level. The preparation of the revision of the Act State Secretaries 
including the preparation of Government Decisions for the re-organisation of the 
Prime Minister's Office was assigned to the Ministry of Justice and the Prime 
Minister's Office. By contrast, the preparation of the amendment of the Civil Service 
Act was delegated to the Civil Service Department in the Ministry of Interior, though 
in consultation with the Prime Minister's Office. Hence, after the development of the 
Reform Programme, the role of the Government Commissioner in realising the 
revision of civil service legislation was effectively downgraded to one of consultation 
and advice to the responsible ministries on the basis of the Public Administration 
Reform Programme.
Both Acts were submitted to Parliament in the spring of 1997. The Act on the Legal 
Status of Members of the Government and State Secretaries was adopted in June
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1997, the amendment to the Civil Service Act was passed in October 1997, i.e. one 
year after the passing of the Government Decree by the Government. The 
negotiations over the final shape of the draft Acts took exclusively place inside the 
Government. Notwithstanding the rejection of the draft Acts by the opposition 
parties, the parliamentary factions did - in accordance with the original expectation - 
not pose an additional obstacle to pass the reform. However, neither of the two Acts 
met the high expectations that had been raised in the Public Administration Reform 
Programme. The Act on the Legal Status of Members of the Government and State 
Secretaries hardly changed the institutional basis of allocating state secretaries to the 
ministerial organisation. By contrast, the 1997 amendment Civil Service Act 
introduced a few changes to both the remuneration and the allocation system 
established in 1992. These legal changes did not decease the degree of formal 
political discretion and hence did not alter ministers' possibilities to interfere into 
personnel policy. As a consequence, the 1997 civil service reform is usually regarded 
as a reform failure because the reform legislation introduced only minor changes, 
although a coherent and far-reaching reform programme had been designed.
The failure to reform the civil service was the result of both a political and 
administrative co-ordination failure at the central government level and a growing 
disinterest of the key actors in a radical reform with de-politicising effects. This 
failure occurred in the context of an anticipated election victory of the MSZP in the 
year before the 1998 national elections and a gradual weakening of the SZDSZ, 
which threatened its political survival. As a result, both governing parties, their 
Ministers, senior bureaucrats who had been brought (back) into the administration 
since 1994, and the staff of the Ministry of Interior, i.e. key actors of civil service 
reform, either became opponents of Verebelyi's Reform Programme or their 
disinterest in reform was reinforced. By contrast, Verebelyi and his Deputy Balasz 
essentially became the last and only proponents of a reform (they had themselves 
proposed), but they were lacking the capacity to influence the reform of the civil 
service towards their desired direction. Consequently, although revised civil service 
legislation was adopted in 1997, few of the propositions raised in the Reform 
Programme found their way into the Acts.
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3.1. The Changing Balance of Power within the Coalition after Autumn 
1996
The adoption of the Public Administration Reform Programme as a Government 
Decree in October 1996 more or less coincides with the beginning of the gradual loss 
of popularity of the SZDSZ until the national elections in April 1998. Conversely, 
during the same period, the MSZP continuously rose on the popularity scale and, by 
the autumn of 1997, it could reasonably expect to win an absolute majority at the 
1998 national elections. Moreover, the period from the autumn of 1996 until the 
spring of 1998 witnessed the increasing political weakening of the President of the 
SZDSZ and Minister of Interior Kuncze and the parallel strengthening of the 
President of the MSZP and Prime Minister Horn within the MSZP and the coalition. 
As a consequence, the change in the balance of power within the coalition and the 
closeness of the national elections affected both the coalition dynamics and the 
strategies of the relevant civil service reform players.
As indicated above, in 1994, Horn was rather a compromise candidate for the Prime 
Ministership than a dominating force within the MSZP and the coalition. He could 
strengthen his position when the first Finance Minister Bekesi was replaced by 
Bokros. Moreover, the implementation of the Bokros Package in 1995 increased the 
loyalty of the SZDSZ to Prime Minister Horn because Horn appeared to guarantee 
that the popular left wing of the MSZP could be held in check. However, the 
spectacular weakening of the SZDSZ was set off in autumn 1996 as a result of 
political scandals and concerns over public safety. Firstly, in September 1996, the so- 
called Tocsik scandal was revealed, which accused the governing parties of 
channelling large sums of success fees in the privatisation process to its own 
supporters. Moreover, in the case of the Tocsik scandal, the governing parties were 
blamed of having received large donations out of the success fees that were paid to 
the Tocsik law firm for brokering a privatisation deal between a local government 
entity and a private firm. Because these allegations were mainly directed at the 
SZDSZ, the SZDSZ faced increasing difficulties to maintain its credibility in the eyes 
of the electorate.
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Secondly, in November 1996, the leadership of the National Police and the 
headquarters of several cities including Budapest were dismissed as a result of a 
growing number of street murders and bomb assassinations. Agh (1997b: 25) argues 
that "the low level of public safety had a negative impact on the public mood and on 
the evaluation of government performance". Although the personnel changes in 
November 1996 aimed at demonstrating a commitment to improving the state of 
domestic security, it was again the SZDSZ, in particular Minister Kuncze, who was 
blamed for the failure to provide public safety because police affairs were lying 
within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. As a consequence, both the Tocsik 
scandal and the salience of public safety issue reduced the popularity of the 
government. However, it was in particular the SZDSZ that lost credibility in the eyes 
of the electorate. By contrast, the MSZP was better able to diffuse the criticisms and 
instead to claim credit for the economic situation which gradually improved since the 
middle of 1996 and especially in 1997.
The weakness of the SZDSZ and the rise of the MSZP are well illustrated in the 
public opinion polls of the period from summer 1996 until the eve of the national 
elections in April 1998. During 1996, the SZDSZ fell from 10-12% at the beginning 
of the year to 7-8% at the end of 1996. From the beginning of 1997 until the elections 
in 1998, the SZDSZ continuously hovered at 5-6% in the popularity index. As a 
result, the SZDSZ was seriously beginning to fight for political survival from the 
beginning of 1997 onwards, as it was threatened not to pass 5% threshold that is 
necessary to gain parliamentary representation. By contrast, the MSZP fell from 18- 
19% at the beginning of the 1996 to 12% at the beginning of 1997. However, from 
the spring 1997 until the elections in April 1998, the MSZP climbed gradually to 21- 
22% in the popularity index (Zavecz 1997, 1998, 1999). During the whole period, 
roughly 40-50% of the voters remained undecided and hence, the MSZP was 
enjoying the support of approximately 40% of the decided voters and managed to 
overtake both the FKGP and the Fidesz in the public opinion surveys. Taking also 
into account the mixed electoral system in Hungary, which strongly favours the large 
parties, the MSZP could reasonably expect to win the national elections in April 
1998 and possibly to even win an absolute majority of seats in parliament. As a
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consequence, the MSZP appeared to become gradually less dependent upon the 
continuation of a coalition with the SZDSZ after the 1998 elections. Although both 
parties indicated early that they considered the other party as a potential coalition 
partner, "it [was] certainly not a favourable perspective for the SZDSZ that the MSZP 
could achieve an absolute majority by itself in 1998" (Agh 1998: 23).
The change in the balance of power within the coalition and between the Presidents 
of the two governing parties, Horn and Kuncze, fed back into the political and 
administrative operations of the government and affected the strategies of the 
relevant players of the civil service reform game. Firstly, the attempt to increase civil 
servants' wages was essentially vetoed by the SZDSZ, though with the tacit support 
of the liberal-technocratic wing of the MSZP. Secondly, the partial centralisation of 
government co-ordination was either rejected by the SZDSZ who enjoyed the support 
of the line ministries, or a postponement of institutional reform was agreed. Thirdly, 
the proposed reform of both the civil service system proper met the combined 
opposition-cum-disinterest of Prime Minister Horn, the Ministers of both governing 
parties, a sizeable group of senior bureaucrats, and the Civil Service Department. As 
a consequence, the Act on the Legal Status of Members of the Government and State 
Secretaries as well as the amendment of the Civil Service Act incorporated only a 
lowest common denominator outcome that reflects the intersection of the interests 
and strategies that prevailed in 1997 among the relevant civil service reform players.
3.2. The Failure to Agree an Increase of Civil Servants' Wages
The attempt to increase civil servants' wage levels was essentially vetoed by the 
SZDSZ and the liberal-technocratic wing of the MSZP, in particular the political 
leadership and the senior bureaucrats of the economics ministries. As a radical-liberal 
party, the SZDSZ was ideologically strongly committed to downsizing the public 
sector, reducing tax burdens, maintaining budgetary stability, and increasing the cost 
efficiency of the public sector. As a consequence of this position, the SZDSZ did not 
endorse the reshuffling of savings resulting from the 1995 Bokros austerity
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programme as suggested in the Reform Programme in order to increase civil servants'
75wages.
Moreover, the civil service did not belong to electoral strongholds of the SZDSZ 
either. Hence, the SZDSZ did not feel any specific electoral commitment to increase 
the wages of civil servants. Instead, the SZDSZ leadership considered it a matter of 
principle that, in a context of its severe political weakness, it must signal to the 
electorate that the course of restrictive economic policy will be retained. Therefore, it 
propagated that the savings of the Bokros austerity programme should be passed on 
to the citizen taxpayers rather than increasing wages in the public sector. The MSZP 
did in fact not explicitly argue against or in favour of wage increases because the 
MSZP was itself divided over the issue. On the one hand, the liberal-technocratic 
wing within the MSZP and in particular the political leadership and the top 
bureaucrats of the Ministry of Finance supported the SZDSZ position. Moreover, 
they feared together with the SZDSZ that an increase of public sector employees' 
wages more generally would signal the abandonment of a policy of budgetary 
discipline before the elections, which had just been put in place in 1995.
At the same time, it was consensus among the officials of the economics ministries 
that the wage levels of senior civil servants and state secretaries needed to be raised 
in order to reduce the growing gap between top civil servants' pay and pay in the 
private sector. On the other hand, both civil servants' wage increases and an enhanced 
participation of civil service unions in administrative policy-making were important 
issues for the popular-left wing of the MSZP. However, as discussed above, the 
formation of a coalition with the SZDSZ had strengthened the liberal-technocratic 
wing within the MSZP at the expense of the popular-left wing. As a consequence, the 
SZDSZ and the liberal-technocratic wing within the MSZP were able to prevent the
75 The so-called Bokros Package, that is, the revised 1995 Budget Act, was effectively a belated shock 
therapy to manage the transformation of the Hungarian economy, in particular, to restore macro- 
economic and budget balance and to regain the confidence of the international financial markets. As a 
result of the implemented budget cuts, the economy stagnated for nearly one year, inflation rose and 
real wages fell by 12% within one year.
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reshuffling of budgetary resources before the national elections for the sake of
Hfincreasing civil servants' wages.
3.3. The Failure to Agree the Reform of the Central Government 
Apparatus
Like the attempt to increase civil servants’ wage levels, the changing balance of 
power within the coalition and the expected outcomes of the approaching elections 
fed back into the negotiations of the partial centralisation of government co­
ordination. As the junior partner of the MSZP in an oversized government coalition, 
the SZDSZ maintained its original position and hence had no interest in supporting a 
centralisation of government co-ordination and an exclusive strengthening of 
strategic planning capacity in the Prime Minister's Office. Rather, the SZDSZ sought 
to keep procedural guarantees in the government coalition to prevent the dominance 
of the MSZP. Moreover, as a result of the decline in popularity, the SZDSZ 
interpreted any reforms that imply the centralisation of government affairs as a sign 
of political weakness.
By contrast, Prime Minister Horn and the MSZP more generally had lost their 
interest in looking for major compromises with the SZDSZ. Rather, they anticipated 
an electoral victory in 1998 and hence were willing to postpone major reform 
activities until after the elections. Finally, both the MSZP and the SZDSZ were aware 
that the proposition to centralise the co-ordination of government policy was 
contested within the administration, i.e. in particular the line ministerial staff disliked
76 Moreover, the MSZP did not link the negotiations during 1997 to a promise to raise civil servants' 
wages after the elections in spring 1998. Instead, the MSZP convened an informal meeting of two of 
its Political State Secretaries with leaders of the civil service unions at the end of 1997 shortly after the 
Civil Service Act had been passed and declared again that because the budgetary situation has not yet 
sufficiently stabilised since the 1995 Bokros package, no wage increases can be offered or promised to 
the civil service before the elections in 1998. At the same time, the two Political State Secretaries 
urged the civil service unions to support the MSZP at the elections. This peculiar strategy of non­
commitment plus gentle pressure can be explained with reference to the opinion polls that gave the 
MSZP a comfortable lead at the turn of 1997/98. In other words, the MSZP expected either that the 
average civil servant tends to be loyal MSZP voters or that it would not be dependent upon the civil 
service vote in the 1998 elections. In the hindsight, observers of the 1997/98 period argued that the 
failure to at least promise an improvement of public sector employees' including civil servants' wage 
levels and working conditions cost the MSZP around 100.000 votes. Given the outcome of the 1998 
elections, this strategy was among the decisive campaign failures of the MSZP.
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the prospect of a strengthened Prime Minister's Office. Hence, the SZDSZ enjoyed 
some tacit support from the administration in its opposition to the centralisation plans 
suggested in the Reform Programme, whereas it would not have been beneficial for 
the MSZP to initiate controversial discussions under the present coalition 
constellation.
As a result, the negotiations over the reform of the system of executive governance 
led either to the postponement of reform activities or to the rejection of proposals by 
the SZDSZ. Firstly, as indicated above, the attempt to establish a mirror structure of 
the ministries with the Prime Minister's Office had already fallen in the preparatory 
stage of the Public Administration Reform Programme. Secondly, the upgrading of 
the departments in the Prime Minister's Office that deal with cross-governmental co­
ordination could have been implemented on the basis of a Government Decision, and 
hence did not require an Act of Parliament. However, because the SZDSZ recognised 
the need to improve cross-governmental co-ordination capacities, the coalition 
partners agreed that the organisational reforms to enhance government co-ordination 
would be postponed rather than rejected and that alternative mechanisms would be 
explored. Thirdly, for the same reasons, the ministers and the parliamentary 
leadership of the SZDSZ rejected the proposal to shift powers to appoint, transfer and 
dismiss senior civil servants to the Prime Minister and to assign senior personnel 
management functions to the Prime Minister's Office. In all three cases, the SZDSZ 
leadership could rely on the tacit co-operation of the line ministries, which sought to 
prevent a shift of power to the Prime Minister's Office.
Fourthly, the coalition partners agreed a compromise over the suggestion to appoint a 
Minister as head of the Prime Minister's Office. The SZDSZ accepted that the 
possibility to appoint a politician in ministerial rank to the Prime Minister's Office 
should be incorporated into the legislation, but it was agreed that the status quo 
would not be changed at least until after the 1998 elections. Hence, the Prime 
Minister' Office would continue to be led by an Administrative State Secretary. Apart 
from her reluctance to allow an accumulation of government power around the Prime 
Minister, the SZDSZ also rejected the consequences of adding another MSZP 
minister with voting rights to the cabinet. Finally, the line ministers and the Prime
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Minister followed the compromise solution over the establishment of cabinet 
structures in the Prime Minister's Office and the line ministries that was suggested in 
the Reform Programme. Hence, on the one hand, the Prime Minister was given 
improved resources to plan government-wide policy and, on the other, the line 
Ministers were granted the right to set up ministerial cabinets to enhance the planning 
and co-ordination capacities within their own policy sectors. Moreover, a 
compromise was reached that the number of (prime)ministerial cabinet members 
would be determined in a Government Decree and that the Prime Minister would be 
granted the right to appoint twice as many cabinet advisors as the line ministers.
As a consequence, the package over the reform of the system of executive 
governance and senior civil service reform proposed by Verebelyi in the Reform 
Programme quickly unravelled during the preparation of the draft legislation. 
Moreover, the failure to reach an agreement over the problem of government co­
ordination combined with the expected victory at the national elections virtually 
eliminated Prime Minister Horn's interest in pushing civil service reform efforts in 
the short term. Hence, the political conditions for the completion of civil service 
reform had reverted back to the status quo ante, i.e. the period after the 1994 
elections when Verebelyi had identified the key obstacle to successful reform in the 
lack of political interest of the governing parties and any leading politician. However, 
although the centralisation of the senior personnel policy had become an important 
component of government reform more generally, it would be wrong to argue that, 
after the adoption of the Government Decree, the success of civil service reform 
hinged exclusively upon the establishment of a senior executive service managed 
from the Prime Minister's Office. Rather, the failure to gain support for the 
centralisation of senior personnel policy contributed to Prime Minister Horn's 
growing disinterest in civil service reform issues. After the adoption of the 
Government Decree, the preparatory process inside government had been set off and 
hence the drafting of legislation on the basis of the Reform Programme had already 
been delegated to the line ministries. Thus, despite the absence of prime ministerial 
interest in the issue, there was still a reasonable expectation that the government 
would be able to submit a far-reaching reform proposal on the basis of the principles 
of professionalisation and stabilisation to parliamentary voting before the 1998
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elections. Moreover, as argued above, the MSZP claimed that it had set up a 
'government by experts' after taking office in 1994. Correspondingly, MSZP 
Ministers had appointed 'their experts' to the top positions in the ministries, many of 
whom had already held high-ranking posts before 1990/91. In principle, the MSZP 
was therefore in the luxurious position that - in accordance with the Reform 
Programme - it could stabilise a professional civil service by adopting civil service 
legislation that would protect senior civil servants and state secretaries from 
dismissal on political grounds.
3.4. The Politics of Disinterest: The Failure to Co-ordinate the Civil 
Service Reform
Although the general conditions for the realisation of the civil service reform plans 
still appeared somewhat favourable, neither the MSZP nor the SZDSZ nor the top 
bureaucrats pushed during the preparation of the draft Acts for institutional 
arrangements that would have reduced the possibilities of ministers to exercise 
political discretion over the allocation and the remuneration of civil servants, in 
particular managing civil servants. Moreover, the Civil Service Department in the 
Ministry of Interior that was formally responsible for drafting the amendment of the 
Civil Service Act no longer advocated reform measures that would have de­
politicised the personnel policy domain of allocating civil servants to the ministerial 
organisation. Hence, during the negotiations of the 1997 civil service reform, 
Government Commissioner Verebelyi and his Deputy Balasz were effectively 
standing alone in their pursuit of a civil service system that corresponds to a de­
politicised personnel policy regime.
Firstly, apart from the delicate dynamics of the pre-election period, Ministers of both 
parties became gradually less interested in changing the status quo arrangements for 
the allocation of senior civil servants and state secretaries - though for different 
reasons. Especially SZDSZ ministers increasingly shared the perception of Ministers 
during the Antall government that they are overly dependent on the ministerial staff 
in the policy-making process. As discussed in Chapter 6, SZDSZ Ministers were 
lacking both experiences in government and an organisation outside government that
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could support them in their policy-making efforts. At the same time, they were 
continuously struggling to exercise control and political leadership over their 
ministerial staff. Consequently, during their term in office, SZDSZ Ministers became 
gradually less willing to surrender their discretion over senior personnel policy in the 
short term, as a stabilisation of the senior positions would have reinforced their 
dependence on the managing civil servants.
In principle, MSZP Ministers shared the dependence on the senior staff in their 
ministries. However, MSZP Ministers were much less puzzled by this constraint. 
They had the possibility to rely to some extent on the expertise of the organisational 
infrastructure of the Socialist party, they had gained experience in the administration 
or in government before 1990, and they could take advantage of their knowledge of 
the professional community in their policy sector including the ministerial 
bureaucracy. As a consequence, MSZP Ministers had little interest in tying their 
personnel policy hands. Rather, they appreciated the possibility that they could draw 
from the large pool of trusted and known professional inside and outside the 
administration and to pursue a governance strategy of allocating (their) experts to 
established or emerging policy problems rather than allocating policy problems to 
organisational structures in the Ministries. This approach, however, contradicted the 
establishment institutional arrangements that would have restricted the possibility to 
intervene into personnel policy, including the possibility to recruit officials from 
other settings than the ministerial bureaucracy.
The other main reason why the MSZP did not demonstrate any enthusiasm in radical 
reforms lied in the lack of bureaucratic demand to pursue a civil service reform that 
would have de-politicised personnel policy. Although many senior officials who had 
already been in office before and shortly after 1990 had returned in 1994 and 
thereafter, the corps of senior civil servants and state secretaries became gradually 
less cohesive when compared to the time of regime change. Rather, there were at 
least two major groups of senior officials and one minor third group. The senior 
bureaucrats of the first group perceived themselves as professionals, experts and 
clearly as career bureaucrats. This was the group of senior bureaucrats that had stayed 
continuously in office since the late 1980s and hence had served under the Nemeth
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government, the Antall government, and since 1994 under the Horn government. 
Although this group was gradually shrinking during the 1990s as a result of the 
continuous political intervention into personnel policy, especially in the state 
secretary ranks, it remained the largest group of senior officials until the change of 
government in 1998, but it had lost much of the influence it had still wielded in the 
early 1990s. These senior officials held a similar position to senior officials in 
general during the Round Table Talks and in the early days of the Antall government. 
Hence, they clearly supported the proposals made in the Reform Programme because 
the continuous politicisation of personnel policy undermined their prospects for 
career advancement within the administration. At the same time, this group of senior 
officials showed few if any signs of non-co-operation with the Horn government 
given the expectation that a civil service reform was on course, their experience with 
a socialist government from before 1990, and certainly the expectation that the 
MSZP would stay in office after the upcoming national elections.
By contrast, the majority of state secretaries and senior civil servants that was 
appointed after the change in government in 1994 had been in high-ranking 
ministerial positions during the later 1980s and the early days of the Antall 
government. The members of this second group had worked in the private sector or 
academia in the meantime and returned with the MSZP's victory at the 1994 
elections. These new appointees perceived themselves much more as part of the 
government than the civil service. They were no longer career bureaucrats but they 
cannot be considered as partisan convicts either. Rather, they stood in the tradition of 
the Nemeth government considering governing a professional task and not 
necessarily a political task (cf. Sarkozy 1996). From their point of view, the change 
of regime and the period of the centre-right government between 1990 and 1994 
'interrupted' especially the project of rationally and professionally turning around the 
Hungarian economy, as political ideology had 'interfered' with economic policy­
making. Consequently, the returning group of senior officials was committed to the 
MSZP by default, that is, as a response to what they regarded as ideological policy­
making under the Antall government, because a government with the MSZP 
promised that the economic transformation project would be completed (Bozoki 
2001).
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This perspective implied that the group of returning senior officials was not 
committed to the civil service nor was it exclusively committed to the MSZP. They 
were mainly committed to completing the economic transformation project, which 
they had kicked off at the end of the 1980s, and, in the extreme, they would prefer a 
return to the private sector after the completion of their project rather than pursuing a 
career in the administration.77 As a consequence, this group of senior officials had 
relatively little sympathy for the senior civil service reform propositions made by 
Verebelyi in the Reform Programme. Instead, they demanded an adjustment of their 
wage levels to comparable private sector wages in order to retain some incentive to 
work on a project basis for the government though formally as members of the civil 
service. Moreover, they demanded some equivalent to an unemployment insurance or 
a 'project completion reward' in order to bridge the period between a job in 
government and a job in the private sector either because they would have finished 
the project or because they would have had to resign due to the return of a 'non­
professional government'. Hence, although these senior officials were not particularly 
committed to the civil service, they were not entirely indifferent towards its reform. 
On the one hand, they could not gain anything from the establishment of restrictions 
upon career mobility between the government ministries and the private sector, but, 
on the other hand, they favoured some reduction of risk against political dismissal.
In Chapter 6, we discussed the claim that, after 1995/96, the MSZP tended to appoint 
increasingly senior civil servants and state secretaries who were neither career civil 
servants nor project-oriented returnees but who were unambiguously entering the 
administration on an MSZP ticket. This claim has proven difficult to verify by 
assessing state secretaries' career path. Therefore, I will add the incentive structure of 
this group of politically committed senior bureaucrats as a rather hypothetical group. 
The senior officials of this smaller, third group had gathered either no or little
77 This project-based, highly flexible approach to senior personnel policy is well illustrated in the 
appointment of a Deputy State Secretary responsible for the preparation of the health reform in the 
Ministry of Finance in October 1997, i.e. six months before the elections. The appointment was 
explicitly driven by project specific needs, here, the preparation of the health reform for the time after 
the elections. Furthermore, the decision demonstrates the expectation o f the political and professional 
leadership in the Ministry of Finance that they would continue their term after the 1998 elections.
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experience in the administration before 1990, but they had continuously been 
affiliated to the MSZP, for instance, by working directly for the party organisation or 
having held official posts in the former youth organisation of the MSZMP, KISZ. In 
contrast to the former two groups of senior officials, these senior officials considered 
the appointment to managing positions in the ministries as a necessary step in their 
political career. Hence, they could leave their mark in a particular policy area, which 
would eventually benefit their political career prospects. Moreover, they could gain 
some government craft in analogy to the concept of 'political craft' (Goetz 1997), 
which would pay off in later stages of their career, i.e. when they become Political 
State Secretary or Minister. To some extent, this career path had already been visible 
during the Antall government, when several state secretaries took over vacant seats in 
Parliament in 1993 or were elected MP in 1994. As shown in Chapter 6, during the 
Socialist-Liberal coalition there were two examples of Administrative State 
Secretaries who were appointed Minister. Hence, the pace of promotion on this 
career path is not pre-determined. However, like the group of project-oriented 
returnees, the ambitious junior politicians had little interest in Verebelyi's senior civil 
service reform because they preferred wage increases and severance pay instead of a 
stabilisation of their position as career civil servants in government.
As a result, during 1997, a situation was evolving that was characterised by growing 
disinterest of the governing parties and a large proportion of senior bureaucrats in 
supporting Verebelyi's civil service reform plans, especially the stabilisation of the 
senior civil service. This is not to say that Verebelyi's senior civil service reform met 
outright opposition. In principle, the SZDSZ, the MSZP and the diverse group of 
state secretaries and senior civil servants were positive towards a modernisation of 
the civil service including the establishment of a senior civil service that operates on 
the basis of merit. However, this generally positive evaluation of Verebelyi's reform 
proposal contradicted the interests of both the governing parties and parts of the 
senior officials at that particular point in time. It was simply not considered expedient 
for any of the players to go ahead with a kind of senior civil service reform suggested 
by Verebelyi in the Reform Programme. Moreover, the peculiar coalition
Finally, it is a good example for the MSZP's approach to policy-making, i.e. experts are allocated to 
both established or emerging policy problems.
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constellation during the year before the 1998 national elections reinforced the 
impression that the time for a fundamental reform has not come yet.
In this context, also the Civil Service Department in the Ministry of Interior lost its 
enthusiasm to initiate far-reaching changes to the existing civil service system, and 
hence turned from being a proponent of the Reform Programme in principle to an 
opponent in the actual negotiations of the civil service reform Act. Firstly, as a result 
of his political weakness, Interior Minister Kuncze became explicitly defensive in his 
approach to civil service reform. Although he recognised the direction of the Reform 
Programme, he deliberately sought to diffuse controversial issues and to minimise the 
potential for an attack by the MSZP and Prime Minister Horn. Therefore, Kuncze 
instructed the Civil Service Department to prepare a Civil Service Act that would not 
lead to the introduction of major new elements to the existing civil service system 
because Kuncze feared that even if the MSZP in principle supported elements of the 
proposed reform, the mere attraction of attention as a result of debate could be 
damaging for him and the SZDSZ. Therefore, any changes were supposed to be 
within the scope of the existing system, and proposed changes were required to keep 
the need for debate low.
Secondly, the Civil Service Department was itself hesitant to prepare major reform 
initiatives. The political weakness of Interior Minister Kuncze, the low profile of 
civil service reform issues at that time, and the prospect of being perhaps soon under 
the political leadership of a minister from another party meant for the senior staff of 
the Civil Service Department that reform efforts should be kept at a minimum level. 
For instance, the Civil Service Department was well aware that the preparation of a 
radical overhaul of the existing civil service system shortly before the elections for a 
weak minister at the top would associate the department with the present political 
leadership. Therefore, the senior personnel of the Civil Service Department did not 
want to put at risk the trust of any potential new political leadership in its willingness 
to co-operate with the new leadership.
Finally, the civil service department did not show any major intention to co-operate 
with the Prime Minister's Office in particular the office of the Government
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Commissioner. Rather, the coalition constellation and the government re­
organisation in 1994 had cost the Civil Service Department much of the institutional 
influence it had held under the Antall government. In 1996/97, the Civil Service 
Department could effectively exploit the political conditions to re-gain parts of the 
territory it had lost to the Prime Minister's Office because it had the lead in preparing 
the amendment for the Civil Service Act. Consequently, the Civil Service 
Department effectively became an opponent to the civil service reform plans that 
were proposed in the Reform Programme. It took on board many of the criticisms of 
the line ministries, the hesitant, ambivalent positions of the governing parties and the 
reluctance of parts of the senior bureaucracy in order to establish its opposing stance 
vis-a-vis the office of the Government Commissioner. For instance, the Civil Service 
Department prevented the centralised compulsory disclosure of vacancies in the civil 
service in its own official journal as had been proposed in the Reform Programme. 
Although the Civil Service Department could have strengthened its institutional role 
in government, it could gain more from advocating the interests of the line ministries 
and hence to form a coalition against the Government Commissioner. In exchange 
the Civil Service Department was assigned the responsibility over the administration
n o
of the reserve system, although the system was considerably scaled down. 
Furthermore, the Civil Service Department effectively blocked any attempts by the 
Government Commissioner to begin the reform of the classification system.
As a consequence, the scope for revising the 1990 Act on State Secretaries and 
amending the 1992 Civil Service Act became very small. The only relevant change of 
the rules governing the allocation of state secretaries to the ministerial organisation 
concerned the requirement of state secretaries to pass a special examination within 
one year after their appointment. However, this legal change was simply taken over 
from the 1992 Civil Service Act, which set this requirement for senior civil servants. 
After the Act on the Legal Status of Members of the Government and State 
Secretaries was submitted to Parliament, these non-changes did not cause any debate 
among government and opposition parties, as the main point of attack referred to the
78 The Reform Programme had proposed such system firstly for senior officials rather than all civil 
servants, and secondly to be administered in the Prime Minister's Office rather than the Ministry of 
Interior.
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gradual centralisation of government operations expressed primarily in the possibility 
to appoint a Minister as head of the Prime Minister’s Office. However, due to the 
overwhelming majority of the governing parties in Parliament, the government could 
even afford the rejection of the proposal by many of the SZDSZ MPs.
Similarly, the amendment of the 1992 Civil Service Act reflected a lowest common 
denominator of what was acceptable to the coalition partners and demanded by the 
senior bureaucrats at the time of preparing the draft Act. For instance, the reform of 
the senior civil service including the establishment of a Civil Service Commission 
fell all together, and none of the proposed changes were included in the draft Act. By 
contrast, the centralised compulsory disclosure of vacancies was introduced for non­
managing instead of managing civil servants, the administration was assigned to the 
Ministry of Interior instead of the Prime Minister's Office and the provision became 
only applicable when line ministries could not fill a formal vacancy within three 
weeks. As a result, the only substantial change that was included and met the support 
of all participants was the introduction of cabinets for Ministers and the Prime 
Minister and the establishment of a separate position of advisors to distinguish 
members of cabinets as formal political appointments from other civil servants. With 
respect to the reform of the remuneration system, the only significant changes that 
found approval were the introduction of a performance-oriented bonus for senior 
civil servants and state secretaries and the establishment of a severance pay for civil 
servants who were dismissed depending on their length of employment and their 
rank, both of which happened to reflect quite closely the preferences of the state 
secretaries and senior civil servants who had only been appointed after 1994, 
especially, to positions in the economics ministries. As a consequence, the legislation 
that was enacted in 1997 was effectively transformed from originally being a radical 
civil service reform programme to a small-scale change that tried to fix the most 
pressing dysfunctionalities of the day.
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4. Conclusion
In conclusion, the civil service reform of 1997 was a continuation of the first reform 
wave in 1990/1992 rather than an entirely new reform project. It originated in the 
ambition of Government Commissioner Verebelyi to complete the 1990/92 civil 
service reform and to correct dysfunctional developments that had become apparent 
in the later Antall years and after the Horn government had taken office in 1994. 
However, the 1997 reform of the civil service effectively became a reform failure. 
Although the political conditions to complete the post-transition civil service reform 
project appeared to be favourable after the Socialist-Liberal coalition took office in 
1994 and although the second reform wave was based on the comprehensive Public 
Administration Reform Programme, hardly any of the proposed institutional reform 
measures found eventually their way into the civil service legislation adopted in 
1997. Instead, the Reform Programme got stuck as a result of changing short term 
interests of key actors of civil service reform and changing strategies in the pre­
election coalition dynamics. In particular, Prime Minister Horn and the Ministers of 
both governing parties, a sizeable group of senior civil servants and state secretaries 
and the Civil Service Department in the Ministry of Interior either became opponents 
of Verebelyi's Reform Programme or their disinterest in reform was reinforced. By 
contrast, Government Commissioner Verebelyi and his Deputy Balasz became the 
last proponents of a civil service reform that would have stabilised and de-politicised 
ministerial personnel policy. Consequently, the 1997 civil service reform generated 
all but a small-scale amendment at the margin that sought to fix the most pressing 
dysfunctional developments of the day, but this had virtually no impact on the degree 
of formal political discretion built into civil service legislation. Yet, Government 
Commissioner Verebelyi and his staff as well as many of the opposing and/or 
disinterested participants of the 1996/97 reform process expected that another 
attempt to complete the civil service reform project would be launched after the 1998 
national elections - most probably under the leadership of the MSZP.
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Chapter 9
Getting Away with It: The Third Reform of the Civil Service in 2001
1. Introduction
Contrary to the expectation of many observers, in the national elections in May 1998, 
the Socialist-Liberal coalition was replaced by a three party centre-right coalition 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Orban from the Fidesz. Although the MSZP 
won the largest share of the popular vote, the FIDESZ became the strongest 
parliamentary party with 29.5% of the popular vote and 38.3% of the seats in 
Parliament as opposed to the MSZP with 32.9% of the popular vote and 34.7% of the 
parliamentary seats. The Fidesz had fought the national elections in an electoral 
alliance with the MDF, which gained 2.8% of the popular vote and 4.4% of the seats 
in Parliament. The Fidesz-MDF alliance formed a government coalition with the 
FKGP, which had won 13.2% of the vote and 12.4% of the parliamentary seats. In 
July, Victor Orban from the Fidesz was elected Prime Minister of the new 
government.
The discussion of personnel policy during the Orban government between 1998 and 
2000 in Chapter 6 suggested that no major pressures to change the existing personnel 
policy regime should have arisen. The Orban government had replaced more state 
secretaries of the Horn government than both the Horn and the Antall government 
had replaced when they took office in 1994 and 1990 respectively. Moreover, the 
Orban government took maximum advantage of the degree of political discretion 
written into civil service legislation by recruiting more new state secretaries from 
other settings than the ministerial bureaucracy than both its predecessor governments. 
Finally, many of the new state secretaries were undoubtedly politically affiliated to 
the centre-right coalition. As a consequence, the analysis in Chapter 3 suggested that 
pressures towards the de-politicisation of personnel policy would only arise to the 
extent that remaining senior and higher civil servants were able to mount demand for
316
the reform of the civil service. At the same time, if these second tier bureaucrats were 
able to voice their demand, then the (new) members of the senior bureaucracy and 
especially the government would prevent the realisation of a civil service reform with 
de-politicising effects.
Contrary to this expectation and contrary to the 1997 reform and to a lesser extent the 
1990/92 reform, the 2001 reform was clearly a politically initiated reform of the civil 
service. The ambition to pursue a radical civil service reform was primarily a 
brainchild of the new Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office, Stumpf and the 
agenda for the 2001 reform was already set in the government programme. However, 
closer scrutiny will reveal that the process that led to the adoption of the third civil 
service reform in 2001 shares many features of the scenario outlined above. 
Accordingly, after briefly discussing the reform agenda and the new constellation of 
key reform actors that arose after the 1998 elections, the Chapter reveals that the 
political ambition for civil service reform can be well traced to the poor performance 
incentive of second tier bureaucrats, the difficulties in attracting and retaining highly 
skilled officials and their impact on the policy-making capacity of the central 
government apparatus. This encouraged Minister Stumpf to initiate a far-reaching 
reform project including a partial de-politicisation of personnel policy. However, 
although the proposal for the third civil service reform enjoyed high level political 
support, the discussion shows that both the political interest of the senior governing 
party Fidesz and the career interest of the senior bureaucrats that had only been 
recruited into the administration after the summer of 1998 contradicted the attempt to 
partially reduce the degree of formal political discretion over personnel policy. These 
opposing positions crystallised in Prime Minister Orban intervention into the 
negotiation process and the ensuing failure to endorse a partial de-politicisation of 
the civil service. As a consequence, the 2001 reform did only lead to the de­
politicisation of the remuneration regime but not of the allocation regime. Finally, the 
2001 reform underwent its first revision shortly after the Socialist-Liberal 
government led by Prime Minister Medgyessy too office in the spring of 2002. The 
Chapter will therefore briefly take issue with the origins of the 2002 amendment of 
the Civil Service Act at the end of the analysis of the 2001 reform.
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2. Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Government Programme and the 
Re-organisation of Civil Service Reform Management
The agenda for the third civil service reform in 2001 was effectively set in the 
government programme in 1998. The government programme of the new centre-right 
coalition outlined the objectives of civil service reform in the context of the ambition 
to improve the efficiency of the state apparatus. The government programme placed 
great emphasis on the constitutional position of the Prime Minister as the only 
member of government elected by and accountable to Parliament. It made the 
criticism that although constitutional reforms had been realised shortly after the 
change of regime, the Prime Minister had not yet been endowed with the resources 
necessary to exercise his constitutional responsibility for the performance of the 
government. Therefore, the new government sought to transform the Prime Minister's 
Office into a 'strategic director and central co-ordinator of government activity1, for 
instance, by establishing a portfolio referential system in the Prime Minister's Office. 
Moreover, the government announced measures to enhance the operational efficiency 
of the line ministries. In particular, it sought to revise the functional division of 
responsibilities between the line ministries, to apply preliminary efficiency studies in 
policy-making and to use modem management methods to improve the standards of 
professionalism within the ministries.
In this context, the government programme emphasised the central role of the civil 
service in delivering good and efficient government and criticised the inability of the 
institutional and financial conditions in place at the time of taking office to 
accomplish these goals. Therefore, the government felt committed 'to elevating the 
prestige of the public administration'. Moreover, the government programme put 
forward four objectives to be developed and implemented during its term in office in 
order to enhance the performance of the civil service.
(i) to make 'the civil service career attractive to talented young professionals'.
(ii) to strengthen performance based elements in public administration by making 
civil servants' 'salaries more flexible and differentiated, based on 
performance'.
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(iii) to establish 'an adequate training system' and to ensure that civil servants are 
well trained, 'dedicated to their work and spend their life in public 
administration'.
(iv) to take measures against corruption in public administration. To this end, the 
government programme suggested to establish a 'new investigative agency to 
pursue crimes committed by those employed in the agencies of law 
enforcement', to establish a system for the 'compulsory property declarations 
of employees in certain public service positions', and to draw up a Code of 
Ethics for civil servants.
At first glance, both the ambition to enhance the prestige of the civil service and the 
general goals of civil service reform may be interpreted as an attempt to depart from 
the status quo personnel policy regime and to establish a formal-legal framework that 
strengthens professional criteria in determining the outcomes of personnel policy at 
the expense of political discretion. However, the discussion of personnel policy 
regimes in Chapter 2 suggests that the four general goals are not sufficiently specified 
to warrant the expectation that the planned reform would lead to a reduction of the 
degree of formal political discretion. Although an 'adequate training system' may be 
linked to professionalisation attempts, it does not have direct implications for the 
extent to which governments can exercise political discretion over the recruitment 
and appointment of civil servants. Similarly, the establishment of an investigative 
agency to prevent the occurrence of corruption does not imply that the staff of such 
an agency would be de-politicised in the first place. Finally, the discussion in the last 
Chapters suggests that performance criteria to determine civil servants' remuneration 
levels or the establishment of a particular career path does not mean that personnel 
policy will be less subject to the exercise of political discretion by governments and 
their ministers. Hence, none of the general civil service reform goals stated in the 
government programme implied that a successful reform will lead to a change of the 
degree of formal political discretion over personnel policy.
When taking office, the new Prime Minister Orban from the Fidesz appointed Sandor 
Pinter as Minister of Interior and Istvan Stumpf as Minister heading the Prime 
Minister's Office. Although Pinter was neither Fidesz member nor Member of
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Parliament, the Fidesz was responsible for the nomination of a candidate for the 
Ministry of Interior. As a result, in contrast to the Socialist-Liberal government, the 
Civil Service Department in the Ministry of Interior was again under the leadership 
of the senior governing party. However, Minister Stumpf also established a Political 
State Secretariat for Public Administration and Regional Policy in the Prime 
Minister’s Office initially headed by Balsay and after 1999 by Mikes, both from the 
Fidesz. At the same time, the Office of the Government Commissioner for the 
Modernisation for Public Administration was dissolved. Verebelyi was offered the 
Directorship of the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration, while the staff of 
the office including his former Deputy Balazs was integrated into the new Political 
State Secretariat. With respect to public administration issues, the Political State 
Secretariat was responsible for the strategic and developmental concept of public 
administration, the co-ordination of public administration policy tasks arising from 
European integration and international assistance programmes, and the design of 
principles for human resource policy in public administration including a uniform 
public service. Moreover, it became responsible for the management and transfer of 
central government senior civil servants on stand-by in the reserve system. As a 
consequence, the formal responsibility of civil service reform issues remained shared 
between the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Interior, although the 
Ministers Pinter and Stumpf and the Political State Secretary Mikes came all (at least 
nominally) from the same party as the Prime Minister.
The retention of public administration affairs in the Prime Minister's Office 
originated primarily in the political priority shift of the Ministry of Interior and the 
objective of the Fidesz to fundamentally reform the system of executive governance 
as outlined above. Firstly, the revelation of the Tocsik scandal in the autumn of 1996 
had placed the issue of corruption in public administration onto the political agenda. 
Until the elections in the spring of 1998, other minor cases had reinforced the public 
perception that corruption is widespread at all levels of public administration, which 
increasingly undermined the prestige of the civil service in the eyes of the public. 
Hence, the problem of corruption in public administration had continuously gained 
political salience and became a major issue at the 1998 national elections (Fricz 
1999). Therefore, Prime Minister Orban selected the former President of the National
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Police until 1996, Pinter, as Minister of Interior. Moreover, Pinter replaced 
Administrative State Secretary Zsuffa with a former high-ranking official from the 
National Police Force, Felkai. Finally, Pinter brought the police back under direct 
ministerial supervision, as he abolished the Deputy State Secretary position 
responsible for police affairs in the Ministry of Interior. Hence, both the re­
organisation and the personnel changes indicated a shift in political priority of the 
Ministry of Interior.
At the same time, the Civil Service Department was deliberately kept in the Ministry 
of Interior and its scope of responsibilities including civil service reform 
management was not changed. The designated Interior Minister Pinter had demanded 
this arrangement during the preparation of the government programme. Firstly, he as 
much as the senior officials of the ministry wanted to prevent the impression that the 
Ministry had been re-transformed from a Ministry of public administration' as 
originally envisaged by Antall to a 'Ministry of police' like during the socialist era. 
Secondly, the government had considered measures to bring public sector employees 
under a more unified legal framework at the time of writing the government 
programme. Hence, Pinter also sought to retain the Civil Service Department 
including responsibility of civil service reform affairs in the Ministry of Interior in 
order to increase their leverage upon the revision of the public sector employment 
laws, in particular, the position of employees of the police force in the new 
legislation.
Secondly, after taking office, the government quickly began to implement the new 
approach to executive governance around the Prime Minister and a strong Prime 
Minister's Office. In fact, the new government pushed the centralisation of the central 
government machinery further than Verebelyi had proposed in the 1996 Public 
Administration Reform Programme. In particular, Minister Stumpf drew on the 
experience of Ministers and state secretaries who had served during the Antall 
government and had pursued intensive research in the years leading to the 1998 
elections. He concluded that the co-ordination failures of the first two governments 
and the tendency towards sectoral separatism can only be overcome, if the Prime 
Minister can take advantage of organisational and personnel resources that allow
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both the effective co-ordination of government policy and the development of 
government policy strategies under his leadership (Stumpf 1999). As a result, the 
Prime Minister's Office was transformed into the 'strategic director and central co­
ordinator of government activities' as outlined in the government programme with the 
following organisational features.
• The establishment of a cabinet responsible for direct advice to the Prime 
Minister;
• A politician in the rank of a minister heading the Prime Minister's Office;
• The establishment of Political State Secretariats responsible of the strategic 
planning and management of government policy including the Secretariat for 
Regional Policy and Public Administration;
• The establishment of Minister's Desks or mirror structures responsible for the co­
ordination and supervision of government policy; and
• The inclusion of several government agencies like the Government Control 
Office or the Public Procurement Office into the organisational structures of the 
Prime Minister's Office.
Prime Minister Orban had received the backing for the re-organisation of the Prime 
Minister's Office before the investiture of his government because, unlike his 
predecessor Horn, he had no serious competitors inside the Fidesz and he could reach 
a compromise with FKGP President Torgyan. Firstly, although the Fidesz had 
gradually become the largest party of the centre-right between 1994 and 1998, the 
party continued to be under the leadership of a small circle of politicians that had 
founded the Fidesz in 1988. When the Fidesz began its gradual move towards the 
conservative right of the party system after 1993 (see also below, last section), some 
of the leading figures of the first hour, for instance, Fodor, left the party and joined 
the SZDSZ. After 1994, the leading circle of the Fidesz retained its dominant 
position because none of the joining factions was able and willing to challenge the 
established leadership. In 1996, the MDF split when the Hungarian People's Party, 
MDNP, was formed by the moderate wing of the MDF, while the rump MDF 
represented the former conservative wing of the MDF. From the outset, the MDNP 
was a close ally of the Fidesz, while the MDF could only gain parliamentary 
representation in 1998 due to an electoral alliance with the Fidesz. Moreover, in
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1997, the KDNP disintegrated when radical populist sections within the KDNP 
seized the leadership of the party. As result, the moderate wing of the KDNP founded 
the Christian Democratic Alliance, KDSZ, which later gained seats in parliament 
because some of its leading politicians ran on the Fidesz party list. However, the lack 
of a coherent ideological profile of the new allies of the Fidesz, the absence of any 
charismatic figure among the affiliated MPs and the circumstances that the Fidesz 
benefited from the disintegration of other centre-right parties stabilised rather than 
challenged the predominant position of the leading Fidesz circle, in particular Orban. 
Therefore, in contrast to both Antall and Horn, Orban did at no point face a serious 
competitor within his own party.
Moreover, the Fidesz could gain the approval for the re-organisation of the central 
government apparatus from the coalition partner FKGP in exchange for government 
offices, for instance, the appointment of an FKGP politician as Minister for the EU- 
PHARE programme, and in particular a political 'division of territories' within the 
central government. In contrast to the Antall government and to some extent the Horn 
government, the new government opted for a conception of 'single-coloured line 
ministries'. This means that the Minister and the Political State Secretary for a given 
ministry were chosen from the same party. Moreover, it was agreed that the Prime 
Minister would not interfere with organisational and personnel decisions of the 
FKGP ministries and would respect the leadership of the FKGP in its policy sectors. 
This arrangement was beneficial for the FKGP because all through the 1990s, it had 
effectively remained a single-issue party that was mainly representing the interests of 
the small-scale agrarian sector. As a result, the FKGP politicians Torgyan and Pepo 
were appointed as Ministers of Agriculture and Environment respectively and apart 
from regional policy issues that had come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
70Agriculture m 1998, the Fidesz's influence over FKGP territory was minimised. At 
the same time, contentious issues between the Fidesz and the FKGP were mainly 
resolved at the top leadership level in informal coalition talks between Prime 
Minister Orban and FKGP President Torgyan.
79 In addition, the FKGP politician Janos Szabo became Minister of Defence. The arrangement at the 
top of the Ministry of Defence differed from the other two FKGP ministries in that a party official of 
the Fidesz was appointed as Administrative State Secretaries.
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The 1998 re-organisation significantly enhanced the role of the Prime Minister’s 
Office in government policy planning and co-ordination.80 For instance, the 
modification of the government's standing orders made the Minister of the Prime 
Minister's Office the convenor of the weekly meeting of Administrative State 
Secretaries and formally included the heads of the mirror structures as full 
participants of this last filter before the government meetings. Hence, the co­
ordination of government policy became centralised as policy proposals that 
originated in the line ministries were channelled through the Prime Minister's Office 
before reaching the government agenda. At the same time, the re-organisation of the 
Prime Minister's Office sought to strengthen its character as a key driving force in 
developing policy strategies for the government as a whole.
In this context, Minister Stumpf justified the retention of the public administration 
unit in the Prime Minister's Office as an element of his new approach to executive 
governance to develop strategies in the area of public administration reform 
including civil service reform. First, similar to Verebelyi's proposal in the 1996 
public administration reform programme, Stumpf had in mind a senior civil service 
under the leadership of the Prime Minister and managed by the Prime Minister's 
Office as a complementary factor to integrate central government operations and to 
overcome problems of sectoral separatism. Second, Stumpf had the ambition to 
initiate and develop a reform of the civil service more generally that would 
fundamentally alter the career structure of the civil service and align the 
remuneration levels of civil servants closer with private sector wages in order to 
attract more talent into the administration and in order to enhance the policy-making 
capacity of the central government apparatus. Moreover, from the outset, Stumpf was 
aware that the achievement of these goals would require a clarification of career 
expectations among higher and senior civil servants including a clarification of the 
boundaries between senior ranks that should be within the reach of political
80 Agh (2001: 163) argues that "[altogether, the new PMO, the 'flagship' of central Government, has 
transformed the workings of executive power beyond recognition. It has acted within the incumbent 
Government like a super-ministry, managing the control and co-ordination of the major policy-making 
processes of individual ministries".
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discretion and other ranks that should be more subject to professional rather than 
political rationality criteria.
However, the duplication of civil service reform responsibilities in the Ministry of 
Interior and the Prime Minister's Office signalled the emergence of a conflict 
between two ministries and their political leadership over the direction of reform and 
especially over the responsibility to prepare the reform already at the time of 
government formation in 1998. On the one hand, the compromise between the Fidesz 
and the FKGP over the establishment of distinct political territories at the central 
government level facilitated the re-organisation of the executive governance system 
centralised in a strong Prime Minister's Office. This, in turn, served to justify 
Minister Stumpfs desire to retain a department responsible for strategic public 
administration issues including human resource policy within the jurisdiction of the 
Prime Minister's Office, which was crucial in order to retain the institutional 
resources to approach the reform of the civil service as key component of the new 
approach to executive governance. On the other hand, Interior Minister Pinter could 
justify his desire to retain responsibility over civil service reform issues in the context 
of an anticipated attempt to unify the public service by emphasising the identity of 
the Ministry of Interior as a ministry for public administration rather than a ministry 
of police. As a result, although the general civil service reform goals of both 
ministries and their political leadership were not incompatible, they implied different 
emphases of reform. However, especially the duplication of civil service reform 
authority sowed the seeds of conflict that would arise during the preparation of the 
reform proposal.
3. Negotiating the 2001 Reform
The negotiations of the third civil service reform that was enacted in 2001 can be 
divided into three stages. Firstly, between the summer of 1998 and the summer of 
1999, there were rather modest reform activities, although the reform agenda 
gradually widened. During this period the Ministry of Interior was in charge of 
preparing the reform of the civil service. Secondly, between the summer of 1999 and
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the autumn of 2000, the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Minister's Office 
competed over the responsibility of civil service reform management, which led to 
continuous conflict that was carried into the cabinet. However, the Ministry of 
Interior remained formally responsible for the preparation of the reform.
Finally, the third period lasted from the autumn of 2000 until June 2001. During this 
period, the civil service reform was realised under the leadership of the Prime 
Minister's Office, although with participation of the Ministry of Interior and the 
involvement of Prime Minister Orban. The main point of contention concerned 
differences between the proposal of the Prime Minister's Office and the position of 
Prime Minister Orban over the rules that determine the composition of the senior 
executive service as a new elite corps. The discussion begins with the origins of 
reform proposed by the Prime Minister's Office in the first two periods. Then, it turns 
to the negotiations that led to the adoption of the amendment of the Civil Service Act 
in 2001. The discussion shows that the proposal of the Prime Minister's Office to 
establish a senior executive service that would have exhibited features of a personnel 
policy regime that allows structured politicisation, contradicted the political interest 
of the Fidesz and the career interests of senior appointees that were recruited during 
the Orban government in the wake of a personnel policy strategy of open 
politicisation.
3.1. Competing Proposals: The Conflict between the Ministry of Interior 
and the Prime Minister's Office
During the first year in office, the Prime Minister's Office concentrated its activities 
upon the internal re-organisation and the structural and procedural mechanisms that 
link the line ministries to the Prime Minister's Office. As a result, after the investiture 
of the Fidesz-led government, the government decided to delegate the first tasks 
towards the preparation of a civil service reform proposal to the Ministry of Interior 
in September 1998, though in consultation with the Prime Minister's Office. Prime 
Minister Orban justified this decision with respect to the potential work overload that 
could arise in the Prime Minister's Office. Initially, the Civil Service Department had 
to deal primarily with the continuous implementation of civil servants' basic
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examinations, continued its efforts to develop a special examination procedure and 
elaborated a concept for further training of civil servants.
Moreover, the Civil Service Department began the conceptual work for the 
establishment of a uniform public service including civil servants. To this end, the 
Civil Service Department convened a Public Administration Co-ordination 
Committee to bring together the views and suggestions of representatives of public 
administration institutions whose employees were governed by other legal 
frameworks. In addition, the senior officials of the Political State Secretariat in the 
Prime Minister's Office participated in the preparation of a reform concept in the 
Public Administration Co-ordination Committee. As a result of the deliberations, the 
reform agenda gradually widened during the first year of the Orban government. For 
instance, in April 1999, the development of a training strategy of senior civil servants 
was formally included into the reform deliberations, and in May 1999, another 
Government Decree delegated the tasks to revise the performance evaluation system 
and to develop a code of ethics for the civil service. Thus, during the first year of the 
Orban government, the reform agenda evolved gradually in accordance with the 
general goals stated in the government programme.
During this period, the Civil Service Department did not attempt to prepare a 
fundamental reform of the civil service system. Although the political constellation 
had changed after the 1998 elections, it maintained a position similar to that held 
during the preparation of the 1997 reform and proposed only incremental reform 
measures that were by and large compatible with the existing civil service system. In 
the domain of determining civil servants' levels of remuneration, the Civil Service 
Department did not consider a modification of the classification system. Rather, it 
sought to adjust the incentives of civil servants by introducing additional honorary 
titles and by shortening the number of years civil servants have to spend in public 
administration in order to be eligible for an honorary title. This approach was 
justified as more flexible and as rooted in Hungarian administrative history, since 
honorary titles had been a major performance and career incentive for Hungarian 
civil servants during the inter-war period. Moreover, the Civil Service Department 
did not propose alternative mechanisms for the recruitment and selection of civil
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servants and hence it did not challenge the high degree of formal political discretion 
built into existing civil service legislation. Instead, following the discussions in the 
Public Administration Co-ordination Committee the Civil Service Department 
intended to unify parts of the legal frameworks governing public sector employees. 
For instance, it was attempted to integrate the Civil Service Act and the Act on 
uniformed personnel into one single Act and to introduce different Chapters for 
different groups of employees.
As a consequence, the initiative to ultimately prepare a large scale reform of the civil 
service originated in the Prime Minister's Office, in particular in the close co­
operation between Minister Stumpf and the Political State Secretariat for Public 
Administration and Regional Policy. As mentioned above, Minister Stumpf placed 
great emphasis on the implications of the civil service reform, especially the reform 
of the senior civil service, to enhance the coherence and policy-making capacity of 
the central government apparatus. As a result, the Head of Department for public 
administration affairs in the Prime Minister's Office, Balazs, began to prepare 
guidelines for a far-reaching reform of the civil service that would link the re­
organisation of the central government apparatus and the reform goals of the 
government programme in the summer of 1999 independent from the Ministry of 
Interior.
Balazs regarded the 1997 amendment of the Civil Service Act as a major reform 
failure because hardly any of the propositions developed in the 1996 Public 
Administration Reform Programme had been incorporated into the amendment. 
Hence, the new reform initiative taken by the Fidesz-led government provided an 
opportunity to complete civil service related elements of the reform programme that 
had already been elaborated before 1998. According to Balazs, dysfunctional 
developments in the civil service that had already been apparent after the change in 
government in 1994, had become more serious by 1998. The 1997 reform had 
addressed neither the problem of an increasing wage gap between the civil service 
and comparable private sector wages nor the problem of instability and politicisation 
of the senior civil service. As a result, the 1997 reform had done virtually nothing to 
prevent the deterioration of the situation in the civil service.
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First, after the Bokros austerity programme of 1995 and the failure to increase civil 
servants' wages in 1997, civil servants' wage levels had further fallen behind private 
sector wages, which had begun to increase at much larger rates since 1996 than 
wages in the civil service. The problem of relatively low wage levels concerned in 
particular the senior civil service, which could gain many times higher wages in 
comparable jobs in the private sector. Moreover, the heavy emphasis on the seniority 
principle and the rigid classification system implied that civil servants could only 
slowly improve their wage position when pursuing a career in the civil service. As a 
result, especially young university graduates lacked an incentive to pursue a career in 
the civil service and to enter the civil service in the first place. Consequently, the 
central government administration was increasingly exposed to a brain drain at the 
top and the inability to attract new talent into the administration.
Second, the personnel policy strategy of the Orban government in 1998 had 
exacerbated this problem. Although both changes in government in 1994 and 1998 
had witnessed the partial return of state secretaries and senior civil servants that had 
previously held senior positions in the administration, both changes in government 
had also demonstrated that the head of the administration tended to be guillotined 
whenever governments change. This policy prevented the development of 
institutional expertise and memory in the administration and, according to the 
administrative policy makers in the Prime Minister's Office, it began to have a 
negative impact on the professional capacity of the central government 
administration. The approach of the Orban government to personnel policy that a 
'young bureaucrat is a good bureaucrat', reinforced this problem (see also below). 
Regardless of the learning capacity of the senior appointees that had been new to the 
administration, it implied that ministries were managed by officials who lacked 
experience in administration and who had to take their apprenticeship at the top of 
the ministries.
At the same time, lower ranking managers and higher civil servants were increasingly 
de-motivated by their deteriorating wage position, the lack of incentive to perform 
well and to gain promotion in the ministerial hierarchy and the lack of political
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commitment towards the establishment of a professional civil service. In principle, 
except a small minority of career state secretaries and senior civil servants, lower 
ranking senior civil servants and higher civil servants could effectively choose 
between two strategies when performing their job. Either they could seek promotion 
by means of demonstrating good performance and probably some commitment to the 
government's cause, which however would undermine their prospect to stay in office 
after the next change in government because their career progression and their policy 
record would be associated with that of the outgoing government. Alternatively, 
lower ranking managers and higher civil servants could try to keep a low profile, 
minimise debate and controversy over their tasks and hence seek to stay in their 
position in exchange for job security.
As a result, by 1998 or shortly after, a basic two class system had evolved in the 
central government ministries. On the one hand, the majority of state secretaries and 
many senior civil servants had been brought back or newly into the administration by 
the Orban government. These appointees enjoyed the trust and support of the 
government and its ministers and they were in the driving seats when it came to 
policy-making in the ministries. Moreover, most of these appointees had no stakes in 
the de-politicisation of personnel policy because they could not expect that their 
career in the administration would depend on the formal-legal basis of personnel 
policy apart from benefits that could arise from new procedures that govern the 
compensation at the time of their dismissal. Rather, they had an incentive to co­
operate as well as possible with the government because their positions in the 
ministries would effectively depend on the performance of the government and the 
results in the next national elections.
On the other hand, the group of officials in lower ranking managing ranks and in 
higher civil service ranks who had mostly been employed by the ministries for a long 
time and who still made up the largest proportion of the overall ministerial civil 
service had to adopt a defensive and receiving approach to policy-making. They had 
no incentive to demonstrate major willingness to co-operate with the new 
government or to show any initiative in the policy-making process because it would 
have enhanced their career prospects only in the short term. Moreover, this second
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class of officials had little incentive to voice its dissatisfaction with the civil service 
policy of the government because it could have raised the impression of disloyalty 
and opposition to the new government. However, lower ranking managers and higher 
civil servants could have gained much from a civil service reform as it had been 
proposed by Verebelyi in 1990/92 and then in 1996 in the Public Administration 
Reform Programme because it would have effectively de-politicised career paths, 
clarified the expectations about their career prospects and enhanced their wage 
position as employees of the state administration.
Senior civil servants in lower ranking managing positions and higher civil servants 
were at no point actively involved in the civil service reform process. However, 
Balazs recognised this dilemma in the central government ministries and considered 
it as necessary to create conditions that would promote professionalism in the civil 
service, incentives to invest in the development of expertise and to demonstrate 
initiative in the ministerial policy-making process. Balazs criticised the propositions 
developed by the Ministry of Interior on the ground that, like in 1997, they would not 
address the challenges and hence not serve to alleviate the problems of the Hungarian 
civil service. Moreover, Balazs could be sure about the support of Minister Stumpf 
who had initiated an independent reform proposal of the Prime Minister’s Office in 
the first place and who was aware that the success of his plans to enhance the central 
government policy-making capacity would hinge on a radical approach to civil 
service reform. Therefore, the Prime Minister's Office began to prepare a 
fundamental overhaul of the existing civil service system in the summer of 1999 in 
order to restructure the remuneration system and to develop a conception that would 
at least partially stabilise the senior civil service.
In the domain of determining civil servants' levels of remuneration, the proposal of 
the Prime Minister's Office sought to lift the multipliers for civil servants in their 
early career stage in order to attract young talent into the administration and for 
senior civil servants and states secretaries in order to prevent the departure of 
managing staff to the private sector. To this end, it was proposed to distinguish the 
career structure into three stages. In the first eight to ten years, young graduates 
would enter the civil service, gain promotions every one or two years and receive
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remuneration increase far above the average annual remuneration increase. For 
instance, according to one of the first proposals in the Prime Minister's Office, young 
higher civil servants would have doubled their remuneration basis within 4 years. By 
contrast, in the second and the third career stage, the average annual remuneration 
increase would be much lower than in the first stage. However, at the end of the 
career, a higher civil servant would finally receive a large remuneration increase in 
order to be able to reach higher pension levels. In addition, it was proposed to almost 
double the existing multipliers for senior civil servants and state secretaries. As a 
result, the classification system for higher civil servants was supposed to become 
twice as steep as the existing system that had been adopted in 1992.
This structure of the classification system was justified with respect to the 
expectation that the most able civil servants would gain an appointment as senior 
civil servant after approximately eight years and hence would be able to triple their 
remuneration basis within eight years. On the other hand, civil servants who would 
fail to reach the senior ranks within ten or more years would have to make a choice 
between job security and the prospect of a generous pension at the end of one's 
career, and lower remuneration increases in their second and third career stages. As a 
result, the reform of the classification system aimed at both the attraction of young 
university graduates into the administration and the retention of senior officials in the 
top administrative positions.
Moreover, it was proposed to substitute both the highly discretionary personal 
remuneration list of ministers and the similarly discretionary 40/20% performance 
bonus scheme with a fully fledged performance evaluation system would serve to 
introduce the performance principle into civil service remuneration. Balazs reckoned 
that the establishment of a coherent, transparent and de-politicised remuneration 
system would only be possible, if the remuneration levels in the civil service would 
be aligned to remuneration levels in the private sector. The exercise of political 
discretion resulted primarily from the large turnover rates in the ministries, which 
exposed the formally established internal labour market of the civil service to the 
competitive pressures of the external labour markets. Hence, ministers were 
practically forced to adjust civil servants' remuneration levels the higher the
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discrepancy between the internal and the external labour market and the larger the 
turnover in the ministry. This rationale implies that ministers were themselves the 
cause of pressure to the exercise of political discretion over the adjustment of 
remuneration levels the more they replaced officials in the ministries. At the same 
time, this means that the politicisation of the remuneration system is a secondary 
problem that can only be solved by either stabilising the civil service or by setting 
remuneration levels for the civil service that are competitive vis-a-vis the private 
sector. As it turned out, the final draft of the civil service reform proposal opted for 
the second option.
By contrast, in the domain of allocating civil servants to the ministerial organisation, 
the Prime Minister's Office proposed the establishment of a two-tier system. On the 
one hand, it sought to specify the recruitment procedure for civil servants in order to 
strengthen merit based criteria in the initial selection of civil servants. This 
proposition included both higher and middle ranking civil servants as well as senior 
civil servants. Moreover, it proposed the creation of a permanent and professional 
senior executive service. On the other hand, the Prime Minister's Office did not touch 
the existing institutional basis of allocating state secretaries to the ministerial 
organisation that granted ministers a high degree of discretion in the selection and 
appointment of state secretaries. This would have required a revision of the 1997 Act 
on the Legal Status of Members of the Government and State Secretaries and, in 
addition, it was considered politically impossible to impose restrictions upon the 
exercise of discretion to recruit, appoint and dismiss state secretaries.
Hence, in general, the proposal for the reform of the senior civil service reflected a 
compromise between the government's interest in retaining political discretion over 
personnel policy and the simultaneous need towards de-politicisation of personnel 
policy in order to strengthen the expertise basis of the administration. Both the 
members of the government and the new appointees to senior ranking positions had 
little interest in tying the government's hands over senior personnel policy affairs. 
Ministers of the Orban government, Political State Secretaries that dealt with 
ministerial policy-making processes and many of the new Administrative and Deputy 
State Secretaries that had already been in office during the Antall years, had to deal
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with the implications of civil servants' low level of motivation on a daily basis. 
However, rather than identifying the cause of the problem in the incentive structure 
of the civil service system, most members of the government and newly appointed 
state secretaries tended to interpret the defensive approach of the ministerial staff as 
opposition to the centre-right government and another prove that the administration is 
by and large sympathetic to the Socialists, and hence, not trustworthy. Hence, there 
was little prospect that members of the government and newly appointed state 
secretaries would support a change of the status quo of the allocation system in so far 
as the exercise political discretion was concerned.
Therefore, it was envisaged that a senior executive service that is limited in scope 
would create an island of comparably non-politicised and professional experts at the 
top of the ministries. This senior executive service would be separate from the bulk 
senior civil service, access would be densely regulated by standards and procedures 
that prevent the politicisation of this new professional corps, and its elite status 
would be reflected in remuneration levels above the top senior civil service levels. 
Moreover, membership in the senior executive service would be protected by 
restricting governments' possibilities to either dismiss senior executive staff or 
effectively force them to resign as was possible under the existing regime. At the 
same time, governments would be free to transfer and appoint members of the senior 
executive service to senior positions in the ministries and non-appointed staff would 
remain in a stand-by position and on the payroll of the government.
As a result, the senior executive service as initially proposed by the Prime Minister's 
Office implied the attempt to establish a personnel policy regime that allows 
structured politicisation to a limited number of senior civil servants and state 
secretaries in the central government ministries. This did not mean that Ministers 
were confronted with new restrictions upon the extent to which and the way they 
could exercise political discretion over the allocation of senior officials to the 
ministries. Ministers could still recruit officials from the ministerial bureaucracy or 
from any other setting and shape the composition of the senior bureaucracy in 
accordance with their desires. At the same time, the Prime Minister's Office expected 
that senior officials who would have a reputation of being selected on the basis of
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merit would be less exposed to the pressures of political dismissal and if so, they 
would not be left out in the cold. Moreover, they expected that the senior executive 
service would create an important career incentive for civil servants in the ministries 
as well as new recruits who would otherwise be deterred from seeking promotion due 
to a too high risk of political dismissal. This approach differed from previous 
proposals that had usually advocated more or less the complete de-politicisation of 
the senior civil service. Accordingly, the Prime Minister's Office claimed that its 
proposal would finally lead to the establishment of a viable career system for the 
Hungarian civil service, in which civil servants could enter the administration as 
university graduates and could (quickly) raise through ranks to the most senior 
positions without having to fear their replacement after a change in government. 
Moreover, the Prime Minister's Office de-emphasised the need to unify public sector 
employment. Although it was recognised that a uniform public service could 
contribute towards the coherence of government, the Prime Minister's Office claimed 
that a permanent and highly professional senior executive service would be more 
conducive towards reaching this objective.
In the autumn of 1999, the proposal of the Prime Minister's Office was discussed for 
the first time at a government meeting. However, the discussion of the proposal 
generated major controversy between the leadership of Prime Minister's Office and 
the Ministry of Interior over the allocation of responsibility to prepare the civil 
service reform. Hence, in contrast to the constellations during the Antall and the 
Horn government, the conflict over the assignment of civil service reform 
responsibilities arose between two ministries that were led by ministers of the same 
political party. The proposals of the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Minister's 
Office were not entirely incompatible. They differed in the extent to which they 
sought to reform the existing civil service system and they proposed different 
instruments to achieve government coherence and an enhanced incentive structure for 
civil servants, but it was conceivable to integrate both proposals into one joint 
proposal. However, during the discussion of the reform proposals at the cabinet 
meetings, Interior Minister Pinter had sought to transform the question of functional 
responsibility over civil service reform into a confidence question. Because the 
Ministry of Interior was formally responsible for civil service affairs and because the
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Ministry of Interior had initially been assigned authority over the preparation of a 
reform proposal, an assignment of functional responsibility to the Prime Minister's 
Office would be equivalent to the withdrawal of confidence from the Ministry of 
Interior and its political leadership by the government. As a result, in January 2000, 
Orban confirmed the original division of labour between the Ministry of Interior and 
the Prime Minister's Office in order to prevent a cabinet crisis over the civil service 
reform issue.
The decision to confirm the original division of labour between both ministries, 
however, did not resolve the conflict inside the government. Because the Prime 
Minister's Office remained involved in the preparation of the reform through the 
government meetings, in the Public Administration Co-ordination Committee and 
through collaboration with the Civil Service Department of the Ministry of Interior, 
the competition sharpened after January 2000. The nature of the division between 
both ministries remained the same. On the one hand, the Prime Minister's Office 
sought to gain support for its large scale reform proposal. On the other hand, the 
Ministry of Interior was reluctant to take on board the propositions of the Prime 
Minister's Office and sought to secure its leadership over the reform preparations. As 
in the negotiations of the 1997 reform, the Ministry of Interior began to question the 
proposal of the Prime Minister's Office by incorporating the criticism of line 
ministries. For instance, the establishment of a senior executive service under the 
leadership of the Prime Minister and managed by the Prime Minister's Office implied 
a centralisation of personnel policy which was not appreciated by many line 
ministries. Similarly, the Ministry of Interior was hesitant to endorse a far-reaching 
reform of the classification system. For instance, the proposal of the Ministry of 
Interior would have implied additional expenditures for civil servants' wages of 20 
billion HUF, which was seven times less than the figure that was proposed by the 
Prime Minister's Office. As a result of the inability to co-operate and the inability to 
agree on the content of civil service reform, Prime Minister Orban decided in the 
summer of 2000 to exclude the Prime Minister's Office from further reform 
preparations.
336
However, in September 2000, the Prime Minister's Office pursued a final attempt to 
gain support from Orban by preparing a note for the Prime Minister that compared 
the implications of the civil service reforms proposed by the Prime Minister's Office 
and the Ministry of Interior. As a result, Orban reversed his decision in October 2000 
and delegated the responsibility for the development of reform guidelines to the 
Prime Minister's Office, while the Ministry of Interior became responsible for writing 
the draft Act on the basis of the Prime Minister's Office's guidelines. This process of 
finalising and writing the draft amendment of the Civil Service Act was speeded up 
by an ad hoc committee for inter-ministerial co-ordination and occasional 
involvement of Prime Minister Orban. The ad hoc committee consisted of the heads 
of the two departments in the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Minister's Office, the 
two Administrative State Secretaries and the two Ministers, Stumpf and Pinter. 
Hence, the intervention of Prime Minister Orban hierarchically induced the co­
operation of the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Minister's Office. However, 
eventually, it also laid bare the difficulties to reconcile the political interests and the 
personnel policy strategy of the Fidesz-led government and the initial proposal of the 
Prime Minister's Office.
3.2. The Limits of De-politicisation
The intervention of Prime Minister Orban in favour of the proposal of the Prime 
Minister's Office and his position in the subsequent negotiations over the final shape 
of the civil service reform Act can be best understood with reference to the political 
interests of the Fidesz and the career interests of the senior appointees that had only 
been brought into the administration by the Orban government. During the 1990s, the 
Fidesz moved its ideological profile from a radical liberal anti-communist youth 
movement to a liberal conservative anti-communist party. The Fidesz was founded in 
1988 by university students and started its political life close to the SZDSZ. Hence, it 
was initially one the parties that represented the Western-oriented pole in the 
Hungarian party system. During the slow rapprochement of the SZDSZ and the 
MSZP after the formation of the Democratic Charter, the Fidesz maintained its 
uncompromising stance towards the MSZP and shifted towards the right of the party
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system as a liberal party with national commitments. The transformation of the 
Fidesz from a radical liberal anti-communist to a liberal conservative anti-communist 
party became most apparent after the weak showing in the 1994 elections and in 
particular the implementation of the Bokros package in 1995. Markus (1999b: 151) 
argues that "the introduction of the [Bokros] stabilisation package shifted the 
fundamental cleavage in Hungarian politics away from that originally formulated in 
cultural terms and towards a pre-class socio-economic commodification cleavage. 
The formal centrality of the cultural divide in party politics, [remained], however, 
persistent. "Class struggle" [became] dressed up as Kulturkampf."
Correspondingly, the Fidesz, like its competitors on the political right, increasingly 
denounced the economic policies of the Socialist-Liberal government as anti-national 
because they would aim at an adjustment to the world market dominated by multi­
national companies without taking into account the far-reaching effects on society, in 
particular the Hungarian middle class. Instead, the Fidesz toned down its free market 
rhetoric and placed greater emphasis on the social responsibility of the state, the need 
to adopt social and economic policies that support and strengthen the Hungarian 
middle class (Korosenyi 1999). The Fidesz indicated its ideological change by 
renaming the party as Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party in 1995 (for the sake of 
convenience, I will continue to refer to 'Fidesz' rather than Fidesz-MPP). Moreover, 
in 1996, Fidesz published a new manifesto 'For a Civic Hungary', in which it 
provided its own definition of 'Hungarianess' distinguishing "between the 'national 
interest' (the interest of all Hungarians, wherever they live) and the 'interest of the 
state' (i.e. of the citizens of Hungary)" (Batory 2002: 18).
At the time of taking office in 1998, the civil service reform goals that were 
formulated in the government programme already broadly reflected the ideological 
turn of the Fidesz. The general goal to enhance the prestige of the civil service 
reflects both the changing role of the state advocated by the Fidesz and the standpoint 
that the civil service was a major representative of the Hungarian middle class whose 
social status and standard of living had severely deteriorated during the Socialist- 
Liberal government. Moreover, the promise to pursue measures that promote the 
status of the civil service was a formidable opportunity to exploit the failure of the
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MSZP-SZDSZ government to deliver a 'civil service friendly policy' between 1994 
and 1998. The MSZP had traditionally drawn disproportionally high electoral support 
from civil servants, whereas the Fidesz was essentially lacking a basis in the civil 
service.
Therefore, after the 1998 elections had turned the Fidesz into the leading party of the 
centre right, the Fidesz was in a position to signal its support for a strong civil service 
as a representative of the Hungarian middle class and to enhance the recognition of 
the Fidesz among civil servants at the direct expense of the MSZP. Moreover, against 
this background, the proposal of the Prime Minister's Office offered more political 
benefits than the propositions that had originated in the Ministry of Interior. In 
particular, the considerable remuneration increases for civil servants in the year 
before the 2002 national elections proposed by the Prime Minister's Office promised 
to be a means to signal the Fidesz commitment to the Hungarian civil service.
Secondly, the Fidesz remained particularly committed to promoting the lot of the 
young generation, which was, for instance, reflected in the creation of a Ministry of 
Youth and Sports in January 1999. Moreover, the Fidesz continued to connect youth 
policy to its uncompromising anti-communist position. Both in 1992 and in 1997, the 
Fidesz had rejected the civil service reform proposals because it criticised the failure 
to implement a rigorous change of regime policy vis-a-vis public administration. 
However, the Fidesz stood for a radical position, i.e. the change of regime vis-a-vis 
public administration would only be completed when the pre-1990 generation of 
administrative personnel that had been socialised under and into the socialist type 
administration dominated by the MSZMP, were replaced by a new generation of 
administrators. As a result, the Fidesz propagated the need to recruit the young 
generation that was naturally unaffiliated with the socialist past. The government 
programme had already included the goal to promote a career in the civil service that 
is attractive for the young professionals and therefore, the reform of the career 
structure could serve as a Fidesz-specific means to implement a change of regime 
policy towards public administration and to build a future basis within the 
administration. Consequently, the radical change of the classification system
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proposed by the Prime Minister's Office met the political interest of the Fidesz 
because it benefited in particular civil servants in their early career stages.
Thirdly, the anti-communist position of the Fidesz had heavily shaped the personnel 
policy strategy of the government in 1998 and thereafter. The Fidesz regarded the 
Horn government essentially as a reincarnation of a pre-transition socialist 
government, especially due to the partial return of many senior officials that had 
already been in office during the Nemeth government. Bearing in mind again that the 
communist/anti-communist cleavage had come to reinforce the dominant socio­
cultural cleavage since the early/mid 1990s, the members of the Orban government 
felt entirely unprepared to work with state secretaries and to a great extent senior 
civil servants who had co-operated with the Horn government. As a result, in 1998, 
from the point of view of the Orban government, it was virtually impossible to trust 
the senior bureaucrats in office in 1998 and hence none of them qualified for an 
appointment to the top ranks in the ministries. At the same time, the Orban 
government re-activated many state secretaries who had gathered experience in 
administration in the early 1990s and recruited a large number of appointees who had 
previously not worked in the administration. Because many of these new appointees 
were in their thirties, the Fidesz was accused of following a strategy that 'a young 
bureaucrat is a good bureaucrat'.
However, a by-product of this approach was the difficulty to reconcile the personnel 
policy strategy of the Fidesz with the proposition of the Prime Minister's Office to 
establish a separate senior executive service that would be subject to the exercise of 
less political discretion than the senior civil service hitherto. During the inter- 
ministerial negotiations after October 2000, Orban had made clear that it shall be a 
prerogative of the government to determine the criteria for the selection of members 
of this new elite corps. This position results primarily from Orban's demand that the 
access to the senior executive service should be open to the senior appointees that 
had only been recruited into the administration after the summer of 1998. Hence, 
Orban rejected the plan to gradually fill the positions of the senior executive service 
or to formalise particular entry criteria such as a certain number of years spent in the 
civil service in the Act.
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Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that the majority of state secretaries and 
senior civil servants that had been recruited by the Orban government supported 
Orban's perspective to keep the access to the senior executive service open for at least 
some time to come. State secretaries and senior civil servants of other ministries had 
not been participant in the inter-ministerial negotiations between the Prime Minister's 
Office and the Ministry of Interior, but it is inconceivable that they had not voiced 
their position towards the establishment of a body of super-bureaucrats during the 
one and a half years that led to the adoption of the 2001 Civil Service Act. As a 
result, it was practically impossible for the Prime Minister's Office to stick to its 
original reform proposal, which would have implied a reduction of the degree of 
formal political discretion over personnel policy to the extent that the senior 
executive service was concerned.
Given Orban's position towards the future composition of the senior executive 
service, the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Minister's Office agreed that the Civil 
Service Act should contain provisions for the adoption of a Government Decree that 
regulates the admission to the senior executive service. At the time of negotiating and 
writing the Civil Service Act, the representatives of the Prime Minister's Office did 
not regard this low level of restrictions upon the possible future exercise of political 
discretion as a failure or defeat of their proposal because they expected that the 
Government Decree would establish the same set of institutional arrangements, 
which they had originally envisaged for the Civil Service Act. However, after the 
adoption of the Act in late May 2001, it turned out that Orban selected a new Deputy 
State Secretary, thereby effectively sidelining both Stumpf and Balazs, to prepare the 
Decree and that the criteria for the selection and recruitment of members of the senior 
executive service became much less restrictive than originally planned by the Prime 
Minister's Office.
In addition, in the meetings between the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of 
Interior, thorny questions were resolved on the spot and attempts were made to 
reconcile the reform proposals of both ministries. For instance, provisions were 
included that extended the scope of the Civil Service Act to uniformed public sector
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employees by allowing senior officials of the police access to the senior executive 
service. Moreover, the initial resistance of line ministries to vest the authority of the 
appointment and management of the senior executive service by the Prime Minister 
and the Prime Minister’s Office could be overcome because the Administrative State 
Secretaries of the line ministries were given the right to recommend candidates for 
recruitment to the Prime Minister's Office. Hence, the negotiations between the 
Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Interior were constructive after Prime 
Minister Orban had effectively enforced the co-operation of the two ministries.
At the same time, the two ministries and the Fidesz more generally did not encounter 
any objections from the coalition partners MDF and FKGP. With respect to the 
MDF, this consensus derives from the close political co-operation between the Fidesz 
and the MDF at the electoral level, as both parties formed an electoral coalition with 
joint candidates for national elections in several districts, which established a kind of 
dependence of the MDF on the Fidesz for electoral survival. The FKGP, by contrast, 
played only a minor role in the final preparation of the Civil Service draft Act. Until 
autumn 2000, the FKGP had no stakes in civil service reform because the main 
division was about the assignment of functional authority to either the Ministry of 
Interior or the Prime Minster's Office and the compromise between the Fidesz and 
the FKGP in 1998 implied that the FKGP would refrain from political intervention 
into the 'Fidesz-territory' unless major political disagreement arises.
By the winter of 2000/2001, however, the FKGP had essentially lost its political 
action capabilities to potentially oppose the Fidesz' civil service reform project 
because the FKGP was internally deeply divided. In February 2001, the FKGP 
President and Minister of Agriculture, Torgyan, had to resign over budget 
irregularities in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Political State Secretary, Szabadi, 
was charged for corruption. In January, a small group of FKGP MPs had already split 
from the parliamentary faction of the FKGP to form an independent group and was 
eventually joined by other FKGP MPs. This groups was supported by the Minister of 
Environment, Turi-Kovacs. Moreover, Imre Boros, Minister without portfolio for 
PHARE affairs and interim Minister of Agriculture left the FKGP. As a result, the 
internal conflicts of the junior coalition partner paralysed potential opposition inside
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the government and facilitated the adoption of the draft Act in parliament, as 
independent MPs supported the government. Moreover, in parliament, the Fidesz 
could usually also rely on the votes of the extreme right wing MIEP. Under other 
conditions, it is likely that at least the FKGP would have been reluctant to endorse 
issues like the prime ministerial right to appoint and transfer senior executive staff 
because it would have undermined the autonomy of FKGP ministers over their 
ministries.
As a result, the draft act was eventually submitted to the government and, in March 
2001, it was submitted to Parliament. The amendment of the Civil Service Act was 
adopted at the end of May 2001 with the votes of the governing parties in parliament 
and against heavy criticism of the opposition parties. First, the SZDSZ maintained its 
position of the previous years. It rejected the substantial pay increase both for 
programmatic and electoral reasons. As a party favouring a policy of low tax 
burdens, it argued that the budget surplus should be passed on to the electorate by 
reducing tax levels rather than raising civil servants' wages. Moreover, the SZDSZ 
enjoyed too little electoral support within the administration in order to justify pay 
increases explicitly for the civil service on electoral grounds, which anyway tend to 
benefit the incumbent parties and not the opposition parties. Second, being a small 
party that is unlikely to become a senior government party, the SZDSZ was opposed 
to the centralising elements and the elements for strengthening political control as 
they had done during the Horn government.
The MSZP primarily rejected the legislative proposal because of the arrangements 
governing the creation of a senior executive service. At the same time, they had 
difficulties to find viable arguments against other elements of the reform. On 
programmatic grounds the MSZP was still not committed to civil service reform. 
However, the MSZP became electorally trapped with respect to the wage increases in 
the civil service and the public sector more generally. On the one hand, the MSZP 
continued to have a much stronger electoral base in the administration than the 
Fidesz, but had failed to implement wage increases while being in government. 
Because the Fidesz sought to implement wage increase for the civil service, the 
Fidesz could benefit from this policy at the expense of the MSZP. Moreover, the civil
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service unions were only opposed to the pay related elements of the civil service 
reform to the extent that they concerned the much higher remuneration increases for 
senior and higher ranks in comparison to lower and middle ranks. Hence, the 
opposition of the MSZP risked a conflict with the civil service unions. Therefore, 
MSZP opposition in parliament could only target details of the pay reform such as an 
uneven distribution of wage increases for civil servants; an argument in which the 
MSZP finally gained support from the civil service unions. Yet, with its opposition to 
the civil service reform in general, the MSZP somewhat risked to further alienate 
civil servants at future elections.
Finally, the MSZP did not object to the creation of a senior executive service as a 
matter of principle, but it was opposed to the weak procedural constraints for the 
appointment of senior executive staff. Moreover, it was opposed to a stand-by clause 
that would grant five years continuous pay to senior executive staff whose 
assignment had been invoked. The MSZP argued that this gives the Fidesz-led 
government the opportunity to politically co-opt the higher levels of the civil service. 
Moreover, the MSZP was concerned that it would be forced to pay and care for many 
appointees of the Orban government because, at that time, it could reasonably expect 
to return to government at least at some point in the future. Therefore, both the 
MSZP and the civil service unions argued that the senior executive service should be 
filled gradually with a maximum of 100 members per year. Moreover, they advocated 
the arrangement that only long serving civil servants, i.e. after five years of service, 
should be eligible for recruitment, as this would prove the party political neutrality of 
senior executive staff.
In the spring of 2002, when the MSZP and the SZDSZ won the national elections by 
a small margin and formed a governing coalition under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Medgyessy, it became one of the first decisions of the new government to 
quickly revise the rules governing the senior executive service. The key issue 
concerned the five year stand-by clause for members of the senior executive service 
whose assignment the Medgyessy government wanted to revoke because it obliged 
the government to continuously pay a high salary for at least some officials who were 
clearly associated with the former governing parties. When the Civil Service Act was
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amended shortly after the investiture of the Medgyessy government, a new stand-by 
clause of two years was therefore introduced still before the positional assignment of 
inherited members of the senior executive service was revoked. This two year stand­
by clause provides an interesting compromise. On the one hand, it recognises the 
obligation to pay a salary to some inherited members of the senior executive service 
for two years. On the other hand and quite in accordance with the 1997 reform 
process, it reflects the interest of new state secretaries who gained an automatic 
appointment to the senior executive service in the 2002 amendment to draw a 
severance pay in case of political dismissal after a future change of government. At 
the same time, however, the Medgyessy government decided to introduce more 
restrictive eligibility criteria for other civil servants who seek membership in the 
senior executive service. In other words, as a governing party, the MSZP has only 
partially modified the rules governing the senior executive service in accordance with 
the criticism it had raised during the debate of the 2001 amendment in Parliament.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, this Chapter has shown that, in contrast to the first two major civil 
service reforms in 1990/92 and 1997, the 2001 reform of the civil service was clearly 
a politically initiated project. The reform reflected primarily in the ambition of 
Minister Stumpf to enhance the coherence and the policy-making capacity of the 
central government apparatus and was already spelled out in the government 
programme in 1998. However, the political ambition for reform originated to a good 
extent in the poor performance incentive of senior and higher ranking career civil 
servants and its negative impact on the policy-making capacity of the central 
government apparatus. As a consequence, Minister Stumpf and the senior officials in 
the Prime Minister's Office prepared a fundamental civil service reform, which, 
however, implied only a partial de-politicisation of the civil service system when 
viewed through the lens of political discretion by trying to establish a personnel 
policy regime that allows structured politicisation for a small elite of senior officials, 
namely the members of a senior executive service.
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However, both the political interest of the senior governing party, Fidesz, and the 
career interest of the state secretaries and senior civil servants that had only been 
recruited into the administration after summer 1998 contradicted the attempt to 
partially reduce the degree of formal political discretion. These opposing positions 
crystallised in the intervention of Prime Minister Orban in the negotiations of the 
final draft of the Civil Service Act. As a consequence, a fundamental reform was 
enacted in 2001, but, from the point of view of political discretion, only the 




In the Introductory Chapter of this thesis, I identified the discrepancy between 
attempts to establish professional, de-politicised civil services and continuing 
politicisation of personnel policy as one of the major puzzles of post-communist civil 
service developments. Having completed the journey across civil service reform and 
policy developments in post-communist Hungary, we can derive two major 
conclusions. Firstly, assuming that civil service reforms have led to the enactment of 
civil service legislation, the Hungarian case suggests that the above mentioned 
discrepancy has resulted from the adoption of civil service legislation that 
incorporates discretionary instruments, which governments and their ministers can 
use and have also used to determine the outcomes of personnel policy. Secondly, in 
Chapter 4, I argued that Hungary differs from other countries in post-communist 
Europe in that it had the most favourable conditions for embarking on a civil service 
reform that could support the de-politicisation of personnel policy. The analysis of 
civil service reform and policy developments in Hungary therefore suggests that the 
context of post-communist politics does not provide conditions that are particularly 
conducive for the de-politicisation of personnel policy and the establishment of civil 
service systems that have the capacity to prevent a potential politicisation of 
personnel policy. This Conclusion briefly summarises the main findings of the 
empirical analysis and puts the Hungarian developments in a comparative post­
communist perspective.
In fact, Chapter 7 showed that the conditions for the establishment of a professional, 
de-politicised civil service in Hungary appeared to be even more favourable than the 
theoretical discussion had suggested. In Hungary, civil service reform did not come 
on to the agenda all of a sudden after the change of regime. Rather, it had been an 
important issue on the administrative reform agenda for nearly one decade before the 
change of regime and strong proponents of reform had emerged. They included the 
trade unions, but also academics from the National School of Public Administration, 
who were eventually appointed to key positions in the Ministry of Interior during the
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Nemeth government (1988-1990) and retained their positions following the first free 
elections and the investiture of the Antall government. Moreover, senior and higher- 
ranking bureaucrats, who turned from being opponents prior to 1989 to being strong 
supporters of civil service reform thereafter, were crucial in promoting reform efforts, 
in particular, during the Round Table Talks of 1989. As a consequence, much of the 
conceptual and theoretical preparations that was necessary for the initiation of a civil 
service reform right after the change of regime had already been completed and 
individuals with the appropriate skill, determination and experience, in particular 
Administrative State Secretary Verebelyi, held senior ranking positions in the 
administration to support the reform efforts of the first post-communist government 
led by Prime Minister Antall. However, despite these favourable starting conditions, 
the initiation and preparation of Hungary's civil service reform right after the first 
democratic elections cannot merely be regarded as a continuation of previous reform 
activities. Rather, it was conditional upon the incentive of the new Prime Minister 
Antall to work with the senior and higher-ranking bureaucrats who had already been 
in office during the Nemeth government.
At first glance, the change of government that was embedded in a change of regime 
and the 'over-politicised personnel policy1 (Goetz/Wollmann 2001) practice of the 
communist regime suggested that the Antall government was confronted with serious 
problems of political trust when taking office in May 1990. However, I showed that, 
shortly after taking office, the Nemeth government increasingly dissociated itself 
from the ruling communist party, MSZMP, and effectively became an 'interim 
government' (Linz/Stepan 1996). In this context, it began to break with the over­
politicised personnel policy practice of the past by promoting reform-minded 
bureaucrats and by recruiting academics into the senior ranks of the state 
administration to prepare the policy reforms for the time after the change of regime. 
Moreover, I argued that the new government and especially Prime Minister Antall 
were able to mitigate problems of political trust in relation to senior and higher- 
ranking bureaucrats who had been in office during the last socialist government 
because they had an opportunity to learn about bureaucratic policy orientations 
during the Round Table Talks of Hungary's pacted transition. At the same time, the 
Round Table Talks provided a setting for senior bureaucrats to demonstrate their
348
willingness to co-operate with future, democratically elected governments. Finally, 
Antall recognised already during the Round Table Talks the need to work with 
bureaucrats who had begun their career at some point during the communist period, 
for their expertise would be indispensable for the success of the radical policy 
changes that were involved in the transformation process.
As a consequence, Chapter 6 demonstrated that, after taking office, Prime Minister 
Antall sought to work primarily with senior and higher-ranking bureaucrats who were 
effectively inherited from the communist regime. Although a large majority of 
bureaucrats in the most senior ranks were replaced, Antall's strategy to recruit most 
first generation state secretaries from the lower managing ranks of the ministerial 
bureaucracy can be considered as an attempt to take advantage of existing 
bureaucratic expertise. Consequently, the appointment of Administrative State 
Secretaries like Verebelyi but also Kajdi and Bogdan who prepared the Temporary 
Act on State Secretaries, and hence the continuation of previous reform activities, 
was only made possible by the particular circumstances that accompanied Hungary's 
transition to democracy.
In this context, Antall initiated first the preparation of the Temporary Act on State 
Secretaries and, shortly, after a far-reaching civil service reform that aimed at de- 
politicising personnel policy. These reforms, however, also reflected the career 
interests of senior and higher-ranking bureaucrats, who feared that future changes in 
government would undermine their career prospects in public administration. 
Moreover, the consensus among the members of the government and the senior 
bureaucracy was reinforced by their view that the transition to democracy requires 
the establishment of a professional civil service that is politically neutral and 
independent from political interference as well as‘their desire to follow Western 
European models of public administration.
However, the Antall government did ultimately not succeed in enacting the proposed 
civil service reform due to the emerging veto power of dissenting factions within the 
governing parties. In particular, the radical factions within the senior governing party, 
MDF, perceived major problems of political trust, as many of them had not had an
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opportunity to alleviate these problems during the Round Table Talks, and more 
importantly, because their radical anti-communist position dramatically reinforced 
the perceived ideological and policy differences between former socialist 
governments and the first post-communist government. As a result, the radical MDF 
factions did not expect that the expertise of inherited bureaucrats would facilitate the 
preparation and implementation of the government's programme. Rather, they 
advocated far-reaching personnel changes in the ministerial bureaucracy, but the 
radical MDF factions had little direct influence over decisions to shape the 
composition of the ministerial bureaucracy, as they were underrepresented in the 
cabinet. As a consequence, these opponents of a fast-track de-politicisation of the 
Hungarian civil service were reluctant to commit towards the non-intervention into 
personnel policy because of a perceived distrust in the loyalty of bureaucrats who 
were inherited from the communist regime. Instead, they demanded tough transitory 
rules and/or an open system of allocation of civil servants to the ministerial 
organisation in order to enhance trust in relation to the ministerial bureaucracy at 
some point in the future.
Although Prime Minister Antall was initially well in command of both his cabinet 
and the factions of the governing parties in Parliament, he lost the capacity to impose 
the government's will upon parliament approximately six months after taking office, 
i.e. when the first major political crisis in the autumn of 1990 ended the honeymoon 
period of the new government. The main argument that finally convinced the 
opposing camps in parliament to support the government proposal, and not to further 
delay the adoption of civil service legislation, was the prospect of bringing Hungary 
back in line with European systems of public administration rather than opting for a 
Hungarian Sonderweg. However, the formal-legal framework that was adopted in the 
spring of 1992 incorporated a variety of discretionary instruments, which 
governments and their ministers could use to determine the outcomes of personnel 
policy, and, as I showed in Chapter 6, the Antall government and its successor 
governments have also done so.
Accordingly, I argued in Chapter 5 that Hungary's civil service system moved from a 
personnel policy regime that allows unbounded politicisation, which is characterised
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first and foremost by the absence of specific civil service legislation, to a regime that 
allows open politicisation. In a personnel policy regime that allows open 
politicisation, the government of the day, or its ministers, has the authority to take 
decisions that concern the admission and dismissal, the appointment and transfer, and 
the remuneration of civil servants, while the exercise of this authority is subject to 
only minor procedural constraints such as general entry criteria. As a result, the 
government has the discretion to determine the composition and remuneration of the 
civil service by recruiting appointees from inside and outside public administration 
and by adjusting the remuneration levels of individual civil servants subject to few or 
no restrictions. In other words, although a civil service is functionally defined in 
public law, the boundaries between politics and administration remain highly 
permeable.
This conclusion applied especially to Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries at 
the apex of the ministerial bureaucracy whose allocation continued to be governed by 
the Temporary Act on State Secretaries. However, I argued that the allocation of 
senior civil servants, that is Heads of Departments, their Deputies and Heads of 
Divisions, and in fact the entire non-managing civil service became subject to the 
exercise of indirect political discretion. In the Hungarian context, indirect political 
discretion refers to the possibility of Ministers to exercise political discretion over 
personnel policy through the Administrative State Secretary, for an Administrative 
State Secretary is hardly constrained in taking personnel policy decisions, but his 
appointment is itself subject to potential open politicisation. Therefore, I concluded 
in Chapter 5 that the allocation of the entire senior civil service became subject to the 
potential open politicisation of personnel policy processes. In fact, the same 
conclusion applied to the wider non-managing civil service, but I argued that that 
ministers are unlikely to display a great interest in the management of civil servants 
below the managerial ranks. Moreover, although the 1992 Civil Service Act 
established a remuneration system, in which civil servants' pay was linked to a 
detailed classification system with clearly defined rights for supplementary pay, the 
analysis revealed that the standardised remuneration system coexisted with important 
discretionary schemes. In particular, the so-called personal remuneration list of 
Ministers, which applied to all ranks of civil servants in the same way, had the
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potential to offset the entire standardised remuneration system. Consequently, I 
argued that the formal-legal framework governing the Hungarian civil service after 
the 1990/92 reform did not have the capacity to prevent a politicisation of personnel 
policy in neither the domain of allocating civil servants to the ministerial 
organisation nor in the domain of setting their levels of remuneration.
However, in Chapter 4 ,1 argued that no other country in post-communist Europe had 
similarly favourable conditions for the completion of a civil service reform that 
would have provided the institutional conditions for an early de-politicisation of 
personnel policy processes. While the attempted civil service reform (partially) failed 
only in the last stage of the reform process, that is, due to the veto power of opposing 
factions within the governing parties in parliament, I argued that the other countries, 
with the exception of Poland, had little prospect of even reaching the stage of 
successfully initiating a civil service reform. Indeed, Poland had similar starting 
conditions than Hungary, for Poland's mode of transition to democracy also classifies 
as a pacted transition. However, regardless of any potential civil service activities 
before the change of regime, for instance, Poland was exceptional in communist 
Europe in that it was the only country that had adopted legislation in 1982 that was 
more or less comparable to civil service legislation, the first post-communist 
government led by Prime Minister Mazowiecki had much less favourable starting 
conditions than the Antall government in Hungary.
On the one hand, the Polish Round Table Talks are likely to have provided a setting 
where representatives of the democratic opposition could gauge the reliability of 
inherited senior bureaucrats, while bureaucrats could signal their willingness to co­
operate with the new government, which eventually encouraged the Mazowiecki
O -l
government to work primarily with inherited senior bureaucrats. On the other hand, 
however, we have to take into account that the Mazowiecki government was formed 
after the semi-democratic elections of 1989 and that it had to co-govem with 
President Jaruzelski from the communist party. Hence, the political context of the 
Mazowiecki government corresponded much more closely to that of the Nemeth
81 These insights originate from personal conversations with Radek Zubek from the London School of 
Economics, Department of Government.
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government in Hungary, which was effectively lacking the legitimacy and the 
political capacity to initiate a far-reaching reform of public administration without 
the consent of the parties of the democratic opposition outside government. However, 
in Hungary, the window of opportunity remained open for a very short time after the 
change of regime, which implies that the protracted nature of the Polish transition 
and the ensuing government instability in the period after 1991 may have prevented 
the initiation of more ambitious civil service reform efforts until the mid 1990s (cf. 
Wiatr 1996).
By contrast, in Chapter 4 ,1 argued that the other post-communist countries entered 
the immediate post-transition period with conditions that were even less conducive to 
the initiation and completion of a civil service reform with de-politicising effects 
upon personnel policy. Firstly, governments that took office in countries that 
underwent a transition by regime collapse such as Czechoslovakia but also the Baltic 
State, although they tend to be classified as transitions through state independence, 
did not have an opportunity to mitigate problems of political trust before taking 
office. Hence, although these first post-communist governments appear to have had 
difficulties to find alternative personnel for the senior ranks of the bureaucracy (e.g. 
Vanagunas 1999 for the three Baltic States), they initiated changes in the ministerial 
bureaucracy to the extent that they could. Moreover, even if the establishment of a 
professional, de-politicised civil service had become an issue in political discourse, 
the analysis of Hungarian civil service reform developments suggests that the new 
governments, which were exclusively formed by parties or movements of the former 
democratic opposition, would have hardly embarked on a de-politicisation of the 
civil service. The reason is that - bearing in mind the position of the radical MDF 
factions in parliament during the first Hungarian civil service reform - they would 
have been reluctant to commit to a mistrusted bureaucracy not to intervene into 
personnel policy.
By contrast, countries such as Bulgaria or Romania who had undergone an imposed 
regime change, which led to the formation of governments by communist successor 
parties after the first free elections, did not provide conditions that were conducive 
for the establishment of a professional, de-politicised civil service either. Although it
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is much more difficult to set the Hungarian case in comparison to these countries, the 
literature suggests little reason to expect the initiation of a civil service reform. As 
Verheijen (1999c: 96) argues for the first post-communist government in Bulgaria 
led by Prime Minister Lukanov from the Bulgarian Socialist Party, "[t]here was a 
natural coalition between remaining old administrative cadres and politicians from 
the re-named Communist Party, based on political loyalty and the need for both 
politicians and civil servants to 'survive' under the new conditions". In other words, 
in countries ruled by communist successor parties in the immediate post-transition 
period, the over-politicised personnel policy dynamics of the pre-transition period 
were most likely to persist.
Consequently, the analysis of civil service reform developments in Hungary suggests 
that the only reasonable prospect for the de-politicisation of the civil service arises, if 
parties of the democratic opposition form the first democratically elected government 
whose members have participated in the Round Table Talks of a pacted transition 
and if these politicians are able to control suspicious forces within and outside 
government. The first government in Hungary was the only one in post-communist 
Europe that came close to this scenario, but it was unable to overcome the resistance 
of opposing groups in parliament, and therefore it can ultimately only be attributed to 
the desire of the new political and administrative elites to follow Western European 
models of public administration that the first civil service reform did not fail all 
together. As a consequence, we can conclude quite in accordance with the insights of 
the transition literature that the mode of transition and the initial constellation of 
actors after the first free elections have mattered a lot for the civil service reform 
trajectories in post-communist Europe. However, in terms of reform outcomes, the 
analysis leads to the conclusion that, directly after the change of regime, the road to 
the establishment of professional, de-politicised civil services in post-communist 
Europe posed too many obstacles to ultimately lead to a rapid de-politicisation of 
personnel policy and the establishment of formal-legal frameworks that provided the 
institutional conditions to prevent the politicisation of personnel policy processes.
In Chapter 4, I also argued that the prospects of establishing professional, de- 
politicised civil service in post-communist Europe do not improve as time goes on.
354
First, if, after a change of government, a government formed by a communist 
successor party is replaced with a government formed by parties of the former 
democratic opposition, it can be expected that more or less the same dynamics ensue, 
which other countries experienced earlier after a transition by regime collapse. 
Second, if a government formed by parties of the former democratic opposition is 
replaced with a government formed by other parties of the former democratic 
opposition or newly formed parties, again similar dynamics can be expected unless 
the ideological and policy differences between both governments are comparably 
minor, which would reduce the salience of governments' problems of political trust in 
relation to the ministerial bureaucracy. Third, I argued that the prospects are not more 
promising either, if a government formed by parties of the democratic opposition is 
replaced by a government that is formed by a communist successor party. Although a 
communist successor party is likely to be less troubled by problems of political trust 
because it will know a comparably large proportion of ministerial bureaucrats from 
the pre-transition period, it will still have an incentive to respond to the politicisation 
tendencies of its predecessor in government. Moreover, there is good reason to 
assume that a communist successor party will mind that some or many ministerial 
bureaucrats had chosen to co-operate with the previous government. As a 
consequence, I argued that personnel policy processes will also be politicised like in 
the first two cases above and that it cannot be expected that major civil service 
reform activities will ensue.
In fact, the analysis of the second and the third Hungarian civil service reform in 
Chapter 8 and 9 did again show that the conditions for a successful civil service 
reform in Hungary appeared to be better than suggested in the theoretical discussion. 
However, it also helped to clarify why it is hard to expect that the prospects of de­
politicisation improve in later periods. Bearing in mind the delicate circumstances 
that led to his transfer from the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Minister's Office in 
1994, the appointment of Verebelyi as Government Commissioner for the 
Modernisation of Public Administration and the investiture of the Socialist-Liberal 
government did initially promise to be the formula to finally establish a professional, 
de-politicised civil service in Hungary. First, located in the Prime Minister's Office 
and directly answerable to Prime Minister Horn, the reformers around Verebelyi
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appeared to have gained more institutional leverage over the course of reform. 
Moreover, the establishment of the office of the Government Commissioner provided 
the mandate to prepare a comprehensive public administration reform programme 
rather than an piecemeal reform that would only lead to incremental changes at the 
margins of the existing civil service system. Finally, the formation of the Socialist- 
Liberal government that stood for an ideology of modernisation and Westernisation 
and the more than two thirds majority of the governing parties in parliament 
promised to represent the political conditions necessary for a successful completion 
of a reform that had not reached its objectives in 1992 and for the correction of 
'dysfunctional developments' that had increasingly become apparent since 1992 such 
as the politicisation of personnel policy and the deteriorating wage levels of civil 
servants relative to private sector employees.
However, as it turned out, the reform proposal got stuck in the coalition dynamics 
before the 1998 national elections, and it contradicted both the personnel policy 
incentives of the governing parties and the career interests of senior officials who had 
only been brought back into the administration in 1994 and thereafter. First, the Horn 
government had replaced a large proportion of senior officials that had been recruited 
and promoted by the Antall government, in particular state secretaries, unless these 
officials had voluntarily resigned when the government took office in the summer of 
1994. In their place, the government tended to appoint senior officials who had been 
recruited from other settings than the ministerial bureaucracy. The MSZP took 
advantage of its legacy as the former communist state party by bringing back officials 
who had already gathered experience in senior positions before 1990 and by 
recruiting new senior officials from various backgrounds of its wide-reaching social 
networks. Similarly, to the extent that the junior coalition partner SZDSZ sought to 
replace inherited senior officials, it tended to recruit personnel from social sectors, in 
which the party was well anchored. As a consequence, the two governing parties had 
effectively no interest in changing the status quo. Moreover, the new appointees who 
had only been recruited into the administration in 1994 or thereafter had nothing to 
gain from the de-politicisation of the senior civil service. However, they supported 
the elements of the civil service proposal that aimed at adjusting their wage levels to
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comparably private sector wages and at providing some kind of insurance against 
political dismissal, given the possibility of future changes of government.
The disinterest of the governing parties in a far-reaching civil service reform was 
reinforced by the peculiar coalition dynamics in the period before the 1998 national 
elections, which resulted from the anticipated election victory of the MSZP and the 
gradual weakening of the SZDSZ. In this context, the SZDSZ did no longer advocate 
anything else but incremental policy change, while the MSZP could reasonably lean 
back and wait with a possible reform until after the upcoming elections. As a result, 
the ambitious civil service reform proposal that was outlined in the Public 
Administration Reform Programme of 1996 was transformed into a small-scale 
institutional adjustment of the status quo that would aim at alleviating the most 
pressing problems of the day. However, this implied that the existing discretionary 
instruments to politically determine personnel policy outcomes were left untouched. 
Rather, additional discretionary instruments were introduced such as the possibility 
for Ministers to set up ministerial cabinets, to grant civil servants a performance- 
related bonus payment as judged by Ministers and the right to severance pay in case 
of political dismissal.
Consequently, the second reform of the Hungarian civil service suggests that the 
investiture of a government formed by a communist successor party, alone or in 
coalition with other parties, does indeed not improve the prospects of establishing a 
de-politicised civil service in post-communist countries. The reason is that although a 
government of this type can be assumed to have less problems of political trust in 
relation to the ministerial bureaucracy when compared to parties of the former 
democratic opposition, attempts to establish institutional mechanisms that restrict the 
open politicisation of personnel policy contradict the desire to allow affiliated 
officials to commute between public administration, the private sector and even 
politics.
Moreover, the Hungarian case suggests that a communist successor party may be 
much less concerned with the consequences of politicising personnel policy 
processes. In Chapter 2, I argued that restrictions upon political interference into
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personnel policy, i.e. a low degree of formal political discretion, serve as institutional 
mechanisms that can enhance the informational role of ministerial bureaucracies in 
the process of policy formulation and development. Conversely, in the absence of 
such restrictions, bureaucrats who seek to pursue a career in public administration 
will have less incentive to share their expertise with the government, to invest in the 
development of expertise, and, we might add, to enter the administration as a career 
civil servant in the first place. If a government can exercise a considerable degree of 
political discretion, a bureaucrat will have to demonstrate some political commitment 
to the government's cause in order to gain a promotion or to stay in the senior ranks. 
Moreover, even if a bureaucrat is promoted on the basis of his performance, a future 
government will have difficulties to trust the bureaucrats because his career 
progression will be associated with the exercise of political discretion by a previous 
government. As a consequence, I argued that a high degree of formal political 
discretion as well as the subsequent exercise of political discretion can enhance trust 
between governments and bureaucrats, but it can also be expected that it will have 
negative repercussions for the expertise basis of the ministerial bureaucracy, for 
governments will almost inevitably have to work with inherited bureaucrats below 
the very top ranks who have no incentive to perform well.
In Chapter 8, I argued that it was a major concern of the Public Administration 
Reform Programme to strengthen the professional capacity of the civil service. 
Moreover, the reformers around Verebelyi had identified the politicisation of 
personnel policy as one of the major obstacles for improving the expertise basis of 
the central government apparatus. However, the personnel policy approach of the 
MSZP suggests that a government formed by a communist successor party may 
perceive less of a need to establish restrictions upon the exercise of political 
discretion to enhance the informational role of the ministerial bureaucracy; at least 
for quite some time after the change of regime. Rather, as the former state party, a 
communist successor party can typically rely on extensive networks of professionals 
from various sectors in society. As a result, it may have the luxury of at least partially 
substituting the loss of expertise within the ministerial bureaucracy by tapping the 
expertise of affiliated professionals, who may have even gathered experience in the 
administration before 1990.
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This leads us finally to the third reform of the Hungarian civil service that was 
discussed in Chapter 9. Like the previous reform, the third reform did initially also 
seem to benefit from favourable conditions in which it was initiated. First, the broad 
outlines of the civil service reform were already presented in the government 
programme, which indicated political commitment to the completion of the reform. 
Second, the reform was eventually initiated and supported from the beginning to the 
end by the Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office, Stumpf. After taking office, 
Stumpf re-organised the central government apparatus in order to enhance the co­
ordination capacity of the government. In this context, Stumpf and the reformers in 
the Prime Minister's Office also advocated civil service reform measures such as a 
fundamental revision of the career and remuneration system to attract young talent 
into the administration and to retain highly skilled personnel in the managerial ranks. 
Hence, the reform proposal stood well in the tradition of the 1996 Public 
Administration Reform Programme. In addition, they proposed the establishment of a 
senior executive service under the leadership of the Prime Minister to enhance the 
policy-making capacity of the central government and to better integrate government 
operations.
On the one hand, the reform proposal did not touch the existing institutional basis of 
allocating state secretaries and senior civil servants to the ministerial organisation, as 
it was politically undesired to impose across-the-board restrictions upon the exercise 
of political discretion to recruit, appoint and dismiss senior officials. Hence, it was 
still possible to fill positions in the ministerial bureaucracy in accordance with 
personnel policy strategies of open politicisation. However, the innovative element of 
the reform was the proposal to combine the existing type of personnel policy regime 
with institutional arrangements that point in the direction of a regime that allows 
structured politicisation. In a personnel policy regime that allows structured 
politicisation, governments and their ministers can influence the appointment and 
transfer of civil servants but not their admission to and their dismissal from the civil 
service nor their levels of remuneration. Therefore, I argued in Chapter 2 that the 
potential politicisation of personnel policy processes is structured in the sense that 
the pool of eligible candidates that may be appointed to by the government to
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administrative positions is limited to internal candidates only. In particular, the 
attempt to establish a senior executive service as a separate elite corps of top civil 
servants who have already gathered experience in administration, are selected on the 
basis of merit, and enjoy privileges such as higher levels of both remuneration and 
job protection, aimed at providing an incentive for high-flyers to pursue a career in 
public administration.
However, notwithstanding the conflict between the Ministry of Interior and the Prime 
Minister's Office over the allocation of reform management authority, Chapter 9 
showed that the reform proposal contradicted the interests of both the Fidesz and the 
senior officials who had only been recruited in the summer of 1998 and thereafter. 
First, in Chapter 6, I argued that the Orban government had even less incentive to 
work with inherited senior bureaucrats when taking office in the summer of 1998 
than the Horn government. The large majority of inherited state secretaries had been 
recruited and/or promoted by the Horn government and many of them had already 
held senior positions before 1990 but not in the later Antall years. Moreover, the 
wholesale change of government in 1998, the continuous polarisation of inter-party 
competition and especially the radical anti-communist position of the governing 
parties reinforced the perception of the members of the Orban government that the 
Horn government was essentially a reincarnation of a pre-transition socialist 
government. As a consequence, the Orban government initiated sweeping changes in 
the senior ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy and brought in trusted appointees from 
outside public administration, many of whom had already been in office in the later 
years of the Antall government. Moreover, in particular the Fidesz relied heavily on 
the recruitment of senior officials from its growing social network, many of whom 
were young in accordance with the legacy of the Fidesz as a radical, anti-communist 
youth movement. However, the by-product of this approach was the difficulty to 
reconcile the personnel policy strategy of the Fidesz with the proposal of the Prime 
Minister's Office because it would have excluded most of the new appointees of the 
Orban government from eligibility for the senior executive service.
As a consequence, the 2001 reform did not lead to the establishment of an island of 
partially de-politicised bureaucratic career paths. Although elements of the formal-
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legal framework such as a higher level of protection from political dismissal point in 
the direction of a personnel policy regime that allows structured politicisation, the 
possibility to admit officials to the senior executive service has in effect become a 
new discretionary instrument at the disposal of the government, especially the Prime 
Minister. Moreover, the revision of the senior executive service provision in 2002 by 
the Medgyessy government has hardly affected this conclusion because the 
introduction of additional entry criteria for civil servants other than state secretaries 
has been offset by reducing the level of protection from political dismissal from the 
senior executive service. Consequently, more than one decade since the change of 
regime and three major civil service reforms have led to the emergence of a 
personnel policy regime that continues to allow governments and their ministers to 
openly politicise the allocation of civil servants to the ministerial organisation, which 
is particularly relevant for civil servants in managerial ranks.
By contrast, the 2001 reform succeeded in de-politicising the domain of setting civil 
servants’ levels of remuneration because the discretionary instruments to politically 
determine the outcomes of remuneration policy have been deleted from the Act. 
However, the analysis of the three major reforms since 1990 also suggested that the 
rules governing the remuneration of civil servants were only indirectly affected by 
problems of political trust. During the negotiations of the first reform, senior 
bureaucrats, especially from the economics ministries, effectively demanded the 
incorporation of institutional mechanisms that would allow the adjustment of their 
wage levels to comparable private sector wages. An adjustment to private sector 
wages would have been difficult to achieve, if civil servants' wages had been 
exclusively determined by the classification system. This would have created a 
degree of wage equality in the internal labour market of the civil service that was not 
mirrored in the external labour market, especially if one bears in mind that senior 
officials in the economics ministries had much more highly paid employment 
alternatives outside public administration than senior officials in the Ministry of 
Culture and Education. Hence, the incorporation of discretionary instruments into 
civil service legislation to determine the outcomes of remuneration policy was 
primarily the result of senior bureaucrats' personal interest.
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In addition, the Ministry of Finance was opposed to proposals that would have led to 
across-the-board increases of civil servants' remuneration levels due to the budgetary 
implications. Finally, I argued in Chapter 9 that governments' personnel policy 
strategies have affected the use of political discretion to determine the outcomes of 
remuneration policy. The reason is that the tendency of new governments to replace 
inherited senior officials with appointees who are primarily recruited from other 
settings than the ministerial bureaucracy exposes the internal labour market of the 
civil service to competitive pressures from the relevant external labour market. As a 
result, the Hungarian case suggests that, in post-communist settings, a de­
politicisation of the remuneration system is only possible, if civil servants' wage 
levels are brought in line with comparable private sector wages. Accordingly, I 
concluded in Chapter 9 that the de-politicisation of the remuneration regime in 2001 
can primarily be attributed to the enormous remuneration increases that were implied 
by the reform and the favourable budgetary situation at the time of the reform 
negotiations.
By contrast, in so far as the allocation regime is concerned, the third reform by and 
large confirmed the earlier finding that the prospects of establishing a civil service 
system that is independent from political interference do not necessarily improve as 
time goes on. In Hungary, problems of political trust in the relation between 
governments and senior bureaucrats have been reproduced from one election to 
another. Moreover, the case of the Orban government suggests that the radical anti­
communism of parties of the former democratic opposition reinforces problems of 
trust because governments formed by this type of parties tend to associate virtually 
the entire ministerial bureaucracy with the communist past. As a result, governments 
that are formed by parties of the former democratic opposition have little incentive to 
recruit their senior officials from the ministerial bureaucracy but tend to turn to their 
own, emerging social networks. Bearing in mind that the communist/anti-communist 
cleavage is one of two cleavages that has had most impact on the political dynamics 
in post-communist Europe (Elster et al. 1998; Kitschelt et al. 1999), the Hungarian 
case therefore suggests that it can hardly be expected that governments formed by
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parties of the former democratic opposition will support civil service reform
• • 82proposals that go beyond a personnel policy regime that allows open politicisation.
At the same time, the original intentions of the 2001 reform indicates that post­
communist governments are beginning to recognise that the continuous politicisation 
of personnel policy may have negative effects on the expertise basis of the ministerial 
bureaucracy, in particular below the very top ranks. Moreover, the 2001 reform 
demonstrates that governments are searching for creative solutions to enhance the 
informational role of the ministerial bureaucracy, while retaining the possibility to 
staff the bureaucracy with trusted appointees. While the most recent major reform of 
the Hungarian civil service has shown the difficulty in reconciling both goals, it also 
suggests that the story of civil service reform in post-communist Europe is still far 
from coming to an end.
82 Elster et al. (1998: 249) refer to the second key cleavage as an identity cleavage that divides "the 
population into members of the titular nation and religious, linguistic, and ethnic majorities of various 




Interviews in Hungary 
September 1999 and September 2002 (underlined on tape)
Agh, Attila. Professor of Political Science at University of Economics and Public 
Administration, Budapest. 19 June 2000.
Akar, Laszlo. Political State Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, 1994-1998. 21 June 2000.
August 2000. 13 June 2001.
Andor, Laszlo. Associate Professor of Economic Policy at University of Economics and 
Public Administration, Budapest. August 2000. April 2001.
Balazs, Istvan. Head of Department for Public Administration Reform, State Secretariat for 
Public Administration and Regional Policy, Prime Minister's Office, 1994-2002. 13 
February 2001. 24 April 2001. 20 June 2001.
Bende-Szabo, Gabor. Deputy Director of the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration.
September 1999. 31 August 2000. 20 June 2001.
Bod, Peter Akos. Minister of Industry and Trade, 1990-1991, and President of the Hungarian 
Central Bank, 1991-1994. 23Avril2001.
Bruszt, Laszlo. Professor of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest. 19 
June 2001.
Csapodi, Czaba. Head of Development Department, Ministry of Transport, 
Telecommunication and Water Management, since 1994. September 1999.
Csiki, Gyorgy. Head of Human Resources Department in the Ministry of Environment, 
1998-2002. 24 April 2001. 26 June 2001.
Czoma, Zsofia. Head of Division for International Affairs, State Secretariat for Public 
Administration and Regional Policy in the Prime Minister's Office, since 1998. 
September 1999. 29 August 2000. 24 April 2001. 21 June 2001.
Felkai, Laszlo. Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, 1998-2002. 3 April
2001.
Gyekiczki, Andras. Chief of Cabinet in the Ministry of Interior, 1994-1998. 1 September
2000. 6 April 2001. 20 April 2001. 15 June 2001. 28 August 2001.
Gyorgy, Istvan. Head of Civil Service Department in the Ministry of Interior, 1989-1991. 
Senior Researcher at National School of Public Administration. 5 April 2001.
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Gyurkovics, Sandor. Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Transport, 
Telecommunication and Water Management, 1990-1999. 19 June 2000. August
2000. 25 April 2001. 25 June 2001. 3 September 2001.
Hazafi, Zoltan. Deputy Head of the Civil Service Department in the Ministry of Interior.
September 1999. 29 August 2000.
Hegyi, Gyorgy. International Secretariat of the Hungarian Socialist Party. August 2000. 
September 2001.
Jaszai, Maria. Head of Department for Administration in the Ministry of Transport, 
Telecommunication and Water Management, since 1995. 29 August 2000. 15 June
2001 .
Javor, Andras. Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of National Welfare, 1990- 
1994. 25 June 2001.
Kajdi, Jozsef. Administrative State Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, 1990-1994. 30 
August 2000. 12 February 2001. 19 April 2001.
Kelen, Zsuzsa. Deputy Head of Department for Relations with the European Union in the 
Ministry of Finance. April 2001. September 2001.
Keleti, Gyorgy. Minister of Defence, 1994-1998. 26 June 2001.
Kiss, Sandor. President of Hungarian Civil and Public Service Union. 11 September 2001. 
Kiszely, Katalin. Member of Parliament, Faction of the Independent Smallholders' Party, 
FKGP, 1998-2002.18 June 2001.
Konya, Imre. Convenor of the Opposition Round Table Talks in 1989, Head of 
Parliamentary Group of the MDF, 1990-1993, and Minister of Interior, 1993-1994. 
19 June 2001.
Kovacs, Laszlo. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1994-1998 and since 2002. President of the 
Hungarian Socialist Party since 1998.1 September 2000.
Kupa, Mihaly. Minister of Finance, 1991-1993.18 June 2001.
Lorincz, Lajos. Professor of Public Administration at National School of Public 
Administration, Budapest. 18 June 2001.
Magyar, Balint. Minister of Culture and Education, 1996-1998. Minister of Education since 
2002.19 April 2001. 21 June 2001.
Peteri, Gabor. Research Programme Director Open Society Institute. August 2000.
Reti, Pal. Journalist for Economic policy issues at the weekly HVG. 20 June 2000.
Salamon, Eszter. Head of Department for Youth Policy in the Ministry of Culture and 
Education, 1994-1998.12 June 2001.
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Silagyine Szemko, Judith. Political State Secretary in the Ministry of Social and Family 
Affairs, 2000-2002. Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Education, 
1998-2000. 29 June 2001. 14 September 2001.
Stumpf, Istvan. Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office, 1998-2002. 20 June 2001. 25 
September 2002.
Suijan, Laszlo. Minister of National Welfare (KDNP), 1990-1994.14 June 2001.
Szabo, Zoltan. Political State Secretary in the Ministry of Culture and Education, 1995- 
1998. 20 April 2001.
Szalai, Erzsebet. Scientific Researcher at Institute of Political Science of the Hungarian 
Academy of Science. 30 August 2000.
Szalai, Tibor. Head of Human Resources Department, Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management, 1999-2002. April 2001.
Szalo, Peter. Deputy State Secretary for Regional Development in the Ministry of 
Environment, 1991-1998, and in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, 1998-2002. September 1999. 21 June 2000. 1 September 2000.
Szanto, Aniko. Journalist for Economic Policy issues at the weekly HVG. 20 June 2000.
Szente, Zoltan. Senior Research Fellow at Hungarian Institute of Public Administration. 
September 1999. August 2000.
Udvarvolgyi, Zsolt. Head of Foreign Affairs Secretary, Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SZDSZ). 13 September 2001.
Vadazs, Janos. President of the Union for Employees at Cultural Institutions in Hungary 
(KKDSZ). August 2000.
Vass, Laszlo. Professor of Political Science, University of Economics and Public 
Administration, Budapest. September 1999. 19 June 2000. 26 April 2001.
Verebelyi, Imre. Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, 1990-1994. 
Government Commissioner for Public Administration Reform, 1994-1998. Director 
of the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration, 1998-2001. September 1999. 14 
February 2001. 6 April 2001. 25 April 2001.
Zsinka, Andras. Head of Human Resources Department in the Ministry of Interior. 18 April 
2001.21 June 2001.
Zsuffa, Istvan. Administrative State Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, 1994-1998. 
September 1999. 13 February 2001.
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Selection of Documents
1990. Temporary Act XXXIII on State Secretaries. 1990.
1992. Act XXm on the Legal Status of Civil Servants.
1997. Act Cl on the amendment of the Act XXIII./1992 on the Legal Status of Civil 
Servants.
1997. Act LXXIX on the Legal Status of members of the Government and State Secretaries.
1997.
2001. Act XXXVI on the amendment of the Act XXHI./1992 on the Legal Status of Civil
Servants and of other Acts.
2002. Act XVm on the amendment of the Act XXm./1992 on the Legal Status of Civil
Servants.
51/1993. Government Decree on the Basic Examination Procedure.
112/1994. Government Decree on the Responsibilities of the Government Commissioner for 
the Modernisation of Public Administration.
35/1998. Government Decree on Special Examination Procedure.
183/1998. Government Decree. On the Establishment of the State Secretariat for Public 
Administration and Regional Policy.
199/1998. Government Decree on Further Training of Civil Servants and Management 
Training in Public Administration.
1100/1996. Government Decision on the Reform of Public Administration.
2039/1997. Government Resolution on 1997-1998 Governmental Action Plan Implementing 
the Reform of Public Administration.
1052/1999. Government Resolution on the Continued Development of Public 
Administration in 1999-2000.
1994. The Programme of the Government of the Republic of Hungary.
1996. Public Administration Reform Programme, Prime Minister’s Office.
1998. The Programme of the Government of the Republic of Hungary.
2000. Governance and Public Administration in Hungary. Edited and published by the Prime 
Minister's Office.
2002. The Hungarian Public Administration in the System of State Organs. Edited by the 
Office of the Prime Minister, State Secretariat for Public Administration and 
Regional Policy. Budapest. Manuscript unpublished.
367
References
Aberbach, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman. 1988. Image IV Revisted: Executive and Political 
Roles. Governance 1(1): 1-25.
Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman. 1981. Bureaucrats and 
Politicians in Western Democracies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Agh, Attila. 1991. The Year of Incomplete Changes. In Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve, 
eds. Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: Okonomia 
Alapitvany, 16-31.
Agh, Attila. 1992. The Year of Structural Stalemate. In Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve, 
eds. Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: Demokracia 
Kutatasok Magyar Kozpontja Alapitvany, 17-34.
Agh, Attila. 1994. The Year of Incertitude. In Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve, eds. 
Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: Demokracia Kutatasok 
Magyar Kozpontja Alapitvany, 16-37.
Agh, Attila. 1995. Partial Consolidation of the East-Central European Parties: The Case of 
the Hungarian Socialist Party. Party Politics 1(4): 491-514.
Agh, Attila. 1996. 1995 - Seeking Ways and Means. In Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve, 
eds. Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: Demokracia
Kutatasok Magyar Kozpontja Alapitvany, 16-31.
Agh, Attila. 1997a. Defeat and Success as Promoters of Party Change: The Hungarian 
Socialist Party after Two Abrupt Changes. Party Politics 3(3): 427-444.
Agh, Attila. 1997b. The Year of Midterm Conflicts. In Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve, 
eds. Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: Demokracia
Kutatasok Magyar Kozpontja Alapitvany, 21-37.
Agh, Attila. 1997c. Parliaments as Policy-Making Bodies in East Central Europe: The Case 
of Hungary. International Political Science Review 18(4): 417-432.
Agh, Attila. 1998. The Year of Early Consolidation. In Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve,
eds. Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: Demokracia
Kutatasok Magyar Kozpontja Alapitvany, 16-33.
Agh, Attila. 2001. Early Democratic Consolidation in Hungary and the Europeanisation of 
the Hungarian Polity. In Prospects of Democratic Consolidation in East-Central
368
Europe, eds. Geoffrey Pridham and Attila Agh. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 157-179.
Agh, Attila. 2002. The Reform of State Administration in Hungary: The Capacity of Core 
Ministries to Manage the Europeanisation. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint 
Meeting, March 2002. Turin/Italy.
Amsden, Alice H., Jacek Kochanowicz, and Lance Taylor. 1994. The Market Meets its 
Match: Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1985. The Economics of Agency. In Principals and Agents: The 
Structure of Business, eds. John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 37-50.
Auer, Astrid, Christoph Demmke, and Robert Polet. 1996. Civil Services in the Europe of 
Fifteen: Current Situation and Prospects. Maastricht: European Institute of Public 
Administration.
Baker, Randall, ed. 2002. Transitions from Authoritarianism: The Role of the Bureaucracy, 
Westport: Praeger.
Balazs, Istvan 1992. Public Administration in Hungary. In Public Administration in 
Hungary, ed. Hungarian Institute of Public Administration. Budapest: Hungarian 
Institute of Public Administration, 6-20.
Balazs, Istvan 1993. Creation of the Personal Conditions of the New Machinery of Public 
Administration. In Public Administration in Hungary, ed. Tamas M. Horvath, 
Budapest: Hungarian Institute of Public Administration, 54-67.
Balia, Steven J. 1998. Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy. 
American Political Science Review 92(3): 663-673.
Balia, Steven J., and John R. Wright. 2001. Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and 
Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy. American Journal of Political Science 
45(4): 799-812.
Banati, Ferenc. 1980. A fizetesek alakulasat befolyasolo tenyezok. In A Kozigazgatas 
szemelyi allomanya (Tanulmanyok az osszetetel, az anyagi es erkdlcsi megbecsules 
korebol, ed. Gyula Fonyo. Budapest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado, 325-335.
Bartlett, David L. 1997. The Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reform 
and Democratisation in Hungary. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Batory, Agnes. 2000. Hungarian Party Identities & The Question of European Integration. 
Brighton: Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 49.
Batory, Agnes. 2002. Attitudes to Europe: Ideology, Strategy and the Issue of European 
Union Membership in Hungarian Party Politics. Party Politics 8(5): 525-539.
369
Bawn, Kathleen. 1995. Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about 
Administrative Procedures. American Political Science Review 89: 62-73.
Bawn, Kathleen. 1997. Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory 
Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System. Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organisation 13: 101-126.
Bercik, Peter, and Juraj Nemec. 1999. The Civil Service System of the Slovak Republic. In 
Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Tony Verheijen. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 184-210.
Bihari, Mihahly. 1991. Change of Regime and Power in Hungary. In Magyarorszag 
Politikai Evkdnyve, eds. Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: 
Okonomia Alapitvany, 32-47.
Bimbaum, Pierre. 1982. The Heights of Power: An Essay on the Power Elite in France. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Bodiguel, Jean-Luc. 1983. A French-Style 'Spoils Systems'?. Public Administration 61: 295- 
300.
Borzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2000. When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and 
Domestic Change. Vienna: European Integration Online Papers No. 4, available at 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm>.
Bosseart, Danielle, Christoph Demmke, Koen Nomden, and Robert Polet. 2001. Civil 
Services in the Europe of Fifteen: Trends and New Developments. Maastricht: 
European Institute of Public Administration.
Bozhidarova, Vessela, Vesselina Kolcheva, and Rumiana Velinova. 1999. Politico- 
Administrative Relations in Bulgaria at Central Government Level. Paper presented 
at the NISPAcee Annual Conference, March 1999. Sofia/Bulgaria.
Bozoki, Andras. 1997. The Ideology of Modernisation and the Policy of Materialism: The 
Day after the Socialists. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 
13(3): 56-102.
Bozoki, Andras. 2001. Globalists vs. Localists: A Historic Debate, and the Position of the 
Left in Hungary. Central European Political Science Review 2(4): 175-199.
Calvert, Randall, Mark Moran, and Barry Weingast. 1987. Congressional Influence over 
Policy Making: The Case of the FTC. In Congress: Structure and Policy, eds. 
Mathew D. McCubbins, and Terry Sullivan. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 493-522.
Calvert, Randall, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry Weingast. 1989. A Theory of Political 
Control and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science 33: 588-611.
370
Campbell, Colin, and B. Guy Peters. 1988. The Politics/Administration Dichotomy: Death 
or Merely Change?. Governance 1(1): 79-99.
Campbell, Colin. 1988. Review Article: The Political Roles of Senior Government Officials 
in Advanced Democracies. British Journal of Political Science 18: 243-272.
Cardona, Francisco. 2000. Scope of Civil Services in European Countries: Trends and 
Developments. Paper presented at a Seminar at the European Institute of Public 
Administration, November 2000. Maastricht, available at SIGMA online: 
<http://www.oecd.Org//puma/sigmaweb/acts/civilservice/docs/scope.htm>.
Colomer, Josep M. 1995. Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe. Journal of 
Democracy 6(2): 74-85.
Colomer, Josep M., and Margot Pascual. 1994. The Polish Games of Transition. Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies 27(3): 275-294.
Csanadi, Maria. 1997. Party States and their Legacies in Post-communist Transformation. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Derlien, Hans-Ulrich. 1988. Repercussions of Government Change on the Career Civil 
Service in West Germany: The Cases of 1969 and 1982. Governance 1(1): 50-78.
Dimitrova, Antoaneta. 2003. Enlargement, Institution-Building, and the EU's Administrative 
Capacity Requirement. West European Politics 25(4): 171-190.
Doeringer, Peter B., and Michael J. Piore. 1971. Internal Labour Markets and Manpower 
Analysis. Lexington: Heath Lexington Books.
Downs, Anthony 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown.
Dunleavy, Patrick. 1991. Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic 
Explanations in Political Science. London: Harvester.
Duverger, Maurice. 1980. A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government. 
European Journal of Political Research 8(2): 165-187.
Eckstein, Harry. 1992. Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and 
Change. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Elgie, Robert C. 2001. France: Dual Structure, Shared Dilemma*. In The Changing World of 
Top Officials: Mandarins or Valets?, eds. R.A.W. Rhodes and Patrick M. Weller. 
Buckingham: Open University Press, 11-40.
Elgie, Robert C. ed. 1999. Semi-presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Elster, Jon, Claus Offe, and Ulrick K. Preuss. 1998. Institutional Design in Post-Communist 
Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Enyedi, Zsolt. 1996. Organising a Subcultural Party in Eastern Europe: The Case of the 
Hungarian Christian Democrats. Party Politics 2(3): 372-396.
371
Epstein, David, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1994. Administrative Procedures, Information, and 
Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science 38: 697-722.
Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost 
Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Evans, Peter B. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Fonyo, Gyula. ed. 1980. A Kozigazgatas szemelyi allomanya (Tanulmanyok az osszetetel, az 
anyagi es erkolcsi megbecsules korebol). Budapest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi 
Konyvkiado.
Fournier, Jacques. 1998. Administrative Reform in the Commission Opinions Concerning 
the Accession of the Central and Eastern European Countries to the European 
Union. In Preparing Public Administrations for the European Administrative Space, 
ed. SIGMA. Paris: SIGMA Papers No. 23, 110-118.
Fricz, Tamas. 1999. Democratisation, the Party System and the Electorate in Hungary. In 
Transition with Contradictions: The Case of Hungary 1990-1998, eds. Maria 
Schmidt and Laszlo Gy. Toth. Budapest: Kairosz Publishing, 93-124.
Gilligan, Thomas, and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. Collective Decision-Making and Standing 
Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures. 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 3: 287-335.
Gilligan, Thomas, and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. Collective Choice without Procedural 
Commitment. In Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, ed. Peter Ordeshook. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Goetz, Klaus H. 1995. Ein neuer Verwaltungstyp in Mittel- und Osteuropa? Zur 
Entwicklung der post-kommunistischen offentlichen Verwaltung. In Transformation 
sozialistischer Gesellschaften: Am Ende des Anfangs, eds. Hellmut Wollmann, 
Helmut Wiesenthal, and Frank Bonker. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 538-553.
Goetz, Klaus H. 1997. Acquiring Political Craft: Training Grounds for Top Officials in the 
German Core Executive. Public Administration 75: 753-775.
Goetz, Klaus H. 1999. Senior Officials in the German Federal Administration: Institutional 
Change and Positional Differentiation, hi Bureaucratic Elites in Western European 
States, eds. Edward C. Page and Vincent Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
147-177.
Goetz, Klaus H. 2000. European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of 
an Effect?. West European Politics 23 (4): 211-231.
372
Goetz, Klaus H. 2001. Making Sense of Post-communist Central Administration: 
Modernisation, Europeanization or Latinization?. Journal of European Public 
Policy 8(6): 1032-1051.
Goetz, Klaus H., and Helen Z. Margetts. 1999. The Solitary Center: The Core Executive in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Governance 12(4): 425-453.
Goetz, Klaus H., and Hellmut Wollmann. 2001. Govemmentalizing Central Executives in 
Post-communist Europe: A Four-Country Comparison. Journal of European Public 
Policy 8(6): 864-887.
Goetz, Klaus H., and Simon Hix. eds. 2000. Europeanised Politics? European Integration 
and National Political Systems. London: Frank Cass.
Grabbe, Heather. 2001. How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance: 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity. Journal of European Public Policy 8(6): 
1013-1031.
Greskovits, Bela. 2001. Brothers-in-Arms or Rivals in Politics? Top Politicians and Top 
Policy-Makers in the Hungarian Transformation. In Reforming the State: Fiscal and 
Welfare Reform in Post-Socialist Countries, eds. Janos Komai, Stephen Haggard 
and Robert R. Kaufman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 111-141.
Gyorgy, Istvan. 1999. The Civil Service System of Hungary. In Civil Service Systems in 
Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Tony Verheijen. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 131- 
158.
Hall, Peter A. 1993. Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State. Comparative Politics 
25(3): 275-296.
Hammond, Thomas H. 1986. Agenda Control, Organisational Structure, and Bureaucratic 
Politics. American Journal of Political Science 30: 379-420.
Hammond, Thomas H. 1996. Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance. 
Governance 9(2): 107-185.
Hammond, Thomas H., and Jack H. Knott. 1996. Who Controls the Bureaucracy? 
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic 
Autonomy in a Model of Multi-institutional Policy-Making. The Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organisation 12(1): 119-166.
Hammond, Thomas H., and Jeffrey S. Hill. 1993. Deference or Preference? Explaining 
Senate Confirmation of Presidential Nominees to Administrative Agencies. Journal 
of Theoretical Politics 5(1): 23-59.
Hayward, Jack, and Vincent Wright. 2002. Governing from the Centre: Core Executive Co­
ordination in France. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
373
Hesse, Joachim Jens, and Klaus H. Goetz. 1993/94. Public Sector Reform in Central and 
Eastern Europe I: The Case of Poland. Jahrbuch zur Staats- und
Verwaltungswissenschaft 6: 237-282.
Hesse, Joachim Jens. 1993. From Transition to Modernisation: Administrative Change in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Public Administration 71: 219-257.
Hesse, Joachim Jens. 1998. Rebuilding the State: Administrative Reform in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In Preparing Public Administration for the European 
Administrative Space, ed. SIGMA. Paris: SIGMA Papers No. 23,168-179.
Hood, Christopher. 2001. Public Service Bargains and Public Service Reform. In 
Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform, eds. B.Guy Peters and Jon 
Pierre. London: Routledge, 11-23.
Horn, Murray, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1989. Commentary on „Administrative Procedures, 
Information, and Agency Discretion44: Administrative Process and Organisational 
Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs. Virginia Law Review 75: 499-508.
Horn, Murray. 1995. The Political Economy of Public Administration, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Huber, John, and Arthur Lupia. 2001. Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary 
Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 45: 18-33.
Huber, John, and Charles Shipan. 2000. The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and 
Transaction Costs. Legislative Studies Quarterly 25(1): 25-52.
Huber, John, and Charles Shipan. 2002. Deliberate Discretion: Institutional Foundations of 
Bureaucratic Autonomy in Modem Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Huber, John. 2000. Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies. European 
Journal of Political Research 37(3): 397-413.
Ikenberry, G. John. 1994. History's Heavy Hand: Institutions and the Politics of the State. 
Paper presented at conference on The New Institutionalism, October 1994, 
University of Maryland.
Illisz, L. 1983. A szemelyzeti igazgatas korszeriisitesenek nehany kerdese a 
kozigazgatasban. Allam-es Igazgatas 33(2): 140-151.
Kajdi, Jozsef, Endre Marinovich, and Gyorgy Muller. 1994. A Antall es Boross-Kormany 
Tisztsegviseldi Almanachja. Budapest: A Miniszterelndki Hivatal Kiadasa.
Kellner, Peter, and Lord Crowther-Hunt. 1980. The Civil Servants: An Inquiry into Britain's 
Ruling Class, London: MacDonald and Janes.
374
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation: 
Congressional Parties and the Appropriation Process. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Kingdon, John W. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 2nd ed. New York: 
HarperCollins College Publishers.
Kiss, Elemer, Andras Toth, Gyorgy Muller, and Zoltan Lorant. eds. 1998. A Horn-Kormany 
Tisztsegviseloi Almanachja. Budapest: A Magyar Hivatalos Kozlonykiado Kiadasa.
Kiss, Elemer, Jozsef Nyeki, Antal Latkoczy, Sandor Kodela and Karoly Galambos. 1997. A 
Magyar Kozigazgatasi Lexikon 1996. Budapest: A Magyar Hivatalos Kozlonykiado 
vezerigazgatoja.
Kitschelt, Herbert, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gabor Toka. 1999. 
Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party 
Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Knapp, Andrew, and Vincent Wright. 2001. The Politics and Government of France. 4th ed. 
London: Routldege.
Knill, Christoph, and Dirk Lehmkuhl. 1999. How Europe Matters: Different Mechanisms of 
Europeanization. European Integration Online Papers No 3, available at 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-007a.htm>.
Konig, Klaus. 1992. The Transformation of a ‘Real Socialist’ Administrative System into a 
Conventional West European System. International Review of Administrative 
Sciences 58: 147-161.
Konig, Klaus. 1999. Verwaltungsstaat im Ubergang: Transformation, Entwicklung, 
Modernisierung. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Komai, Janos. 1992. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press and Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Korosenyi, Andras. 1996. Demokracia es patronazs. Politikusok es koztisztviselok viszonya. 
Politikatudomanyi szemle 5(4): 35-62.
Korosenyi, Andras. 1997. A kozigazgatas politikai iranyitasa es a patronazs. Valosag 
40(12): 46-71.
Korosenyi, Andras. 1999. Government and Politics in Hungary. Budapest: Central European 
University Press.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organisation. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press.
Kulcsar, Laszlo. 1980. Az allamigazgatasi dolgozok szemelyi allomanyanak es anyagi- 
erkolcsi osztonzorendszerenek szociologiai vizsgalata (zarotanulmany). In A 
Kozigazgatas szemelyi allomanya (Tanulmanyok az osszetetel, az anyagi es erkolcsi
375
megbecsules korebol, ed. Gyula Fonyo. Budapest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi 
Konyvkiado, 239-312.
Lane, Jan.-Erik. 2001. Introduction: Switzerland - Key Institutions and Behavioural 
Outcomes. West European Politics 24(2): 1-18.
Lengyel, Laszlo. 1995. Nineteen-Ninety Four (Dawn or Sunset). In Magyarorszag Politikai 
Evkdnyve, eds. Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: 
Demokracia Kutatasok Magyar Kozpontja Alapitvany, 45-57.
Liegl, Barbara, and Wolfgang C. Muller. 1999. Senior Officials in Austria. In Bureaucratic 
Elites in Western European States, eds. Edward C. Page and Vincent Wright. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 90-120.
Lijphart, Arend. ed. 1992. Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. 
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
Lippert, Barbara, Gaby Umbach, and Wolfgang Wessels. 2001. Europeanization of CEE 
Executives: EU Membership Negotiations as a Shaping Power. Journal of
European Public Policy 8(6): 980-1012.
Lokkos, Janos. 1980. A kozigazgatas szemelyi allomanyanak osszetetele es anyagi-erkolcsi 
osztonzorendszere (zarotanulmany). In A Kozigazgatas szemelyi allomanya 
(Tanulmanyok az osszetetel, az anyagi es erkdlcsi megbecsules korebol), ed. Gyula 
Fonyo. Budapest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado, 159-194.
Lorincz, Lajos. 1982. Karrierrendszer a koziggazgatasban. Jogtudomanyi Kozlony 3: 161- 
169.
Lorincz, Lajos. 1983. Career System in the Public Administration. Acta Juridica - 
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 25: 371-385.
Lorincz, Lajos. 1985a. On the Economic and Political Determinants of Public 
Administration. In Politics and Public Administration in Hungary, ed. Gyorgy 
Szoboszlai. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado.
Lorincz, Lajos. 1985b. L’etat actuel de l'administration en Hongrie et les tendances de son 
development. Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 27: 75-110.
Lorincz, Lajos. 1988. Modernization and Reform in Public Administration. Acta Juridica - 
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 30: 27-43.
Lorincz, Lajos. 1998. Administrative Law. In Introduction to Hungarian Law, ed. A. 
Harmathy. The Hague: Kluwer, 39-50.
376
Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1994. Designing Bureaucratic Accountability. 
Law and Contemporary Problems 57(1): 91-126.
Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2000. Representation or Abdication? How 
Citizens Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed. European Journal of Political 
Research 37(3): 291-307.
Mair, Peter. 1997. Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: 
Clarendon.
Markowski, Radoslaw. 1997. Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in East Central 
Europe. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30(3): 221-254.
Markus, Gyorgy. 1999a. Hungarian Cleavages and Parties prior to 1989. In Cleavages, 
Parties, and Voters: Studies from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Romania, eds. Kay Lawson, Andrea Rommele, and Georgi Karasimeonov. 
Westport: Praeger, 61-76.
Markus, Gyorgy. 1999b. Cleavages and Parties in Hungary after 1989. In Cleavages, 
Parties, and Voters: Studies from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Romania, eds. Kay Lawson, Andrea Rommele, and Georgi Karasimeonov. 
Westport: Praeger, 141-157.
Mayntz, Renate, and Fritz W. Scharpf. 1975. Policy-making in the German Federal 
Bureaucracy. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Mayntz, Renate, and Hans-Ulrich Derlien. 1989. Party Patronage and Politicisation of the 
West German Administrative Elite 1970-1987. Governance 2(4): 384-404.
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Talbot Page. 1987. A Theory of Congressional Delegation. In 
Congress: Structure and Policy, eds. Mathew D. McCubbins, and Terry Sullivan. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 409-425.
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrol versus Fire Alarm. American Journal of Political Science 28: 167-179.
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. Administrative Procedures 
as Instruments of Political Control. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 3: 
243-77.
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1989. Structure and Process, 
Policy and Politics: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of 
Agencies. Virginia Law Review, 75: 431-82.
Merkel, Wolfgang. 1999. Systemtransformation: Eine Einfuhrung in die Theorie and 
Empirie der Transformationsforschung. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik. 2001a. Methodological Frameworks for the Study of Politico- 
administrative Relations and their Applicability in Post-communist Settings. In
377
Politico-Administrative Relations: Who Rules?, ed. Tony Verheijen. Bratislava: 
NISPAcee, 45-63.
Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik. 2001b. Getting on Track: Civil Service Reform in Post- 
communist Hungary. Journal of European Public Policy 8(6): 960-979.
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organisation and Management.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Miller, Gary. 1992. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moe, Terry M. 1984. The New Economics of Organisation. American Journal of Political 
Science 28: 739-777.
Moe, Terry M. 1987. An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance.
Legislative Studies Quarterly 12: 475-520.
Moe, Terry M. 1989. The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure. In Can the Government 
Govern?, eds. John Chubb, and Paul Peterson. Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution, 267-321.
Moe, Terry M. 1990a. The Politics of Structural Choice: Towards a Theory of Public 
Bureaucracy. In Organisation Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and 
Beyond, ed. Oliver E. Williamson. New York: Oxford University Press, 116-153. 
Moe, Terry M. 1990b. Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organisation 6: 213-253.
Moe, Terry M., and Caldwell, Michael. 1994. The Institutional Foundations of Democratic 
Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems. Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 171-195.
Nelson, Joan M. ed. 1994. Intricate Links: Democratisation and Market Reforms in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Nikolova, Krassimira. 1998. The Framework for Public Management Reform in Bulgaria: A 
View from the Inside. In Innovations in Public Management: Perspectives from 
East and West Europe, eds. Tony Verheijen, and David Coombes. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 59-102.
Niskanen, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine. 
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. 1992. Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic Performance. 
Panama City: International Centre for Economic Growth, Occasional Paper No. 30.
378
North, Douglass C., and Barry Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: The 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England. St. 
Louis: Washington University Political Economy Working Paper No. 129.
Nunberg, Barbara. 2000. Ready for Europe: Public Administration Reform and European 
Union Accession in Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: The World Bank 
Technical Paper No. 466.
Nunberg, Barbara, ed. 1999. The State After Communism: Administrative Transitions in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. Delegative Democracy. Journal of Democracy 5(1): 55-69.
O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Phillippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press.
Offe, Claus. 1991. Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory facing the Triple 
Transition in East Central Europe. Social Research 58(4): 865-892.
Offe, Claus. 1995. Designing Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. In The Theory of 
Institutional Design, ed. Robert E. Goodin. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 199-226.
Page, Edward C. 1992. Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power: A Comparative 
Analysis. Hempel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Page, Edward C., and Vincent Wright. 1999. Conclusion: Senior Officials in Western 
Europe. In Bureaucratic Elites in Western European States, eds. idem. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 266-279.
Peters, B. Guy, and R.A.W. Rhodes, and Vincent Wright, eds. 1999. Administering the 
Summit: Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries. Basingstoke: 
Macmillian and New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Peters, B. Guy. 2001. The Politics of Bureaucracy. 5th ed. London: Routledge.
Pollack, Mark. 2002. Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the 
Study of Delegation. West European Politics 25(1): 200-219.
Pratt, John W., and Richard J. Zeckhauser. 1985. Principals and Agents: The Structure of 
Business. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Raadschelders, J.C.N., and M.R. Rutgers. 1996. The Evolution of Civil Service Systems. Li 
Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective, eds. Hans A.G.M. Bekke, James 
L. Perry, and Theo A.J. Toonen. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 67-99.
Racz, Barnabas, and Istvan Kukorelli. 1995. The ’Second-Generation’ Post-communist 
Elections in Hungary in 1994. Europe-Asia Studies 47(2): 251-279.
379
Radaelli, Claudio M. 2000. Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive 
Change. Vienna: European Integration Online Papers No. 4, available at 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm>.
Ramseyer, J. Mark, and Frances M. Rosenbluth. 1993. Japan’s Political Market Place. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rhodes, R.A.W. 2001. United Kingdom: 'Everybody but Us'. In The Changing World of Top 
Officials: Mandarins or Valets?, eds. R.A.W. Rhodes, and Patrick M. Weller. 
Buckingham: Open University Press, 111-151.
Richards, David. 1996. Appointments to the Highest Grades in the Civil Service - Drawing 
the Curtain Open. Public Administration 74: 657-677.
Romsics, Istvan. 1999. Hungary in the Twentieth Century. Budapest: Corvina Books and 
Osiris Kiado.
Roots, Harry, and Natalia Karotom. 2002. Soviet Administration in Estonia: Continuity and 
Shifts in Attitudes in the Course of Reform. In Transitions from Authoritarianism: 
The Role of the Bureaucracy, ed. Randall Baker. Westport: Praeger, 65-84.
Rouban, Luc. 1999. The Senior Civil Service in France. In Bureaucratic Elites in Western 
European States, eds. Edward C. Page, and Vincent Wright. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 65-89.
Rouban, Luc. ed. 1998. Special Edition of Revue Franqaise d\Administration Publique on 
the Politicisation of the Civil Service.
Sakozy, Tamas. 1996. Kormayzas a "politika" es a "szakma" iitkozespontjaban (Governance: 
The Buffer between Politics and Expertise). In Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve, 
eds. Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: Demokracia 
Kutatasok Magyar Kozpontja Alapitvany, 193-208.
Sandor, Peter, and Laszlo Kodela. 1992. A Magyar Koztarsasag Allami Vezetoi (State 
Executives of the Republic of Hungary in 1991. In Magyarorszag Politikai 
Evkdnyve, eds. Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: 
Demokracia Kutatasok Magyar Kozpontja Alapitvany, 179-194.
Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Vol. 1. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1994. Community and Autonomy: Multi-Level Policy-Making in the 
European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 1: 219-242.
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2002. The Europeanisation of Eastern 
Europe: Evaluating the Conditionality Model. Manuscript unpublished.
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2002. The Futures of European Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
380
Schnapp, Kai-Uwe. 2000. Ministerial Bureaucracies as Stand-In Agenda Setters? A 
Comparative Description. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung 
(WZB), Discussion Paper FS IQ 00-204.
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1986. Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions. Political 
Science: The Science of Politics, ed. Herbert F. Weisberg. New York: Agathon 
Press, 51-81.
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1989. Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice 
Approach. Journal of Theoretical Politics 1(2): 131-147.
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1991. Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government 
Commitment. In Social Theory for a Changing Society, eds. Pierre Bourdieu and 
James S. Coleman. Boulder: Westview Press and New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 245-262.
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1992. Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A 
Comment on Macey. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 8: 111-118.
SIGMA. 1999. European Principles for Public Administration. Paris: SIGMA Papers No. 
27.
Silberman, Bernard S. 1993. Cages of Reason: 'The Rise of the Rational State in France, 
Japan, the United State, and Great Britain. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press.
Smith, Gordon. 1989. A System Perspective on Party System Change. Journal of Theoretical 
Politics 1(3): 349-363.
Sootla, Georg, and Harry Roots. 1999. The Civil Service System in the Republic of Estonia. 
In Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Tony Verheijen. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,. 235-266.
Sootla, Georg. 2002. Creating a New Civil Service on the Ruins of the Soviet Bureaucracy: 
When Ideologies Meet Realities. In Transitions from Authoritarianism: The Role of 
the Bureaucracy, ed. Randall Baker. Westport: Praeger, 27-46.
Spence, David. 1999. Agency Discretion and the Dynamics of Procedural Reform. Public 
Administration Review 59: 425-442.
Strmecki, Mik. 2002. Transition in Slovenia from a Comparative Perspective. In Transitions 
from Authoritarianism: The Role of the Bureaucracy, ed. Randall Baker. Westport: 
Praeger, 127-132.
Strom, Kaare. 2000. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. 
European Journal of Political Research 37(3): 261-289.
Stumpf, Istvan, and Bela Bartfai. 1999. A Magyar Kozigazgatasi Lexikon 2000. Budapest: A 
Magyar Hivatalos Kozlonykiado vezerigazgatoja.
381
Stumpf, Istvan. 1999. Kormanyzasvaltas 1998-ban (Governance Change in 1998). In 
Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve (Political Yearbook of Hungary), eds. Sandor 
Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: Demokracia Kutatasok Magyar 
Kozpontja Alapitvany, 324-335.
Szalai, Erzsebet. 1999. Post-Socialism and Globalisation. Budapest: Uj Mandatum 
Konyvkiado.
Szamel, Lajos. 1980. Az allamigazgatasi dolgozok fogalma es jogallasuk szabalyozasa. In A 
Kozigazgatas szemelyi allomanya (Tanulmanyok az osszetetel, az anyagi es erkdlcsi 
megbecsules korebol), ed. Gyula Fonyo. Budapest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi 
Konyvkiado, 19-76.
Szente, Zoltan. 1999. Kozigazgatas es politika metszespontjan: a miniszterek es az 
allamtitkarok rekrutacioja Magyarorszagon, 1990-1998. Szazadveg 13(Summer): 3- 
52.
Szocs, Laszlo. 1998. A Tale of the Unexpected: The Extreme Right vis-a-vis Democracy in 
Post-Communist Hungary. Ethnic and Racial Studies 21(6): 1096-1115.
Thatcher, Mark., and Alec Stone-Sweet. 2002. Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non- 
Majoritarian Institutions. West European Politics 25(1) 1-22.
Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. Annual Review 
of Political Science 2: 369-404.
Torres-Bartyzel, Claudia, and Grazyna Kacprowicz. 1999. The National Civil Service 
System in Poland. In Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Tony 
Verheijen. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 159-183.
Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision-making in Political Systems: Veto Players in 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism. British 
Journal of Political Science 25: 289-326.
Tsebelis, George. 2000. Veto Players and Institutional Analysis. Governance 13(4): 441- 
474.
Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press and New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Vanagunas, Stanley. 1999. The Civil Service Reform in the Baltics. In Civil Service 
Systems in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Tony Verheijen. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 213-234.
Vass, Laszlo. 2001a. Civil Service Development and Politico-administrative Relations in 
Hungary. In Politico-Administrative Relations: Who Rules?, ed. Tony Verheijen. 
Bratislava: NISPAcee, 147-174.
382
Vass, Laszlo. 2001b. Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform in Hungary: Who 
Stops Whom?. In Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform, eds. B. Guy 
Peters, and Jon Pierre. London: Routledge, 83-92.
Velinova, Rumiana, Vessela Bozhidarova, and Vesselina Kolcheva. 2001. Politico- 
administrative Relations in Bulgaria. In Politico-Administrative Relations: Who 
Rules?, ed. Tony Verheijen. Bratislava: NISPAcee, 64-85.
Verebelyi, Imre. 1993. Options for Administrative Reform in Hungary. Public 
Administration 71: 105-120.
Verheijen, Tony, and Aleksandra Rabrenovic. 1999. Politico-administrative Relations in 
Central and Eastern Europe: An Irresolvable Stalemate?. Paper presented at the 
NISPAcee Annual Conference, March 1999. Sofia/Bulgaria.
Verheijen, Tony, and Aleksandra Rabrenovic. 2001. The Evolution of Politico- 
administrative Relations in Post-communist States: Main Directions. In Politico- 
Administrative Relations: Who Rules?, ed. Tony Verheijen. Bratislava: NISPAcee, 
410-426.
Verheijen, Tony. 1999b. Conclusions. In Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern 
Europe, ed. idem. CheltenhamNorthampton: Edward Elgar, 327-338.
Verheijen, Tony. 1999c. The Civil Service System of Bulgaria: Hope on the Horizon. In 
Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. idem. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 92-130.
Verheijen, Tony. 2000. Administrative Capacity Development: A Race Against Time?. The 
Hague: Scientific Council for Government Policy, Working Documents No. 107.
Verheijen, Tony. ed. 1999a. Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Verheijen, Tony. ed. 2001. Politico-Administrative Relations: Who Rules?. Bratislava: 
NISPAcee.
Vidlakova, Olga. 2001. Politico-administrative Relations in the Czech Republic. In Politico- 
administrative Relations: Who Rules?, ed. Tony Verheijen. Bratislava: NISPAcee, 
86-108.
Weber, Max. (1980) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der Verstehenden Soziologie. 
5th Ed. Edited by Johannes Winkelmann. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Weingast, Barry, and Mark Moran. 1983. Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? 
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political 
Economy 91: 775-800.
383
Wiatr, Jerzy J. 1996. Dilemmas of Reorganising the Bureaucracy in Poland during 
Democratic Transformation. In Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality, eds. 
Haile K. Asmerom, and Elisa P. Reis. London: Macmillan, 144-154.
Wiesenthal, Helmut. 1996. Contingencies of Institutional Reform: Reflections on Rule 
Change, Collective Actors, And Political Governance in Post-Socialist 
Democracies, Berlin: Max-Planck Gesellschaft, Arbeitspapiere AG TRAP 96/10.
Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. 
New York: Free Press.
Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press
Wise, L. 1996. Internal Labour Markets. In Civil Service Systems in Comparative 
Perspective, eds. Hans A.G.M. Bekke, James L. Perry, and Theo A.J. Toonen. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 100-118.
Wood, B.Dan, and Richard J. Waterman, W. 1991. The Dynamics of Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy. American Political Science Review 85: 801-828.
Zavecz, Tibor. 1997. Harman as elen - partpreferenciak 1996-ban (Three on the Top - Party 
Preferences in 1996). In Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve, eds. Sandor Kurtan, 
Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: Demokracia Kutatasok Magyar Kozpontja 
Alapitvany, 642-650.
Zavecz, Tibor. 1998. Atrendezodott elmezony - partpreferenciak 1997-ban (Changes on the 
Top: Party Preferences in 1997). In Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve, eds. Sandor 
Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo Vass. Budapest: Demokracia Kutatasok Magyar 
Kozpontja Alapitvany, 800-807.
Zavecz, Tibor. 1999. Ket part versenye as elsosegert (Two Parties Compete for Victory). In 
Magyarorszag Politikai Evkdnyve, eds. Sandor Kurtan, Peter Sandor and Laszlo 
Vass. Budapest: Demokracia Kutatasok Magyar Kozpontja Alapitvany, 696-706.
Zsuffa, Istvan. 1998. Transitory Rules of the Act Governing the Legal Status of Public 
Administration Officials. Paris: SIGMA Working paper No.
384
